

IMISCOE Research Series

Olena Fedyuk
Marta Kindler *Editors*

Ukrainian Migration to the European Union

Lessons from Migration Studies

IMISCOE



Springer Open

IMISCOE Research Series

This series is the official book series of IMISCOE, the largest network of excellence on migration and diversity in the world. It comprises publications which present empirical and theoretical research on different aspects of international migration. The authors are all specialists, and the publications a rich source of information for researchers and others involved in international migration studies.

The series is published under the editorial supervision of the IMISCOE Editorial Committee which includes leading scholars from all over Europe. The series, which contains more than eighty titles already, is internationally peer reviewed which ensures that the book published in this series continue to present excellent academic standards and scholarly quality. Most of the books are available open access.

For information on how to submit a book proposal, please visit: <http://www.imiscoe.org/publications/how-to-submit-a-book-proposal>.

More information about this series at <http://www.springer.com/series/13502>

Olena Fedyuk • Marta Kindler
Editors

Ukrainian Migration to the European Union

Lessons from Migration Studies



Springer Open



**CENTRE OF
MIGRATION
RESEARCH**

Editors

Olena Fedyuk
Marie Curie Changing Employment ITN
University of Strathclyde
Glasgow, UK

Marta Kindler
Centre of Migration Research
University of Warsaw
Warsaw, Poland

ISSN 2364-4087

ISSN 2364-4095 (electronic)

IMISCOE Research Series

ISBN 978-3-319-41774-5

ISBN 978-3-319-41776-9 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-41776-9

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016953852

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016. This book is published open access.

Open Access This book is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, duplication, adaptation, distribution, and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this book are included in the work's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included in the work's Creative Commons license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory regulation, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or reproduce the material.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made.

Printed on acid-free paper

This Springer imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG Switzerland

Foreword and Acknowledgements

This book is the result of a collective activity. Beneath the visible road signs of editors, authors and titles, there lies a collective history of scholarship and collaboration. This book is the outcome of five years of cooperation by international scholars and experts under the aegis of the International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion in Europe (IMISCOE) research cluster “Ukrainian migration to the European Union”. Several workshops preceded the publication of this book, starting with one on the current state of research on Ukrainian migration to the EU which took place during the 2011 IMISCOE annual conference.

Our interest in Ukrainian migration has different roots, but there are some common traits as well, particularly curiosity about mobility within Europe beyond the EU border zone. Additionally, both editors have experienced migration to the EU and overseas and have written doctoral theses, one at the Central European University and the other at the European University Viadrina, about Ukrainian women migrating to the domestic work sectors in Italy and in Poland.

As the editors of the book, we would like to thank the institutions that have supported its publication financially: the IMISCOE Research Network, the Centre of Migration Research at the University of Warsaw and the Marie Curie *Changing Employment* Initial Training Network.

We thank all the contributors of this book for their patience and diligence during multiple rounds of revisions. For thoughtful comments on drafts of chapters, we are grateful to colleagues from the Centre of Migration Research. We are also thankful to the anonymous referees who have evaluated this manuscript. Finally, our thanks go to Keith Povey who has done an incredible language-editing job on the manuscript.

Warsaw, Poland
Glasgow, UK

Marta Kindler
Olena Fedyuk

Contents

1	Migration of Ukrainians to the European Union: Background and Key Issues	1
	Olena Fedyuk and Marta Kindler	
Part I Continuities and Changes in Ukrainian Migration: An Analytical Review of Literature		
2	Ukrainian Migration Research Before and Since 1991	17
	Bastian Vollmer and Olena Malynovska	
3	Economic Aspects of Ukrainian Migration to EU Countries.....	35
	Olga Kupets	
4	Regulating Movement of the Very Mobile: Selected Legal and Policy Aspects of Ukrainian Migration to EU Countries.....	51
	Monika Szulecka	
5	The Gender Perspective in Ukrainian Migration	73
	Olena Fedyuk	
6	The Temporary Nature of Ukrainian Migration: Definitions, Determinants and Consequences.....	91
	Agata Górny and Marta Kindler	
Part II Ukrainian Migration to Selected EU Countries: Facts, Figures and the State of Literature		
7	Ukrainian Migration to Poland: A “Local” Mobility?	115
	Zuzanna Brunarska, Marta Kindler, Monika Szulecka, and Sabina Toruńczyk-Ruiz	

8	Ukrainians in the Czech Republic: On the Pathway from Temporary Foreign Workers to One of the Largest Minority Groups	133
	Yana Leontiyeva	
9	Ukrainian Migration to Greece: from Irregular Work to Settlement, Family Reunification and Return.....	151
	Marina Nikolova and Michaela Marouf	
10	Migration of Ukrainian Nationals to Italy: Women on the Move.....	163
	Francesca Alice Vianello	
11	Migration of Ukrainian Nationals to Portugal: The Visibility of a New Migration Landscape	179
	Maria Lucinda Fonseca and Sónia Pereira	
12	Research on Ukrainian Migration to Spain: Moving Beyond the Exploratory Approach.....	193
	Mikołaj Stanek, Renáta Hosnedlová, and Elisa Brey	
13	Theorizing the Ukrainian Case: Pushing the Boundaries of Migration Studies Through a Europe–US Comparison.....	215
	Cinzia D. Solari	
	Index.....	229

Chapter 1

Migration of Ukrainians to the European Union: Background and Key Issues

Olena Fedyuk and Marta Kindler

1.1 Introduction

Ukrainians form one of the largest groups of all third-country nationals living and working in the European Union (EU), yet in the contemporary research environment, their migration to the EU goes unnoticed, and Ukrainians are seen mainly as one of the “migrant groups” in studies concerning Central and Eastern European migrants. Why has this subject been studied so little? Or has it been studied, but without stirring wider public or political interest? This volume brings together a team of scholars from a range of disciplines to trace the dynamics of Ukrainian migration and its research over the last three decades and to provide a comprehensive overview of the available literature on Ukrainian migration to the EU.

Ukrainian migration to the EU is interesting for contemporary migration studies for four reasons. First, it is the largest of all post-USSR migratory movements to the EU and thus a trend-setter for migrants from the post-Soviet space, who use their experience of the Soviet past as a form of social capital in migration. Second, with over 300,000 first residence permits issued to nationals of Ukraine in 2014,¹ they provide a valuable case for comparative studies of third-country nationals’ mobility across the EU, as well as across a great variety of occupational and legal statuses. Third, Ukrainian migration responds keenly to the gendered demand of particular labour sectors in the receiving countries; migrations from Ukraine are highly feminized in some cases, and in others the gender ratio is more or less equal. Analysis of the emergence and development of these gendered migration streams opens up a

¹http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Residence_permits_statistics

O. Fedyuk (✉)

Marie Curie Changing Employment ITN, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK

e-mail: olena.fedyuk@strath.ac.uk

M. Kindler

Centre of Migration Research, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland

e-mail: marta.kindler@uw.edu.pl

very important perspective on a larger debate of precariousness and gendering of work in the EU. Finally, migrants from Ukraine engage in a wide range of transnational practices. All these aspects justify the need for an in-depth and more systematized look at up-to-date knowledge of these complex migrations.

Ukraine provides a rich case study to explore how geopolitical changes in Europe change and shape migration. The raising of the Iron Curtain in the early 1990s opened a new chapter in the mobility of Ukrainian nationals, marked by the ability to leave the country and return, a right denied to citizens of the Soviet era. Ukraine's geopolitical role has been further determined by its location between the EU's eastern border and Russia, and on the route of several important gas pipelines connecting Russia and the EU. Over the last 25 years it has been a country of turbulent transformations, with social developments resulting not only in the overthrow of governments and changes of leadership but also in the creation of new groups of precarious and marginalized people unable to pursue their professional and economic activities in Ukraine. This has led to a variety of individual histories and mobility flows that are constantly changing in the face of contemporary political and economic factors. Thus the military action that started in 2014 in the east of Ukraine and the breakaway of Luhansk and Donetsk regions, as well as a dramatic political and economic reallocation of resources following the Maidan protests of 2014, is likely to lead to a reconfiguration of economic and humanitarian migration. Understanding these processes in a historical context, and linking past and current forms of mobility makes the state-of-the-art form of this volume a fruitful and timely exercise.

Ukrainian migration did not begin with the emergence of the independent Ukrainian state in 1991. It is rooted in pre-World War I migrations from the territories of present-day Ukraine, and is influenced by the experience of the massive Soviet-era forced relocations of populations, labour migration and movements for socialist projects (such as the construction of the power plants in the east of Ukraine or the cultivation of the Virgin Lands in Russia). Ukrainian migration research uses the term “fourth-wave migration”, to describe economically driven migration from post-independence Ukraine. The term, hardly familiar among researchers outside Ukraine, has an important symbolic role, not only in the positioning of recent migration in the historical and political context of the last two centuries, but also in the nation-state-building project of independent Ukraine. To understand the latter, it is necessary to look at the proposed classification in more detail. The first wave is identified as the movements of the rural population that started in the last decades of the twentieth century and lasted until World War I. In response to the political and economic oppression experienced by the Ukrainian population under Russian and Austro-Hungarian imperial rule, large numbers from Eastern Ukraine migrated to Siberia and the Altai, while those from Western Ukraine went to the Americas (particularly the USA, Canada, Argentina and Brazil) (Lopukh 2006).

Similar directions of migration occurred in the second wave in the inter-war period, and the third wave includes post-World War II and the socialist mobilization projects of the 1950s and 1960s (Shybko et al. 2006). This wave classification occupies a prominent position in Diaspora Studies (Wolowyna 2013; 2010), which often

identify the reasons for the first three waves of migration in the political turmoil and oppression of the relevant period. The beginning of the fourth wave of migration – labour migration – is attributed by Shybko et al. (2006) to the socio-economic changes that occurred in Ukrainian society after 1991, such as restructuring of the post-Soviet economy and labour markets, the significant rise in unemployment, long delays in payments of salaries, and currency and wage inflation. What distinguishes the first three waves is that they are described as politically driven, while the fourth one is economic and social in nature.

The “four waves” perspective poses a number of controversies. It not only depoliticizes the events that followed Ukrainian independence, reducing them to simple economic transformations, but it also omits the history of economically driven migration by individual workers and groups (Bedezir 2001; Černík 2006) throughout the Soviet era. Such were, for example, the seasonal and other forms of circular migration of the 1970s and 1980s to oil-rich regions of the USSR, the main purpose of which was to increase the consumption power of individuals and households. The “historical wave” approach is part of an important state-building political exercise that involves migration research in the rewriting of Ukrainian history following decades of Soviet ideological domination. In our view, the “four waves” approach provides an important historical perspective that stretches across the emergence and dissolution of the state’s borders and migration regimes, notably the division of Ukrainian territory between Poland, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Romania and, of course, the Soviet Union. However, in selectively elevating certain population movements over others, the “four waves” represents an ideological construction of migration research that ignores the Ukrainian population’s high level of mobility during the Soviet era. The symbolic importance of this perspective has inspired the methodological approach in this volume – mapping the research analyzing migration and the ideologically informed agendas that have shaped it in different national and disciplinary arenas.

1.2 Placing Ukrainian Migration Research in a Broader Context

Contextualizing migration to the EU in the larger picture of migration from Ukraine, it is important to note that estimates of the number of Ukrainians worldwide differ greatly. The major difference lies in the way Ukrainian migrants are defined in Russia. Data from 2002, where the country of birth is the defining criterion, give the number of Ukrainians in Russia as 3,559,975, which accounts for 66.7% of Ukrainians living in the major destination countries (5,335,840 in total, *circa* 2012; MPC 2013). In 2010 the nationality criterion used by Russian statistics shows 93,390 Ukrainian residents. In this case the total size of the migrant population in major receiving countries drops to 1,869,255 persons, leaving Russia with 5% of the total stock while the USA becomes the top destination country hosting 18.8% of

Ukrainians living abroad (351,793 persons), followed by Poland with 12.2% (227,446 persons). The USA gains even more significance when self-identification, rather than place of birth or nationality, are considered. Throughout the 1980s there were 716,780 persons declaring Ukrainian ancestry living in the USA. Their number increased by 29% in the 2000s to reach 931,297 in 2010, constituting 0.3% of the total US population.² The declared ethnic origin criterion puts Canada third largest in the world, after Ukraine and Russia, in terms of Ukrainian population. According to the 2011 National Household Survey (NHS), Ukrainian Canadians number 1,251,170 (3.7% of the country's population) and are mainly Canadian-born citizens. Ukrainian Canadians are the ninth-largest ethnic group in Canada. Meanwhile, Ukrainian emigration stocks in Canada were equal to 59,460 persons in 2006, ranking them far below the USA and Israel (258,793 in 2005) (MPC 2013, table 1). The EU as a whole, with over one million Ukrainians (1,052,184) when defined according to country of birth, has a share of 19.7%, while when defined according to country of nationality – 56.3%.

The two current main destinations for Ukrainian migration are the EU and the Russian Federation. By 2013 third-country nationals constituted 4% (20.4 million) of the total EU population. Ukrainians rank top among non-EU citizens, with 303,000 first residence permits in 2014. The most common reason for third-country nationals entering the EU is family (family reunion or formation), with the highest numbers of permits issued in Italy and Spain, and the second is education, with the UK leading. These permits are in general easier to access than labour migration permits. However, Ukrainians stand out from this picture, with employment-related permits (issued to 206,000 persons) the main category of entry and Poland (81% of all Ukrainians receiving permits in 2014) the main destination country with approximately 30% more than in 2013.³ It is also important to note that in 2014, the largest increase relative to 2013 among the 30 main citizenship groups of asylum applicants in the EU28 was recorded for Ukrainians.

Contemporary migration of Ukrainian nationals to the European Union began in the mid-1990s (although statistics did not reflect this until the early 2000s) with migration to the countries of Southern Europe – Italy, Spain and Portugal – but also to countries in Western Europe with a historical legacy of migration, such as Germany. Ukrainians were migrating in the early 1990s to Central and Eastern Europe (mainly Poland and Czech Republic), but these countries were not EU member states at the time. Unlike the temporary stay (less than a year) that used to characterize migration within Central and Eastern Europe, the temporal character of migration to Southern Europe began to include uninterrupted stays of 2 years or more. It also started to involve further mobility within the European Union, as Ukrainian nationals entered one country in order to move to another, without returning to Ukraine. Since 2008, migrants have tended to choose labour markets that have been less affected by the economic crisis and those that view migrant workers

²<http://navihator.net/articles/view/id/128>;

<http://www.inform-decisions.com/stat/index.php?r=immig/verimmig>

³http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Residence_permits_statistics

from Ukraine favourably. Very little return from EU countries has been registered among Ukrainian migrants (see Chaps. 10, 11 and 12).

Among important EU destination countries for Ukrainian migrants, Germany stands out with its profile due to large ethnic resettlement programmes. Of the top twenty foreign populations in Germany in 2011, Ukrainian nationals with a residence permit ranked twelfth with a total of 124,293 (BMI 2011). There were also about 205,000 German nationals with a Ukrainian immigration background in 2011 (Destatis 2012), who were largely ethnic German resettlers or Jewish migrants from Ukraine. The biggest growth in ethnic German resettlers took place between 1991 and 2004, amounting to an average of 3000 newly arrived people per year (Bpb 2011). Initially family members amounted to 20–30% of all repatriates from Ukraine (BMI 2004; BMI 2013, Wirz unpublished). Currently, the next most significant reason for Ukrainian migration to Germany in terms of numbers is family reunification (BAMF 2012a). 1441 Ukrainian labour migrants with a work permit entered Germany in 2011 (BAMF 2012a). Additionally, the majority of au pairs from CIS countries in Germany come from Ukraine; there were 1155 Ukrainian au pairs in 2010 (BAMF 2012b). A total of 396 Ukrainian IT specialists entered Germany from 2000 to 2004 under a special arrangement (BMI 2004) and a very small group of other labour migrants – only a few per year – includes self-employed and highly qualified Ukrainian nationals (BAMF 2012a, Wirz unpublished). In recent years, there has been a growth in the outsourcing of IT and human resources management to the EU through multinational corporations' networks, and this represents yet another turn in the dynamics of Ukrainian labour mobility. The transformations in the dynamics of migration are triggered not only through Ukrainian relations with the EU (such as the EU visa liberalization action plan for Ukraine, local border traffic agreements between Ukraine and neighbouring countries, and bilateral agreements on social security). They are also shaped through geopolitical transformations of the whole region, such as the expansion of the EU, which has strongly impacted ties with many neighbouring countries, and the changing political situation in Ukraine (for a more detailed discussion see Chap. 4).

Placing the migration of Ukrainians to the EU in a broad context, we identify six significant developments: first, the legacy of Soviet-era spatial mobility in current patterns of Ukrainian migration; second, the ongoing recession and increasing political instability in the country of origin; and third, the labour demand in particular sectors of receiving EU countries. The type of jobs taken by immigrants in the receiving countries is accompanied, on the one hand, by the introduction of restrictions on settlement of third-country nationals, and on the other, by the creation of new channels for temporary labour migrants. A fourth factor is the absence of legal protection for citizens of the country of origin (in particular, the lack of effective bilateral agreements with receiving countries that would guarantee transfers of pensions and other social benefits). Fifth is the increase in women's independent labour migration and related changes in, and reinforcement of, particular gender roles. There are state-specific, largely economic, variations in these developments, including the effects of the 2008 economic crisis, and the state's current and past migration policies, as well as the current European political and ideological crisis in the

face of rising refugee waves. Finally, the volume also briefly relates to developments in Ukraine since the 2013 political upheaval, the Maidan movement and the military conflict that followed.

To a great extent contemporary Ukrainian migration to the Russian Federation is a continuation of the internal labour migration of the USSR.⁴ According to Shulga (2002), many migrants continue to regard migration to Russia as internal movement, perceiving the border as transparent. Temporal and circular trips of one to 3 months are the dominant pattern (Libanova et al. 2009). The absence of language barriers and extensive social networks in Russia facilitate their integration and Ukrainian migrants “dissolve into the crowd” (Shulga 2002: 283) as an unremarkable group. While official data suggest that in 2010 there were 200,000–300,000 Ukrainian labour migrants in Russia, the unofficial estimates stand at between 800,000 and 3,000,000 (Tegler and Cherkez 2011), as a large share of the labour migrants do not work officially. Over 70% of all Ukrainian migrants to Russia are men (Tegler and Cherkez 2011). The majority work in the construction sector (Libanova et al. 2009), which has been heavily affected by the 2008 economic recession (Sylina 2008). Further changes in these migration patterns can be expected following the 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia and the ongoing war. Such changes will reflect the links with Russia among segments of Ukrainian society, as well as the nationality-based safety networks in the EU established through migration after Ukrainian independence. This volume offers a useful insight into the continuities and disruptions of migration research around the dissolution of the USSR.

Another destination country for Ukrainian migration is Turkey. By 2012, 3,839,852 Ukrainians had arrived in Turkey (İçduygu 2013). Ukrainian nationals are exempt from visas for travel to Turkey for up to 60 days. Since the 1990s, it has been one of the key destinations for so-called “shuttle traders” (Shulga 2002) and temporary labour migrants, with Ukrainian women working primarily in the domestic sector, textiles, restaurants and the sex industry (Akalin 2007; İçduygu 2006), while men work in the agricultural sector (İçduygu 2006). Like migrants in the EU, a number of Ukrainian migrants who enter Turkey through official channels slip into undocumented status by continuing their stay after their visas expire (Kirişçi 2009). In 2012, Ukrainians were among the top five nationalities of visa overstayers (864 people were apprehended). However, the main form of irregularity is unofficial work. In 2012 over 7500 residence permits were granted to Ukrainian nationals (İçduygu 2013).⁵

Migration from Ukraine to Israel, the USA and Canada is different in nature. Ukrainian nationals primarily migrate to Israel to settle, arriving either within the framework of the return programme for people of Jewish background and their family members (the Law of Return) or via family reunification.⁶ Between 1990 and 2003 approximately 950,000 migrants (many of them highly educated) arrived in

⁴ We would like to thank Victoria Volodko for her contribution to this section.

⁵ *ibid.*

⁶ http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/social-issues-migration-health/international-migration-outlook-2014/israel_migr_outlook-2014-22-en#page1

Israel from the former Soviet Union (FSU), which constituted 17% of Israel's total population (Walsh and Tartakovsky 2011). Data on Ukrainian migrants is usually presented as part of the FSU migration. Although according to some sources migrants from the former Soviet Union have been quickly absorbed into the middle class of Israeli society (Kimmerling 1998, cited in Al-Haj 2002), it has been noted that as a group they seek cultural uniqueness (Ben-Rafael et al. 1998, cited in Al-Haj 2002), with the Ukrainian Jewish youth in Israel having created a particular trans-national culture (Golbert 2001). As research has shown, demographic concentration in terms of residential patterns is accompanied by relatively closed social networks and the ethnic component is central for self-identification (Al-Haj 2002).

Long-term settlement migration is also a characteristic of post-Soviet emigration from Ukraine to the USA and Canada (see also Chap. 2). The number of Ukrainians in the USA is steadily increasing. Migrants who arrived in the period 1997–2007 made up 68% (190,000) of all persons with Ukrainian ancestry in the USA (Wolowyna 2010). A large number of those migrants were under 18. What is also important to note is that a significant share, especially in the 1990s, constituted Ukrainian Jews. This among others contributes to the increasing number of Russian-speaking persons of Ukrainian ancestry in the USA. However, new migration (post-1991) has increased the number of Ukrainian speakers by 60% (Wolowyna 2010). The main class of entrants between October 2013 and September 2014 (the dominant trend since 2007) were immediate relatives of a US citizen, with a total of 8193 Ukrainian nationals admitted.⁷ The majority of people of Ukrainian ancestry live in the states of New York, Pennsylvania and California.⁸

Since 1991, a modest but growing number of immigrants have come to Canada from Ukraine, largely due to Ukraine's political and economic instability. Between 1991 and 2001, 23,435 Ukrainian nationals migrated to Canada (Makuch 2003). From 2004 to 2013, 23,623 Ukrainian nationals became new permanent residents in Canada.⁹ Ukrainian migrants who arrived after 1991 were attracted by the opportunities available in the labour market, but they show a low level of social integration with the "old" Ukrainian diaspora in spite of their interest in Ukrainian businesses (Makuch 2002). The total Ukrainian ethnic community in Canada amounts to 328,250 persons and has formed over 500 charitable organizations (mainly religious) (Couton 2013). Post-Soviet Ukrainian migration to Canada is characterized by the high professional status of the newcomers (Hudyma 2011). However, as in the case of migration to the EU, migrants in general do not work in their own profession, but instead find employment in unskilled or low-skilled sectors.

⁷http://www.inform-decisions.com/stat/index.php?r=site/page&view=inmig_ukr

⁸http://www.inform-decisions.com/stat/index.php?r=site/page&view=showmaps&map=usa_ukrs.jpg

⁹<http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/ukrainian-canadians/>

1.3 Contributions to This Book

The contributions to this book aim to engage in a critical dialogue with existing knowledge; although each chapter in our volume confirms the proliferation of research about Ukrainian migration in a number of disciplines, this research has been highly unsystematic, patchy and often politicized. There is a vast discrepancy in methodologies, data sets that are not comparable and an absence of longitudinal approach. This volume seeks to map out existing research in a variety of disciplines, analyzing its proliferation in certain areas and entering into a constructive debate with the literature as to the development of the research trajectories, the politics of knowledge production and need for further studies.

1.3.1 Part I: Continuities and Changes in Ukrainian Migration: An Analytical Review of Literature

The first part opens with a historical perspective often missing from the study of Ukrainian migration. Olena Malynovska and Bastian Vollmer address the long pre-Soviet and Soviet history of labour migration from Ukrainian territory, which is repeatedly dismissed in the analysis of more recent, post-independence migration. The authors trace changes not only in migratory patterns but also in scholarly production of knowledge about migration as affected by ideological fashions past and present. The economic analysis of migration of Ukrainian nationals by Olga Kupets in Chap. 3 looks at the impact of the changing economic situation in Ukraine and in migration destination countries – among others the temporal demand of particular labour market sectors. It appraises the evidence on the labour market performance of Ukrainians working temporarily abroad. Monika Szulecka, in Chap. 4, reviews Ukrainian migrants' dynamic changes of administrative status and the opportunities linked to such transformation, along with academic discourses on different aspects of irregularity in migrants' entry, stay or work. The author also analyzes laws and policies relevant to Ukrainian migrants in various receiving states.

A separate chapter is dedicated to Ukrainian migration research from a gender perspective. Gendered migration has gained visibility and politicization not only in the discourse of states but also in civil society and academia. The recent military events in Ukraine are forcing further consolidation of traditionalist (patriarchal) values and discourses and male/female dichotomies in Ukrainian society, leaving very little space for a variety of women's lived experiences and strategies. Chapter 5 by Olena Fedyuk emphasizes the lack of gender perspectives in virtually all disciplines that provide a perspective on Ukrainian migration in this volume and introduces an open debate on gender as a focal political construction in studying Ukrainian migration. Normative gendered discourse and practices serve to shame and control migrants and their families, influence remittance flows, and extend state-making and church-building exercises. Part I ends with a chapter by Agata Górny and Marta

Kindler, who study theoretical and empirical approaches to temporality and the study of time-dependent aspects of Ukrainian migration. The authors attempt to identify lessons learned from observation of Ukrainian spatial movements as regards causes and consequences of the temporariness of their international mobility.

The five different dimensions that guide the analysis of Part I of this volume are also reflected in the analyses of data and literature concerning Ukrainian migration to selected EU countries in Part II. A degree of repetition is inevitable, as the authors analyzing the different dimensions draw on the same studies that are reviewed in the country chapters. It is worth noting that one dimension is not addressed separately – integration. The integration of Ukrainian migrants is mentioned in specific chapters (see Chaps. 7, 8, 11 and 12).

1.3.2 Part II: Ukrainian Migration to Selected EU Countries: Facts, Figures and the State of the Literature

The second part of the book provides an overview of data and literature available on the migration of Ukrainian nationals to six EU countries: Poland, Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. This part allows for a focus on the contrasts and commonalities of the migration linking Ukraine to Central European countries (Czech Republic and Poland) and Southern European countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain). It is difficult to compare data from the different countries, with such large discrepancies in the availability, as well as the quality, of statistical data on migration. We decided, nevertheless, to arrange the country chapters according to geographical regions.

Migration to Southern European countries intensified in the early 2000s, at a later stage of the Ukrainian migration to the EU. Although, in general, in all of these countries Ukrainian migrants originating from the western part of Ukraine predominate, the Southern European destination countries had a significant share of migrants from Kiev. We can arrange the countries in sub-groups, with the changing gender balance of Ukrainian migration initially showing a clear predominance of women migrants to Italy and Greece. However, we are also aware of cross-country similarities between the regions, with the economic crisis, especially felt in the construction sector, having to a great extent halted the migration of Ukrainians to Portugal and the Czech Republic. The effects on migration of such occurrences as the Maidan and the ongoing military conflict are yet to be studied, but in Poland there is a clear rise in terms of all entry channels for Ukrainian migrants, while returns which had been occurring since the economic crisis from such countries as Greece stopped. The chapters in this part of the volume capture the complexity of the same group of migrants arriving at and moving between different destinations at different moments in time, and provide a necessary background to identify future research agendas.

Starting with Ukrainian migration to Poland, Chap. 7, written by a team of scholars, Zuzanna Brunarska, Marta Kindler, Monika Szulecka and Sabina Toruńczyk-Ruiz,

discusses the character of this migration flow and stock and addresses the changes that have occurred in the last two decades in what the authors term a “local” form of mobility. This local character, visible from highly temporary (even less than a month) circular movement before Poland’s EU accession through to a continuation of circulation, although less frequent, in the post-2004 era, is certainly a unique characteristic of Ukrainian mobility to this country. However, as the authors note, the political changes in Ukraine are a milestone in the changing face of migration to Poland, with the number of settlement permit applicants clearly on the rise, but accompanied by a rise in all channels of entry, including asylum applicants. A step ahead on the journey from temporary labour migrants toward a settled and well-integrated minority is the Czech Republic, analyzed thoroughly by Yana Leontiyeva in Chap. 8. Leontiyeva notes, however, that although Ukrainian migrants do form the largest minority, their inflow to the Czech Republic practically stopped in 2008, due to the worsening of the situation in the country’s labour market.

Marina Nikolova and Michaela Marouf in Chap. 9 provide an overview of Ukrainian migration to Greece, which like other Southern European countries was known for its large-scale emigration, but with the fall of the Soviet Union became a country receiving immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe, including Ukrainians. Characterized by a large informal economy and a seasonal tourist industry, Greece had a significant need for a temporary labour force. However, it is currently undergoing the worst economic recession in recent history, with decreasing rates of employment and income, a skyrocketing public debt and loans from the IMF and EU all affecting migration patterns. Francesca Alice Vianello, who writes on Ukrainian migration to Italy in Chap. 10, first provides background information on Italy as receiving country, setting Ukrainian migrants within the broader context of immigrant groups. She takes a gender approach to her analysis, however, focusing on the feminized character of this migration and offering a description of the most typical profiles of Ukrainian migrant women present in Italy.

Ukrainian migration to Portugal, having no historical links, was sudden and very intense. Chapter 11 by Maria Lucinda Fonseca and Sónia Pereira analyzes the sudden development of this migration, and how Ukrainians have integrated in the country. The authors point to the changes, similar to those noted in the chapter on Greece, from (mainly irregular) labour migration to family reunification and study as the main motives for entry. Mikołaj Stanek, Renáta Hosnedlová and Elisa Brey provide an accurate assessment of the key data sources regarding Ukrainians in Spain in Chap. 12, pointing to its shortcomings and putting forward proposals for improvement. As in Portugal, the migration to Spain had no historical links and was unexpected. Stanek and colleagues critically review the current literature on this migrant group and identify conceptual gaps, such as the need for clarity in the notion of integration, for future comparative research.

The final Chap. 13 of this volume by Cinzia Solari goes beyond Ukrainian migration to the European Union, providing the reader with a comparison of Ukrainian migrants in Rome and Los Angeles. This chapter identifies some of the points of comparison, such as transnational activity of migrants and their impact on the sending country, the role of gender in this process and the differing patterns of Ukrainian

migration to the European countries presented in the volume and to the USA. Methodologically the close-up ethnographic account of this chapter distinguishes it from the rest of the volume and suggests yet another operational possibility for current and future comparative studies.

1.4 Key Issues

This book provides the reader with knowledge on migration of one of the important third-country national groups to the European Union. It navigates around the existing patchwork of steadily growing research on migration of Ukrainian nationals to the EU by providing critical analysis of up-to-date available sources and linking historical and contemporary texts to establish the continuity of migratory trends and practices.

The volume's analysis reveals the durability and continuous transformation of migration from Ukraine, with continuing temporariness of labour migrants on one hand and increasing numbers deciding to reside longer abroad on the other, and at the same time some evidence that settlement allows them to circulate. The volume points to differences between receiving states, not only as regards entry channels – such as the difference between receiving residence permits for work reasons (Poland) and for family reasons (Spain) – but also as regards the labour market situation, where discrepancies remain between earnings in Central and Southern Europe, the latter being more attractive and facilitating actual settlement. Notably, members of ethnic minorities can be found in more senior positions in the labour market in countries with a longer immigration history than those in Central Europe. Interestingly, in those countries that were predominantly receivers of temporary Ukrainian migrants and that do not facilitate access to residence, as is the case in Poland, settlement seems to be gaining significance.

The volume also reflects on the reasons for progress or silences in certain areas. Progress has been made regarding the main trends and patterns of migration from the economic and legal perspectives, insights into practices in particular qualitative research, such as those concerning migrant domestic work, and theoretical approaches, such as the transnational perspective. Areas not addressed include internal differences within Ukrainian migrant groups in the different countries. Too often the groups are treated in research as a single “block”, while significant differences can be found in their socio-economic backgrounds, levels of education, generation and how these are linked to reasons for migrating and migration practices. There is almost no critical gender perspective in the analysis, with most of the studies focusing on Ukrainian women migrants. Almost nothing is known about second-generation Ukrainian migrants. A critical study of the civic engagement of Ukrainians settling in the EU is also missing, especially in the light of the ongoing events in Ukraine. We also know little, apart from data on remittances, and the general consequences of the increasing depopulation and population ageing of Ukrainian society, about the impact of Ukrainian migration on Ukraine's

development. Also, to what extent have the receiving societies changed due to the appearance of a new migrant group, especially in countries like Spain or Portugal where it occurred so suddenly?

This book illustrates national differences in data availability and reliability. The basic concepts underlying international statistics – such as the categories used to define an international migrant – continue to vary across the different countries. When it comes to cataloguing migrants by their legal status, Ukrainians can be an exemplary case study of the fluidity and imperfections of the latter and of how legal status affects people's access to mobility, social security and employment. Population census and data sources on residence cards in a number of countries often underestimate the actual number of Ukrainian migrants staying in a given country. In Poland, for example, as in numerous countries, the majority of Ukrainians stay based on visas and do not apply for residence cards. While population registers at the national level are used to produce international statistics on migration in Spain, the Polish population register cannot be used for such purposes as it lacks crucial basic information, such as the place of residence, and there are no population registers in Portugal. The data collection system reflects the need to control for migration of third-country nationals, with more importance attached to particular movements of foreign citizens by the respective countries, and not as much on having all-EU comparative, reliable data on immigrants and emigrants. A further aspect is the statistics available in the country of migrant origin, Ukraine, where a systematic quantitative approach is practically non-existent, the last census having been conducted in 2001 and the next, planned but postponed since 2012, now due in 2016.

It is important to note that this volume not only refers to literature in English, but gives equal attention to research published in Ukrainian and Russian, as well as Italian, Greek, Portuguese, Czech, Polish and Spanish. The use of Ukrainian- and Russian-language sources in particular is a long-delayed gesture of recognition of the important contributions of Ukrainian- and Russian-speaking scholars and hopefully can help facilitate more direct dialogue with Ukrainian scholars.

Each chapter in the volume provides its concluding remarks and maps out the further development of the research in their area. However, we deliberately leave the reader without a concluding chapter, but a chapter that serves as a concluding vignette, offering an ethnographic perspective on comparative research into Ukrainian mobility to the EU and the USA.

We hope this volume can serve as a knowledge production map that facilitates scholars in various disciplines to see the bigger picture in this generally disconnected research area and helps identify spaces of critical interventions and collaborative research. At a time when both Ukraine, with its current political and military crisis, and the EU, seem to be sinking ever deeper into an ideological and political coherence crisis, we would like the book to be seen as a watershed, enabling the inquiry on mobility from Ukraine to the EU to continue in a more integrated way.

duplication, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included in the work's Creative Commons license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory regulation, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or reproduce the material.

References

- Akalin, A. (2007). Hired as caregiver, demanded as a housewife. *Journal of Women's Studies*, 14(3), 209–225.
- Al-Haj, M. (2002). Identity patterns among immigrants from the former Soviet Union in Israel: Assimilation vs. ethnic formation. *International Migration*, 40(2), 49–70.
- BAMF (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees). (2012a). *Das Bundesamt in Zahlen 2011. Asyl, Migration, ausländische Bevölkerung und Integration. Zahlen 2011*, Nürnberg: BAMF.
- BAMF (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees). (2012b). *Das Migrationspotenzial aus der GUS in die Europäische Union*. Research Report 17, Nürnberg: BAMF.
- Bedezir, V. (2001). Migration from Ukraine to Central and Eastern Europe. In C. Wallace & D. Stola (Eds.), *Patterns of migration in Central Europe* (pp. 277–291). Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Ben-Rafael, E., Olshtain, E., & Geijst, I. (1998). Identity and language: The social insertion of Soviet Jews in Israel. *Immigration to Israel* (pp. 333–356).
- BMI (Federal Ministry of the Interior). (2004). *Migrationsbericht im Auftrag der Bundesregierung. Migrationsbericht 2004*. Berlin: BMI.
- BMI (Federal Ministry of the Interior). (2011). *Migration und Integration. Aufenthaltsrecht, Migrations- und Integrationspolitik in Deutschland*. Berlin: BMI.
- BMI (Federal Ministry of the Interior). (2013). *Migrationsbericht des Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge im Auftrag der Bundesregierung. Migrationsbericht 2011*. Berlin: BMI.
- Bpb (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung). (2011). Die soziale Situation in Deutschland, (Spät-) Aussiedler. *Zahlen und Fakten*. 28.11.2012. <http://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/zahlen-und-fakten/soziale-situation-in-deutschland/61643/aussiedler>.
- Černík, J. (2006). Of Clients and Chereps. The organisational structures of Ukrainian Labour Migration. In A. Szczepaniková, M. Čaněk & J. Grill (Eds.), *Migration processes in Central and Eastern Europe: Unpacking the diversity* (pp. 25–29). Prague: Multikulturní centrum Praha. http://aa.ecn.cz/img_upload/79a33131c9c4293e0fcef50bfa263ef/Migration_Processes_in_CEE_hq.pdf
- Couton, P. (2013). The impact of communal organizational density on the labour market integration of immigrants in Canada. *International Migration*, 51(1), 92–114.
- Destatis (Federal Statistical Office). (2012). *Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit. Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund. Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus 2011*. Series 1, Number 2.2, Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt.
- Golbert, R. L. (2001). Transnational orientations from home: Constructions of Israel and transnational space among Ukrainian Jewish youth. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 27(4), 713–731.
- Hudyma, K. (2011). Ukrainian language in Canada: From prosperity to extinction? *Working Papers of the Linguistics Circle of the University of Victoria*, 21(1), 181–189.
- Içduygu, A. (2006). A panorama of the international migration regime in Turkey. *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales*, 22(3), 11–21.

- Içduygu, A. (2013). *Turkey and international migration 2012–2013*. Report prepared for the annual meeting of the OECD Expert Group on Migration, Paris, 27–29 November 2013. https://mirekoc.ku.edu.tr/sites/mirekoc.ku.edu.tr/files/FINAL__OECDMigrationRTurkey2012-13.pdf. Accessed 10 Nov 2015.
- Kimmerling, B. (1998). The new Israelis: Multiple cultures without multiculturalism. *Alpayim*, 16, 263–308.
- Kirişçi, K. (2009). *Turkey: The political and social dimension of migration*. Mediterranean migration 2008–2009 report. European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies - <http://www.carim.org/publications/MMR-0809%20-%20Part%204%20-%20Palestine-Turkey.pdf>
- Libanova, E., Burakovskij I., & Myroshnychenko, A. (2009). Fund “Open Ukraine” has announced new data concerning Ukrainian labor migrants abroad during the round table talk entitled “Ukrainian labor migration: reality, challenges and answers”. Open Ukraine. <http://open-ukraine.org/ua/programs/migration/research-program/>
- Lopukh, V. (2006). Chetverta khvila imigracii do SSHA: prichyny i motivacii [The fourth wave of migration to USA: Reasons and motivation]. *Demographiya ta socialna ekonomika* [Demography and Social Economy] Vol. 2.
- Makuch, A. (2002, March 10). Sociologist examines latest wave of Ukrainian immigration to Canada. *The Ukrainian Weekly*, LXX(10).
- Makuch, A. (2003, March 30). Ukrainian Canadians in the 2001 Census: An overview. *The Ukrainian Weekly*, LXXI(13).
- MPC. (2013). Ukraine. Migration Profile. Migration Policy Centre. www.migrationpolicycentre.eu
- Shulga, N. (2002). *Velikoepereselenie: repatrianty, bezhentsy, trudovyemigranty*. [The great resettlement of peoples: Repatriates, refugees, labor migrants]. Kiev: Institutsotsologiyi NAN Ukrainy
- Shybko, V., Khomra, O., Ozhevan, M., & Prymak, O. (Eds.). (2006). *Trudova mihratsija hromadjan Ukrainy*, [Labor migration of Ukrainian Citizens]. Kyiv: Kyjivskyj Universytet.
- Sylina, T. (2008). Na rekakh vavilonskikh (On Babylonian rivers) -2. *Zerkalonedeli* [Weekly Mirror].
- Tegeler, V., & Cherkez, O. (Eds.). 2011. *Ukrainian labour migration processes in Russia: Social and gender aspects. Materials of a comprehensive sociological study*. Odessa: TOB “Elton”.
- Walsh, S. D., & Tartakovsky, E. (2011). The relationship between different components of national identities and psychological adjustment among high-school adolescent immigrants from Russia and Israel in Ukraine. *The European Journal of Developmental Psychology*, 8(4), 452–472.
- Wirz, Y. (unpublished). Ukrainian migration to Germany: Diverse but little seen. Country Report.
- Wolowyna, O. (2010). *Some consequences of the new wave immigration from Ukraine for the Ukrainian diaspora in the United States*. Paper presented at the 3rd international scientific-practical conference. Lviv: International Institute of Education, Culture and Relations with Ukraine.
- Wolowyna, O. (2013). *Effects of the 4th wave immigration on the language situation of persons of Ukrainian ancestry in the United States*. Paper presented at the 4th international scientific-practical conference. Lviv: International Institute of Education, Culture and Relations with Ukraine.

Part I
Continuities and Changes in Ukrainian
Migration: An Analytical Review of
Literature

Chapter 2

Ukrainian Migration Research Before and Since 1991

Bastian Vollmer and Olena Malynovska

2.1 Introduction

During the Soviet era, academic research understood migration as a way of regulating and re-allocating the labour force, balancing the supply and demand of labour. Severe censorship prevented the publication of migration statistics. Attention was devoted to the development of theories and methods of analyzing migration processes. After 1991, when Ukraine became independent from the Soviet Union, it became one of the most important countries in the world for both immigration and emigration. Not only are migrants using the well-known Central European migration route to the EU; there has been intensive population exchange within the USSR (not always voluntary) and previous traditions of migration have resulted in personal ties with the population of neighbouring countries.

The patterns of contemporary migration, and the aspiration of migrants, cannot be understood without a historical perspective that explores the eras pre- and post-1991. The caesura of 1990–1991 set a major transformation in motion: from Soviet states to democratic state structures, from command economies to liberal markets, and from Soviet population management to liberalized mobility of people. Academic institutions and individual research agendas were also transformed. The newly established economic regime both in Ukraine and in the wider region is prone to economic fluctuations (such as those caused by the economic crisis starting in 2008), and so migrants' strategies and corresponding policy regimes are of an increasingly temporary nature. 1991 also gave a new lease of life to Ukrainian migration research, which though still not entirely independent of neo-traditionalist

B. Vollmer (✉)

Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

e-mail: bastian.vollmer@compas.ox.ac.uk

O. Malynovska

National Institute for Strategic Studies, Kyiv, Ukraine

e-mail: malynovska@voliacable.com

and nationalist forces, was able to benefit from both more highly developed methodology and new empirical data going well beyond the former ideological limits and regulations of censorship.

This chapter provides an overview of migration research, concepts and trends before and after 1991, linking the two historical eras of migration and seeking explanations that have hitherto been absent from research. Consideration of the growing significance of temporality in the migratory movements in the region points to the need for a systematic historical analysis of Ukrainian migration. Post-1991 understandings of migration are still influencing migration patterns and discourses in the twenty-first century.

2.2 Aspects of and Trends in Migratory Movements Before 1991

In a 1986 TV programme about the *perestroika* years, which was shown to both American and Soviet audiences and was one of the first TV “bridges” between the USSR and the USA, a participant claimed that “there’s no sex in the USSR”. This idiom has been used to characterize the level of hypocrisy in Soviet reality, and it applies to discussions of migration in Soviet times. In the view of the Soviet authorities, migration, like sex, “did not exist”. Soviet policy as well as academic discourses viewed the internal relocation of the population as the redistribution of the labour force serving the economy’s needs. International migration – going abroad or leaving the Soviet Union – was treated as treason. Migration statistics were not publicly available. Censorship forbade the use of precise figures when it came to demographic statistics or the size of the labour force. The authorities only allowed these statistical categories to be described in relative terms. This censorship was officially justified on national security grounds. However, the main reason for secrecy was the extremely high rate of forced population relocation and the enormous human losses that accompanied it, which contradicted the Soviet leadership’s claims of constantly improving living standards and high rates of population growth. The regime, which deported whole nations and exiled millions of people to deserted areas, strictly controlled population movement with the help of a passport system and closed borders, seeking to keep its population control policies secret.

At the same time, migration had a strong impact on the development of Ukraine’s population. Emigration from Ukraine in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries corresponded to developments in Europe at that time. The nature of these migrations from the two parts of Ukraine (belonging at that time to two countries) and the reasons for them (poverty, lack of arable land, unemployment) were the same, differing only in their direction: east, to the Transvolga Region, Siberia and the Far East from the territories of the former Russian Empire; and west, over the ocean, from the Austria-Hungarian territories. The political emigration that subsequently added to economic emigration had different causes: the failed wars of national liberation (1917–1920) and the redrawing of the world as a result of World

War II. Today the Ukrainian diaspora numbers at least ten million people (see Chap. 1). Early analyses of statistical data and sociological research into migrants (Bachynski 1914; Popok 2007; Troshchinsky 1994) published at the turn of the nineteenth century were subsequently revisited after the fall of the USSR.

Migration policy in the USSR sought to settle large numbers of people in remote territories and to mix different ethnic groups to create a homogeneous population enabling a unitary state to be preserved and developed by a new historical community, the “Soviet people”. In Soviet times, opponents of the Soviet regime, individuals who had shown themselves disloyal towards the regime and certain ethnic groups were relocated in increasingly large numbers, while visits abroad by Soviet citizens and visitors entering the USSR were strictly limited and controlled. As many as one million people were evicted from Ukraine’s rural areas in the interests of collectivization. After the annexation of Western Ukraine in 1939 under the terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 10% of its population was forcibly resettled. With the onset of war between the Soviet Union and Germany, more than 400,000 descendants of German colonists were deported. In 1944, nearly 200,000 Crimean Tatars as well as Bulgarians, Armenians, Greeks and Germans were deported from Crimea. After the war 300,000 people involved in the national liberation movement and members of their families were deported from Western Ukraine to remote areas in the northern and eastern regions of the USSR. Thus internal movement increased and international migration all but disappeared.

Under these circumstances, research on the population, including its mobility, represented a danger to the authorities (since new evidence undermining Soviet ideology could have been found), which led to the suppression of research in this area. This is exemplified by the history of the Demographic Institute of the Academy of Science of Ukraine. Founded in 1918 and headed by M. V. Ptukha, the Institute was one of the world’s first institutions specializing in population studies (Steshenko 2001). In the second half of the 1930s, when the disastrous consequences of collectivization, the great famine and repression became evident, demographic research, including migration studies, practically ceased to exist. The Soviet authorities considered the census of 1937 “subversive”, suppressed its results and classified it “secret”. In 1938, the authorities ordered the closure of the Institute and the harassment of its staff, including Ptukha.

Migration studies recommenced only during the Khrushchev Thaw of the 1960s due to the state campaigns aimed at the development of virgin lands and mineral resources in the east and the north, which demanded relocation of considerable numbers of workers to remote and sparsely populated areas of the USSR. The success of the resettlement policy, the decision making associated with it, and the integration of individuals in these new places could be studied. Another line of research was the declining growth rate of the labour force, which represented a substantial problem for the sprawling Soviet economy with its large share of labour-intensive production.

Under conditions of strict centralization, within which both academia and science operated, most advanced studies were carried out at the central scientific establishments of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR based in Moscow. Its contribution

to research was notable, not only for its high standards but also for the relative freedom of its scientific investigations, especially in comparison with other research centres based in the Soviet republics. The revival of migration studies in the USSR is associated with the names of T. Zaslavska (1970), Zh. Zaionchkovskaya (1972), V. Perevedentsev (1975), L. Rybakovskiy (1987) and others who worked for the Novosibirsk branch of the Academy of Sciences and later in Moscow. Their research demonstrated that in spite of the authorities' efforts, the outflow of the population from Siberia exceeded the inflow. Their research helped to establish measures aimed at stimulating migration to the east and north of the country.

Migration research that began at the Academy of Sciences fostered studies at leading scientific centres in other regions of the USSR, securing the legitimization of the subject. Thanks to these initiatives, migration research was quickly revived in Ukraine. Scientific traditions that were preserved by researchers such as V. M. Ptukha and his students continued at the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences. The focus in the 1960s was the analysis of statistical data concerning the scale, direction, social composition and driving forces of migration. In the 1970s and 1980s, a shift in the theoretical focus towards explaining migration processes contributed to the development of migration policy measures (Zagrobskaya 1982).

2.2.1 Internal Migration in the Soviet Republics

From 1960 to 1970, 5–6% of Ukraine's population changed their place of residence annually, crossing both administrative borders and even those of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic (Yankovskaya 1977). According to the last Soviet census in 1989, 44.4% of Ukraine's then residents had changed their place of residence at least once in their lives. Migration was consistently important, but there were differences in the regions where migratory movements took place. The lowest rates were in the western regions, those in central regions were about average, while the highest were in the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk industrial area and the agricultural regions of the south-east.

Similar to other researchers in the USSR, the examination of migration processes by Ukrainian researchers focused mainly on internal migration processes within the USSR. According to the migration typology applied by Ukrainian researchers, migration within Ukraine was considered internal, while moving to other Soviet republics was called external. International migration was regarded as absolutely insignificant and was associated only with rare exchanges of experts and specialists (Berezyuk 1969). More than half of the total internal migration was inter-city resettlement. One-third was rural-to-urban migration and about 10% was movement between rural areas (Tovkun 1966).

Mass migration to the cities and concentration of industries caused serious urban social, economic and infrastructural problems (especially in cities with a population of more than half a million) (Stepanenko 1981). Rural areas and small rural towns

became increasingly run-down (Stepanova 1984). Researchers pointed out that migration placed a strain on transport infrastructure, created difficulties in providing goods and services, produced a shortage of accommodation and triggered changes in the demographic structure of the population. Suggestions aimed at reducing excessive migration included improving living conditions in rural areas and building more higher education institutions in the provinces, while at the same time limiting migration to urban centres. Rural employers introduced bonuses, advantageous terms for acquiring accommodation and better opportunities for promotion and career development (Onikiyenko et al. 1975).

Although most migration took place within the republic, there were also population movements from Ukraine to other Soviet republics. During the last decade before the break-up of the USSR, the annual migration turnover between Ukraine and the rest of the USSR was about 1.5 million. Another feature of inter-republic migration was the persistent positive migration balance. During the 1950s, the migration balance exceeded 550,000, accounting for over 10% of the total population increase in Ukraine. In the 1960s, the migration surplus was about 530,000, which was 12.9% of the total population increase (Academy of Science of the UkSSR 1977). In the 1970s, it was less than 200,000, and in the 1980s 132,000 or 14.3% of the total population increase (Khomra 1992). Though the value of migration surplus gradually decreased, the balance remained positive in Ukraine even when it became negative in most Soviet republics (Academy of Science of the UkSSR 1977). Migrants mostly came from Kazakhstan, other Central Asian republics, the North Caucasus and the Central Black Earth Region as well as from Transcaucasia. A negative migration balance was recorded between Ukraine and the North Siberian region (especially Tyumen Oblast) but also the Central Region and the Russian Far East.

Men dominated emigration while immigration was gender balanced but consisted predominantly of return migrants and ethnic migration from non-Slavic republics which had “expelled” people as a result of rapid demographic growth. From the second half of the 1980s interethnic tensions increasingly came into play. Since ethnic Ukrainians dominated migration outflows and the numbers of ethnic Ukrainians arriving were much lower, the number of Ukrainians living outside Ukraine grew: 13.8% according to the 1979 census; 15.4% according to the 1989 census. At the same time, the number of inter-republic immigrants increased: for example, in 1959 Russians constituted 16.9% of Ukraine’s population and in 1989 22.1%. During the inter-census period from 1979 to 1989, the number of Azerbaijanis living in Ukraine grew 2.1 times, Tajiks 1.8 and Armenians 1.4.

In the Soviet era migration of people meant migration of the labour force (Khomra 1990). Researchers drew attention to the declining labour force which meant that Ukraine would not be able to provide manpower to other regions of the USSR in the future (Zahrobska 1974). From both an economic and social point of view, migration was considered a positive phenomenon leading to changes in the social structure favourable to the working class (rural-to-urban migration), rising education standards (educational migration) and closer relations between the nations of the USSR (mixing of different ethnic groups) (Zahrobska 1974).

Soviet researchers saw the increase in migration as a natural result of high levels of production growth. In socialist terms, the relocation of labour brought about the settlement of new territories, technical progress and the improvement of welfare and educational standards (Khomra 1979). This increase in relocation was facilitated by the abolition of private land ownership, decreasing property ownership, the availability of jobs in every region of the USSR and rapid processes of industrialization and urbanization (Khomra 1979). At the same time, the authorities expected that, according to the basic tenets of socialist development, the volume of “migration” would gradually decrease once the development of different regions of the country had evened out and the gap between standards of living in rural and urban areas as well as between physical labour and intellectual work had been bridged.

2.2.2 *Resettlements*

Ukrainian researchers viewed migration along the lines of Soviet interpretations of Marxist theory; its systematic nature under socialism was opposed to the spontaneous migration in capitalist society (Khomra 1987). While capitalist migration is determined by elements of capital reproduction, the aim of socialist migration is to improve and develop the overall personality of migrants and the effectiveness of social production (Khomra 1990).

Ukrainian researchers categorized organized and unorganized resettlements in terms of redistribution of manpower and migration respectively (Onikiyenko et al. 1975). In accordance with the predominant ideology of the time, there could be no contradiction between the collective will of the community and personal interests. Organized resettlement increased over the years: in 1965, organized resettlement made up 31% of total migration flows and in 1975 it constituted 45%. The share of unorganized resettlement decreased from 65 to 55% (Yankovskaya 1977). In spite of people’s legal right to choose their place to live and work, in Soviet times such freedom did not imply freedom from the obligation to contribute to the Soviet community as such, and it did mean that the interests of Soviet society took precedence over private interests (Khomra 1987).

Organized resettlement occurred mainly within Ukraine, yet one-third of migrants were “directed” to other republics of the USSR. At the turn of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, fifteen regions in the west, centre and north-east of Ukraine experienced constant resettlement out of the republic. The largest-scale resettlement project was the development of virgin lands elsewhere. Up to half of the Ukrainian resettlement projects were directed to Kazakhstan (Zharobska 1974). Later, considerable numbers of workers went to develop the oil and gas fields of Western Siberia and to build the Baikal-Amur railway.

There were three types of organized resettlement. The first, which already existed at the time of the Russian Empire and in the early decades of Soviet rule, was the resettlement of peasant families from densely populated areas and those lacking arable land to areas with considerable land resources. These rural resettlements made up 7–11% of all organized relocations. Most people were resettled from the

west and centre of Ukraine to the southern steppe area of the republic or outside Ukrainian territory. Thus, between 1961 and 1975, 100,000 people were resettled, 62% to the Crimea where there was a large need for manpower after the deportation of its native population.

The second type, which began in the 1930s and made up 20–26% of all organized resettlement, was allocation of manpower required by industry, i.e. resettlements linked to contracts of employment. Between 1961 and 1975, 1.5 million Ukrainians were affected by these “organized recruitments”, which took place in all regions (except for Mykolaiv, Kherson and Kirovograd regions and the Crimea (Yankovskaya 1977), i.e. the main regions of rural settlement). People moved either to Donetsk-Prydniprovsk industrial region or outside the republic. The third type was supposed to mobilize labour for construction work. These campaigns were mainly aimed at young workers. A further type directed graduates into work. State authorities allocated jobs to graduates from vocational schools, secondary technical schools and institutes of higher education.

However, these resettlement schemes were not always successful. First, although these types of organized resettlement were presented by the authorities as an economic measure (the ideology of creating Soviet citizens was merely a side-effect), they never overrode other migration systems and patterns even in the harshest totalitarian times of the USSR. Second, a considerable proportion of migrants on organized resettlement schemes returned to their previous place of residence or failed to remain in the place to which they were allocated. For example, research using data from agricultural zones in the south of Ukraine from 1968 to 1972 shows 16.7% of migrants soon left their allocated place of settlement (Yankovskaya 1977). Third, not only newly resettled persons, but also the native population, left the areas to which they were directed (in the north and the east of the USSR). Despite all the authorities’ efforts, the balance of migration in/outflow was negative most of the time (Onikiyenko and Popovkin 1973).

2.2.3 Migration Policy

Soviet migration policy was subdivided into three areas: administrative, economic and ethical (Khomra 1979). The administrative domain included instruments of migration control, such as the passport system, which restricted the issue of passports to certain categories of citizens (such as the rural population before 1974), and the institution of *propiska* (residence registration/permit).¹ However, as most scholars argue, the effect of these instruments was limited. Since most rural residents had no passport, it ought to have been impossible for them to seek work or education

¹ *Propiska* was used to control migration, especially to big cities, health-resort regions and border areas, where it was almost impossible to obtain a residence permit. *Propiska* was the basic administrative document without which one could not get a job or go to school, use the health services, draw a pension or social security payments. Living without *propiska* could also result in administrative penalties, and up to 1974, criminal charges.

elsewhere. However, the migration of young people from the villages to the cities increased instead of decreased as planned by the authorities. For example, young men from rural areas often never returned to their villages after military service. Equally ineffective was the restriction of residence permits in big cities. People refused to leave urban areas, as they knew it might be impossible to return, which resulted in disproportional urban growth. Suburbs were not formally part of the city but commuting distances increased, adding to the burden on infrastructures.

Indirect migration flow instruments that proved more efficient included incentives relating to working or living conditions, improved community services and the introduction of regular salary increases as well as significant pension benefits and other bonuses related to specific regions (Yankovska 1980).

“Ethical means” or rather, ideological pressures that influenced migration in the socialist system, are a special area of migration policy. Various resolutions of the Communist Party and its youth organization, Komsomol, affected resettlement regulations; for instance, in 1974 the Trans-Siberia railroad was announced as a Komsomol-sponsored construction project. The XVIIth Congress of the Youth Communist League appealed to young people to participate in the construction of the road. The regional Committee of the Komsomol mobilized young people for resettlement using so-called “Komsomol trip sheets”, which assigned them to the construction area in Siberia. In previous years, the same scheme had been used to provide labour for the development of the Siberian oil and gas fields.

Researchers established the following migration policy objectives: increased job satisfaction through improved matching of workers’ qualifications with type of work; ironing out regional differences in living standards; reducing discrepancies between working and living conditions in urban and rural areas; growth of production; development of social infrastructure; and sanctions on employers failing to provide appropriate conditions for new settlers (Onikienko et al. 1975).

2.2.4 Non-Soviet Migration

Migration between Ukraine and countries outside the USSR was uncommon and had no significant effect on population growth or economic development. Only during World War II and its immediate aftermath was it substantial. More than 200,000 Germans were repatriated from Galicia, Volyn and Northern Bukovina in 1939–1940. Between 1945 and 1946, following an inter-governmental agreement with Poland, half a million ethnic Ukrainians were (mostly) forcibly resettled in Ukraine, and 800,000 ethnic Poles were removed from Ukraine to Poland. At the same time, 30,000 Czechs left Volyn for Czechoslovakia (Bruk and Kabuzan 1991).

In the post-war period, immigration from outside the USSR was strictly limited. Only a handful of political refugees took shelter in the USSR. The Ukrainian Red Cross, for example, looked after a couple of hundred Yugoslav citizens who found themselves in Ukraine after the 1949 conflict between Tito and Stalin, and communists from Chile who arrived in Ukraine. People had to get the authorities’ permission to leave the USSR, which was only (and not always) granted if they could

provide an invitation from close relatives. Hence most emigrants were members of ethnic minorities with relatives abroad (e.g. Jews, Germans). However, according to data from Ukraine's Ministry of the Interior, during the entire post-war period and until 1970, only 2000 permits to leave Ukraine for Israel were issued. Emigration increased in the 1970s when, under pressure from the international community, the USSR was forced to mitigate emigration bans. During this decade, 81,000 permits for emigration to Israel and 3000 to Germany were granted. Nevertheless, international migration constituted little more than 1% of total migration. Its share grew somewhat during the *perestroika* era, when emigration restrictions were liberalized, reaching 2.7% of total migration flows in 1989 (Khomra 1992).

For ideological reasons, international migration was studied either as an example of something taking place in other countries or from a historical perspective, i.e. as a process that occurred in the past. Thus, a noticeable area of international research in the 1970s and 1980s was the study of migration processes in Europe and the USA. These studies were rich in data; the development of world migrations was examined, and the status of migrant workers in the destination countries as well as the main courses of migration policy in receiving countries were discussed (Shlyepakov 1960; Frolkin 1975; Shamshur 1987). However, the ideologically limited understanding of migration undermined the analytical potential of these studies: it was understood as a form of exploitation dictated by capitalism. Some of these studies, such as those treating labour migration from Yugoslavia, were censored and not available to the general public (Malinovskaya 1984).

More fundamental scholarly analysis of the emigration of Ukrainians to the USA and Canada in the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries became possible during the Khrushchev Thaw era. A whole range of historical studies were conducted which analyzed statistical and archival data, memoirs and letters, the destiny of the emigrants and the circumstances of the overseas resettlements (Shlyepakov 1960).

The democratization of Soviet society in the *perestroika* era enabled Ukrainian scholars to partially liberate themselves from political prejudice towards the analysis of international migration. Previously restricted topics became gradually more acceptable, such as the history of forced resettlement and deportation by the totalitarian regime. The analysis of once confidential documents enabled publication of the shocking death toll among Ukrainians caused by subjugation and famine (Perkovskiy and Pirozhkov 1990; Buhay 1990).

2.3 Aspects of and Trends in Research on International Migration After 1991

The break-up of the Soviet Union transformed overnight what was formerly categorized "internal migration" into "international migration". People migrated in this period in great numbers both within and across the borders of the former territory of

the Soviet Union. Out of the 1989 population of the USSR, approximately 25.3 million Russians lived outside Russia (Heleniak 2002). Among a whole range of repatriation movements, between 1994 and 1998 some 636,000 people left Ukraine for Russia (Cipko 2006).

In 1991, the Ukrainian academic landscape experienced a breakthrough as the ideological oppression of the Soviet era came to an end. Considerably broader methodologies were employed and much more empirical data was made available. A revision of Ukraine's migration history took place, though it cannot be denied that the work of Soviet Ukrainian scholars laid the foundation for contemporary migration research. The migrations of Soviet times – mainly deportations and political emigration – remain a politically sensitive topic in Ukraine. At the same time, a degree of caution towards international migration was inherited; thus it is still interpreted by some scholars as a departure from the norm, representing the “real” challenge to a society's development.

With independence, the economic and regulatory context of migration changed in Ukraine. The state-building process needed research-based recommendations for the development of new migration policy and legislation. Funding was scarce, so migration research relied mainly on the support of international organizations, international funds or consortia. The 1996 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) conference organized by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) gave a major impetus to research on migration, setting up an action plan that promoted the study of various aspects of the migration situation in Ukraine. During the transition period the most active branch of research was the law and legal studies, due to the need for a new legislative framework to regulate migration. Other areas of research gradually emerged – especially in sociology and economics – developing new concepts and typologies of Ukrainian migration. Ukrainian research tended to neglect migrations of previous decades, focusing instead on new migratory phenomena, which can be categorized into three main groups:

1. Labour migration, often used as an umbrella term to include various other migratory patterns and forms of migration such as irregular or circular migration;
2. Irregular migration;
3. “Ethnic” migration and repatriation.

As the results of studies on Ukrainian labour migration and irregular migration have been extensively addressed in other chapters (see Chaps. 3 and 4, and Part II) the focus here regarding the first two groups is on the new approach to research as compared with studies in Soviet times. The third group, “ethnic” migration and repatriation, is introduced more thoroughly.

2.3.1 Labour Migration and Irregular Migration

In the Ukrainian context “labour migration” tends to be used as all-encompassing term for migration. Migration is often understood in Ukrainian research as well as in the public domain as labour migration, since it is hard to imagine why a person would migrate if not for work.

The research focus has shifted to a pattern formally categorized as “unorganized migration”, i.e. the research became agency centred. The majority of research on Ukrainian labour migration in the past two decades has addressed selective migrant groups and specific regions or specific thematic areas, and qualitative large-scale survey methods have predominantly been used rather than sparsely quantitative research. Detailed in-depth findings based on ethnographic methodology (as elaborated by Massey 1993 and Massey et al. 1990) were presented in 1994 (Pirozhkov et al. 1997; Frejka et al. 1999). 440 in-depth interviews were conducted in migrant households in Kyiv, Chernivtsi and in another village close to Lviv. The research concluded that migration served as a survival strategy in the years of economic crisis and transition. A longitudinal perspective was added in 2002 when the same methodology was applied to discuss changes in structure, character and destination of migrations (Pirozhkov et al. 2003).

With the development of labour migration from Ukraine, NGOs based in Ukraine and in the destination countries started to engage in the field. In 2002, Women’s Perspectives, an NGO based in Lviv, conducted one of the first surveys with the help of migrants in Italy (Western Ukrainian Centre 2003; see also Chap. 10). Another study was conducted by a group of scholars from Lviv in collaboration with the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in eight destination countries. In around 100 in-depth interviews they found psychological issues to be one of the main reasons for migration (Malynovska 2011). Further research was devoted to the issues of children who were “left behind” in Ukraine. In 2006 the Women’s Rights Centre La Strada Ukraine conducted 103 interviews with children in five regions, from which they concluded that children whose parents are abroad had a number of problems of a psychological and social nature and were increasingly likely to show vulnerability and deviant behaviour (Levchenko 2006) (for more details see Chap. 5).

The labour migration research spectrum has expanded rapidly, with numerous studies on emigration from widely varying perspectives now available. For instance, a group of researchers from the EU-funded EUMAGINE project has examined the current migration hopes and dreams of (non-) migrants in Ukraine (eumagine.org; see also Vollmer 2015).

Although there are many studies on irregular migration from Ukraine, none of them present an in-depth investigation of the situation. One of the first studies on irregular migration to use detailed interviews was conducted in 1999 by a joint Hungarian-Polish-Ukrainian project funded by the IOM (Klinchenko et al. 2000). Another publication to include analysis of international law and Ukrainian legislation was *Illegal Migration and Trafficking in Women* edited by the Institute of State and Law of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Shemshuchenko 2001). The living conditions and legal status of irregular migrants were examined by another Ukrainian team of researchers and their results published by the Kennan Institute in 2001 and 2008. This longitudinal perspective offered a rich analysis of changes in migrants’ situation over 7 years (Braichevska et al. 2004; Braichevska et al. 2009). The causes of this kind of migration are discussed in detail in Chap. 4.

2.3.2 *Ethnic Migration and Patterns of Repatriation*

In the early days after the Ukrainian struggle for independence (1991–1993), migration was dominated by mobility of previously Soviet citizens of various ethnic backgrounds to their corresponding “homelands” newly established as nation-states. Nationals of all other newly established independent states moved out of Ukrainian territory, while Ukrainians and Tatars returned from the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. However, members of ethnic minorities (Germans, Greeks, Jews and Poles) who had relatives abroad also started to leave Ukrainian territory between 1987 and 1990. In 1990, for instance, 68,000 permits to leave for Israel were issued (see also Chap. 1). Deportees and their descendants returned to Ukraine: 250,000 Crimean Tatars, Bulgarians, Armenians and Greeks returned to Crimea and more than 2000 Germans resettled in southern Ukraine (Vollmer et al. 2010; Zayonchkovskaya 2000). After resettlement, many returnees found themselves on the margins of society. For example, in 2005, only about 50% of returned Crimean Tatars were permanently housed, while more than 50% of those of working age were unemployed (Malynovska 2006).

A particularly difficult aspect of the ethnic migration of the 1990s was the arrival, settlement and restoration of rights to former deportees (Crimean Tatars, Bulgarians, Armenians, Greeks and Germans). This has attracted the attention of historians, lawyers, economists and sociologists. The history of deportations, the struggle for rehabilitation, the process of repatriation and the legal, political, social and economic problems of returnees and their integration into Ukrainian society have been the subject of numerous studies (Gabrielian and Petrov 1998; Zinchenko 1998; Ilyasov 1999; Pribytkova 1999).

Important historical documents and statistical data on the deportation, return and reintegration of former deportees in Crimea were published between 1999 and 2003. Significant sources include a series of volumes entitled *Deported Crimean Tatars, Bulgarians, Armenians, Greeks, Germans* and the journal *Crimean Studies* published in English and Ukrainian by the Centre for Information and Documentation of Crimean Tatars.

Attention has also been drawn to the repatriation of former deportees by the significant costs the Ukrainian state incurred between 1992 and 2010. The arrival of returnees had serious political consequences and international repercussions. The large number of Ukrainians returning to their native land resulted in a record-high migration balance between 1991 and 1993, with the population increasing by half a million, although fertility rates remained negative.

Research on repatriation can be divided into two categories: (1) studies of the scale and trends of returnees to Ukraine (e.g. Hrushevsky and Kutkovets 1992; Troscyns'kyj et al. 1998); and (2) studies of issues arising from their reintegration (e.g. Braychevska 1999; Malynovska 1999; Minhasutdinov 1999). Some researchers have devoted their work to individual ethnic groups and their migrations out of or back to Ukraine. Diamanti-Karandou (2003) focused on Greeks migrating in the

period 1990–2000, while others such as Klinchenko et al. (1999) and Malynovska (2007) have examined the limbo status of Meskhetian Turks currently residing in Ukraine. Only a few articles have been devoted to new ethnic groups forming due to new patterns of migration (Volosyuk and Pylynsky 2002; Braychevska and Malynovska 2002).

2.4 Conclusions

Research agendas on Ukrainian migration remain politicized, even though dominating ideologies of the state have changed drastically. In particular the role of external funding is (though not as severely as in the 1990s) influenced by political developments and institutional power relations.

There is no specialized research institution dedicated to international migration and there are very few examples of international collaboration, though this seems hardly surprising in a country where both the authorities and the public perceive a poorly defined migration policy as “normal”. Even the establishment of a new State Migration Service has not improved the situation. An example of this failed improvement is the use of such statistics to create policies relating to labour migration and Ukrainian citizens living abroad.

Many studies from the past cannot be seen as reliable sources documenting migration. A systematic historical study that examines temporality and its main variable of time is at the heart of prospective research. The historical perspective calls for further research examining the link between the two distinct eras of Ukrainian history and its implications. Taking the historical perspective into account is a field of research that would look at current micro systems or the evolving migration cultures that are emerging in Ukraine. Interestingly, they are set to change and develop following the political upheaval of Maidan in 2014 and the ongoing military crisis in the east of Ukraine.

Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, duplication, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included in the work's Creative Commons license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory regulation, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or reproduce the material.

References

- Academy of Science of the UkSSR. (1977). *Demograficheskoye razvitiye Ukrainskoy SSR (1959–1970)* [Demographic development of the Ukrainian SSR (1959–1970)]. Kiev: Naukova Dumka.
- Bachynski, J. (1914). *Ukrains'ka immihratsiya v Z'jednanyh Derzhavah Ameryky* [Ukrainian emigration to United States of America]. Kyjiv: Druk.
- Berezuk, A. I. (1969). *Sezonnaja migratsiya naselenija Zakarpatskoj oblasti USSR I puti jeje uporjadochenija* [Seasonal migration of rural population of the Transcarpathian region of the Ukrainian SSR and the ways to its orderliness]. Kyiv: Institute of Economics, Academy of Science of the UkSSR.
- Braichevska, O., Volosiuk, H., Malynovska, O., Pylynskyi, Y., Popson, N., & Ruble, B. (2004). *Nontraditional immigrants in Kyiv*. Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
- Braichevska, O., Malynovska, O., & Pylynskyi, Y. (2009). “*Netradytsijni*” *immigranty u Kyjevi: sim rokviv potomu* [Nontraditional immigrants in Kyiv after seven years]. Kyiv: Stylos.
- Braychevska, O. (1999). Repatriates in Ukraine: The ways of integration. *Migration Issues*, 3, 34–39.
- Braychevska, O., & Malynovska, O. (2002). Afghan community in Kyiv: The formation and socio-demographic characteristics. *Migration Issues*, 2, 36–48.
- Bruck, A., & Kabuzan, V. (1991). *Migratsionnyje protsesy v Rossii I SSSR* [Migration processes in Russia and the USSR]. Moscow: Institute for Scientific Information in Social Sciences, Academy of Science of the USSR.
- Buhay, M. F. (1990). Deportatsiji naselennja Ukrainy (30–50-na rr.) [Deportation of the population of Ukraine (30–50s)]. *Ukrainian History Journal*, 10>, 32–38.
- Cipko, S. (2006). Contemporary migration from Ukraine. In R. R. Rios (Ed.), *Migration perspectives*. Geneva: IOM.
- Diamanti-Karandou, P. (2003). Migration of ethnic Greeks from the former Soviet Union to Greece, 1990–2000: Policy decisions and implications. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 3(1), 25–45.
- Frejka, T., Okólski, M., & Sword, K. (Eds.). (1999). *In-depth studies on migration in central and eastern Europe: The case of Ukraine* (Economic Studies 12, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe). New York/Geneva: United Nations.
- Frolkin, N. M. (1975). *Trudovaja immigratsiya vo Frantsij v novejsheje vremja* [Labour immigration in France in modern times]. Kiev: NaukDumka.
- Gabrielian, O. A., & Petrov, V. P. (1998). *Krymskije tatory: deportatsyja, vozvrashchenije I obustrojsvo* [The Crimean Tatars: Deportation, return and settlement]. Simferopol: Amen.
- Heleniak, T. (2002). *Migration dilemmas haunt post-Soviet Russia, country profiles – migration policy institute*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.
- Hrushevsky, O., & Kutkovets, T. (1992). *Ukrainjtsi v Rosiji: analiz za rezul'tatamy doslidzhennja* [Ukrainians in Russia: Analysis of the study's results]. Moscow: Hrom. Dumka.
- Ilyasov, R. (1999). *Krymskije tatory: kratkij obzor proshlogo i analiz sotsyjal'no-ekonomicheskogo polozhenija nastojashchego* [The Crimean Tatars: A brief overview of the past and analysis of the socio-economic situation of the present]. Simferopol: Krymuchpediz.
- Khomra, A. U. (1979). *Migratsiya naselenija: voprosy teorii, metodiki issledovanija* [Migration of population. Theoretical questions, research methods]. Kyiv: Nauk. Dumka.
- Khomra, A. U. (1987). Planomernost' migratsii pri sotsializme [Systematic nature of migration in the times of socialism]. *Demographic Studies*, 11, 75–91.
- Khomra, A. U. (1990). *Vosproizvodstvo naselenija* [Reproduction of population]. Kiev: Nauk. Dumka.

- Khomra, A. U. (1992). The migration of population of Ukraine in 1959–1988: Basic laws and development tendencies. In *Migration and urbanization of population* (pp. 33–52). Kiev: Nauka. Dumka.
- Klinchenko, T., Malynovska, O., Minhasutdinov, I., & Shamshur, O. (1999). Meskhetian Turks in Ukraine: de-jure nationals, de-facto refugees. *Migration Issues*, 2, 37–48.
- Klinchenko, T., Malynovska, O., Mingazutdinov, I., & Shamshur, O. (2000). Migrant trafficking and human smuggling in Ukraine. In F. Laczo (Ed.), *Migrant trafficking and human smuggling in Europe: A review of the evidence with case studies from Hungary, Poland and Ukraine* (pp. 329–416). Geneva: IOM.
- Levchenko, K. (Ed.). (2006). *Problemy ditej trudovyh mihrantiv: analiz sytuatsiji* [Problems of children of migrant workers: An analysis of the situation]. Kyiv: TOV Agenstvo “Ukraiina”.
- Malinovskaya, E. A. (1984). *Problema trudovoj emigratsii v social'no-ekonomicheskoy politike SFRJ* [The problem of labour emigration in social-economic policy of SFRY]. Kiev: Institute of Economics.
- Malynovska, O. (1999). Repatriatsija v Ukrajinu [Repatriation to Ukraine]. *Migration Issues*, 4, 17–29.
- Malynovska, O. (2006). *Migratsija i migratsijna polityka v Ukrajinu* [Migration and migration policy in Ukraine]. National Institute of International Security Problems. <http://www.niisp.gov.ua/articles/78/>. Accessed 19 Mar 2012.
- Malynovska, O. (2007). Friendship of nations: Meskhetian turks in Ukraine and the presentation of ethnic identity. In T. Trier & A. Khanzhin (Eds.), *The meskhetian turks at the crossroad: Integration, repatriation or resettlement?* (pp. 238–287). Flensburg: European Centre for Minority Issues.
- Malynovska, O. A. (Ed.). (2011). *Social'no-ekonomichni na etno-kul'turni naslidky migratsiji dlja Ukrainy* [Socio-economic and ethno-cultural consequences of migration for Ukraine]. Conference paper 27 September 2011. Kyiv: NIIS.
- Massey, D. (1993). The methodology of an ethnosurvey. In D. J. Bogue (Ed.), *Readings in the methodology of population research*. New York: UNFPA.
- Massey, D., Abarcon, R., Dur, J., & Gonzales, H. (1990). *Return to Aztlan*. Berkley/Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Minhasutdinov, I. (1999). Dejaki obstavyny ta rezultaty repatriatsiji v Ukrajinu 1991–1998 [Some conditions and results of repatriation to Ukraine's 1991–1998]. *Refugees and Migration: Ukrainian Journal of Law and Policy*, 2, 82–91.
- Onikiyenko, V. V., & Popovkin, V. A. (1973). *Kompleksnoje issledovanie migratsionnyh protsessov* [Complex study of migration processes]. Moscow: Statistika.
- Onikiyenko, V. V., Sych, A. S., & Trubenko, B. I. (1975). O territorial'noj mobil'nosti trudovyh resursov [On the territorial mobility of manpower]. In: *Problems of use of human resources*. Kyiv: Nauk. Dumka.
- Perevedentsev, V. I. (1975). *Metody izuchenija migratsii naselenija* [Methods of population's migration study]. Moscow: Nauka.
- Perkovskiy, A., & Pirozhkov, S. I. (1990). Demografichni vtraty narodonaselenija Ukrajin's'koji RSR v 40-h rokah [Demographic losses of the population of the Ukrainian SSR in the 40s]. *Ukrainian History Journal*, 2, 46–50.
- Pirozhkov, S. I., Malynovska, O., & Marchenko, N. (1997). *Zovnishnja mihratsija v Ukrajinu: prychyny, naslidky, stratehiji* [External migration in Ukraine: Causes, consequences, strategies]. Kyiv: Akadempres.
- Pirozhkov, S. I., Malinovskaya, E., & Homra, A. (2003). *Vneshnije trudovyje migratsyi v Ukraine: sotsyal'no-ekonomicheskij aspekt* [Foreign labor migration in Ukraine: Socio-economic aspect]. Kyiv: National Institute for International Security Studies.
- Popok, A. A. (2007). *Zakordonne Ukrajinstvo jak ob'jekt derzhavnoji polityky* [Ukrainians abroad as an object of public policy]. Kyiv: Alterpres.

- Pribytkova, I. M. (1999). *Pravovyje i humanitarnyje problemy reintegratsyi raneje deportirovanyh v Krymu* [Legal and humanitarian issues of reintegration of formerly deported people in Crimea]. Kyiv: Company VAITE.
- Rybakovskiy, L. L. (1987). *Migracija nasrlnija: prognozy, factory, politika* [Migration of population: Prognoses, factors, policy]. Moscow: Nauka.
- Shamshur, O. V. (1987). *Zolotyjr dveri immigratsiji: chto krojetsa za njimi?* ["Golden door" of immigration: What's behind it?] *Kharkov: Prapor*.
- Shemshuchenko, J. (Ed.). (2001). *Nelehal'na mihratsija ta torhivlja zhinkamy v mizhnarodno-pravovomu konteksti* [Illegal migration and trafficking in women in the international legal context]. Kyiv: Institute on state and law of National Academy of Science of Ukraine.
- Shlyepakov, A. (1960). *Ukrajins'ka trudova emigratsij v SSHA I Kanadi (rinetsj 19 – pochatok 20 stolittja* [Ukrainian labour emigration to the USA and Canada (end of the 19th – beginning of the 20th centuries)]. Kyiv: SAUKSSR Publishing.
- Stepanenko, A. V. (1981). *Goroda v uslovijah razvitogo socijalizma* [Cities in the conditions of developed socialism]. Kiev: Nauk Dumka.
- Stepanova, A. P. (1984). *Aktual'nyje problem demografiji v issledovanijah uchenyh USSR* [Urgent demographic problems in the studies of the scholars of the UkSSR]. Kiev: The Institute of Economics of the AS of the UkSSR.
- Steshenko, V. (2001). Mikhail Vasiljevich Ptuka kak demograph 1884–1961 [Mihail Vasiljevich Ptukha as a demographer 1884–1961], *Demoscope weekly*, 35–36. <http://demoscope.ru/weekly/035/nauka03.php>. Accessed 26 Jan 2014.
- Tovkun, V. (1966). *Sovremennaja migratsija naselenija v Ukrajinskoj SSR* [Modern migration of the population in the UkSSR]. Kiev: The UkSSR Productive Forces Study Council.
- Troshchinsky, V. P. (1994). *Mizhvojenna ukrajins'ka emihratsija v Evropi jak istorychne i sotsial'no-ploitychne javyshche* [Inter-war Ukrainian emigration in Europe as a historical and socio-political phenomenon]. Kiev: Intel.
- Troshchinsky, V. P., Shvachka O., & Popok A. (1998). *Emihratsijnyj potentsial osib ukrajins'koho pohodzhennja ta vyhidstv z Ukrajiny – zhyteliv Respubliki Kazakhstan: analitychnyj zvit pro provedene sotsiolohichne doslidzhennja/Mizhnar. orhanizatsija z mihratsiji* [Immigration potential of persons of Ukrainian origin and immigrants from Ukraine-residents of Republic of Kazakhstan: Analytical report on sociological study/International organization for migration]. Kyiv: Pheonix.
- Vollmer, B. (2015). *Ukrainian migration and the european union – dynamics, subjectivity, and politics*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Vollmer, B., Bilan, Y., Lapshyna, I., & Vdovtsova S. (2010). *Ukraine: Country and research areas report*. EUMAGINE Project paper No. 3. Oxford: Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), Centre of Sociological Research (CSR).
- Volosyuk, H., & Pylynsky, J. (2002). Dejaki aspekty formuvannja v'jetnams'koji spil'noty u m. Kyevi [Some aspects of formation of the Vietnam community]. *Migration Issues*, 1, 27–34.
- Western Ukrainian Center. (2003). *Sotsial'ne oblychcha novitnjoji trudovoji mihratsiji: rezul'taty masovoho sotsiologichnogo opytuvannja ukrajins'kyh zarobitchan v Italiji* [Women's perspectives. The social face of the new Ukrainian labor migration: Results of mass survey of Ukrainian workers in Italy]. Lviv: Women's Perspectives Western Ukrainian Centre.
- Yankovska, E. A. (1980). Problemy udoskonalenja upravlinja terytorial'no-galuzevym pererozpodilom trudovyh resursiv [Problems of improvement of territorial and sectoral redistribution of manpower resources management]. *Visn SA UkSSR*, 4, 97–102.
- Yankovskaya, E. A. (1977). *Pereraspredelenije trudovyh resursov* [Redistribution of labour resources]. Kiev: NaukDumka.
- Zagrobaskaya, A. F. (1982). *Migratsija, vosproizvodstvo i urovenj obrazovanija naselenija* [Migration, reproduction and the educational level of the population]. Kiev: NaukDumka.
- Zahrobska, A. F. (1974). *Organizovani pereselenja v systemi migratsiji naselennja URSS* [Organized resettlements in the system of migrations of the population of the UkSSR]. Kiev: NaukDumka.

- Zaionchkovskaya, Z. A. (1972). *Novosjely v gorodah* [New settlers in the cities]. Moscow: Nauka.
- Zaslavska, T. I. (Ed.). (1970). *Migratsija sel'skogo naselenija* [Migration of rural population]. Moscow: Mysl.
- Zayonchkovskaya, Z. (2000). Recent migration trends in the commonwealth of independent states. *International Social Science Journal*, 52(165), 343–355.
- Zinchenko, Y. (1998). *Kryms'ki tatary: Istorychnyj narys* [Crimean Tatars: Historical review]. Kyiv: Institute of Political and Ethnonational research, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine.

Chapter 3

Economic Aspects of Ukrainian Migration to EU Countries

Olga Kupets

3.1 Introduction

Two main phases can be identified in the development of economic migration research in Ukraine. In the 1990s to mid-2000s, descriptive or qualitative studies by demographers, sociologists and other researchers focused predominantly on emigration trends, and migration policy analysis was based on administrative statistics on residential migration, small-scale surveys of migrants or anecdotal evidence (e.g. Pirozhkov et al. 1997; 2003; Pribytkova 2002; 2003; Libanova and Pozniak 2002; Malynovska 2004; Pozniak 2007). Since 2008 more researchers have become involved in economic migration research and their focus has moved increasingly to the assessment of the costs and benefits of migration for Ukraine in the context of the migration-development nexus. The gathering of the first all-Ukrainian micro-level data on labour migration by the State Statistics Service in 2008 gave impetus to these studies, as did the significant improvement in the collection of macro data on personal remittances by the National Bank of Ukraine. The Labour Migration Survey, carried out in May–June 2008, employed the nationally representative combined sample of non-institutional households used in the monthly Labour Force Survey and in the quarterly Household Budget Survey, including in total 22,099 households and 48,054 individuals of working age (UCSR 2009; IDSS 2010).¹ The next survey on labour migration issues using a nationally representative sample was conducted in 2012 as part of the EU–ILO project “Effective Governance of Labour Migration and its Skill Dimensions” (ILO 2013).

There is no single theoretical model that would bring together all aspects of economic migration research. For a systematic classification of numerous studies on

¹It was carried out by the State Statistics Service of Ukraine in cooperation with the Ukrainian Centre for Social Reforms, the Open Ukraine Foundation, IOM, and the World Bank.

O. Kupets (✉)
Kyiv School of Economics, Kyiv, Ukraine
e-mail: kupets@kse.org.ua

Ukrainian labour migration, following Bauer et al. (2005), two main research areas can be identified:

1. Main reasons for migration, factors contributing to the decision to migrate for work and choice of destination country, with a focus on the consequences of the global economic crisis on migration flows between Ukraine and EU countries.
2. The economic impact of migration on Ukraine as a sending country.

The labour market performance of migrants in the destination countries and the effects of migration on destination countries are analyzed extensively in other chapters of this book (see Chap. 6 and Part II).

Analysis of the first theme, which is disproportionately over-represented in the research literature on migration of Ukrainian nationals, is an important prerequisite for a better understanding of the second theme, which is on the agenda of the current migration debate but remains under-researched in Ukraine. Ukrainian researchers tend to share the view that migration of Ukrainian nationals undermines regional and national economies by depriving them of valuable human resource capital, which is then exploited for the benefit of richer countries (for information about the Soviet legacy in contemporary migration research see Chap. 2). This perspective influences the research problems and approaches chosen and has implications for policy. In our review of economic migration research in Ukraine, we seek to consider both positive and negative economic effects of migration and remittances.

3.2 The Economic Aspects of Labour Migration of Ukrainian Nationals to EU Countries

3.2.1 Reasons for Migration and Choice of Destination Country

Reasons for Ukrainian Migration

Although there is an array of theories and conceptual frameworks of migration from the economic perspective, they have typically not been employed by Ukrainian researchers to provide explanations for the behaviour of Ukrainian migrant workers that has been observed. An extensive review of existing theories of labour migration developed by Western, Russian and Ukrainian scholars and the determinants of migration is provided in Maidanik (2010) and IDSS (2010). Maidanik (2010) also describes the patterns of labour migration of Ukrainian youth compared with the older population of working age, analyzes the impact of migration experience on young people (including the issues of the use of savings accumulated abroad for solving housing problems, human trafficking and inter-generational relations) and provides policy recommendations.

Alongside the use of simple statistical analysis or qualitative research to describe the main reasons for Ukrainian migration, Ukrainian researchers have been favouring “push–pull” theory, which has been heavily criticized by Western researchers (De Haas 2010). Quantitative studies also usually lack comparative analysis of the causes of migration among the different migrant groups (by age, gender, skill level, social status, overall economic situation at the time of departure, etc.), and this can often be attributed to samples being small and non-representative. For the same reasons, formal models of migration decision processes have rarely been used to test key hypotheses on the determinants of migration. Nevertheless, studies that predominantly describe the existing status quo without providing much explanation remain very valuable as they contribute to a better understanding of the mechanisms behind migration.

Recent studies of the reasons for Ukrainian labour migration based on various data sources show that the main driving force behind the decision to work abroad is usually labour migrants’ desire to improve the living standards of their families; the major push factor for migration of Ukrainians is low wages and the main pull factor in the destination countries is anticipated higher earnings (ETF 2008; GfK 2008; UCSR 2009; Bogdan 2011; Kupets 2013). Qualitative research based on in-depth interviews with Ukrainian migrants working in European countries (e.g. Ivankova-Stetsiuk 2009; Kys 2010) and focus-group discussions with Ukrainians at home (Kupets et al. 2012) add that it is not only differentials in wage rates that matter for the decision to migrate abroad, but also the lack of stability of earnings in Ukraine due to widespread wage arrears and under-employment in the formal sector and even more acute problems in the informal sector. As a result, many Ukrainians have already chosen long-term labour migration to European countries or are considering the opportunity to secure stable earnings by migrating abroad. Interviews with local employers and population in Italy and Spain suggest that Ukrainians and migrants from other Eastern European countries are not using migration as an economic survival strategy but rather as a strategy to improve living conditions at home (Kys 2010, see also Chaps. 10 and 12).

Unemployment appears to be a less important reason for seeking work abroad than low wages in Ukraine and the possibility of earning quick money abroad (ETF 2008; GfK 2008; UCSR 2009; Bogdan 2011). This is not surprising because unemployment rates defined according to the ILO methodology are lower in Ukraine than in many destination countries, whereas average wages are significantly higher in all destination countries.

One study of the determinants of temporary work abroad among residents of a small town in Ukraine (Hormel and Southworth 2006) found that unemployment increases the odds of temporary labour migration. However, in-depth interviews conducted by the same authors reveal that the majority of the unemployed did not migrate. Estimates based on the Labour Migration Survey show that out of 1.3 million labour migrants in 2007–first half of 2008, only 37.2% were not employed before moving abroad, whereas the rest had jobs in Ukraine but were dissatisfied with their wages (or income in the case of self-employment). This argument is further supported by recent analysis of migration intentions among unemployed school

teachers in Ukraine (Kupets 2013); although four of the seven unemployed teachers interviewed were looking for employment abroad, they considered migration as second best to decent employment in Ukraine. Family reasons, lack of money to finance the move abroad and fear of the unknown (partly due to lack of information about the destination and the absence of social networks abroad) are among the most frequently mentioned factors against realization of migration intentions among the unemployed who were interviewed.

According to Bauer et al. (2005), some labour migrants may also aim to accumulate savings or develop skills while abroad in order to increase their economic opportunities in their places of origin. The evidence suggests (see GfK 2008; Kupets 2013) that most Ukrainian labour migrants who go abroad to earn quick money and reach a definite savings target (usually to improve housing conditions, pay for children's education or buy durable goods) typically assign a much lower priority to professional development and accumulation of skills abroad than to purely economic reasons. The issue of skills development among migrants, particularly among the highly skilled, did receive attention in the ILO–EU project “Effective Governance of Labour Migration and its Skill Dimensions”, which was launched in 2011. Among other outcomes of this project, quantitative and qualitative analysis of international migration among teaching and research professionals shows that due to existing structural barriers, most migrant teachers from Ukrainian schools actually face a trade-off between skills development and low wages in Ukraine, and relatively high earnings but inadequate skills development abroad (Kupets 2013). Meanwhile, better opportunities for professional development and self-advancement abroad are taken very seriously by senior academics and researchers (both potential and current) in their migration decisions and choice of destination. Differences in motivation for migration based on education, skill level and social status need to be further investigated with a larger data set covering representatives of all professions.

Ukrainian Labour Migrants' Choice of Destination Countries

A further interesting research question posed mainly in the foreign-language literature is why Ukrainians seeking better economic opportunities go to Russia, Poland, Eastern or Southern European countries when, according to neoclassical economic theory, they would be expected to go wherever the expected net returns to migration are greatest, for example, to Austria, Germany or Scandinavian countries, which are relatively close to Ukraine and where income and employment opportunities are much better. After a careful analysis of the factors influencing migration decisions of Ukrainians moving from Komsomolsk to Russia and other former Soviet Union (FSU) countries, Hormel and Southworth (2006) conclude that people do not choose destinations exclusively on the basis of expected economic gain. They also use cultural capital (encompassing language, traditions and education) and social capital (ties to people and institutions that facilitate finding jobs and housing abroad) to diversify risk and maximize utility. Similar conclusions can be drawn from a study

of Ukrainian teachers working abroad in low-skilled jobs, according to which the most popular reasons for choosing a particular destination country were “having relatives/friends abroad” and “better employment and/or income opportunities compared to other countries”, followed by “knowledge of language of that country” and “geographical/cultural proximity of the country to Ukraine” (Kupets 2013). At the same time, quite important reasons also reported by over 20% of respondents were the relative ease of gaining visas, work/residence permits and irregular entry to the country of current destination.

A growing number of policy studies on Ukraine’s path toward a visa-free regime with the EU² suggest that visa issues are quite important for the choice of destination country, the economic performance of Ukrainians abroad and the consequences of the migration experience for both sending and receiving countries. In one sociological survey³ that only partially supports this statement, an absolute majority of Ukrainian respondents did not consider the visa regime with Europe to be a significant barrier to their emigration or labour migration, and reported their lack of financial means to be the major obstacle (Kipen and Avksentiev 2011). An interesting study by Weinar et al. (2012) that looks at the Schengen visa regime as a tool of labour migration policy and assesses the potential impact of liberalization of the visa regime on migratory movements between Ukraine and Moldova and the EU finds that the current Schengen visa regime has not been particularly successful in protecting labour markets in the destination countries from the flow of immigrant workers from Ukraine and Moldova. Szulecka (Chap. 4) discusses the impact of visa regimes on Ukrainian migrants in detail. Such a regime restricts the development prospects of the countries of origin by limiting circular migration, intellectual capital circulation and business exchanges. Fedyuk (Chap. 5) provides a critical analysis of the so-called social costs of Ukrainian labour migration.

The Changing Economic Situation in Ukraine and Destination Countries and Its Impact on Migration Flows

The third question with respect to economically driven migration of Ukrainians that deserves special attention is whether the improving labour market situation and living conditions in Ukraine before the global financial crisis that began in 2008 and the worsening situation in many European countries have caused migration flows to decrease and return migration flows to increase. This question remains

²See also publications of the NGO Europe Without Barriers at <http://novisa.com.ua/en/publics>

³The nationwide sociological survey “Migration potential of Ukraine in the context of acquiring a visa-free regime with the EU” was carried out in 2011 by the Donetsk Institute of Social Research and Policy Analysis with the support of Europe Without Barriers, a consortium of NGOs and think tanks set up by the International Renaissance Foundation. The results are presented in Kipen and Avksentiev (2011).

under-researched because of the absence of comparative longitudinal data.⁴ The limited evidence available from administrative statistics in destination countries, surveys, focus-group discussions and in-depth interviews with migrants (e.g. IDSS 2010; Ivankova-Stetsiuk 2009; Stakanov 2011) has provided mixed results. Long-term migration flows from Ukraine seem to have decreased, particularly among highly skilled professionals providing knowledge-intensive services. ICT professionals benefit from better employment opportunities in Ukraine due to increasing outsourcing by foreign companies (Kupets 2013). On the other hand, an increasing number of students and young researchers are attracted by better opportunities for education and professional development abroad. For example, according to UNESCO's Institute for Statistics,⁵ the number of mobile students from Ukraine studying abroad at tertiary level increased from 25,826 (or 0.94% of total tertiary enrolment in Ukraine) in 2006 to 38,666 (or 1.62%) in 2012.

Migration intensity among less skilled Ukrainians seeking work abroad has not decreased but rather has changed character: more and more Ukrainians prefer short-term and circular migration, predominantly to neighbouring countries such as Russia and Poland whose labour markets were not as greatly affected by the crisis and are typically more open to Ukrainian workers. See, for example, the findings of two surveys of working-age individuals conducted in 2007 and 2011 in Ternopil Oblast, which is a migrant-exporting region in Ukraine (Shushpanov 2011), the analysis of labour force reallocation in Eastern Europe with two main attraction centres for migrants – Poland and Russia – (Kozynskii 2011) and the study of circular migration between Ukraine and Poland by Iglicka et al. (2011). See also Chap. 7 for a review of studies on Ukrainian migration to Poland.

As regards return migration, few of the Ukrainians who have been working in Southern or Western European countries for several years have chosen to return to Ukraine because of the fear of uncertainty at home and strong pull factors abroad, such as income differentials and a better quality of life (IDSS 2010; Stakanov 2011). Economic recession and decreasing labour demand have forced long-term labour migrants from Ukraine to consider self-employment or sectors that are less sensitive to business-cycle fluctuations; some of those who worked legally and lost their jobs because of the crisis moved onto welfare (Stakanov 2011; see also Chap. 8 on the Czech Republic, and Chap. 9 on Greece). For example, according to Marques and Góis (2007) since 2003 thousands of Ukrainians have left Portugal, seeking better income and employment opportunities in other European countries, such as Spain, France or the UK (see also Chap. 11). At the same time, such sectors as care, household or services have hardly been affected by the crisis, thus allowing Ukrainians, especially regularized women, to keep their jobs (UCSR 2009; IDSS 2010; Levchenko et al. 2010).

⁴The situation may change when the data from the 2012 wave of Labour Migration Survey becomes available to the wider research community.

⁵See <http://data.uis.unesco.org> (Accessed 4 Apr 2014).

3.2.2 *The Economic Impact of Migration on Ukraine as a Sending Country*

Migration research in this area can be classified in many ways, one of which is according to the channels by which migration can affect the sending economy. The first part of the literature discusses the direct effects of emigration on the labour market, population stock and economic growth. The second concentrates on the effects of remittances, with a preliminary analysis of their trends and determinants (Leontiyeva and Tollarová 2011). The third deals with the analysis of return migration and its possible impacts. Finally, the fourth part of the literature, which is not described in detail below, is devoted to other aspects of migration, including the entrepreneurial potential of migrants' children (Maidanik 2011); the impact of migration on the education of the younger generation through incentive (or disincentive) effects and remittances (Vakhitova et al. 2013); projected skill needs in Ukraine and EU countries (Kolyshko and Panzica 2013); and the impact of international migration of teaching and research professionals on Ukraine's education system and economic development through various channels, including the intellectual diaspora (Kupets 2013). There are also synthesis studies such as Malynovska (2011) or IDSS (2010) that analyze various possible effects of labour migration from Ukraine. A comprehensive study of the costs and benefits of labour mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine), with forecasts of future migration flows and implications for sending and destination areas, is the main outcome of an EU-funded project.⁶

Direct Impact of Migration on the Ukrainian Economy and Population

In the group of studies on the economic and demographic effects of Ukrainian labour migration, the research of O. Pozniak (2007, 2012), deserves special mention. In his research paper, prepared as part of the CARIM-East project in 2012, he estimated that adjusted numbers for *de jure* population at the beginning of 2008, taking into account labour migration (on estimates of Ukrainian labour migrants, see Chap. 1), would be about 583,000 (or 1.3%) lower than the official statistics of the State Statistics Service of Ukraine showed (45,609,000 vs. 46,192,000 people). Besides, the share of people aged 65 and over in this "adjusted" *de jure* population would be slightly larger (16.5% vs. 16.3%). These estimates suggest that labour migration negatively affects the population stock and its age structure. The effects of labour migration on other demographic indicators such as birth, fertility,

⁶ See http://www.enpi-info.eu/main.php?id=18637&id_type=4&lang_id=450. The project was carried out by a consortium composed of CASE (Warsaw), IZA (Bonn), CEU (Budapest), the London School of Economics Enterprise and local partners in the EaP countries, including Kyiv School of Economics in Ukraine, in 2011–13. The outcomes of the project are available at http://www.case-research.eu/en/migration_ENPI (Accessed 1 July 2013).

marriage, divorce and mortality rates are not estimated because of the lack of reliable statistics.

At the same time, Pozniak (2012) found empirical support for a hypothesis of the positive effect of migration on the Ukrainian labour market: the unemployment rate in the first half of 2008 would be almost twice as high (12.2% vs. 6.2%) had Ukrainians not migrated abroad or had all labour migrants returned at once. Although labour migration undoubtedly provided temporary relief from unemployment in Ukraine, particularly in the late 1990s–early 2000s, assessment of the quantitative effect, based on the assumption that all labour migrants would be otherwise unemployed in Ukraine, is not conclusive.

The other side of the coin with respect to the impact of international migration on labour supply is that Ukraine is expected to face severe labour shortages very soon because the working-age population is shrinking due to natural population decrease and emigration of working-age individuals, return migration of Ukrainians (many of whom have already settled abroad) seems to be very small and immigration alone is insufficient to compensate for population losses. There are already signs of shortages of health workers, teachers, construction workers, welders and drivers in some migrant sending regions, and most worryingly, these are often the most active and entrepreneurial people (Malynovska 2011). According to projections made by the Institute of Demography and Social Studies, the first signs of labour shortage in Ukraine will show in 7 years and in 10–12 years' time this problem will be more evident. It is estimated that between 2012 and 2061, a total of 7.9 million additional workers will be needed (Pozniak 2012).

Some researchers also stress that there may be skill shortages even in the case of large flows of return migrants due to widespread skill downgrading while working abroad and the low economic activity of those who intend to go abroad again (Bogdan 2011; Kupets 2011). Besides, there is anecdotal evidence of the moral hazard problem induced by migration and remittances, which is reflected in decreasing economic activity among the members of households with at least one labour migrant, particularly among the young, though this fact is not statistically proven (IDSS 2010).

Another frequently mentioned concern in the Ukrainian literature and mass media is the “brain drain” or large-scale emigration of highly skilled professionals including scientists, engineers, doctors and IT specialists (Kupets 2013). One important implication is that investment in education in Ukraine may not lead to faster innovation-led economic growth because a large number of its highly educated people leave the country. However, some researchers focusing on the subject argue that the problem of emigration of highly skilled professionals is often exaggerated and mythicized because available statistical information is scarce and inconclusive (Parkhomenko 2006; Genov 2007). Currently, nobody in Ukraine can say with certainty how many highly skilled professionals leave the country each year, how these numbers change over time and how they compare to the total stock of professionals remaining. As regards the outflow of Ukrainian scientists, analysis of administrative statistics reported by the State Statistics Service of Ukraine reveals a decreasing level of emigration for permanent residence abroad (e.g. from 184 PhD

students in 1996 to 51 in 2012, and from 59 individuals with a PhD degree in 1995 to 5 in 2012) and an increase in short-term academic trips and international scientific collaboration (Kupets 2013; see also Chap. 1). Furthermore, intellectual migration is increasingly driven more by opportunity than by needs as it was in the 1990s.

Trends, Determinants and Economic Effects of Remittances

Earlier studies on remittances focused on estimates of their size or descriptions of trends and macro- or micro-level characteristics (see, e.g., Haidutsii (2007a, 2007b) for a macro-level descriptive analysis; UCSR (2009) and IDSS (2010) for description of remittances at the household level). Libanova (2011) contributed to the literature by analyzing the impact of private remittances on poverty and income inequality in Ukraine. As expected, remittances are found to have positive effects on the material well-being of recipient households. At macro level they played an important role in reducing the incidence and severity of poverty. But they also increased income inequality, being the fourth important determinant after wages, pensions and entrepreneurial income. Several recent studies in the Czech Republic (Leontiyeva and Tollarová 2011; Strielkowski 2011; Strielkowski et al. 2012) show that there is no significant correlation between the amounts remitted and the income level of the receiving household, and that receiving remittances lowers the odds of spending household income primarily on current consumption but increases the odds of spending it on education and housing (Strielkowski et al. 2012; see also Chap. 8). The empirical estimation of the education demand on the household by Vakhitova et al. (2013) reveals that, after controlling for other factors, average expenditures on education among remittance-receiving households are larger but marginal propensity to invest in education is higher among non-receiving households. This finding implies that remittance-receiving households tend to spend less from each additional unit of income and therefore an increase in remittances is unlikely to substantially contribute to the demand for education in Ukraine.

An attempt to provide a synthesis of existing and emerging scholarly knowledge on the effects of remittances in Ukraine and other CIS countries was recently supported by the CARIM-East project (Kupets 2012). The author reviewed the descriptive and empirical literature, provided analysis where possible, offered policy implications and identified gaps in the literature. Analysis of official statistics on remittance flows in Ukraine revealed that remittances in US\$ rose steadily until 2008 but as the domestic economy and the economies of Russia and the EU – the major regional sources for remittances into Ukraine – went into crisis in 2009, inflows slightly decreased. Nevertheless, the decline in remittances and their volatility was smaller than those of foreign direct investment (Fig. 3.1). At the same time, the amount of remittance inflows measured in local currency increased steadily, acting as a hedge against negative shocks in the home country for recipient households. Due to the rapid recovery, almost to pre-crisis level, of remittances from Russia in 2010, total inflows to Ukraine also increased. This demonstrates the heavy dependence of the Ukrainian economy on that of Russia, not only in terms of the frequently




Fig. 3.1 Remittances and foreign direct investment to Ukraine, 2005–2011 (*Source:* World Development Indicators on-line data set (Accessed July 2013))

mentioned international trade and financial channels, but also in terms of remittances. The main conclusion of the study is that the development effects of remittances in Ukraine are often contradictory and contingent upon many factors, and that there is still much to be done to gain a better understanding of the factors influencing remittance behaviour of migrants and spending behaviour of remittance-receiving households.

Return Migration and its Developmental Potential

Research studies dealing with the effects of return migration on the Ukrainian economy and demographic profile can be divided into two types. The first is based on qualitative research – in-depth interviews and focus-group discussions with migrants and experts – and provides a deep insight into migrants' experiences, their return intentions and problems encountered (Ivankova-Stetsiuk 2009; Kys 2010; Kubal 2012). Kys (2010) identified two main groups of returners: (i) the “disappointed”, who returned because of nostalgia for home and family, unwillingness to live with the humiliating status of a foreigner and a slave, or the impossibility of earning the desired amount; and (ii) the “missionaries” returning home after the successful completion of their mission, such as a savings goal, end of employment contract or an attractive job offer in Ukraine.

Studies of the second type are mainly quantitative, and complement or support the findings of qualitative research. For example, the typology of return migrants offered by Kupets (2011) is very similar to the one mentioned above but there is also information on the proportion of each group of return migrants: (i) “retirement return”, 4.8%; (ii) “innovation return”, 2.5%; (iii) “conservatism return” (“missionaries” in the Kys typology), 37.5%; and (iv) “failure return” (Kys’ “disappointed”

plus deportees), 55.2%. So, very few returnees were innovative agents of change who invested in their own business and created jobs, probably due to existing entry barriers, the high administrative costs of doing business, inadequate contract enforcement and other barriers to business in Ukraine. This study, which is based on 2008 Labour Migration Survey data, examines observable characteristics of return labour migrants, identifies the factors determining return decisions and analyzes the performance of return labour migrants in Ukraine compared to non-migrants, applying the multinomial probit model and correcting for sample selection bias into return migration. The study concludes that so far there is no strong evidence of “brain gain” from return labour migration in Ukraine because of the skill waste experienced in the host countries, the disadvantages of return migrant status and the low probability of finding suitable work in Ukraine because of high reservation wage⁷ among (former) migrants.

A quantitative study by Markov (2006) based on a survey of Ukrainian migrants in Italy in 2002–2003 looks at the plans of migrants willing to return in terms of their entrepreneurial characteristics and potential economic activity in Ukraine. Two other quantitative studies of return migration (ETF 2008; Bogdan 2011) also provide policy recommendations on how to integrate returning migrants into the local community and labour market, and how to harness the contribution of return labour migration for Ukraine’s development taking into account the high propensity of former migrants to set up entrepreneurial activity and create jobs. In particular, the latter study emphasizes the need for a long overdue national policy on reintegration of return migrants in Ukraine, the highlights of which should cover (a) coordination with EU states’ programmes on assisted voluntary return for Ukrainian nationals; (b) comprehensive and widely distributed information about the points of the reintegration policies supported by the Ukrainian state; (c) close cooperation with regional and local authorities on programmes providing temporary housing and support with employment for the return migrants; and (d) availability of micro-credit for entrepreneurial projects by return migrants (Bogdan 2011).

The Institute of Demography and Social Studies macro-level studies (IDSS 2010; Pozniak 2012) estimated that if all migrants working abroad as own-account workers and employers (16% and 4.7% of all labour migrants in 2007–2008 respectively) had returned to Ukraine and retained the same employment status, the unemployment rate would have decreased from 6.2% to 5.6% or 5.4% depending on the number of employees hired by each entrepreneur among returnees (three or five employees on average). This could also have increased tax revenues by €18 million from entrepreneurs themselves plus between €24 million and €40 million as personal income tax from their employees. Between €43 million and €72 million could also have been saved from the State Unemployment Insurance Fund if these entrepreneurs hired the former registered unemployed (Pozniak 2012). However, these effects are mere hypotheses because as yet conditions in Ukraine are not propitious

⁷A reservation wage is the lowest wage rate at which a worker would be willing to accept a particular type of job.

for small businesses to make productive investments and establish supply-chain relations with foreign colleagues.

3.3 Conclusions

The above overview of the literature dealing with economic aspects of Ukrainian labour migration to the EU and other countries gave information on the main trends and findings of the research. However, it is by no means exhaustive, given that there are plenty of short and fragmentary studies that simply duplicate previous work, and the long monographs of several authors lack consistency and clear focus.

Significant progress has been made in qualitative research on labour migration issues. Below we identify several topics that deserve further research attention, given their academic and policy importance:

- Reasons for migration depend on education and skills (not only level but also field), social status of migrants and other individual and family characteristics.
- The determinants of various types of migration (by purpose – education; employment; family reunification, etc.; skill level of migrants; duration and frequency) and selectivity issues.
- Labour market behaviour of household members receiving remittances compared to other households.
- The degree of substitutability between international and internal labour migration.
- The relationship between the ageing of the Ukrainian population, labour migration and labour market situation, given that older workers are less mobile and so are less likely to respond to economic shocks by migrating. Besides, ageing population increases demand for care services that may raise the issue of “care drain” because of mass migration of Ukrainian women caring for the elderly abroad but not for their parents in Ukraine.
- The impact of growing youth unemployment in European countries on migration motives of young Ukrainians seeking a better life.
- The impact of the global economic crisis on migration behaviour, the magnitude, type and composition of migration flows, with a subsequent analysis of the effects of these changes on pertinent economies. It would also be good to examine carefully the phenomenon of “temporary return” (found by Hosnedlová (2012) in Spain among unemployed Ukrainians who have a residence/work permit and return to Ukraine for a time) and its consequences for both Ukraine and countries where many Ukrainians have become naturalized or at least regularized but have subsequently lost their jobs because of the economic crisis.

Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, duplication, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give

appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included in the work's Creative Commons license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory regulation, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or reproduce the material.

References

- Bauer, T. K., Haisken-DeNew, J. P., & Schmidt, C. M. (2005). Chapter 7. International labour migration, economic growth and labour markets: The current state of affairs. In M. Macura, A. L. MacDonald, & W. Haug (Eds.), *The New demographic regime: Population challenges and policy responses* (pp. 111–135). New York/Geneva: United Nations.
- Bogdan, T. (2011). Labor migrants' problems – Acute policy challenge for Ukraine. Study carried out in the framework of local government initiative fellowship 2010/2011 within the Open Society Foundation's (OSF) project "Developing Economic Reintegration Initiatives for Ukrainian Labor Migrants". Available at: http://mirpal.org/files/files/Article_2%20%D0%98%D0%BD%D1%84%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%8F.pdf
- De Haas, H. (2010). Migration and development: A theoretical perspective. *International Migration Review*, 44(1), 227–264.
- European Training Foundation (ETF). (2008). *The contribution of human resources development to migration policy in Ukraine*, Turin: ETF, working document. Available at: http://etf.europa.eu/web.nsf/pages/The_contribution_of_human_resources_development_to_migration_policy_in_Ukraine_EN
- Genov, N. (2007). Brain-Drain from eastern Europe? What we know about and What Not?, paper presented at the second IZA workshop on EU enlargement and the labor markets in Bonn, 7–8 September 2007. Available at: http://www.iza.org/conference_files/EUEnlarge2007/genov_n3662.pdf
- GfK. (2008). *Human trafficking survey: Belarus, Bulgaria Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine*, prepared by the GfK Ukraine for the International Organization for Migration, Kyiv Office.
- Haidutskii, A. (2007a). *Masshtaby potokiv migratsiynogo kapitalu v Ukrayinu* [Magnitude of migration capital flows to Ukraine]. *Herald of the National Bank of Ukraine*, 10, 11–15.
- Haidutskii, A. (2007b). *Migratsiyniy kapital v Ukrayini* [Migration capital in Ukraine]. *Finances of Ukraine*, 5, 24–37.
- Hormel, L. & Southworth, C. (2006, Jun). Eastward bound: A case study of Post-Soviet labour migration from a rural Ukrainian town, *Europe-Asia Studies*, 58(4), 603–623.
- Hosnedlová, R. (2012). *Decidiendo el futuro: la cuestión de retorno y redes personales de los inmigrantes ucranianos en la Comunidad de Madrid*. Doctoral thesis, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España.
- Iglicka, K., Gmaj, K., & Borodzicz-Smoliński, W. (2011). Circular migration patterns. Migration between Ukraine and Poland. METOIKOS Project, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute.
- Institute of Demography and Social Studies of NASU (IDSS). (2010). *Naseleennya Ukrayiny. Trudova emigratsiya z Ukrayiny* [Population of Ukraine. Labour emigration from Ukraine]. Kyiv: IDSS.
- International Labour Organization (ILO). (2013). *Report on the methodology, organization and results of a modular sample survey on labour migration*. Kyiv/Budapest: ILO/ILO Decent Work Technical Support Team and Country Office for Central and Eastern Europe.
- Ivankova-Stetsiuk, O. (2009). *Ukrayinska trudova migratsiya v yakisnomu vymiri: za materialami glybynyh interv'yu ta fokus-grup* [Ukrainian labour migration in the qualitative dimension:

- Based on the materials of In-depth interviews and focus groups]. In I. Markov (Ed.), *Na rozdorizhzi. Analitychni materialy kompleksnogo doslidzhennya protsesiv ukrayinskoyi trudovoyi migratsiyi (krayini Evropeyskogo Soyuzu i Rosiyska Federatsiya)* [At the crossroads: Analytical materials of the complex research on Ukrainian labour migration (Countries of the European Union and Russian Federation)] (pp. 123–190). Lviv: Caritas Foundation.
- Kipen, V., & Avksentiev, M. (2011). *Mihratsijnyj capital Ukrajiny v kontekstivizovohorezhymu z ES: analitychnyjzvit*. [Migration potential of Ukraine in the context of acquiring a visa-free regime with the EU: Analytical report], Institute of Social Research and Political Analysis, Donetsk: Institute of Social Research and Political Analysis.
- Kolyshko, R., & Panzica, F. (2013). Analysis of vacancies and skills needs in Moldova and Ukraine and EU countries of destination. Report prepared for the ILO–EU project “Effective Governance of Labour Migration and its Skill Dimensions”.
- Kozynskii, S. (2011). Migratsiya robochoyi syly ta konkurentospromozhnist natsionalnyh ekonomik u shidnoevropeyskomu regioni: vyklyky dlya Ukrainy [Migration of the labour force and competitiveness of the national economies in the eastern European region: Challenges for Ukraine]. In O. Malynovska (Ed.), *Sotsialno-ekonomichni ta etnokulturni naslidki migratsiyi dlya Ukrainy: zb. materialiv nauk.-prakt. konferentsiyi* [Socio-Economic, ethnic and cultural consequences of migration for Ukraine: Conference proceedings] (pp. 62–71). Kyiv: National Institute for Strategic Studies.
- Kubal, A. (2012). *Facts and fabrications. Experiences of law and legality among return migrants in Ukraine*. Working Paper No. 59/2012. Oxford: International Migration Institute. Available at: <http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/publications/imi-working-papers/wp-59-2012-facts-and-fabrications-experiences-of-law-and-legality-among-return-migrants-in-ukraine>
- Kupets, O. (2011). *Brain gain or brain waste? The performance of return labor migrants in the Ukrainian labor market*. Working paper No 11/06E. Kiev: EERC. Available at: http://www.eerc.ru/default/download/creater/working_papers/file/e06582977985dd1176007ac43d796aac23edca8.pdf
- Kupets, O. (2012). The development and the side effects of remittances in the CIS countries: The case of Ukraine. CARIM-East Research Report 2012/02. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute. Available at: <http://www.carim-east.eu/media/CARIM-East-2012-02.pdf>
- Kupets, O. (2013). *International mobility of Ukrainian teaching and research professionals*. Kyiv/Budapest: ILO/ILO Decent Work Technical Support Team and Country Office for Central and Eastern Europe.
- Kupets, O., Babenko S., & Vakhitov V. (2012). Ukraine Case Study: Jobs and Demographic Change. A background paper prepared for the World Development Report 2013. Available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTNWDR2013/Resources/8258024-1320950747192/8260293-13209567112276/8261091-1348683883703/WDR2013_bp_Jobs_And_Demographic_Change.pdf
- Kys, R. (Ed.). (2010). *Trudova migratsiya yak instrument internatsionalizatsiyi. Zbirka materialiv kompleksnogo doslidzhennya trudovoyi migratsiyi i rynkiv pratsi (Ispaniya, Italiya, Moldova, Ukrayina, Rosiyska Federatsiya)* [Labour migration as a tool of internationalization. A collection of materials of the complex research on labour migration and labour markets (Spain, Italy, Moldova, Ukraine, Russian Federation)]. Lviv: Drukarski kunshyty.
- Leontiyeva, Y., & Tollarová, B. (2011). *Results from a survey of foreigners' incomes, expenditures and remittances. Main findings concerning remittances*. Prague: Sociologický ústav AV ČR. Available at: <http://www.soc.cas.cz/articles/cz/5/6127/Leontiyeva-Y.-B.-Tollarova-2011.-8222-Resultsfrom-a-Survey-of-Foreigners-8217-Incomes-Expenditures-and-Remittances.-Main-Findings-Concerning-Remittances-8220.-Praha-Sociologicky-ustav-AV-CR-v.v.i.html>
- Levchenko, K., Malinovskaya, E., Shvab, I., & Trofimenko, O. (2010). *Ukrainskaya Gretsia: prychyny, problemy, perspektivy (po rezul'tatam oprosa trudovyh migrantov)* [Ukrainian

- Greece: Reasons, problems, prospects (according to labour migrants' interviews)]. Institute of Sociology NASU and International Women's Rights Centre La Strada Ukraine, Kyiv: Agency Ukraine.
- Libanova, E. (2011). Migratsiyni transferty, bidnist ta nerivnist v Ukraini [Remittances, poverty and inequality in Ukraine]. In O. Malynovska (Ed.), *Sotsialno-ekonomichni ta etnokulturni naslidki migratsiyi dlya Ukrainy: zb. materialiv nauk.-prakt. konferentsiyi* [Socio-Economic, ethnic and cultural consequences of migration for Ukraine: Conference proceedings] (pp. 15–25). Kyiv: National Institute for Strategic Studies.
- Libanova, E., & Pozniak, O. (Eds). (2002). *Zovnishni trudovi migratsiyi naseleennya Ukrainy* [External labour migration of the Ukrainian population]. Kyiv: RVPS.
- Maidanik, I. (2010). *Ukrayinska molod na rynkah pratsi zarubizhnyh krayin* [Ukrainian youth on the foreign labour markets]. Kyiv: Institute of Demography and Social Studies of NASU.
- Maidanik, I. (2011). Pidpryemnytskiy potentsial ditey trudovyh migrantiv v Ukraini [Entrepreneurial potential of labour migrants' children in Ukraine]. In O. Malynovska (Ed.), *Sotsialno-ekonomichni ta etnokulturni naslidki migratsiyi dlya Ukrainy: zb. materialiv nauk.-prakt. konferentsiyi* [Socio-Economic, ethnic and cultural consequences of migration for Ukraine: conference proceedings] (pp. 131–142). Kyiv: National Institute for Strategic Studies.
- Malynovska, O. (2004). *Ukrayina, Evropa, migratsiya: migratsiyi naseleennya Ukrainy v umovah rozshyrennya ES* [Ukraine, Europe, Migration: Migration of the Ukrainian population under conditions of the EU enlargement]. Kyiv: Blank-Press.
- Malynovska, O. (2011). *Trudova migratsiya: sotsialni naslidki ta shlyahy reaguvannya* [Labour migration: Social consequences and political response]. Kyiv: National Institute for Strategic Studies. Available at: <http://www.niss.gov.ua/articles/607/>
- Markov, I. (2006). *Deyaki rysy suchasnoyi ukrayinskoyi trudovoyi migratsiyi* [Some peculiarities of the present-day Ukrainian labour migration]. *Independent Culturological Magazine "Ji"*, (pp. 65–72). Available at: <http://www.ji-magazine.lviv.ua/ji-junior/loginov/markov.htm>
- Marques, J. C., & Góis, P. (2007). Ukrainian migration to Portugal. From non-existence to the top three immigrant groups. *migrationonline.cz*. Available at: http://aa.ecn.cz/img_upload/3bfc4ddc48d13ae0415c78ceae108bf5/JCMarquesPGois_UkrainiansinPortugal.pdf
- Parkhomenko, N. (2006). Brain drain from Ukraine: Current situation and future challenges. Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine (CPCFPU), Policy Paper 3/2006. Available at: <http://cpcfpu.ru/en/projects/foreignpolicy/papers/306/>
- Pirozhkov, S., Malynovska, O., & Marchenko, N. (1997). *Zovnishnya migratsiya v Ukraini: prychny, naslidki, strategiyi* [External Ukrainian migration: Causes, consequences and strategies]. UNECE, National Institute of Strategic Studies, Kyiv: Academpress.
- Pirozhkov, S., Malinovskaya, E., & Homra, A. (2003). *Vneshnie trudovyye migratsii v Ukraine: sotsialno-ekonomicheskiy aspekty* [Foreign labour migration in Ukraine: Socio-economic aspects]. Kiev: NIPMB.
- Pozniak, O. (Ed.). (2007). *Migratsiyni protsesy v Ukraini: suchasniy stan i perspektivy* [Migration trends in Ukraine: Current situation and future prospects]. Uman: SPD Sochynskiy.
- Pozniak, O. (2012). *External labour migration in Ukraine as a factor in socio-demographic and economic development*. CARIM-East RR 2012/14, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute. Available at: <http://www.carim-east.eu/media/CARIM-East-2012-RR-14.pdf>
- Pribytkova, I. (2002). *Trudovi migranty u sotsialniyy ierarhiyi ukrayinskogo suspilstva: statusni pozitsiyi, tsinnosti, zhittevi strategiyi, styl i sposib zhyttya* [Labor migrants in the hierarchy of the Ukrainian society: status, values, life strategies and life style]. *Part I, Sociology: theory, methods and marketing*, 4, 156–167.
- Pribytkova, I. (2003). *Trudovi migranty u sotsialniyy ierarhiyi ukrayinskogo suspilstva: statusni pozitsiyi, tsinnosti, zhittevi strategiyi, styl i sposib zhyttya* [Labor migrants in the hierarchy of the Ukrainian society: status, values, life strategies and life style]. *Part II, Sociology: theory, methods and marketing*, 1, 109–124.

- Shushpanov, P. (2011). Novitni tendentsiyi zovnishnoyi trudovoyi migratsiy naselennya Ternopil'skoyi oblasti [New trends in International labour migration of population in Ternopil Oblast]. In O. Malynovska (Ed.), *Sotsialno-ekonomichni ta etnokulturni naslidki migratsiyi dlya Ukraïny: zb. materialiv nauk.-prakt. konferentsiyi* [Socio-Economic, ethnic and cultural consequences of migration for Ukraine: conference proceedings] (pp. 150–154). Kyiv: National Institute for Strategic Studies.
- Stakanov, R. (2011). Trudova emigratsiya do ta pislya svitovoyi kryzy: perspektyvy ta naslidky dlya ekonomiky Ukrayiny [Labour emigration before and after the global crisis: Prospects and consequences for the Ukrainian economy]. In O. Malynovska (Ed.), *Sotsialno-ekonomichni ta etnokulturni naslidki migratsiyi dlya Ukraïny: zb. materialiv nauk.-prakt. konferentsiyi* [Socio-Economic, ethnic and cultural consequences of migration for Ukraine: conference proceedings] (pp. 72–82). Kyiv: National Institute for Strategic Studies.
- Strielkowski, W. (2011). Tovarno-denezhnyie perevodyi iz Chehii v Ukrainu: issledovanie v ramkah proekta po izucheniyu ukrainskoy migratsii [Remittances from Czechia to Ukraine: Study within the project on Ukrainian migration research]. In O. Malynovska (Ed.), *Sotsialno-ekonomichni ta etnokulturni naslidki migratsiyi dlya Ukraïny: zb. materialiv nauk.-prakt. konferentsiyi* [Socio-Economic, ethnic and cultural consequences of migration for Ukraine: conference proceedings] (pp. 115–121). Kyiv: National Institute for Strategic Studies.
- Strielkowski, W., Glazar O., & Weyskrabová B. (2012). *Migration and remittances in the CEECs: A case study of Ukrainian labour migrants in the Czech Republic*. Working Paper No. 19/2012, Prague: Institute of Economic Studies, Charles University. Available at: <http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz/default/file/download/id/20821>
- Ukrainian Centre for Social Reforms (UCSR), State Statistics Committee of Ukraine. (2009). *Zovnishnya trudova migratsiya naselennya Ukrayiny* [International labour migration of the Ukrainian population]. Kyiv: UCSR.
- Vakhitova, G., Coupe, T., & Sologoub, I. (2013). *The relations between education and migration in Ukraine*. Kyiv/Budapest: ILO/ILO Decent Work Technical Support Team and Country Office for Central and Eastern Europe.
- Weinar, A., Korneev, O., Makaryan, S., & Mananashvili, S. (2012). *Consequences of Schengen Visa liberalisation for the citizens of Ukraine and the republic of Moldova*. MPC Research Report 2012/1, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute.

Chapter 4

Regulating Movement of the Very Mobile: Selected Legal and Policy Aspects of Ukrainian Migration to EU Countries

Monika Szulecka

4.1 Introduction

Analyzing the legal and policy aspects of the mobility of Ukrainian citizens requires clarification of what in fact influences this mobility in a legal and institutional sense. Primarily, it is migration policy, which may be understood as a state's system of regulations and practices towards foreigners as well as its own citizens leaving for other countries (potential and real migrants) together with its normative substantiation and executive institutions (see Lesińska et al. 2011). More specifically, immigration policy targeting incomers should be studied for the purposes of the analysis presented in this chapter, since the focus is on Ukrainian citizens coming to the European Union and to individual countries. Immigration policy is implemented through various kinds of policy instruments. Immigration law is regarded as the so-called “hard” policy instrument due to its binding nature and the consequences of law infringements. Besides regulations (such as employer sanctions or regularization programmes introduced by concrete laws), there are also “soft” policy instrument, such as guidelines or best practices to be followed. Currently immigration policies are based not only on control principles (although in the light of the immigrant/asylum crisis of 2015 the main focus on control has been reinforced) aimed at governing the inflow and stay of foreigners, but also on integration principles, a direct result of the need to deal with ethnic diversity and provide support for migrants' adaptation in a growing number of states.

The chapter is partly based on the draft text titled “Legal aspects of Ukrainian migration to the EU countries in the light of their changing migration policies and laws” prepared in 2014 by Michaela Marouf, Marina Nikolova and Monika Szulecka as the input to the state of the art on Ukrainians' migration to the EU elaborated within IMISCOE research initiative.

M. Szulecka (✉)

Centre of Migration Research, University of Warsaw, Warszawa, Poland

The Institute of Law Studies, The Polish Academy of Sciences, Warszawa, Poland

e-mail: m.szulecka@uw.edu.pl

Importantly, the relation between migration policy and the law in force in a given state is not always concurrent. It may happen that the law in force has not been adjusted to take account of established policy goals, especially if they change relatively quickly. It is also possible that the state has almost no migration policy, which is more probable when cross-border mobility is not considered an issue in public debate. Then migration governance is usually limited to border control and establishing basic regulations regarding foreigners' stay in a given country (see e.g. Duszczek 2012). Immigration policy and immigration regulations are interrelated and they change according to state goals and priorities linked to security and social cohesion on the one hand, and in response to labour market needs on the other.

In the EU context, however, we can describe immigration policies that are more or less developed depending on the immigration experience of a particular EU country, and EU migration policy, which is still being elaborated through, for instance, the passing of new directives to be implemented by EU states. Ukraine as an important source country of foreign labour force in a number of EU countries attracts special attention in the political debates on immigration to the EU. The geopolitical changes that have occurred in Europe over the last 25 years have been accompanied by the development of migration regulations at the EU level and in specific receiving nation-states, some of which directly affect the mobility of Ukrainians. Reports on immigration in the EU show that Ukrainian nationals are able to take advantage of regulations and policies potentially improving their administrative status (for instance, by applying for national visas that also give access to the labour market; see e.g. European Commission 2014). The particular strategies they adopt to cope with restrictions (including overstaying and waiting for regularization) depend on the nature of their migration and their economic goals (Gropas and Triandafyllidou 2014; Kraler et al. 2014). The strategies also depend on channels creating legal and institutional opportunity structures; in the EU this means migration and labour-market policies regarding third-country nationals who are citizens of its eastern neighbours.

Before the EU enlargement of 2004, Ukrainian nationals enjoyed a relatively liberal regime (with no visa requirement) crossing national borders to neighbouring countries, such as Poland, Hungary and Slovakia (previously also to Czechoslovakia). However, as EU candidates these countries were obliged to adapt their immigration regulations and border controls to the EU's requirements, which included the introduction of a visa requirement and restrictions on the conditions of foreigners' entry and stay. Although in some states (Poland and Hungary) these restrictions did not apply to the citizens of Ukraine until 2003, in Slovakia they were introduced as early as 2000.

Moreover, until implementation of the Schengen *acquis* in 2007–08¹ by the new EU member states,² the legal framework of Ukrainians' mobility between the home country and Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary was quite liberal. Despite the introduction of obligatory visas, Poland's liberal policy toward the short-term mobility of Ukrainians and its tacit tolerance of often undocumented

¹ Controls at internal land and sea borders were waived on 21 December 2007, and at internal air borders on 30 March 2008.

² The states that joined the EU in 2004.

work performed by them represented a compromise between Poland's EU interests and its national interests in maintaining good relations with its eastern neighbour, a source country of significant migrant groups (see Kicingier 2005; Chap. 7).

Although new EU member states such as Poland and Hungary did not want to limit the entry of Ukrainian migrants and cross-border trade between Ukraine and their respective countries (especially Poland), meeting the EU's requirements inevitably meant strengthening the EU external border, and for Ukrainians, literally some closed gates. Hungary closed some of the small border crossing points between Hungary and Ukraine. For the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary accession changed the status of Ukrainians to that of third-country nationals.

The tightened border controls and more restrictive policies might have been a barrier to spatial mobility for Ukrainians. However, the pull factors – the relatively attractive economic conditions in the Visegrad countries (V4: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) – were sufficiently strong to make them overcome the new and even more disadvantageous conditions, since these countries' membership of the Schengen Area was linked to further security improvements and restrictions in the visa regime (on economic pull factors for Ukrainian labour migrants, see Chap. 3). At the same time, however, the new EU member states were at least to some extent dependent on the workforce from Ukraine (Plewa 2007), leading to policy instruments that would satisfy the demand for foreign labour and maintain cross-border trade relations despite the restrictions on crossing borders and applying for permits to stay.

The EU's European Neighbourhood Policy led, for Ukraine, to the Eastern Partnership programme, which aimed to liberalize entry rules for citizens of EU neighbouring countries and prevent irregular migrants from developing countries in Asia and Africa from using Ukraine as the transit country to the EU. However, the political crisis of 2014–15 in Ukraine slowed the pace of activities aimed at waiving visa obligations for Ukrainian citizens. Some authors argue that Ukraine's participation in the Neighbourhood Policy has been motivated mostly by the desire of many Ukrainian citizens to guarantee a visa-free regime for Ukrainians travelling to the EU, with agreement on readmission requirements and improved border controls perceived as an acceptable price for this (see e.g. Düvell 2012; Düvell and Vollmer 2009).

Individual nation-states have taken specific steps, in accordance with EU structures as regards local border traffic, and independently in the case of regulations on the admission of foreigners to the EU labour markets – particularly in the case of the new member states. For instance, in Poland the law on foreigners' access to the labour market has been significantly relaxed: the work permit application process has become cheaper and simpler, and citizens of selected countries, including Ukraine, have been allowed to work in Poland on a short-term basis without a work permit, provided that a special employer's declaration of intent to hire a foreigner has been registered. This regulation has made it easier to obtain a national visa giving the right to work in Poland (Duszczuk et al. 2010; see also Chap. 8).

Importantly, labour markets remain regulated mostly by national laws (see also Düvell 2011). There is practically no common EU policy for Ukrainian economic migrants and the observed trends are, at least to some extent, the result of policies and practices applied towards third-country nationals by particular countries, despite

some accepted priorities (such as freedom of movement within EU territory, security of external borders and privileges for foreigners with certain skills). However, many changes in the national laws on access to residence permits and the labour market or restrictions in this area are the result of EU directives, such as the Single Permit Directive (2011/98/EU), the EU Blue Card Directive (Directive 2009/50/EC), the Researchers' Directive (2005/71/EC) or the directive on sanctions against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals (2009/52/EC) (see also Chap. 3).

This chapter discusses how legal and policy aspects of Ukrainians' migration in the EU context are reflected in the literature. Results of selected studies are presented with a particular focus on visa policies, special work programmes and regularization of migrants' stay. Migrants' legal status and experience of irregularity are also discussed.

4.2 A Few Reflections on the Legal and Policy Context of Ukrainians' Movement in Migration Literature

The legal and institutional context creating the opportunity for Ukrainians' migration does not usually constitute a separate research issue, mostly because legal or policy aspects are often described from a wider perspective, beyond that of a particular host or source country. This approach disguises the wide range of relations between mobility patterns of Ukrainians and general or specific policies at national or EU level.

Available literature often discusses migration of Ukrainian nationals in the context of the EU enlargements of 2004 (when Ukraine became a neighbour of the EU) and 2007. Since 2009, Ukraine's place in the Eastern Partnership programme within the European Neighbourhood Policy has been discussed in studies related to migration (Fargues 2013), although the programme is chiefly concerned with free-trade agreements (Dąbrowski and Maliszewska 2011).

Migration policy in practice is analyzed in the literature to emphasize that legal status results from both policies and their everyday implementation by the state, local authorities and individuals. Annual reports on migration prepared by, for instance, the European Commission, national contact points of the European Migration Network, the International Organization for Migration, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, FRONTEX and the Fundamental Rights Agency of the EU include data on how the legal framework influences migration flows and stocks (including irregularity), but they are generally based on statistics and short qualitative descriptions, and lack the detailed consideration of causes and consequences that is of interest to migration researchers (see e.g. FRONTEX 2015; ICMPD 2013). Comparative policy-oriented studies, such as those prepared annually by the European Migration Network, often omit the migrants' perspective, only providing information on particular migrant groups with regard to whom very specific programmes or policy tools are mentioned. National or local case studies on, for example, migrants' adaptation, mobility patterns and participation in the

labour market provide some academic evidence of the role and implementation of migration regulations.

Ukrainians appear in wider categories of foreigners, such as third-country nationals in the EU context, citizens of ex-USSR countries or the CIS region, or nationals of countries participating in the Eastern Partnership programme, making it difficult to identify factors specific to them. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the literature mostly discusses those legal instruments or policies that are thought to have the greatest impact on Ukrainians' mobility patterns, including the visa facilitation process, regularization programmes and specific programmes admitting migrants from Ukraine to the labour markets. Most studies focus on admission policies and policy towards irregular migrants in a broad sense, since these are regarded as the most relevant for the context of Ukrainian nationals' mobility, and are important factors both increasing and decreasing migrant opportunities.

Literature on the legal aspects of Ukrainian mobility in the EU context can be divided into two main categories. First, there are comparative international studies that usually refer to specific issues, for example how regularization programmes or guarantees of fundamental rights shape patterns of mobility. Such studies refer to Ukrainian migrants only when they constitute a significant immigrant group to which particular legal instruments apply (e.g. Kupiszewski and Mattila 2008 with regard to policies controlling the legality of employment and addressing informal employment; FRA 2011 for the fundamental rights of irregular migrant domestic workers). The second category is represented by numerous case studies in which the legal status of Ukrainians functioning in particular EU³ states or even economic sectors is featured, but is not the main topic of analysis (e.g. Antoniewski 1997; Antoniewski and Koryś 2002; Drbohlav et al. 2008; Grzymała-Kazłowska et al. 2008; Hosnedlová and Stanek 2014; Näre 2011; Nikolova 2014).

A comparative study on the irregular employment of foreigners (Kupiszewski and Mattila 2008) considers why the informal employment of foreigners is common in some countries and what policies or lack of policies contribute to migrants' participation in the informal economy. In both Poland and Hungary undocumented work by Ukrainians was linked to the relatively easy access to those countries and the low risk of detection that work performed during a "tourist" stay entailed. In Hungary cross-border trips by Ukrainians using visas allowing them to stay in Hungary for up to 90 days and work in the informal economy was usually arranged by ethnic Hungarians from Ukraine. For the border control authorities the real purpose of stay was irrelevant, since only the validity dates of visas were checked. Moreover, in Hungary the informal employment of foreigners was considered a marginal phenomenon in comparison to the informal employment of native Hungarians (Hars and Sik 2008). In Poland, informal work performed by Ukrainians was also linked to the structure and scale of the informal economy in general, with both Poles and foreigners working informally in agriculture or construction. Until

³Some case studies were also conducted in the pre-accession period of the 1990s or early 2000s in relation to the future EU-8 states, where immigration from Ukraine has always constituted a significant share of the migratory landscape.

2007 the costly and time-consuming process of obtaining work permits for foreigners discouraged employers from hiring migrant workers legally. In 2007 the cost was reduced and access to all employment sectors without a work permit was introduced for seasonal workers from Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, which was supposed to decrease the scale of foreigners' presence in the informal economy (for more details see Chap. 7). However, according to this study the risk of detection of irregular employment remained very low, with the result that until Schengen enlargement easily obtainable tourist visas were used by Ukrainians to enter Poland and then work informally (Kicinger and Kloc-Nowak 2008).

A study by the EU's Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA 2011) investigated the fundamental rights of irregular migrant domestic workers. In some countries (especially Hungary and Poland) these were mostly Ukrainians working in private households who did not have valid documents authorizing them to stay in the country. Access to fundamental rights for migrants working irregularly is often at the discretion of their employers, and the study found that their main strategy in cases of sickness or exploitative practices was to change employer and to rely on social networks (for more details on the use of social networks by Ukrainian migrants in Poland see Chap. 7). Assistance from NGOs and trade unions was available in some sectors, but not for Ukrainians working in the domestic sector in Poland. Informal employment increases the risk of labour exploitation, bad working and living conditions, especially in agriculture and construction (Dąbrowski 2014; see also Chap. 3). Studies that include analysis of legal aspects of Ukrainian migration to the EU, along with economic, social or cultural factors, show a visible share of irregular migrants from Ukraine and – which is even more frequent – undocumented workers in many EU countries (including Poland, the Czech Republic, Greece, Italy and Portugal). According to Eurostat statistics,⁴ Ukrainian nationals are in the top ten countries of origin for measures targeting or preventing irregular migration and undocumented work by migrants in the EU. It is estimated that only about one-third of migrant workers from Ukraine in the EU have proper work and stay permits, while a quarter stay in the EU illegally (Coupé and Vakhitova 2013). This general picture of economic migrants from Ukraine in the EU is confirmed by studies conducted in particular countries (see Part II).

4.3 Admitting Ukrainian Migrants to EU Territory and Labour Markets

The broad concept of admission policies covers not only regulations and their implementation concerning entry to EU countries, but also laws referring to the labour market, since the two issues are inter-connected. The perspective applied in

⁴http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Statistics_on_enforcement_of_immigration_legislation. Accessed 10 Sep 2015.

migration research usually considers how visa obligations limit migration of third-country nationals and how facilitations may affect migration.

A study of Ukrainians in the Netherlands by Stepan Shakhno and Cathelijne Pool (2005) found that Ukrainian citizens were having increasing difficulty obtaining visas, as the authorities saw them as potential visa overstayers, and a growing number of visa applications were rejected, even though there had been no change in the visa regulations. This led to a sharp increase in the cost of arranging a visa,⁵ and to overstaying, as the higher the cost of the visa, the more time was needed to amass the funds to repay the costs. Moreover, leaving the destination country was linked to the risk of formal obstacles on re-entry into the Schengen Area. Restrictive visa policies were therefore thought to lead to an increase in non-compliant behaviour, including overstaying or the use of informal entry channels or papers.

Studies on EU migration from countries participating in the Eastern Partnership programme, which was initiated in 2009, have shown that visa-issuing practices vary across the member states, contrary to expectations under the EU Visa Code, which has been in force since 5 April 2010. A 2010 survey of visa applicants in Ukraine found that problems with the complexity of regulations, concerns over differing visa-issuing practices across the EU, lack of information and long visa application procedures discouraged them from following legal routes, turning instead to informal intermediaries, which usually meant higher costs (see Europe Without Barriers 2010). The risk of the undesirable development of informal services linked to visa-issuing processes means that visa facilitation agreements have grown in importance for both policy makers and researchers (Kahanec et al. 2013). Using informal channels to obtain a visa sometimes meant applying for visas that were not in fact linked to the real purpose of travel to EU countries. For instance, Polish national visas relatively easily obtained by nationals of Ukraine served for work not only in Poland, but also in other countries, such as Italy, Spain and the Czech Republic, although these visas did not allow paid activities to be performed in countries other than Poland.

It is important to emphasize that after the enlargement of the EU and the expansion of the Schengen Area, traditional destination countries for Ukrainian migrants, usually those bordering Ukraine, also introduced specific regulations providing exemption from EU-wide visa requirements, such as the agreements on local border traffic. In Poland, Hungary and Slovakia such agreements have been concluded (Fargues 2013), allowing citizens of Ukraine living in the border area (as defined by these agreements) to enter the respective EU countries on the basis of multiple permits. However, this only applies to the areas immediately adjacent to the border on both sides, and leaving this border area without the appropriate documents, such as a visa or residence permit, is not permitted. Nonetheless, these local border traffic agreements have facilitated cross-border mobility of non-EU citizens, especially in the light of restricted visa policies stemming from EU and Schengen zone enlarge-

⁵As individual applications were rejected, people determined to travel often had to arrange their visa through a travel agency, paying much more than the actual cost of the visa.

ment (for more information on the agreement on local border traffic between Poland and Ukraine see Chap. 7).

In a study of visa agreements between sending and receiving countries, Piotr Kaźmierkiewicz (research coordinator) (2009) examined the migration of Western Newly Independent States' (WNIS) citizens to Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and the Slovak Republic. They suggested that before the integration of "new" EU member states into the Schengen zone, modified entry schemes⁶ had played a significant role in attracting migrants from the WNIS. Concrete steps have been taken by the receiving countries, including Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, to maintain such regimes. For instance, as announced by the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs, an agreement⁷ on the relaxation of mutual border crossing conditions for citizens of the Slovak Republic and Ukraine residing in the border zone was signed by the two countries in 2008, affecting 400,000 residents of 295 towns and villages. The aim of the agreement was to ease Ukrainian citizens' entry into the Slovak Republic by removing obstacles created after Slovakia's inclusion in the Schengen zone in December 2007 (Kaźmierkiewicz, research coordinator 2009). The effects of the local border traffic agreement between Ukraine and Poland that entered into force in 2009 (when Poland was already part of the Schengen zone) showed that it was treated more as a facility for frequent cross-border travellers than migrants. The frequent travellers were involved in trading in goods brought across the border (e.g. Konieczna-Sałamatin et al. 2012).

As the experience of the Slovak Republic shows, when the visa procedures for Ukrainians were liberalized and agreement on local border traffic was enforced, there was a reduction in the number of entry refusals of Ukrainian nationals (EMN – Slovak Contact Point 2011). However, facilitating the obtaining of visas could also contribute to an increase in irregular migration. This is the case with Polish visas issued to Ukrainians declaring their entry purpose as seasonal work, business cooperation or private visits. Relatively easy access to supporting documents, especially to the declarations of intent to hire a foreigner registered by Polish employers, has turned Polish national visas into a very valuable asset for Ukrainians working (lawfully or unlawfully) in Poland or (usually unlawfully) in other EU countries, since it is much easier to gain entry visas to Poland than to other EU states (Klaus 2011; Bieniecki and Pawlak 2010; Duszczuk et al. 2010). The main aim of the declarations system was to enable migrants to function in the formal economy, cope with the restricted visa regime after Poland's accession to the Schengen Area and to solve the problems of labour shortages in some sectors. However, the system has often been abused by migrants seeking to enter the EU and earn more than they can in Poland (for more information see Chap. 7).

⁶Including visas free of charge (for instance tourist visas between Ukraine and Poland), local border traffic solutions applying to residents of border areas, and various exemptions from work permit requirements.

⁷The agreement introduced visa-free travel for a period up to 30 days for the residents of the 30-km-long border zone and a special permit allowing border-zone residents to stay in the border zone of the other country for a total of 90 days in a given 180-day period for social, cultural, economic and family reasons.

The liberalization of visa policies is in fact part of a broader programme of managing migration relations with countries neighbouring the EU. Marta Jaroszewicz (2012) traced the implementation of the Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation (VLAP), the ultimate goal of which is the lifting of visa requirements in the EU for, among others, nationals of Ukraine. The plan “includes conditions concerning document security (including biometrics), irregular immigration (including readmission), public order and security, external relations and fundamental rights” (Jaroszewicz 2012: 23). Several “new” EU member states (including Poland and Romania) have supported very strongly the introduction of a visa-free regime as it would “promote contacts between people and the development of democratic society” (Jaroszewicz 2012: 23) in the two countries. To a lesser degree, this was also supported by the foreign ministries of Sweden and Germany and by business circles in a number of EU member states, while Southern European countries remain relatively indifferent. However, most interior ministries of the “old” EU member states have been against abolition of visa requirements for Eastern European countries (Jaroszewicz 2012), mainly due to concerns about an increase in irregular migration and undeclared employment.

Interestingly, according to a study conducted in the Visegrad countries on prospects for mobility between these countries and Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine after the forthcoming visa abolition for travels up to 90 days (Jaroszewicz and Lesińska 2014), the removal of visa requirements is not expected to significantly increase the scale of Ukrainians’ migration to the V4 countries. While there may be a modest increase in the number of economic migrants, family members and potentially also undocumented workers, the circularity and maybe also settlement rates may be higher due to continuing political unrest and the deteriorating economic situation in Ukraine related to military action in the east. The study also analyzed the political context of admitting Eastern Europeans to the Visegrad countries as the potential pull factor for migrants, including those from Ukraine. Jaroszewicz and Lesińska (2014) emphasize the diversity in policies towards labour migrants from the neighbouring countries of the EU: Hungary has been focused on admitting co-ethnics, and the Czech Republic revised its policies in the light of the economic crises and tightened up on the admission of foreigners to the labour market (with the exception of policies towards highly skilled migrants) (see also Chap. 8). Meanwhile, Poland’s policy and regulations for admitting foreign labour have been liberalized to privilege nationals of the Eastern Partnership countries, with Ukrainians taking widespread advantage of this (see also Chap. 7).

There are special programmes aimed at admitting foreigners to the labour market, and, rarely, programmes based on bilateral agreements between Ukraine and the source country. For instance, in thematic studies on circular migration and the labour market in Portugal, a programme of this kind was cited as good practice satisfying the needs of the host country and improving the potential of the labour force in the country of origin. The main assumption of the programme was the return of seasonal Ukrainian workers recruited in Ukraine to their own country after completing assignments in Portugal (Aliens and Border Service 2010a, b; Chap. 11).

An example of policies that may result in improved access to both the territory and the labour markets of the receiving EU country is the policy towards co-ethnics, also called repatriation policy, introduced by Poland and Hungary. In both cases Ukraine was the source country of co-ethnics, who could gain some privileges in accessing long-term residence permits, access to the labour market and reduced fees for public transport or cultural institutions. In the case of Hungary it was the Hungarian Identity Card applied for by many Ukrainians living in the Ukrainian-Hungarian border areas. Holders of this card were mostly women working in Hungarian private households who wanted to maintain their ties with Ukraine. In the case of Poland it was the Polish Charter, whose beneficiaries have enjoyed easier access to entry visas, whether as employees or entrepreneurs, and to cultural events and free education (Lesińska et al. 2011). In Poland, the value of the Polish Charter increased after the Law on Aliens of 2013 came into force in May 2014: it facilitated access to permanent residence permits and citizenship for persons with documented Polish roots and holders of the Polish Charter (see more in Chap. 7).

4.4 Regularization as a Long-Awaited Policy Tool

The basic elements of migratory processes requiring regulation are: entry (prevention of illegal entry); stay (restrictions on the issue of residence permits, including permits issued to those previously illegally staying, and obligation to leave); and work (conditions of admission to the labour market and control of legality of employment). Regularization combines the priorities of policy on residence permits with those of policy towards irregular migrants. However, it is only one of the political reactions to irregular migration. Other elements include control policies (including rejecting entry or applications for residence permits or refusing permission to stay due to infringement of the conditions of stay), returns and readmission. Many studies on Ukrainians' adaptation to EU countries include the issue of migration and legalization strategies. In a number of states, especially in Southern Europe – in Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal – waiting for regularization turned out to be one of the important elements of migrants' experiences (Ambrosini 2012; Kraler 2009; Kraler et al. 2014). Ukrainians are one of the nationalities to have benefited most from regularization programmes or mechanisms in a number of countries (e.g. in Portugal, Poland, Spain, Italy) and to have failed to do so due to the lack of regularization programmes in others (e.g. Czech Republic) (Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler 2009).

Studies in several EU countries (such as Spain, Portugal, Italy and Poland) show that migrants from Ukraine, like other third-country nationals, become irregular residents in particular by overstaying visas or temporary residence permits after entering EU territory legally (Vogel and Cyrus 2008; Kraler et al. 2014; Fonseca et al. 2014; Fagasiński et al. 2015). The 2015 migration crisis may change the trends that have been observed EU-wide for the last decade, but it should be emphasized that irregular entry during that period has mostly occurred through the southern borders of the EU, and, despite the political crisis in Ukraine, Ukrainian nationals

do not constitute a significant share in the massive mobility of potential asylum seekers we observe on the EU territories today.

Studies of regularization provide information not only about the scale of previously irregular migrants from Ukraine in particular countries, but also the reasons for irregularity, the consequences of unregulated status and the potential changes that come with obtaining permits. Overstaying visas or residence permits is seen as a necessary, not the worst choice when the migration policy of the country includes regularization programmes from time to time (as in the case of Italy or Spain). Studies that provide not only statistical analysis of the programme's implementation, but also evidence from beneficiaries of regularization, may be a particularly valuable source of information about the long-term effects of regularization policies. Fagasiński et al. (2015) described the conditions in which Ukrainian migrants lived before they were granted residence permits (informal employment, low wages, risk of exploitation at work, lack of stability) and the advantages of being regularized – most often a sense of security, stability and the opportunity to improve economic status. This study, however, also pointed out that the opportunities provided by regularization programmes may be “wasted” if migrants continue to experience problems having their work situation formalized (see also Reichel 2014). This highlights again the dependence of third-country nationals not only on migration regulations, but also on employment regimes, and their high level of dependency on their employers.

Between 1998 and 2007 five regularization programmes were introduced in Greece giving Ukrainians residing there the opportunity to regularize their stay. The majority of those who arrived with the first wave of immigration in the 1990s had decided to overstay and wait – up to 6 years in some cases – for the first regularization programme (Levchenko et al. 2010). This affected the duration of their stay in the country, as they could not travel freely back to Ukraine and then return to Greece. Those who entered between 2001 and 2005 were able to obtain stay and work permits quite quickly, as everyone was registered within less than a year of arrival (Levchenko et al. 2010). Those who arrived after 2005 had no chance to legalize their stay in such a framework, since there were no regularization programmes (see also Chap. 9).

In Portugal, the 2001 regularization legislation, which was in force for 18 months, was a pull factor in immigrants' choice of Portugal as destination country (Marques and Góis 2007). It also revealed the scale of the Ukrainian presence in the country as well as the role of networks in spreading the word about regularization. The middlemen in Ukraine widely promoted the regularization procedure and the job opportunities in the construction sector in Portugal. “It can be attributed to the marketing of Portugal done by Eastern European travel agencies, particularly in the Ukraine, that offered very attractive packages that included travel documents, transportation and job opportunities which were affordable to a large segment of the population” (Baganha et al. 2004: 31). Studies of regularization in Portugal show that in 2001, 63,000 immigrants from Ukraine received permits to stay. Importantly, the number of Ukrainians who regularized their stay was higher than that of traditional immigrant groups for Portugal, namely Brazilians and Cape Verdeans (Levinson 2005; Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler 2009, see also Chap. 11).

4.5 Semi-compliance: The Predominant Status of Ukrainian Migrants?

The commonly observed administrative status of Ukrainians in the EU is what is termed semi-compliance (see for example Kubal 2013; Ruhs and Anderson 2010), namely possessing valid documents authorizing stay, but doing undeclared work. This should be distinguished from non-compliance, where migrants have no authorization to stay, and thus work, in EU countries. The extent and character of irregularity by Ukrainian migrants in individual EU countries depends on admission regulations and policies towards irregular migration and the informal economy, as well as enforcement of the law. Undeclared work by Ukrainian migrants is often a complex issue, since it involves not only working without the required permit, but also abusing the channels that give access to the labour market (such as in Poland the system of declarations of intention to employ a foreigner, see also Chap. 7, and in the Czech Republic trade licences for hired workers – see Duszczyk et al. (2010); Leontiyeva (2014), for an analysis of the “Švarc system” in the Czech Republic see Chap. 8).

Why is Ukrainian migrants’ legal status predominantly semi-compliant? There is a combination of factors: availability of legal channels in individual cases; migrants’ economic aspirations; implementation of control policies in the host country; and existing tolerance towards informal employment. The stronger the push factors in Ukraine, the less important compliance with immigration rules may be for migrants who are willing to take risks in order to be able to work or live in other countries (Triandafyllidou 2013).

Geopolitical changes have to some extent “delegalized” mobility previously treated as “legal” in a visa-free regime (Haidinger 2007), although this often involves some form of non-compliance with the law, for instance, involvement in illegal trade (Iglicka 1999) or being employed without a proper work permit, but possessing an alternative proof of access to the economy (e.g. trade licence rather than work permit) in the destination country. Such practices are common among Ukrainian migrants in the Czech Republic (Drbohlav et al. 2008). It may be the case that undocumented work is neither the choice of the employee nor the employer when the government of the host country creates obstacles to discourage immigrants from applying for a stay permit, as in the case of Spain in 2004 (Markov 2009).

As researchers have noted, as far as changes in administrative status are concerned, the greatest difference noticed by migrants is the shift from irregular to regular status, since it at least gives opportunities for lawful employment and cross-border travels. However, advancement in administrative status, meaning that migrants get long-term permits for stay and/or work or citizenship, does not necessarily lead to advancement in their economic status (Grzymała-Kazłowska et al. 2008; Kindler and Szulecka 2010; Stefańska and Szulecka 2013; Maroukis et al. 2011). Legal restrictions relating to the foreign labour force can make the lawful employment of foreigners unprofitable, costly or time-consuming.

Although Ukrainian migrants’ legal status is one of the factors determining their opportunity structure, and influencing their adaptation strategies and the duration of

their stay, these issues in turn impact their administrative status. The complex relationship between administrative status, possible irregularity linked to this status and other aspects of migrants' mobility and stay in the destination countries can be studied comparatively by looking at differences between Ukrainians and other national groups. For example, in Poland, Ukrainians are usually compared with Vietnamese, who constitute a significant migrant group although their numbers are lower. Both groups face general barriers to mobility, such as the need for visas and quite strict requirements for legalization of a long-term stay. However, although access to both the territory and the labour market is facilitated to some extent for Ukrainians, work in the informal sector is still very common among Ukrainian migrants. This stems from employers' reluctance to formalize the work relationship as well as economic calculations made by both migrants and employers. Unlike the Vietnamese (excluding those settled, with long-term residence permits), Ukrainians usually have valid documents authorizing them to stay in Poland, which are necessary if they are to be employed in accordance with the law (Stefańska and Szulecka 2013; Grzymała-Kazłowska et al. 2008; Górny et al. 2010).

A study on semi-compliance by Anderson et al. (2006) using interviews with nationals from EU-8 member states (including Poland and Lithuania) and from third countries (including Ukraine) showed that restricted access to the territory and the labour market in the UK in case of third-country nationals could contribute to migrants' vulnerability in the labour market. Some of them decided to use fake documents in order to get satisfactory jobs, but this still did not give them a sense of stability and security. As Anderson et al. (2006) argue, semi-compliant status should be recognized as an important issue not only by researchers, but also by policy makers.

Ukrainians' semi-compliant legal status has a number of consequences. Problems with semi-compliance are most often experienced by migrants at work: they may be unable to pursue their rights to work breaks, paid leave or proper pay rates (Klaus 2011; Skrivankova and Anti-Slavery International 2006). In some countries, such as the Czech Republic, semi-compliance stems from the way regulations on admitting foreigners to the labour market are applied. As Leontiyeva extensively describes in Chap. 8) and according to a study by Čermáková and Nekorjak (2009), Ukrainians constituted the group (after Vietnamese) at greatest risk of labour exploitation due to their isolation from the receiving society and the specific relations (client system) operating in their sectors, such as construction. However, despite problems linked to informal employment, Ukrainian migrants may gain some sense of security from networks and informal friendly relations with their employers (Harney 2012; Kindler and Szulecka 2013).

4.6 Conclusions

Although a good deal of information on the effects of policies is published in regular reports, more in-depth investigation of the legal framework from a critical perspective is needed. Several legal aspects of Ukrainian nationals' mobility are

under-researched. First is the comparative study of changes in migrants' administrative status with a particular focus on Ukrainians, in the context of the enlarged European Union (after 2004) and Ukraine's cooperation with the EU on readmissions and visa system liberalization. A complex study covering the impact on migrants' trajectories of such factors as EU enlargement, Schengen zone enlargement and policy options in a number of countries hosting Ukrainians on a significant scale (Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, Italy, Spain, Germany, Greece) would be valuable. It would update current knowledge and verify common assumptions, including those on the temporary character of Ukrainians' mobility and the prevalence of semi-compliant status among Ukrainians. Also relevant would be the consequences of the introduction of visas for Ukrainian migrants in various European countries, followed by the visa liberalization processes and the introduction of facilitations in entry policies targeting particular groups, including potential migrants (e.g. local border traffic, seasonal workers, highly skilled migrants). Such a study, which would require an interdisciplinary approach and intensive international cooperation based on empirical data, should be based not only on migrants' testimonies but also on information from other sources, such as institutional actors, employers and law enforcement agencies. National quantitative data to include areas outside the biggest cities would be effective in the analysis of mobility patterns in the context of changing regulations. In the light of upcoming visa abolition for Ukrainian citizens in the EU Visa Liberalisation Action Plan framework, it would also be challenging to study the prospects for the mobility of Ukrainians following this change of regime. So far, these have been studied in reference to, among others, Visegrad countries. Following up these studies after further steps in visa liberalization are undertaken could result in valuable knowledge on how changes in visa regime impact the mobility of Ukraine nationals, especially as regards the dominant economic character of this mobility.

Second, policies specific to Ukrainian nationals are not covered sufficiently in migration research. This is relevant, for instance, to highly qualified migrants finding employment other than in the secondary sectors usually associated with migrating Ukrainian nationals. Though relatively small, this group of migrants is worth studying from the legal perspective, in order to establish (i) whether there are obstacles that prevent well-qualified migrants from taking up jobs in the primary sector; (ii) whether discrimination occurs and whether there are any measures to prevent it; and (iii) whether there are any special schemes that would facilitate the migration of highly skilled migrants and how EU law (such as the EU Blue Card or the Researchers' Directive) has influenced their mobility and economic adaptation. The potential or real impact of these policies has been studied more broadly (Cerna 2008), without particular reference to Ukraine or without a particular focus on laws and policies (see Konieczna-Sałamatin (2015) on the phenomenon of migrants with diplomas in the Polish economy).

In many EU countries the law on migrants' access to the labour market and the regulations on prolonging legal stay have changed in the past decade. For instance, in Poland foreigners who have graduated from Polish universities since 2009 may work without a work permit and short-term workers may work on the basis of an

employer's declaration of their intention to hire a foreigner. The Czech Republic offers privileged access to the labour market and the territory for highly skilled migrants and members of their families. There are many more examples of national regulations that can have an important influence on the mobility patterns of prospective and current Ukrainian migrants. The scale of the Ukrainian presence in many EU countries makes understanding of the outcomes of policies desirable for both academics and policy makers. Potential institutional and legal changes stemming from the immigrant/asylum crisis of 2015 are also of importance in the planning of studies. Although to a great extent these changes refer to the asylum system on national and EU levels, it is very probable that the crisis also impacts the legal framework on returns and the admission of third-country nationals. To what extent these changes may affect migration from Ukraine to the EU remains an open question.

Third, there is a continuing need for study of how the economic crisis, and the immigrant and asylum crisis, may result in migrants' position in the receiving economies deteriorating, causing them to lose their regular status when applying for documents becomes too costly. In receiving countries, deteriorating economic conditions are likely to lead to an increase in anti-immigrant sentiment (Awad 2009). Such a sentiment may also increase in the context of the immigrant/asylum crisis, although the cultural distance between the EU and sending regions (Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Northern Africa) as well as differing migration patterns may in fact cause the opposite effect, with Ukrainians more welcome than before, but incomers from outside Europe facing more restrictive policies. Among other factors, arrival patterns, the internal EU political crisis, racism, rising xenophobia and right-wing political populism need to be considered.

Increasing anti-immigrant sentiments may influence migration policies and their implementation, making migrants with an already precarious legal status as well as disadvantages in the labour market potentially even more vulnerable. However, in times of crisis special policies aimed at decreasing the negative effects of the downturn for immigrants may also be introduced, such as support to find a new job without losing their work permit if they become unemployed, or access to return programmes (see, for example, the policy choices made by the Czech Republic during the economic crisis; IOM 2010). The effects of the crisis may be felt in different ways at local level in different EU countries; for example, in Spain restrictions were introduced on access to health care, to which irregular migrants were previously entitled on registration at a local registration office (see Chap. 12).

Finally, in November 2013, the decision of the Ukrainian authorities not to sign the Association Agreement with the EU caused massive protests leading to larger revolutionary upheavals against the dictatorship of Ukrainian oligarchs, the corruption present at every level and the poor economic conditions in the country, which led to effective change of the country's leadership. The resultant political turmoil, linked with military action in the east of Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimea by Russia, induced greater caution on the EU's part, with Ukraine regarded as an unstable territory producing (so far unconfirmed) outflows of refugees and displaced people.

The Association Agreement, which was eventually signed in 2014, although not implemented till the end of 2015, paved the way for a visa-free regime (on fulfilment of a number of security conditions), which would allow Ukrainian migrants to avoid spending time and resources on visa applications and increase the protection of migrant workers' rights. Considering both the situation in Ukraine and the demand for foreign labour in many EU countries (where there is a preference for workers from the Eastern Partnership which includes Ukraine), it is clear that economic migration from Ukraine will not be decreasing in the near future, despite the slowness of the visa liberalization process.

However, both the political tensions and the military conflicts of 2014 and 2015 imply other possible scenarios for migration from Ukraine to the EU. The *de facto* independence of several of the eastern regions of Ukraine, especially in the Donbas region, raised the prospect of neighbouring EU countries – Poland, Hungary and the Slovak Republic – becoming a destination for Ukrainian asylum seekers fleeing from Eastern Ukraine and “Russian” Crimea (Leontiyeva 2014). This, in turn, raises questions about potentially more liberal practices within an even more restrictive legal framework toward third-country nationals and the recognition of Ukrainians fleeing the military conflict as deserving of international protection.

Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, duplication, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included in the work's Creative Commons license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory regulation, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or reproduce the material.

References

- Aliens and Border Service. (2010a). *Satisfying labour demand through migration in Portugal*. European migration network. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/emn-studies/labour-demand/21a._portugal_national_report_satisfying_labour_demand_thru_migration_version_5nov2010_en.pdf. Accessed 20 Sep 2015.
- Aliens and Border Service. (2010b). *Temporary and circular migration in Portugal: Facts, policies and strategies*. European migration network. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/emn-studies/circular-migration/21a._portugal_national_report_circular_migration_final_version_6_jan_2011_en.pdf. Accessed 20 Sep 2015.
- Ambrosini, M. (2012). Surviving underground: Irregular migrants, Italian families, invisible welfare. *International Journal of Social Welfare*, 21, 361–371. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2397.2011.00837.x.

- Anderson, B., Ruhs, M., Rogaly, B., & Spencer, S. (2006). *Fair Enough? Central and east European migrants in low-wage employment in the UK*. Project Report. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
- Antoniewski, R. (1997). Przyczynek do badań nad nieformalnym rynkiem pracy cudzoziemców. Funkcjonowanie "giełdy pracy" w jednej z podwarszawskich miejscowości [Foreigners in the informal labour market. 'Labour stock market' in one of the towns near Warsaw]. *CMR Working Papers* (No 3). Warszawa: ISS UW. Available at: <http://www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/publ/549/>. Accessed 8 Mar 2012.
- Antoniewski, R., & Koryś, I. (2002). Imigranci o nieregulowanym statusie: społeczne i ekonomiczne determinanty funkcjonowania w Polsce [Irregular migrants: Socio-economic aspects of functioning in Poland]. *CMR Working Papers* (No 47). Warszawa: ISS UW.
- Awad, I. (2009). *The global economic crisis and migrant workers: Impact and response*. Geneva: International Migration Programme, International Labour Organization.
- Baganha, M.-I., Marques, J.-C., & Góis, P. (2004). The unforeseen wave: Migration from Eastern Europe to Portugal. In M.-I. Baganha & M.-L. Fonesca (Eds.), *New waves: Migration from Eastern to Southern Europe* (pp. 23–39). Lisbon: Luso-American Foundation.
- Baldwin-Edwards, M., & Kraler, A. (Eds.). (2009). *REGINE: Regularisations in Europe. Study on practices in the area of regularisation of illegally staying third-country nationals in the member states of the EU. Appendix B: Country profiles of 22 EU member states and the USA*. Vienna: ICMPD.
- Bieniecki, M., & Pawlak, M. (2010). *Strategie ukraińskich migrantów zarobkowych wobec polskiej rzeczywistości instytucjonalnej* [Strategies of Ukrainian economic migrants in Poland's institutional context]. Warszawa: ISP.
- Čermáková, D., & Nekorjak, M. (2009). Ukrainian middleman system of labour organization in the Czech Republic. *Tijdschriftvooreconomische en sociale geografie*, 100, 33–43. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9663.2009.00505.x.
- Cerna, L. (2008). *Towards an EU blue card: The proposed delegation of national immigration policies to the EU level*. COMPAS Working Paper (pp. 08–65).
- Coupé, T., & Vakhitova, H. (2013). Costs and benefits of labour mobility between the EU and the eastern partnership partner countries – Country Report: Ukraine (September 2013). CASE Network Studies and Analyses No. 464. Available at: ssrn.com/abstract=2323407 or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2323407>.
- Dąbrowski, P. (2014). *Praca przymusowa cudzoziemców w Polsce: analiza zjawiska w wybranych grupach imigranckich* [Forced labour of foreigners in Poland: Analysis of the phenomenon among selected immigrant groups]. Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.
- Dąbrowski, M., & Maliszewska, M. (Eds.). (2011). *EU eastern neighbourhood. Economic potential and future development*. Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer.
- Drbohlav, D., Džurová, D., Čermák, Z., Janská, E., Čermáková, D., & Medova, L. (2008). Immigrants' irregular economic activities in the Czech Republic (a multi-approach study). *European Review of Labour and Research*, 14(4), 639–652.
- Duszczyk, M. (2012). *Polska polityka migracyjna a rynek pracy* [Polish immigration policy and the labour market]. Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR.
- Duszczyk, M., Lesińska M., Stefańska R., Szczepański, M., & Szulecka, M. (2010). Polityka migracyjna w Polsce oraz jej wpływ na napływ i osiedlanie się imigrantów [Migration policy in Poland and its impact on the inflow and settlement of immigrants]. In A. Górny, I. Grabowska-Lusińska, M. Lesińska, & M. Okólski (Eds.), *Transformacja nieoczywista. Polska jako kraj migracji* [Unobvious transformation. Poland as a country of immigration] (pp. 69–124). Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.
- Düvell, F. (2011). Paths into irregularity: The legal and political construction of irregular migration. *European Journal of Migration and Law*, 13(3), 275–295.
- Düvell, F. (2012). Transit migration: A blurred and politicised concept. *Population Space and Place*, 18, 415–427. doi:10.1002/psp.631.

- Düvell, F., & Vollmer, B. (2009). *Irregular migration in and from the neighbourhood of the EU. A comparison of Morocco, Turkey and Ukraine*. CLANDESTINO Report. Available at: http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/transit_report_compas_sept09.pdf. Accessed 22 July 2012.
- Europe Without Barriers. (2010). *Schengen consulates in assessments and ratings visa practices of the EU member states in Ukraine 2010*. Kiev. Available at: http://novisa.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Viza_Monitor_ENG-3.pdf. Accessed 8 Mar 2013.
- European Commission. (2014). *5th Annual report on immigration and asylum*. Available at: [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/com/com_com\(2014\)0288/_com_com\(2014\)0288_en.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/com/com_com(2014)0288/_com_com(2014)0288_en.pdf). Accessed 12 Oct 2015.
- Fagasiński, M., Górczyńska, M., & Szczepanik, M. (2015). *Wychodząc z cienia. Badanie prawnych, politycznych i społecznych konsekwencji programu regularizacyjnego* [Coming out from the shadow. A study on the legal, political and social consequences of the regularisation programme]. Warszawa: Helsińska Fundacja Praw Człowieka.
- Fargues, F. (Ed.). (2013). *EU neighbourhood migration report 2013*. Florence: European University Institute, Migration Policy Centre. Available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/27394/MPC_NeighMigration.pdf?sequence=5. Accessed 20 Feb 2014.
- Fonseca, M. L., Pereira, S., & Esteves, A. (2014). Migration of Ukrainian nationals to Portugal: Changing flows and the critical role of social networks. *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, 3(1), 115–130.
- FRA. (2011). *Migrants in an irregular situation employed in domestic work: Fundamental rights challenges for the European Union and its member states*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/migrants_in_an_irregular_situation_employed_in_domestic_work_en.pdf. Accessed 8 Mar 2013.
- FRONTEX. (2015). *Annual risk analysis*. Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2015.pdf. Accessed 10 Oct 2015.
- Górny, A., Grabowska-Lusińska, I., Lesińska, M., & Okólski, M. (2010). *Transformacja nieoczywista. Polska jako kraj imigracji* [Unobvious transformation. Poland as country of immigration]. Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.
- Gropas, R., & Triandafyllidou, A. (2014). *European immigration: A sourcebook*. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.
- Grzymała-Kazłowska, A., Stefańska, R., & Szulecka, M. (2008). Różnice i podobieństwa w integracji migrantów o różnym statusie prawnym [Similarities and differences in integration of immigrants having different legal statuses]. In A. Grzymała-Kazłowska (Ed.), *Miedzy jednością a wielością. Integracja odmiennych grup i kategorii migrantów w Polsce* [Between unity and multiplicity. Integration of different groups and categories of immigrants in Poland] (pp. 81–140). Warszawa: OBM WNE UW.
- Haidinger, B. (2007). *Migration and irregular work in Europe. Literature review*. Vienna. Available at: http://www.undocumentedmigrants.eu/londonmet/library/r81814_3.pdf. Accessed 20 Mar 2014.
- Harney, N. D. (2012). Migrant strategies, informal economies and ontological security: Ukrainians in Naples, Italy. *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, 32(1/2), 4–16.
- Hars, A., & Sik, E. (2008). Hungary – Towards balanced tightening of regulations on irregular employment. In M. Kupiszewski & H. Mattila (Eds.), *Addressing the irregular employment of immigrants in the European Union: Between sanctions and rights*. Budapest: International Organization of Migration.
- Hosnedlová, R., & Stanek, M. (2014). Analysing selected transnational activities among Ukrainian immigrants in Spain. *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, 3(1), 99–114.
- ICMPD. (2013). *Yearbook on illegal migration, human smuggling and trafficking in central and eastern Europe. A survey and analysis of border management and border apprehension data from 2010. With a special module on the detention of migrants and asylum seekers*. Vienna: ICMPD. Available at: http://www.icmpd.org/fileadmin/ICMPD-Website/ICMPD_General/Publications/2014/ICMPD_Yearbook2010_A5_final.pdf

- Iglicka, K. (1999). The economics of the petty trade on the eastern polish border. In K. Iglicka & K. Sword (Eds.), *The challenge of East–west migration for Poland* (pp. 120–144). London: Macmillan.
- IOM. (2010). *Migration and the economic crisis in the European Union: Implications for policy*. Brussels: IOM.
- Jaroszewicz, M. (2012). *Making the impossible possible. The prospects for visa-free movement between the EU and its eastern partners*. Warsaw: OSW. Available at: http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/pw_27_en_0.pdf. Accessed 5 Oct 2015.
- Jaroszewicz, M., & Lesińska, M. (Eds.). (2014). *Forecasting migration between the EU, V4 and eastern Europe. Impact of visa abolition*. Warsaw: Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia.
- Kahanec, M., Zimmerman, K.F., Kurekova, L., & Biavaschi, C. (2013). *Labour migration from EaP Countries to the EU – Assessment of costs and benefits and proposals for better labour market matching*. IZA Research Report No. 56. Available at: http://www.iza.org/en/webcontent/publications/reports/report_pdfs/report_pdfs/iza_report_56.pdf. Accessed 20 Feb 2014.
- Każmierkiewicz, P. (research coordinator). (2009). The situation of migrants from Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine on the labour markets of Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic, Regional Report, Söderköping/Cross-Border Cooperation Process. Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4ed8edfa2.pdf>. Accessed 10 May 2012.
- Kicinger, A. (2005). *Between polish interests and the EU influence – Polish migration policy development 1989–2004*. CEFMR Working Paper, 9/2005. Available at: http://www.cefmr.pan.pl/docs/cefmr_wp_2005-09.pdf. Accessed 5 Nov 2015.
- Kicinger, A., & Kloc-Nowak, W. (2008). Combating the illegal employment of foreigners in the enlarged European Union: Polish country report. In M. Kupiszewski, & H. Mattila (Eds.), *Addressing the irregular employment of immigrants in the European Union: Between sanctions and rights*, IOM. Available at: http://www.cefmr.pan.pl/docs/cefmr_wp_2008-01.pdf. Accessed 10 May 2012.
- Kindler, M., & Szulecka, M. (2010). Integracja ekonomiczna migrantek na polskim rynku pracy – przyczynek do badań. [Economic integration of women migrant on the Polish labour market – a research case.] In M. Kindler, & J. Napierała (Eds.), *Migracje kobiet przypadek Polski*. [Migration of women. Poland's case.] (pp. 138–160). Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.
- Kindler, M., & Szulecka, M. (2013). The economic integration of Ukrainian and Vietnamese migrant women in the polish labour market. In L. Näre, & J. Andall, (Eds.), *Gender and the labour market in Europe*. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 39, 649–667.
- Klaus, W. (Ed.). (2011). *Ziemia obiecana? Warunki pracy cudzoziemców w Polsce* [Promised land? The conditions foreigners' work in Poland]. Warszawa: Stowarzyszenie Interwencji Prawnej.
- Konieczna-Sałamatin, J. (Ed.). (2015). *Imigranci o wysokich kwalifikacjach na polskim rynku pracy*. Raport z badań 2014–2015 [Immigrants with higher qualifications on the Polish labour market, Report from the study of 2014–2015]. Warszawa: Instytut Społeczno-Ekonomicznych Ekspertyz.
- Konieczna-Sałamatin, J., Świdrowska, E., & Wołowski, P. (2012). *Granica do naprawy. Problemy pogranicza Polski i Ukrainy* [A border to be repaired. Problems of the Polish-Ukrainian borderland]. Warszawa: Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego. Available at: http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Otwarta%20Europa/Granica_do_naprawy.pdf. Accessed 5 Oct 2015.
- Kraler, A. (2009). *Regularisation: A misguided option or part and parcel of a comprehensive policy response to irregular migration?* IMISCOE Working Paper No 24.
- Kraler, A., Reichel, D., König, A., Baldwin-Edwards, M., & Şimşek, M. (2014). Final report – Feasibility study on the labour market trajectories of regularised immigrants within the European Union (REGANE I).

- Kubal, A. (2013). Conceptualizing semi-legality in migration research. *Law and Society Review*, 47, 555–587. doi:10.1111/lasr.12031.
- Kupiszewski, M., & Mattila, H. (2008). *Addressing the irregular employment of immigrants in the European Union: Between sanctions and rights*. IOM. Available at: http://www.cefmr.pan.pl/docs/cefmr_wp_2008-01.pdf. Accessed 10 May 2012.
- Leontiyeva, Y. (2014). Ukrainian migration to Europe: Policies, practices and perspectives. *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, 3(1), 5–10.
- Lesińska, M., Stefańska, R., & Szulecka, M. (2011). Development of migration policies of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – on the way to maturity. In I. Grabowska-Lusińska, D. Drbohlav, & A. Hars (Eds.), *Immigration puzzles. Comparative analysis of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland before and after joining the EU* (pp. 77–115). Saarbruecken: LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing.
- Levchenko, K., Malynovska, O., Shvab, I., & Trofymenko, O. (2010). Ukrainian Greece: reasons, problems, prospects (According to the labour migrants' interview results), Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine and International Women's Rights Centre La Strada Ukraine.
- Levinson, A. (2005). *The regularisation of unauthorized migrants: Literature Survey and Country Case Studies. Regularisation programmes in Portugal*. Oxford: Compas.
- Markov, I. (2009). *Ukrainian labour migration in Europe: Findings of the complex research of the processes of Ukrainian labour immigration*. Lviv: Caritas Ukraine. Available at: http://www.kiev-dialogue.org/fileadmin/user_upload/KG_8_2012/0172_Markov_Caritas-1_01.pdf. Accessed 20 Feb 2014.
- Maroukis, T., Iglicka, K., & Gmaj, K. (2011). Irregular migration and informal economy in Southern and Central-Eastern Europe: Breaking the vicious cycle? *International Migration*, 49, 129–156. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2435.2011.00709.x.
- Marques, J. C., & Góis, P. (2007). *Ukrainian migration to Portugal. From non-existence to one of the top three immigrant groups*. Multicultural Centre Prague, migrationonline.cz.
- Näre, L. (2011). The informal economy of paid domestic work: Ukrainian and polish migrants in Naples. In M. Bommers & G. Sciortino (Eds.), *Foggy social structures: Irregular migration, European labour markets and welfare state*. Amsterdam: IMISCOE Research, Amsterdam University Press.
- Nikolova, M. (2014). Ukrainian migration to Greece: patterns and challenges of remaining and of return. *Central and Eastern European Migration Review (CEEMR)*, December 2014, 1–14. Available at: <http://ceemr.uw.edu.pl/articles/ukrainian-migration-greece-patterns-and--challenges-remaining-and-return>. Accessed 4 Feb 2015.
- Plewa, P. (2007). The rise and fall of temporary foreign worker policies: Lessons for Poland. *International Migration*, 45, 3–36. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2435.2007.00402.x.
- Reichel, D. (2014). 'This will benefit our society'. *Regularisations and employment in Poland. REGANE assessment report*. ICMPD: Vienna.
- Ruhs, M., & Anderson, B. (2010). Semi-compliance and illegality in migrant labour markets: An analysis of migrants, employers and the state in the UK. *Population Space and Place*, 16, 195–211. doi:10.1002/psp.588.
- Shakhno, S., & Pool, C. (2005). *Reverse effects of restrictive immigration policy; Ukrainian migrants in the Netherlands*. Available at: <http://www.migrationonline.cz/e-library/?x=1963625>. Accessed 4 Feb 2015.
- Skrivankova, K., & Anti-Slavery International. (2006). *Trafficking for forced labour in Europe*. Available at: http://www.antislavery.org/includes/documents/cm_docs/2009/t/trafficking_for_fl_in_europe_4_country_report.pdf. Accessed 4 Feb 2015.
- Stefańska, R., & Szulecka, M. (2013). *Bezpieczny status prawny jako determinanta awansu ekonomiczno-zawodowego odmiennych grup imigrantów w Polsce* [Safe legal status as a factor of economic and professional advancement of different immigrant groups in Poland]. *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, 2(1), 91–115.

- Triandafyllidou, A. (Ed.). (2013). *Circular migration between Europe and its neighbourhood: Choice or necessity?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Vogel, D., & Cyrus, N. (2008). *Irregular migration in Europe – Doubts about the effectiveness of control strategies*. Focus migration policy brief No 9. Available at: http://focus-migration.hwwi.de/typo3_upload/groups/3/focus_Migration_Publikationen/Kurzdossiers/PB09-Irregular-Migration.pdf. Accessed 23 Sep 2015.

Chapter 5

The Gender Perspective in Ukrainian Migration

Olena Fedyuk

5.1 Introducing Gender

Literature on feminization of migration not only flagged a shift in academic research towards a more gender-sensitive approach to researching migration but also opened a wide array of research agendas rooted in understanding mobility as gendered practice and experience. It also in part marked a response to the changing nature of global labour markets, the rise of the demand for a more flexible and cheaper labour force, growing market segments (such as care and domestic work)¹ and the changing patterns and practices of migration. It not only introduced gender-sensitive analysis of male and female migratory trajectories but opened up a number of analytical debates that were mostly ignored in literature prioritizing the “male breadwinner” perspective. These included: gender-differentiated wages and working conditions during migration (see Ehrenreich and Fuentes 1983; Andall 1998; Anderson 2000; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997); transnational motherhood and uneven distribution of care responsibilities between men and women (Gamburd 2000; Andall 1998; Hochschild 2001); and the relation between care work, citizenship and family rights (Lutz and Palenga-Möllennebeck 2012; Anderson and Shutes 2014). The debates on changing gender roles triggered by migration in both sending and receiving countries resulted in a number of analytical concepts, such as care chains (Orozco 2009), care diamonds (Razavi 2007) and transnational welfare (Piperno and Tognetti Bordogna 2012). This growing range of analytical approaches, however, only marginally stirred the analysis of Ukrainian migration to the EU.

¹Categories of care and domestic work often overlap, especially if care is provided within the privacy of the home and the tasks related to providing care for a child or an elderly person overlap with tasks related to cooking and cleaning. However, I keep the two categories separate as care can be provided by migrants in institutionalized spaces such as hospitals or retirement homes.

O. Fedyuk (✉)

Marie Curie Changing Employment ITN, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK

e-mail: olena.fedyuk@strath.ac.uk

As discussed in detail in other chapters in this volume (in particular see Chaps. 8 and 10), labour migration from Ukraine is strongly determined by the work sector–gender–destination country paradigm. Information on the unbalanced sex ratio of Ukrainian citizens can therefore be found in research literature dealing with migration to particular countries and from particular regions in Ukraine (to name a few Ukrainian sources, Pirozhkov et al. 2003; Boyko 2010; Shybko et al. 2006; Kys 2010; Markov 2005; Parkhomenko and Starodub 2005; Malynovska 2009; Tegeler and Cherkez 2011; Susak 2002; Leontiyeva 2011). Though these few examples do not specifically operationalize gender as an analytical category, they offer an overview of the situation of Ukrainian migrants in the receiving countries according to the gendered segmentation of the labour market and migration patterns.

This chapter will address the ways in which gender features in studies of Ukrainian migration to the EU and the implications of such approaches for research, political and public debates. In Ukraine, where the political, economic and public spheres are characterized by an unprecedented curtailing of gender equality even in comparison with the Soviet triple burden (Wanner 2005; Utrata 2008), gendered analysis bears a narrow interpretation, in which *gendered* stands for *female*, while *female* stands for *familial* or *emotional*. Thus, Ukrainian nationalist state-building discourse substituted the Soviet ideal of a woman-worker with the neo-traditionalist mythological figure of Berehynia (Rubchak 2011; Solari 2008; Hrycak 2011; Haydenko 2011) – a “representation of a nurturing woman, guardian of non-symbolic domestic hearth and embodiment of moral principles” (Haydenko 2011: 114). This imagery constitutes a powerful mechanism that generates solid gender-specific roles, furthermore replacing “woman” with “mother” and “mother” with “Ukraine”, representing “all maternal functions as natural women’s duties” (Haydenko 2011: 12–13) and ignoring the diversity of women’s experiences.

5.2 What’s Out There? An Overview of Correlation Between Migrants’ Gender, Sector of Employment and Choice of Destination Country

Using statistical data from various sources that contain gender information, Markov et al. in *At the Crossroads* (2009) provide a comparative gender profile of Ukrainian migration to eight countries: Poland, Czech Republic, Ireland, the UK, Russia, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. The greatest imbalance can be seen in migration to Italy (16.8% men and 83.2% women), which corresponds almost exactly with the 80% of all Ukrainian migrants to Italy being employed in the domestic and care sector. Another country characterized by a significant labour imbalance, Russia, with 80% male and 20% female migrants, also follows the gendered labour division with the biggest sectors of employment for all migrants being construction, mining and city transportation (Markov et al. 2009, see also Chap. 10). However, not all countries follow gender-determined professional paths. Ireland, which has about

45% female and 55% male migration, shows that 80% of all migrants are involved in construction. This discrepancy challenges us to consider how gender features in employment opportunities for migrants, and what connection there is between labour demand, dissemination of information and the ability of migrants to respond to this demand across borders and despite visa regimes. Similarly, Molodikova (2008) identifies an important link between the percentage of female migrants and the employment opportunities available to women in Ukraine, remarking that while the levels of unemployment for male and female are rather similar, it is more complicated for a female to get a job. Periods of unemployment are longer for women (15 months as opposed to 13 for men) while according to statistical data in 2006, women's salaries were 72.8% of men's.

Ukrainian labour migration research is marked by the politicizing of female migration, and while this releases a wealth of important new questions, it can reduce its potential by remaining permanently in the "women's domain". Thus, among the issues that have received much-needed attention are those linked to employment in the care sector, care drain from Ukraine and care chains, migrants' children, identifications and gender roles linked to female migration, transnational families and the experiences not only of migrants but also of those who indirectly participate in migration, benefit from it and carry out their own tasks in transnational enterprises. The following section identifies and reviews the scope of questions in the literature that adopts a gender-sensitive approach to migration from Ukraine to the EU.

5.3 The State of the Art and Identifying Trends

5.3.1 *At the Intersection of Gender, Family and Generation*

In the discussion of Ukrainian migration both in scholarly texts and in public and media discourses in Ukraine and abroad, women, children and the familial sphere remain within the domain of "gendered questions", while men and women outside families seem to be persistently untouched by the gender discussion of Ukrainian migration.

Gender as a category that can help untangle the migration situation should not be regarded as an independent factor but should be analyzed and constructed at the juncture of sex, age, family status and social class, together with an understanding of the path contingency derived from gendered normative expectations. A notable exception is the work of Lutz and Palenga-Möllenneck (2012), who draw on examples of Ukrainian migrants and consider a generation of caregivers with a special focus on fathers, whether or not they take over the caring roles of mothers in families with migrant breadwinner mothers. The authors argue that migration studies started to speak about the fragmentation of the family as a problem only when mothers started to migrate in larger numbers (2012: 22). They warn against a simplistic expectation of the reversal of gender hierarchies where migration has caused

breadwinner role reversal: reversal of “traditional” male-favouring earning capacities can lead to a backlash of gendered expectations and conformism, and extra pressures within families. Lutz and Palenga-Möllenberg’s research succeeds in identifying these tangible normative gendered stereotypes and analyzes them by specifically examining men’s gendered citizenship obligations as “citizen-the-wage-earner” and women, particularly mothers, as “citizen-the-carer” (Lutz and Palenga-Möllenberg 2012). The former, the authors suggest, are privileged over the latter; in their research conducted in Ukrainian families they found that fathers who performed care duties single-handed were rarest, with the majority delegating child care to female relatives, especially grandmothers, who, in addition to their caring responsibilities often “looked after” young fathers themselves, thus prioritizing gender over nuclear family connections and keeping care work solely within the women’s domain (Lutz and Palenga-Möllenberg 2012). This arrangement calls for a better analysis of the impact of mothers’ absence not only on children, but rather on the extended family network, which acquires new importance, requiring new forms of reciprocity and obligation not only across nuclear families but also across generations. Thus, not only the role of motherhood, but also grandmotherhood is reinvented in the context of female migration (Vianello 2009a, 2009b; Fedyuk 2011; Solari 2008; Volodko 2011a, b; Tyldum 2015), and so are the cross-generational, gendered expectations among siblings and relatives in extended families.

Introducing the generational dimension to the understanding of changing care patterns in families remains one of the few areas in which time and temporality, as a concept that allows an understanding of the transformations of migratory patterns and practices in time, is present in the discussion of Ukrainian migration. However, such texts are often limited to a discussion of the clash of women’s roles as earners and carers and the inter-generational practices that have evolved as a solution to this contradiction in migrant families. Furthermore, generational family roles often remain static, like snapshots of the situation at a given time, with little reference to change in the families as the cause of migration or change in generational roles and statuses.

Sex-differentiated information can be found in country reports and texts that examine general migratory patterns from Ukraine, destination countries and their labour market sectors (Shybko et al. 2006; Kys 2010; Markov 2005; Parkhomenko and Starodub 2005; Iglicka et al. 2011; Marques and Góis 2007; Leontiyeva and Tollarová 2011). Such research, though it fails overall to use gender as an analytical category, can be a source of quantitative information useful for more critical analysis. The data from the 2008 Modular Population Survey of Labour Migration Issues shows that unlike men, whose migration sharply drops after the age of 50, women remain active in migration up to retirement age (Fargus 2013). Molodikova (2008), in operationalizing sex-differentiated information in her work on Ukrainian migration, concludes that women labour migrants are generally slightly older than men (average age 20–39 for men and 30–44 for women), that married women migrate more often than single ones and the percentage of divorced and widowed migrants is also very high.

Molodikova also indicates that women tend to return less frequently – 1.6 times per year as compared to 2 times for men (Molodikova 2008: 20). This is an important observation in relation to both the nature of female employment and the temporality of female and male migratory patterns. However, Molodikova's text does not offer critical analysis as to how such quantitative data can be linked either to the level of female migrant status irregularity or to the type of employment that does not allow women to take breaks as often as men, or even the level of pay that allows men to "afford" to stay out of work more often than women. Similarly, there is little information on gender in studies of remittances; for example, Leontiyeva and Tollarová (2011), in their text on incomes, expenditures and remittances of Ukrainians in the Czech Republic (see Chap. 8), mention the importance of dependent children for remittances but give no further information as to the gender of the remitters. In another example of the gender-differentiated approach to data collection, a study focusing on circular migration by Iglicka et al. for the METOIKOS project (2011) addresses types of Ukrainian male and female migrant circularity patterns and links these patterns to gendered labour market sectors.

Due to the fairly rigid employment sector segmentation in receiving countries and the consequent formation of gendered migration to specific countries (e.g. Greece and Italy predominantly female migration, Spain and Portugal family-type migration), some gender-specific information can be gained from qualitative and quantitative research focusing on specific destination countries (see respective literature reviews in Part II). This literature, however, remains highly unbalanced and patchy in terms of the themes, type of research and geographical area covered. Thus, female migrations have received much more scholarly attention, as the quantity of research on migration to Italy and Greece has increased in the last decade (to name a few Vianello 2006, 2008, 2009a, b, 2011; Fedyuk 2009, 2011, 2012; Volodko 2011a, b; Rovenchak 2011a, b; Solari 2008, 2010; Hrycak 2011; Tyldum 2015; Mudrak 2011). Even in countries with a more gender-balanced migrant structure like Poland, the majority of the qualitative research focuses on female aspects of migration (Kindler 2009, 2011; Rovenchak 2011a; Volodko 2011a, b). Ukrainian literature on the migration of women addresses a wide range of topics and geographical areas though it does remain focused on particular issues such as transnational motherhood, family and care chains, care work and conditions of employment, transnational welfare and its gaps, and identity shifts and challenges to normative gender roles.

Contemporary labour migration from Ukraine, then, can only be understood with an intersecting transnational, gendered and cross-generational approach. Middle-aged women (as with migration to Italy) often choose to migrate to allow their adult daughters to pursue full-time child rearing (also see Utrata 2008; Solari 2008). The older generation's reluctance to return has to be explored from the perspective of the very limited opportunities available in Ukraine. They are unlikely to find employment and an income in Italy, and after years of being a breadwinner many find it very disturbing to fall back into dependency on the family, with whom contacts may have been damaged by years of separation. Therefore, for the older generation, their mobility is "a way to stay at home" (Morokvasic 2004:7) and a way of "preserving

home”, preventing the scattering of other family members throughout the world in migration. This approach is just one example of how time in migration flows differently for families back at home and for migrants, while time spent away both opens up and closes different opportunities for men and women.

Trying to overcome the limitations of the ideological and normative construction of motherhood in migration, a number of authors have turned to the transnational family framework, exploring care chains and care across borders by considering gender, age, life cycle and the ideological imaginations of family shared by family members. Thus, a number of authors examine the importance of informal family networks, kinship and particularly kinship alliances along gender lines, and map out the networks of migrants’ social relations and the power asymmetries within these networks (Lutz and Palenga-Möllenberg 2011; Vianello 2009a, b; Tymczuk and Leifsen 2012; Volodko 2011b; Solari 2008; Fedyuk 2012; Yarova 2006) in order to understand the mechanisms that trigger and sustain migration.

5.3.2 Feminization of Migration and Care Work

Women’s employment as care and domestic workers is the focus of a number of studies (also see Chaps. 9 and 10), most notably Marta Kindler’s (2011) work on Ukrainian domestic workers in Poland, which considers the consequences of labour market flexibilization and daily labour practices in the privacy of Polish homes, and how legality affects migrants’ choices and shapes their professional identities as migrant labourers, forcing them to negotiate against the insecurities of their legal, social and professional position. Kindler addresses relationships that are defined by the space and conditions of employment hidden away in the private sphere of the home, often resulting in class power asymmetries between employer and employee.

Care work and the uneasy informal negotiations it entails are discussed in Näre’s (2007) comparative study of domestic workers from Poland and Ukraine in Naples, Fedyuk’s PhD thesis (2011) and Vianello’s book (2011) both on Ukrainian migration to Italy. Female employment in the domestic and care sectors is addressed through analysis of the role of skills versus profession in constructing a marketable migrant profile, as well as the transformation of the meaning of migration over time. It also addresses issues of self-identification, professional realization and the role of migration within individual biographies.

In texts addressing the feminization of migration from Ukraine, Tolstokorova (2010a, b) provides a gender-based analysis of the role of remittances in social sustainability in Ukraine and their impact on poverty, health, education, labour issues and gender equality. In other cutting-edge research, Piperno and Tognetti Bordogna’s (2012) text on migration and development perspectives between Italy and Ukraine explores this migration from the unique perspective of Italian-Ukrainian decentralized cooperation initiatives at supranational and local levels, looking at examples of emerging small businesses (especially involving Ukrainian women), transnational NGO initiatives in support of transnational parenting, and migration trajectories

oriented towards the well-being of children and social protection. Vianello (2009a, b, 2011) addresses care chains, looking not only at childcare by migrant parents, but also at the gaps in elderly care in Ukraine resulting from the departure of women who would otherwise be taking care of their ageing parents and in-laws (also see Fedjuk 2009; Chap. 10).

The politicization of female migration in the Ukrainian state and media is reflected in a number of texts addressing the positioning of women vis-à-vis the nationalistic normative model of familial roles, and women's shifting identities and gender roles transformed through their migration experience. Solari's text on human resource drain (2010) provides a particularly insightful analysis into the role of gender in Ukrainian migration and the effect of gendered migration on family structures, the labour market and the Ukrainian state. The author starts by looking into the historic post-Soviet reorganization of work and family and new Ukrainian nationalism. In this transformation, she suggests, the newly independent Ukrainian state intensifies implicit gender inequalities in terms of employment, careers, workloads and pay rates, forcing more and more women into unemployment, underemployment, chronically underpaid state jobs and reproductive unpaid labour. On a national ideology level, Solari concludes, docile, feminine and nurturing women are envisioned as embodying Ukraine's authentic national traits that distance Ukraine both culturally and morally from the "unnatural" values of the Soviet past, and write Ukraine back into European values. Such works provide an opportunity to historicize the present migrations in the context of broader geopolitical changes in Ukraine (also see Chap. 13).

These conclusions are echoed in Solari's other text "Between 'Europe' and 'Africa'", in which the author takes a close look at women's ideological concern with Ukraine's modernity, the link between their professional positioning in the former USSR and in the independent Ukraine, and the misplaced sense of identity which makes them feel simultaneously at home and out of place in both Ukraine and Italy (Solari 2008). Addressing similar issues of ideological reframing of the Ukrainian position in Europe through Ukrainian female migration, Hrycak, in her text "Women as Migrants on the Margins of the European Union", looks further into the ideological construction of migration to Italy by the Ukrainian state. Such discourses view women migrants as deviant in contrast to male migrants, to whom the breadwinning function is assigned by default (Hrycak 2011). Women's migration for paid labour, states the author, is presented as abandoning their domestic roles, their families and Ukraine as such.

In relation to women's emancipatory experience of earning a living for themselves and their families in another country, a legitimate question has been raised, particularly by feminist researchers: how does this emancipatory experience affect women's positioning within their families, and does it add up to a concrete gender role shift in migrants' families? Thus Volodko, in her PhD thesis on the influence of labour migration on family roles (2011b), examines migrant women's experience in Greece and Poland and concludes that such migration hardly results in any significant change in Ukrainian families' gender roles. The most significant, though temporary, changes take place during women's migration. However, in the post-migration

period, most women in the research sample return to the pre-migration gender-defined family roles. Among the migrants to Poland and Greece, families are typically transnational (see Chaps. 8 and 9). Vianello (2013), in her paper on social remittances in female migration to Italy, observes only a modest shift in gender roles, which she attributes to women increasingly striving for the right to self-care and self-realization and the recognition of different and more women-friendly life patterns, rather than to shifts of the gendered responsibilities and ideals in Ukraine. Both works can be seen as touching upon the issue of time in migration, i.e. the changing of identities and identifications with time, the development of simultaneous attachments in the places of migration and home, and the differentiated flow of time in the place of migration and at home (characterized by the different paces of value and role change).

Vianello's article on migrant returnees (2009b) and Solari's (2010) article represent a departure from the view of migrant women as the only active gender agents, i.e. portraying migrating women as those whose gender awareness has been transformed while the gender awareness at home has remained frozen in time or fallen behind "modern" models. As Vianello convincingly demonstrates in her work, gender understanding has been transforming in Ukraine equally fast, though in a neo-conservative or neo-traditionalist direction (also see Chap. 10). It is a point of paramount importance, especially in the case of returning female migrants, as it allows insight into the difficulties they face not in the gender-backwardness of their homes but as a part of the larger consolidation of normative gender roles in which the migration of women both fuels such neo-conservative zest and triggers a desire for stronger control over the female bodies (also see Fedyuk 2011).

5.3.3 *Transnational Family and Motherhood at a Distance*

A number of texts (Lutz and Palenga-Möllenberg 2011; Torre and Piperno 2008; Molodikova 2008; Tolstokorova 2010a, b; Volodko 2011a) utilize Arlene Hochschild's (2001) concept of "care drain" or "care gap" created by the departure of Ukrainian women to perform paid care work abroad. The debate is conducted in the context of a highly politicized debate on "Euro-orphans" (also "social" or "national" orphans), also known as the children left behind. As Lutz and Palenga-Möllenberg (2012) note, the increase in female migration aroused strong media interest and public debates on absent parents, in particular mothers: "starting in 2000, public national [Ukrainian] discourses switched from relative silence to a very lively interest in children of labour migrants" (2012: 26). The terms "Euro-orphans" or "social orphans" came to mean children orphaned while their parents are alive, a "victim of the parents' hunger for the Euro" (Lutz and Palenga-Möllenberg 2012: 26). A handbook on studying and researching contemporary labour migration from Ukraine published by the Ukrainian Academy of Science includes the following in its glossary of terms: "Distant family – is a family which is characterized by the lasting absence of one or several family members, a family

with defects of upbringing, most typical of which are conflicting relationships between the parents, lack of time spent with the child, mistakes in upbringing, etc.” (Kychak 2009). Though all of the problems listed can be attributed to some degree to any family, the definition uses strong blaming language to portray these problems as arising from migration, and migrant families as inherently flawed.

Actual research into the effect of migration on various aspects of migrants’ children’s lives calls into question both results and ethical principles. Thus, according to a survey conducted in 2006 by La Strada Ukraine in several regions of Ukraine and discussed in greater detail in Molodikova’s (2008) report, in Ternopol (one of the regional centers in the west of Ukraine) one in four school children (25.5%) had a parent abroad, and 4.2% had neither parent at home. The 103 children of labour migrants who were surveyed provide some data as to the length of separation: 36% of fathers and 30% of mothers worked abroad for up to 3 years, with 14% of fathers and 11% of mothers abroad for more than 5 years (quoted in Molodikova 2008: 25). The report suggests there are negative behavioural changes among children whose parents work abroad: children of migrants are reported to leave school, study badly and generally lack discipline. They become angry and aggressive, and make the wrong friends. Among other problems, Molodikova identifies drug abuse, prostitution and suicide. The author suggests “the situation is especially dangerous when the mother migrates. It is also noticed that children brought up by fathers sometimes can’t identify themselves [*sic*] and tend to homosexual relationships” (Molodikova 2008: 25).

Such conclusions, lumping together drug abuse, prostitution and homosexuality, speak of the demonization of migration and place the main responsibility for families’ well-being on women’s shoulders. They lack both social and economic contextualization of the children’s background and comparison with the results of similar research conducted among the children of non-migrants in the same area. The lack of similar research in the Ukrainian context paves the way for harmful policy recommendations. Thus, Molodikova (2008) suggests an institution of state guardianship should be developed where care for migrants’ children is provided by state, NGO and religious institutions but sponsored (conveniently so) by migrating parents: “It is necessary also to promote sports, tourism and other activities. Taking into consideration the state’s financial deficit, such events could be fee paid as migrants’ children have enough money to pay for themselves” (2008:29).

Similar conclusions and ideological connotations are found in research by some Ukrainian scholars. Levchenko’s text (2006) on problems facing labour migrants’ children attempts to explore the effect of parents’ migration on children’s psycho-emotional state and behaviour and seeks the roots of deviant behaviour in the children. Kluchkovska and Hlumnytska’s (2010) edited volume, which uses the term “social and national orphans” as a neutral, non-problematized term in the title of the collection, provides a selection of texts addressing a range of problems from the perspectives of psychologists, teachers, policy makers and civil servants, making a number of policy recommendations as to how to reduce the negative effects of migration on migrants and their families. Ihnatolya and Rul’ (2011) based their analysis on surveys of high-school students, providing a more organized methodological

and critical approach to this issue as they compared the life challenges faced by migrant and non-migrant children. The authors analyze the specific features of migrant children's socialization and recommend social integration measures. Rul' (2010), in her survey of high-school children (223 respondents) in the Zakarpattia region, singles out psychological stress, hard physical labour, difficulties at school and lack of daily routine as problems typically described by migrants' children. The author concludes that migrants' children are readier to solve their problems themselves, relying on their parents' money, than children of non-migrants.

Lutz and Palenga-Möllenneck (2012) suggest that the terms "Euro-orphan" or "social orphan" became buzzwords in academia and the media without being clearly identified or critically reflected upon (2012: 26). The press used "so-called statistical references for emphasis in this debate: most articles mention large numbers and suggest that they can be seen as indicators of an as yet undiscovered and underestimated mass phenomenon. ... In Ukraine, the figure has been circulating of 7.5 to 9 million children left behind, and to trace the source of these numbers, we refer to a survey estimating the numbers of Ukrainians working abroad at 7 million, of whom only 6% are said to be childless" (Lutz and Palenga-Möllenneck 2012: 27). The authors point out that such debates "of blame, primarily women, are seen as being responsible for the neglect of their children.... Male migration from Eastern and Central Ukraine to Russia gets more attention in the national media without being scandalized as a loss of care resources" (2010: 14). Similarly, Solari (2010) notes that during her research in Italy among Ukrainian migrants, respondents often expressed pride at being able to help their children (also see Chap. 13). However, when speaking of other people's children, remittances were often discussed with a negative connotation, and other children regarded as being corrupted by easy money (Solari 2010). These ambiguous discourses clearly show that remittances trigger economic inequalities, which make migrants' children more visible, enhance consumerist competition and put more pressure on migrants.

The issue of children left behind is almost exclusively explored in relation to migrant mothers and motherhood from a distance. Tolstokorova, in her critical paper based on small-scale research, "Where Have All the Mothers Gone? The Gendered Effect of Labour Migration and Transnationalism on the Institution of Parenthood in Ukraine" (2010b), argues that it is the *mothers* who keep bearing the multiple burdens linked to migration. She argues that Ukrainian transnational mothers "undergo multidimensional exploitation" among which she enumerates exploitation of their labour by the employers, emotional exploitation by the families back home, by middlemen who make money on their efforts to maintain transnational connections (information and communication technologies, phone networks, the public transport industry), and by national economies and financial corporations earning interest on women's cash transfers. Here, the author also includes "the private educational system benefitting from university fees paid with mothers' earnings abroad" (2010b: 204–5). Thus, the author calls on migration scholars to look critically at the price of transnationalism and suggests that transnational motherhood entails a "vignette of women's burdens: overexploitation, multiple penalties and financial and emotional outsourcing" (2010b: 204). From this exhaustive list of

exploitations, the author concludes that the women gain the rather ephemeral reward of hope that their sacrifice will be beneficial for their children, a hope that Tolstokorova points out might not necessarily come to fruition (2010b: 204).

Several authors attempt to address this prominent importance of motherhood and family in Ukrainian female migration, while maintaining a critical approach. Fedyuk's dissertation "Beyond motherhood" based on a year of research in Bologna and Naples, looks into how motherhood figures at the various levels of migrating women's lives – employment, transnational connections with their families or sexual and intimate relations established with Italian men outside the transnational family. To provide an alternative to the discourse of motherhood that is so prevalent in all aspects of migrating women's lives, Fedyuk considers the "migration project" in which migrating and non-migrating family members in extended families are equally affected by migration across generations, whether performing their part in the "migration deal" as migrants and/or care-givers and/or remittance handlers and/or those who keep the door for the migrants' return open. The author concludes that the nature of the contemporary labour migration project from Ukraine to Italy is that family members rotate in their roles within the project, depending on their age, gender and stage of life. Thus, those who migrate may return home for a while to take their position in the care chains, while a son or a daughter can temporarily join the migration until they decide to marry and have their own children.

5.4 Conclusions

This section identifies seven topics in literature on Ukrainian migration from a gender perspective and proposes further studies in the directions discussed.

Systematic cross-country analysis. There is a need for a systematic gender-sensitive cross-country migratory pattern analysis for several EU countries. Such an analysis would identify employment conditions in terms of age and sex in various destination countries and sectors, and consider how this affects migrants' working conditions, salaries, legalization opportunities, care chains and care arrangements within transnational families, remittance patterns, length of stay and future plans. A systematic analysis would contextualize migrants' positions within specific socio-economic conditions, migratory patterns and the changes in migratory practices over time, allowing us to construct a meaningful analytical concept of gender and how it features in Ukrainian labour migration.

Male migration. More research is needed on the combination of gendered labour conditions, age and migrants' regularity status as well as on the role of competing masculinity norms at play in employer–employee relations. A useful enquiry into the link between paid jobs and unpaid gendered tasks would be research on Ukrainian men employed in "non-traditional" jobs as care workers, gardeners, nurses and domestic workers, and the possible effect on their perception of gender roles and masculinity. Regrettably, men are largely excluded from analysis of transnational care chains, families, children left behind and identity changes through

migration. Significantly, there is also no research that would show how the pattern of male migration shifts and adapts over time and within professional and personal biographies.

Female migration. While female migration remains one of the areas where a thorough qualitative approach has been used in selected destination countries, it is important to examine the transformation of women's migratory patterns over time and explore the effects of status changes and length of stay on women's professional biographies, remittance patterns, care chains and position in transnational families.

Migrants' children. This category of research not only needs academic and analytical work, but also ethical revision. Terms like "Euro-/social/national orphans" not only politicize this sensitive issue, adding no analytical value, but stigmatize the children and cause serious social consequences by labelling them "orphans" and damaging their trust in their parents' care. The issues of children's neglect through lack of care, resources, parenting responsibility (of both mother and father) and social sensitivity to their position are of paramount importance and should be researched with appropriate ethical and analytical caution. Thus, it is important to thoroughly contextualize the children in the socio-economic conditions that applied before migration (it often happens that the departure of the primary caregiver, especially the mother, is accompanied by a general crisis of family relations and socio-economic conditions experienced particularly acutely by children after the departure of the most integral family member) and in the wider socio-economic conditions of the specific area (it often happens that the numbers come from quite under-developed rural areas which, migration apart, are affected by various social problems).

There is a need to research the effect of parents' migration on their children not only in terms of the emotional connection, but the socio-economic conditions of parents' departure, children's lives when apart from their parents and the experiences of reunion. It is crucial to contextualize the child's gender, age at separation, the years spent apart and the reunion age (if it took place at all). The temporal aspect of migration plays a key role here; gendered norms and normative expectations are particularly strong in the case of children and young adults, and the length of separation from parents and conditions of transnational connections have a powerful effect on the overall experience of separation. Finally, temporality is significant in researching professional patterns, children's choices and the reproduction of migration as a valid life trajectory, since migrants' children seem to be more likely to join migration for a shorter or longer time, while migrants themselves might choose to rotate migration with non-migration periods, relying on remittances from other migrating kin when at home.

Transnational families. It is important to note here the first attempts to conduct research with multi-transnational families, a pattern which is becoming more and more common in Ukraine and in the larger context of the global gendered labour market. With economic migration practices becoming internalized by the families over many years and decades of labour migration, it is not uncommon for different family members to respond to the gendered opportunities provided by various national labour markets and split up to work in different countries, e.g. women would go to Italy or Greece to provide domestic and care services, while men would

undertake seasonal migration to Russia or the Czech Republic to do construction work. This approach would help understanding of a wide range of family behaviours in the face of migratory opportunities and the lack of opportunities in Ukraine. It would also allow for a cross-generational approach to migration, in which the reasons for, and the consequences of, migration are located over several generations of any family and affect migrating and non-migrating family members in specific ways (often dictated by age, gender and shared gendered familial norms).

Migration both triggers, and is triggered by, the particular social, economic and political structures of the sending country and thus should not be seen only as bringing change to the home country, but also as being changed by various socio-economic dynamics *in* the home country. Thus, Solari demonstrates that it is not the Ukrainian “homeland” that is a static entity and individual migrants or even migration patterns merely “impact” it (2010: 229). “It is not a collision but rather best understood as a process of mutual constitution”, which Solari calls “constitutive circularity” (2010: 229). In Solari’s analysis, migration conceptualizes, on a theoretical macro level, the transformation caused by migration; it cannot be understood by simply adding up a number of push and pull factors, and is a process which sustains, generates and transforms itself within the larger family unit.

Temporality and gender. A whole new approach is needed to understand how temporality overlaps with gender, i.e. how time spent in migration creates different opportunities for men and women. Thus, how time in migration affects opportunities for professional and status mobility for men and women and how time spent away from home affects different opportunities for return to Ukraine, reintegration or re-starting professional and personal lives after their return. Also, it can help us to understand how time spent in gender-dominated work sectors (e.g. care work, construction work) creates very different legal, professional and personal opportunities for men and women that determine their migratory and remittance patterns as well as their decisions to return or re-migrate.

Finally, in Ukraine, where the rigid division of family roles not only praises a normative family model that is unachievable for many in today’s economically challenging times but also condemns transnational migrants’ family arrangements as deviant, dangerous and unwanted, ignoring all those practices that can allow us to understand migrants’ choices, strategies and decisions, and denies the flexibility of the whole family unit, it is important to open up research to the issues of care not only for children, but for other family members, especially migrants’ ageing parents, and to examine more closely the directionality of care flows and power hierarchies within transnational families and all their members. Such research, however, has to be sensitive to the constantly shifting conditions of migration determined by accumulated experience in migration and a migrant’s shifting legal, professional and personal situation.

Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, duplication, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included in the work's Creative Commons license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory regulation, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or reproduce the material.

References

- Andall, J. (1998). Catholic and state constructions of domestic workers: The case of Cape Verdean women in Rome in the 1970s. In K. Khalid & H. Lutz (Eds.), *The new migration in Europe: Social constructions and social realities*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Andall, J. (2000). *Gender, migration and domestic service: The politics of black women in Italy*. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.
- Anderson, B. (2000). *Doing the dirty work?: The global politics of domestic labour*. London: Zed Books.
- Anderson, B., & Shutes, I. (2014). *Migration and care labour theory, policy and politics*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Boyko, Y. (Ed.) (2010). *The Socio-economic problems of contemporary Ukraine. Regional peculiarities of labour organization under the system crisis*. Lviv: NASU. Institute of Regional Research 4(84).480 P.
- Ehrenreich, B., & Fuentes, A. (1983). *Women in the global factory*. Boston: South End Press.
- Ehrenreich, B., & Russell Hochschild, A. (2004). *Global woman: Nannies, maids, and sex workers in the new economy*. New York: Metropolitan Press.
- Escrivà, A. (2005). Aged global care chains: A southern-European contribution to the field. In *International Conference on Migration and Domestic Work in Global Perspective Wassenaar*.
- Fargues, Ph. (ed.) (2013). EU neighbourhood migration report 2013. Migration Policy Center. European University Institute. http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/27394/MPC_EU_NeighbourhoodMigrationReport2013_web.pdf?sequence=5 Accessed 23 October 2015.
- Fedyuk, O. (2009). Death in the life of Ukrainian labor migrants in Italy. *Migration Online*. <http://www.migrationonline.cz/e-library/?x=2162690> Accessed (16 August 2011).
- Fedyuk, O. (2011). Beyond motherhood: Ukrainian female labor migration to Italy. PhD thesis manuscript. Budapest: CEU.
- Fedyuk, O. (2012). Images of transnational motherhood: the role of photographs in measuring time and maintaining connections between Ukraine and Italy. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 38(2), 279–300.
- Gamburd, M. R. (2000). *The kitchen spoon's handle: Transnationalism and Sri Lanka's migrant house maids*. Stanford: Cornell University Press.
- Haydenko, V. (2011). Chronicle of Children's Holidays: Construction of gender stereotypes in Ukrainian preschools and elementary education. In M. J. Rubchak (Ed.), *Mapping difference. The many faces of women in contemporary Ukraine*. New York/Oxford: Berghahn.
- Hochschild, A. R. (2001). Global care chain and emotional surplus value. In W. Hutton & A. Giddens (Eds.), *Global capitalism*. New York: The New Press.
- Hofmann, M., & Reichel, D. (2011). Österreichischer Integrationsfonds: Ukrainian migration: An analysis of migration movements to, through and from Ukraine. <http://www.integrationsfonds.at/publikationen/laenderinformation/ukrainianmigration/>. Accessed 18 Aug 2011.
- Hondagneu-Sotelo, P. (1994). *Gendered transitions: Mexican experiences of immigration*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Hondagneu-Sotelo, P., & Avila, E. (1997). "I'm here, but I'm there." The meanings of Latina transnational motherhood. *Gender and Society*, 11(5), 548–571.

- Hrycak, A. (2011). Women migrants on the margins of the European Union. In M. J. Rubchak (Ed.), *Mapping difference. The many faces of women in contemporary Ukraine*. New York/Oxford: Berghahn.
- Iglicka, K., Gmaj, K., & Borodzicz-Smoliński, W. (2011). *Circular migration patterns. Migration between Ukraine and Poland*. Florence: European University Institute and Robert Schuman Centre For Advanced Studies. <http://www.eui.eu/Projects/METOIKOS/Documents/CaseStudies/METOIKOScasestudyPolandUkraine.pdf>. Accessed 1 December 2011.
- Ihnatolya, N., & Ruľ, V. (2011). Problems of the socialization of labor migrants' children under the transformation of Ukrainian society. *Crossroads*. (1–2): 212–221. http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_23409-1522-21-30.pdf?110720153220. Accessed 26 Feb 2015.
- Kindler, M. (2009). The relationship to the employer in migrant's eyes: The domestic work Ukrainian migrant women in Warsaw. *Cahiers de l'Urmis*, 12. <http://urmis.revues.org/index853.html>. Accessed 18 Mar 2011.
- Kindler, M. (2011). *Risky business? Ukrainian migrant women in Warsaw's domestic work sector*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Kluchkovska, I., & Humnytska, N. (Eds.). (2010). *The newest emigration: The problems of the social and national orphans: Compilation of the scientific papers and presentations from the round-table discussions*. Lviv: Lvivska Politekhnyka.
- Kotusenko, V. (2007). Labour migration from Ukraine and its ethical implications. *Oikonomia*, 3, 9–13.
- Kychak, O. (2009). *Zapytalyky ta ankety dlja vyvchennja problem suchasnoji trudovoji emigratsiji Ukrajiniv Zakarpattja* [Questionnaires for studying contemporary labor from Transcarpathia]. Uzhhorod: Grazhda.
- Kys, R. (Ed.). (2010). *Trudova mihratsija jak instrument internatsionalizatsiji. Zbirka materialiv kompleksnoho doslidzhennja trudovoji mihratsiji ryнкiv pratsi (Ispanija, Italija, Moldova, Ukrajin, Rosijs'ka Federatsija)* [Labour migration as a tool of internationalization. A collection of materials o the complex research on labour migration and labour markets (Spain, Italy, Moldova, Ukraine, Russian Federation)]. Lviv: Drukarskikunshty.
- Kyzyma, I. (2006). *Female migration in Ukraine: Determinants and consequences*. <http://soc.kuleuven.be/ceso/impalla/ESPANET/docs/kyzyna-paper.pdf>. Accessed 18 Mar 2011.
- Leontiyeva, Y. (2011). *The socio-economic impact of admission policies and admission-related integration policies in the Czech Republic*. http://aa.ecn.cz/img_upload/6334c0c7298d6b396d213ccd19be5999/YLeontiyeva_socioeconomic_impact.pdf. Accessed 3 Mar 2013.
- Leontiyeva, Y., & Tollarová, B. (2011). *Results from a survey of foreigners' incomes, expenditures and remittances. Main findings concerning remittances*. Prague: Sociologický ústav AV ČR. http://www.soc.cas.cz/download/1182/Leontiyeva_Tollarova_Remittances_2010.pdf. Accessed 1 June 2012.
- Levchenko, K. (Ed.). (2006). *Problemy ditej trudovyh mihrantiv: Analiz sytuatsiji*. [Problems of labour migrants' children: general analysis]. Kyiv: Ahentstvo Ukrajin.
- Lutz, H., & Palenga-Möllenbeck, E. (2011). Care, gender and migration: Towards a theory of Transnational domestic work migration in Europe. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 19(3), 349–364.
- Lutz, H., & Palenga-Möllenbeck, E. (2012). Care workers, care drain, and care chains: Reflections on care, migration, and citizenship. *Social Politics*, 19(1), 15–37.
- Malynovska, O. (2009). International migration flows and social transformations in the era of globalization. *Demographics and Social Economics*, 1(11), 5–19. http://www.nbu.gov.ua/portal/Soc_Gum/Dtse/2009_1.pdf. Accessed 19 March 2013.
- Markov, I. (Ed.). (2005). *Ukrainian labour migration in the context of changes in the contemporary world*. Lviv: Manuscript.
- Markov, I., Bojko, J., Ivankova-Stetsyuk, O., & Seleshchuk, H. (2009). *Na rozdorizhzi: analitychnyj material kompleksnoho doslidzhenja* [At the crossroads: analytical materials of complex research]. Lviv: Papuha.

- Marques, J. C., & Góis, P. (2007). Ukrainian migration to Portugal. From non-existence to one of the Top Three Immigrant Groups. <http://www.migrationonline.cz/en/e-library/ukrainian-migration-to-portugal-from-non-existence-to-one-of-the-top-three-immigrant-groups>. Accessed 19 Mar 2013.
- Molodikova, I. (2008). *Trends in the field of social policies and welfare reforms in Ukraine and Moldova*. Roma: CeSPI. <http://www.cespi.it/WPMIG/BREPORT%20Ucraina.pdf>. Accessed 26 Feb 2015.
- Morokvasic, M. (2004). Settled in mobility: Engendering post-wall migration in Europe. *Feminist Review*, 77, 7–25.
- Mudrak, V. (2011). *The Italian-Ukrainian care chain: Transnational welfare, Transnational Families and Care Drain*. LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing.
- Näre, L. (2007). Ukrainian and Polish Domestic Workers in Naples – A Case of East-South Migration. *Migration Online*. <http://www.migrationonline.cz/e-library/?x=1966763>. Accessed 27 Mar 2013.
- Orozco, A. P. (2009). *Global perspectives on the social organization of care in times of crisis: Assessing the situation*. Gender, Migration and Development Series, Working Paper 5. The United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (UN-INSTRAW).
- Parkhomenko, N., & Starodub, A. (Eds.). (2005). *Ukrajinska trudova mihratsija do krajin Evropejskoho Sojuzu u dzerkali sotsiologiji: informatsijno-analityczne vydannja* [Ukrainian labour migration to EU countries through sociology]. Kyiv: SlavutychDelfin. www.old.pauci.org/file/KJoC3YBaYoA_.doc. Accessed 3 Mar 2013.
- Piperno, F., & Tognetti Bordogna, M. (2012). *Welfare transnazionale. La frontiera esterna delle politiche sociali* [Transnational welfare. External frontier of the social politics]. Roma: Ediesse.
- Pirozhkov, S. (1997). Trends in Ukrainian migration and short-term work trip. In J. R. Azrael & E. A. Payin (Eds.), *Cooperation and conflict in the former Soviet Union: Implications for migration*. New York: Rand Publishing.
- Pirozhkov, S., Malinovskaya, E., & Homra, A. (2003). *Vneshnijetrudovyjemigratsyi v Ukraine: sotsial'no-ekonomicheskij aspekt* [External labour migration in Ukraine: Socio-economic aspects]. Kiev: NIPMB.
- Razavi, Sh. (2007). *The political and social economy of care in a development context: Conceptual issues, research questions and policy options*. Gender and Development Programme Paper Number 3.
- Rovenchak, O. (2011a). Transformations of professional/career and class/status identities and practices in the context of Ukrainian emigration. *Social Psychology*, 4(48), 133–143.
- Rovenchak, O. (2011b). Ethnic and linguistic identifications and practices of Ukrainian migrants to Poland and Greece. *Social Psychology*, 6(50), 97–106.
- Rubchak, M. J. (2011). Turning oppression into opportunity: An introduction. In M. J. Rubchak (Ed.), *Mapping difference. The many faces of women in contemporary Ukraine*. New York/Oxford: Berghahn.
- Rul', V. (2010). Life difficulties as obstacles on the way of socialization of transborder labor migrants' children (a case study of Transcarpathian region). *Social Psychology*, 1, 142–151.
- Shybko, V., Khomra, O., Ozhevan, M., & Prymak, O. (Eds.). (2006). *Trudovamihratsijahromadjan Ukrajiny* [Labor migration of Ukrainian Citizens]. Kyiv: Kyjivskij Universytet.
- Solari, C. (2008). Between “Europe” and “Africa”: Building the “New” Ukraine on the shoulders of migrant women. University of California, Berkley, Institute of Slavic, East European and Eurasian Studies. <https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1ws054s5>. Accessed 9 Apr 2014.
- Solari, C. (2010). Resource drain vs. Constitutive circularity: Comparing the gendered effects of Post-Soviet migration patterns in Ukraine. *The Anthropology of East Europe Review*, 28(1), 215–238.
- Susak, V. (2002). Ukrainian guest workers and immigrants in Portugal (1997–2002). *Ukrainians in the Contemporary World: Conference of the Ukrainian graduates of American educational*

- programs, pp. 194–207. Kyiv: Stylos. http://www.kennan.kiev.ua/kkp/content/publications/conf_books/Yalta_text.pdf. Accessed 19 Mar 2013.
- Tegeler, V., & Cherkez, O. (Eds.). (2011). *Ukrainian labour migration processes in Russia: Social and gender aspects. Materials of a comprehensive sociological study*. Odessa: TOB “Elton”.
- Tolstokorova, A. V. (2010a). Bitter berries of better life: Socio-demographic costs of labour migration for the Ukrainian society. *ENQUIRE (Electronic Nottingham Quarterly for Ideas, Research and Evaluation)*, 5, 68–94.
- Tolstokorova, A. V. (2010b). Where have all the mothers gone? The gendered effect of labour migration and transnationalism on the Institution of Parenthood in Ukraine. *The Anthropology of East Europe Review*, 28(1), 184–214.
- Torre, A., & Piperno, F. (2008, November 20–21). Care migration and the impact of families. A comparative study of women from Romania, Ukraine and Ecuador. In *Conference presentation at ‘Transnational parenthood and children left behind’*, Oslo.
- Tyldum, G. (2015). Motherhood, agency and sacrifice in narratives on female migration for care work. *Sociology*, 49, 56–71.
- Tymczuk, A., & Leifsen, E. (2012). Care at a distance: Ukrainian and Ecuadorian transnational parenthood from Spain. *Special issue of Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 38(2).
- Utrata, J. (2008). *Babushki as Surrogate wives: How single mothers and grandmothers negotiate the division of labor in Russia*. <http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/3b18d2p8>. Accessed 19 Mar 2013.
- Vianello, F. A. (2006). The Italian side of the Ukrainian migration: The social networks role. In *Metodologija, Teorija ta Praktika sociologičnogo analizu sučasnoho suspil'stva: Zbirnik Naukovich Prazi* (Vol. 2, pp. 64–68). Charkiv: Charkivskii Nazionalnii Universitet imeni B.N. Karasina.
- Vianello, F. A. (2008). Svalutazione sociale. Percorsi di mobilità tra Italia e Ucraina. [Social devaluation. Path of mobility between Italy and Ukraine]. *Inchiesta*, 38(160), 119–126.
- Vianello, F. A. (2009a). *Migrando sole. Legami transnazionali tra Ucraina e Italia* [Migrating alone. Transnational ties between Ukraine and Italy]. Milano: Franco Angeli.
- Vianello, F. A. (2009b). Domanda di servizi alla persona e immigrazione ucraina: tre profili di donne migranti [Demand of care services and Ukrainian immigration: Three profiles of migrant women]. *Autonomie locali e servizi sociali*, 3.
- Vianello, F. A. (2011). Suspended migrants. Return migration to Ukraine. In M. Nowak & M. Nowosielski (Eds.), *(Post)transformational migration* (pp. 251–274). Berlin: Peter Lang.
- Vianello, F. A. (2013). Ukrainian migrant women's social remittances: Contents and effects on families left behind. *Migration Letters*, 10(1), 91–100.
- Volodko, V. (2011a). Transnational family practices of Ukrainian female labour migrants in Poland. In J. Isanski & P. Luczynski (Eds.), *Selling One's favourite Piano to emigrate: Mobility patterns in Central Europe at the beginning of the 21st century* (pp. 105–119). Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Volodko, V. (2011b). *Vplyv trudovoji mihratsiji na simejni roli suchasnykh ukrajins'kykh zhink* [The effect of migration on the familial roles of Ukrainian women: cases of migration to Poland and Greece]. Dissertation report. Kyiv: Shevchenko University.
- Wanner, C. (2005). Money, morality and new forms of exchange in post-socialist Ukraine. *Ethnos*, 70(4), 515–537.
- Yarova, O. (2006). The migration of Ukrainian women to Italy and the impact on their family in Ukraine. In A. Szczepaniková, M. Čaněk, & J. Grill (Eds.), *Migration processes in Central and Eastern Europe: Unpacking the diversity*. Prague: Multikulturní centrum Praha.

Chapter 6

The Temporary Nature of Ukrainian Migration: Definitions, Determinants and Consequences

Agata Górny and Marta Kindler

6.1 Introduction

Temporary and fluid forms of mobility have been growing in importance in recent years, with international migration becoming an increasingly complex process, difficult to define and measure. Notions of temporary and long-term (or settlement) migration are usually either over-fuzzy or too strict to capture various “in-between” types of mobility. Consequently, a number of short-term, circular or incomplete forms of migration are not being captured in research (Robertson 2014), and studies of the duration of temporary migration projects, such as those involving, for example, repeated trips to one country for years or for a lifetime, are rare (Stola 1997; Morokvasic 2004).

The circular migration framework has attracted the attention of policy makers in national and international contexts as a form of temporary mobility which can bring about “triple-win” outcomes – for migrants and for both destination and sending countries (see Vertovec 2007; Constant et al. 2013; EMN 2011). The positive view of this kind of mobility seems to echo earlier enthusiasm for temporary migrant workers’ programmes (so-called guest-worker programmes).

Discovering the mechanisms of temporary mobility has become a high-priority task on the European political agenda. This means, however, that temporality has become a necessary analytical dimension in migration studies – not only the temporal dimension of migration (duration of stays, etc.), but also its associated processes, such as the variety of causes and consequences of temporary and permanent

Analyses presented in this chapter were partly funded by the National Science Centre under the research project: “Two decades of irregular temporariness? An examination of changes in mobility from Ukraine to Poland in a multidimensional perspective” (no. DEC-2011/B/HS4/02275)

A. Górny (✉) • M. Kindler

Centre of Migration Research, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland

e-mail: agata@gorny.edu.pl

mobility, adaptation strategies used by temporary and permanent migrants, and others. In other words, when migration understood as the time-space strategies of individuals is under consideration, “time” should be explored, not just as a length of stay, but as a meaningful sociological component, to a greater extent than is the case in traditional approaches devoted mainly to permanent migration.

Mobility can be understood broadly as migration and other more fluid types of movement. The relatively large scale of Ukrainian migration to Europe makes it a powerful case for addressing the above issues; the presence of Ukrainians in a number of European countries allows for cross-country comparisons with regard to temporal patterns of mobility; and, finally, Ukrainian migration takes a variety of forms, temporary and circular mobility being the most prevalent. In contrast to other third-country nationals in Europe, especially those from geographically more distant countries, Ukrainian migrants remain largely mobile, especially those heading for Central Europe.

Last, but not least, in contrast to the “managed circularity” (via special programmes) promoted by politicians promising a “win-win-win” scenario (EMN 2011), Ukrainian migration is an example of a predominantly “spontaneous circular migration”. Individual Ukrainian households bring about this mobility, using their limited resources, migrant networks and an industry of “mobility facilitators” (such as, for example, companies arranging travel documents). Meanwhile, as some authors advocate (Newland et al. 2008), understanding mechanisms of spontaneously developing circular migration is the most valuable insight into how this type of mobility should be managed. Lessons drawn from the study of Ukrainian migration can therefore contribute to the discussion on the role that temporary migration can play in the entry of third-country nationals to Europe and what the most effective solutions for its management are.

Temporariness of Ukrainian migration is, however, to a great extent determined (restricted) by visa regulations, which usually allow Ukrainians to enter and stay in the destination European countries only for a short time and without the right to work (see Chap. 4). Therefore, this chapter addresses constraints on permanent migration encountered by Ukrainian nationals coming to Europe. The analysis is not limited to the link between legal constraints and temporariness of migration, but also takes into account other aspects of mobility (employment opportunities, family situation, social resources and others), which are crucial in shaping the circular character of mobility (cf. Vertovec 2007).

Moreover, this chapter predominantly refers to studies carried out in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), which are particularly numerous because Ukrainians constitute the main group of labour migrants in countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic. This is not the case in Western and Southern European countries, where Ukrainian nationals are one among many national migrant groups. Moreover, Ukrainian labour migrants in the CEE region are particularly likely to be involved in mobility of a highly temporal character (e.g. shuttle mobility). Thus, the topic of temporality of mobility is highly relevant to Ukrainian migration to these countries.

The analysis begins with a short overview of migration literature, demonstrating how temporality (as an analytical dimension) and temporariness (as the characteristic

of temporary migration) are addressed in migration literature generally, and locating works on Ukrainian migration to Europe within this literature. An examination of definitional issues allows a particular focus on notions used to analyze temporary migration from Ukraine. First, the main lines of research on temporary migration from Ukraine are discussed, focusing on definitional issues and examining notions used to analyze Ukrainians in particular. Second, we examine how the determinants of different temporal forms of mobility of Ukrainians – mainly temporary versus permanent migration – are considered, as addressed in the literature. Finally, the consequences of temporariness for Ukrainian migrants, as well as for destination countries are examined. We omit consequences for Ukraine as they have been addressed in detail in Chap. 3. In the conclusions we consider the results of our overview in the context of the “triple-win” scenario promoted in the political discourse on temporary migration in Europe. The approach in this chapter is determined, therefore, both by the themes identified in the literature and by the theoretical and practical relevance of the problems of immigration of third-country nationals to Europe.

6.2 Theoretical and Empirical Aspects of Temporality and Temporariness

6.2.1 *Temporality in Migration Studies*

Temporality, understood as the time dimension, though crucial, is one of many factors taken into account in definitions and categorizations of migrants and non-migrants in migration literature. Others include the space dimension (direction of migration), the goal of migration and the political context. The secondary role of the temporal dimension in classic works on migration stems from the fact that these works were mainly devoted to overseas and international migration to Europe, usually with a tacit assumption that migration should involve a longer stay or settlement (cf. Massey 1999). Nevertheless, reflection on the temporality of migration or specifically on the differences between temporary and permanent mobility was not fully excluded from theoretical and empirical consideration as early as the 1970s and 1980s (cf. Zelinsky 1971; Burawoy 1976; Piore 1979, 1986; Stark and Bloom 1985; see also King et al. 2006; Cwerner 2001).

At the same time, several interesting perspectives on how to approach “time” in international mobility have been already proposed. As regards determinants of temporal patterns of migration, a classic work by Hägerstrand (1975) – his “time geography” – deserves attention. It analyzes decisions of migrants through the lenses of constraints and opportunities for pursuing a given time-space strategy (e.g. permanent migration versus temporary migration). Constraints are listed under three headings. The first are capacity constraints – the lack of physical, economic or social means to undertake certain actions. The second are coupling constraints – the

inability of individuals to be engaged in various activities, such as creating a family, or to be in different locations at the same time. Some of these projects are tied to a place, while others can be easily transferred (Malmberg 1997). The third group of factors are steering constraints – rules and laws that limit or increase access to time-space. For example, Malmberg elaborates on Hägerstrand’s framework of constraints on settlement migration by noting that the opportunities to migrate internally can explain the lack of incentive to migrate abroad (Malmberg 1997: 25).

More recent and less well known is an approach of Robertson (2014) who coined two time-related concepts that can be helpful in capturing the complexities of present-day migration trajectories: “time track” and “timescales”. The first concept refers to “movement over time but not always forward movement” (2014: 4). Robertson argues that a migration time track does not have to be linear and can stop or restart at different moments of a migrant’s life. In turn, she understands “timescales” as temporal ordering of various events at macro level (political and economic global and national contexts), meso level (migration regimes, systems of governance, institutions, brokers, agents) and micro level, encompassing life events in a migrant’s biography. The openness of the “time track” concept can be perceived as both a strength and a weakness of the proposed approach; however, it enables the analysis of temporary mobility without predetermined concepts of migration such as circular migration, return migration, transnational migration and others.

The above approaches focus on the context of decisions about mobility strategies of individuals. It can be argued that a different perspective is taken by Cwerner (2001) in his “times of migration” approach. He sees temporality of mobility not only as its temporal form – various temporary forms of mobility versus permanent migration – but also as a development of migration experience in time both at the individual and group level. Consequently, he focuses on the temporal dimension of the incorporation of migrants into host societies while proposing eight types of “times” that intersect with behaviours of migrants at different stages of their migration experiences (cf. King et al. 2006). An important part of his argument relates to the significance of the temporal dimension in discussions not only on immigration but also on the nation-state and multicultural societies (Cwerner 2001).

6.2.2 *Temporariness of Mobility in Migration Studies*

Temporariness as a characteristic of temporary migration was first addressed in pioneering works on internal, urban–rural labour mobility in Africa that focused on circular mobility (e.g. Mitchell 1961; Elkan 1959; compare Kaczmarczyk 2002). The list of studies on temporary mobility that supplement earlier studies focusing on permanent migration is already substantial (see for example, Danzer and Dietz 2009; Ács 2010; Constant and Zimmermann 2011; EMN 2011; Constant et al. 2013).

Four main concepts have been developed to capture the notion of temporary international movements: circular migration, return migration, transnational

migration and – recently – liquid migration. The concept of “liquid migration” pertains to migration movements that involve “complex, transitory patterns in terms of transient settlement – transnational or otherwise – and shifting migration status” (Engbersen et al. 2010: 117). This approach to migration is gaining in importance in studies on mobility within the European Union, where lack of administrative borders allows migrants to freely change their destinations.

The remaining three research streams are more universal. Works on return migration concentrate first of all on the probability that migrants will return home at some point in their stay abroad and on how migration experience impacts intentions to return (cf. Dustman and Weiss 2007; Dustman and Kirchkamp 2002). It should be stressed, however, that there is no single definition of return migration in this field even though it is usually assumed that a return migrant is a person who leaves the destination country with the intention of remaining at home for a longer time. Studies of return migration from the perspective of the destination country focus on the departure from the destination country rather than on the migrant’s intentions and duration of stay in the home country (Fihel and Górný 2013). Such a definitional approach intersects with the approach frequently encountered in studies on circular migration, which can be defined as “systematic and regular movement of migrants between their homelands and foreign countries typically seeking work” (Constant and Zimmermann 2011: 498).

Research on circular migration addresses a number of topics, but among the most frequent are determinants and patterns of migration, and selectivity in circular mobility with regard to different individual characteristics of migrants. The main conclusions of these works are that distinctive determinants of circular migration (as opposed to permanent migration) can be identified pertaining to individual characteristics of migrants and opportunity structures in sending and receiving countries. Circular migrants are more often men than women, possess vocational more often than secondary or higher education and have their households located in the sending country (cf. Constant et al. 2013).

Different emphases and research topics can be found in the literature on transnational migration. Levitt et al. (2003: 565) argue that transmigrants are those who maintain “enduring ties to their homelands even as they are incorporated into countries of settlement”. Research on transmigration arose in response to methodological nationalism, as a framework where the perspective has moved away from the centrality of a single state.

In the review of literature on Ukrainian migration that follows, the Hägerstrand (1975) “time geography” approach is employed. This enables temporary mobility to be addressed from the perspective of the constraints on permanent migration. This also corresponds with the character of Ukrainian inflow to Europe governed by the legal regulations that limit opportunities for their settlement in Europe. Approaches and concepts used in the examination of Ukrainian migration are considered with a focus on three concepts developed in the literature: circular migration, return migration and transmigration.

6.3 Temporal Forms of Ukrainian Migration and Their Definitions

How are intersections between the temporariness of Ukrainian mobility and its durability captured in the definitions and concepts used in works about Ukrainians migrating to Europe? The answer to this question requires us to distinguish between specific national and regional approaches in studies of Ukrainian migration. For example, researching Ukrainian migration to Spain, Hosnedlová and Stanek (2010, 2014) suggest that there are two migratory systems, one based on short-distance migration between Ukraine and the neighbouring countries of CEE and the other based on long-distance migration to Southern and Western Europe. According to the Spanish National Immigrant Survey of 2007, trips of Ukrainian migrants to their home country were infrequent and short: one-third of the surveyed migrants visited Ukraine less often than every 2 years (Hosnedlová and Stanek 2010; see also Chap. 12). Malynovska (2004) points to the differences in the duration of migration between the various destinations (in Poland and Germany the stay lasts between one and six months, while in the Southern European countries it is over 6 months). However, these authors have not proposed any particular time-related analytical notions to capture the observed regional variations in mobility of Ukrainian nationals.

One particular group of works, focusing on Ukrainian migration to the CEE region, deals with the early 1990s Ukrainian “shuttle movements” of cross-border traders to Poland, which were usually very short – lasting from a day to several days – and of a predominantly intensive circular character. A variety of terms were used to describe this particular mobility, such as “highly temporary”, “transitory”, “flexible”, “circular”, “pendulum” and “fluid” (Stola 1997; Okólski 1997, 2001, 2004). These notions reflect the specificities of mobility from and to the CEE countries in the 1990s which was not only the result of geographical proximity, but was also a period following political and economic transition in the region. At the same time, researchers analyzing this form of mobility pointed to the fact that although these flows of foreigners were non-permanent, they represented a stable number of foreign workers in the stock.

The concept of circular migration has been used particularly frequently in studies on Ukrainian migration to Central Europe – the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (Grzymała-Kazłowska and Okólski 2003; Górny et al. 2010a; Drbohlav 2003; Illés and Kincses 2012; see also Chap. 7). However, only certain works elaborate in greater depth on the conceptual issues pertaining to circular migration. Illés and Kincses (2012), researching immigration to Hungary, including the inflow of Ukrainians, proposed a statistical operationalization of circular migration capturing the repetitiveness (thus the time dimension) of mobility. They defined international circular migration as “a hetero-space and discrete-time spatial mobility system containing at least three interlinked individual moves in which two have return character” (2012:203). On the basis of this definition, the authors used official registries to argue that circular migrants accounted for around 15% of all migrants coming to

Hungary between 2006 and 2008. The same study also showed that circulation to Hungary is typical for Serbians, Romanians and Ukrainians and is observed primarily in border regions. It is arguable whether three movements already amount to circular migration. The other question is whether official registries enable circular movements to be captured adequately. The authors admit that their study covered only officially defined migrations which lasted for 1 year or longer. Consequently, all shorter trips to Hungary were ignored. It should be stressed that even if registries include shorter migrations (but usually not longer than 3 months), the problem of neglecting some part of circular mobility not captured in official registries usually remains.

Other elaborations on the character of circular migration can be found in works on Ukrainian migration to Poland that discuss not only cross-border traders but also economic short-term migrants. Okólski (1997, 2001) proposed the concept of “incomplete migration” to describe this circular flow of migrants. Okólski draws on Chapman and Prothero’s (1983–1984) definition of a “territorial division of responsibilities, activities and goods”, with people linked to a pendulum, having no clear intention of a long-term change of dwelling (Okólski 2001: 56). He classified as “incomplete migrants” those spending most of the year in the country of migration, and for whom the income earned abroad constituted an important part of the overall household income in the country of origin. Incomplete migration is characterized by circulation and work in the secondary labour market. According to the results of one of the earliest studies on Ukrainian migrants, an ethno-survey carried out in three localities in Ukraine between 1993 and 1996, the average length of Ukrainian migrants’ stay in Poland was between 2 and 3 weeks (Okólski 2001). The study identified three major strategies characterizing incomplete migrants from Ukraine to Poland: migration as a physical survival strategy (for households with income below subsistence level and those where none of the members worked); migration as a transformation-period survival strategy (attempting to preserve the previously acceptable living standards and diversifying the sources of household income); and migration as an entrepreneurial strategy, with the goal of creating or developing one’s own business (*ibid.*). The concept was used not only to analyze Ukrainian migration to Poland, but also Polish migration to Western European countries (Jaźwińska and Okólski 1996, 2001) in the 1990s. However, its usage is limited in later migration studies, because the incomplete migration approach is embedded in the context of the post-communist economy and has not been further developed to accommodate the transition towards a market economy in CEE countries.

As in the above overview of Ukrainian incomplete migrants’ strategies, the role of a household’s place of residence in conceptualizing migration was also stressed in the typology of mobility proposed by Górny et al. (2010b) for immigration to Poland. The study was based on 160 qualitative interviews (including 75 interviews with Ukrainian migrants) conducted in different studies in 2005–08 by the Centre of Migration Research, University of Warsaw. The typology was based on two dimensions: (1) whether a migrant lives in Poland (operationalized by the presence of other household members and the duration of stay); and (2) the number of countries in which a migrant lives. The proposed categories include “immigrant” (living

basically in Poland), “circular migrant”, “transmigrant” (connected to Poland) and a rather theoretical category of “transmigrants” (not connected with Poland, i.e. living in several countries but not in Poland). Two of these categories relate in particular to temporary mobility. “Circular migrants” have been defined as those who come regularly to Poland but who regard their home as being in another country (usually the home country), whereas “transmigrants (tied to Poland)” are those whose place of residence is in Poland and in one or several other countries (Górny et al. 2010b: 191–192).

Results of this study suggest that “circular migrants” originated originally from the ex-USSR (mainly Ukraine) and typically worked in secondary market sectors such as domestic services and construction. They also had a tendency to operate in the social circles of other circulants and were relatively likely to attract new circular migrants to Poland. “Transmigrants” were more diversified in terms of sector of employment and character of their social ties in Poland than “circular migrants.” It should be stressed, however, that, according to the results of this study, transmigration was usually a transitory stage leading to more permanent forms of migration in Poland or presumably abandonment of migration to Poland (which could not be analyzed in the study described). In contrast, circular migration was found to be a relatively durable pattern of migration.

The above approach links circular migration with transmigration, a connection not often noted in the literature on Ukrainian migration to Central Europe. The study suggests, however, that Ukrainian migrants coming to Poland should be seen rather as circular migrants and to a lesser extent as transmigrants. Other studies conducted in CEE employ the notion of transnationalism, usually to analyze the degree of integration of Ukrainians in the host society. For example, Grzymała-Kazłowska and Okólski (2003) argued that, even though the most prevalent adaptation strategies among Ukrainian migrants in Poland in the 1990s were “surface accommodation”, typical of short-term and circular migrants, and “assimilation”, the formation of “transnational social spaces” in which migrants operated was also relatively frequent. Consequently, even those who were settled in Poland were capable not only of maintaining close contact with their friends and relatives in Ukraine, but of actually being simultaneously members of both societies (Grzymała-Kazłowska and Okólski 2003).

The notion of circulation is rarely found in studies in European countries outside the CEE region. However, it has been used by some scholars analyzing temporary forms of Ukrainian migration to Italy (Vianello 2011, 2013; Solari 2010; see also Chap. 10). For example, Vianello (2013) developed, on the basis of a qualitative study, a typology related to the circulation of Ukrainians to Italy. The two main dimensions that she uses are the place of residence of the migrant’s family (Ukraine vs. Italy) and gender combined with the age of migrants (adult women, adult men and a third category of young second-generation migrants). This typology, like that of Górny et al. (2010a, b), suggests that the presence of family in the country of origin or the country of destination is one of the identifiers of circulation. Overall, this typology, although stimulating, can be considered as descriptive rather than as providing actual ideal types and is thus difficult to apply in other studies.

Apart from developing a rich definitional framework to analyze the circularity of Ukrainian migrants to Italy, Vianello (2013) points also to a transnational “double presence” of migrants, who engage in transnational practices to cultivate family ties in Ukraine. These practices enable Ukrainian women to perform roles related to their multiple identities, not only as workers, but also as mothers and grandmothers. This “double presence”, which Vianello refers to also as “the migrant in transit” (see Chap. 10), also demonstrates the durability of temporary forms of mobility, creating a transnational social space within which repetitive movements continuously occur.

Summarizing, among the concepts that have been most frequently used in the analysis of Ukrainian migration to Europe are circular migration and transmigration (or transnational practices). We can talk about some “national/regional approaches” as regards the usage of these two terms. Studies on Ukrainian migration in CEE usually refer to circular migration, while research in Southern Europe discusses, rather, transmigration or transnational activities. The term “return migration” has been much less popular in studies of Ukrainians in Europe presumably because the return movements to Ukraine are typically short visits and do not relate to intention to return as suggested by studies both in Central and Southern Europe.

More nuanced approaches to these migration concepts can be also found in the literature reviewed here. Time dimensions addressed in them include, for example, duration of stays in the home and destination countries, and number (intensity) of trips. These approaches usually take the form of empirical-only typologies proposing some specific diversifications of types of circular and/or transnational migrants coming to the given country (cf. Górny et al. 2010b; Illés and Kincses 2012; Okólski 2001; Vianello 2013). What they virtually all have in common is an emphasis on the role of a household and its location (country of origin or migration) in determining patterns of mobility. However, novel terms introduced by researchers to capture temporariness in Ukrainian migration, even if defined, are difficult to operationalize, and thus their use is rather limited.

6.4 Determinants of Ukrainians’ Temporary Mobility

The discussion on the determinants of temporary aspects of Ukrainian migration starts by examining research on steering constraints (cf. Hägerstrand 1975), such as laws and regulations on entry and stay, and restrictions on labour market participation (see Chap. 4). These constraints are usually to the fore when temporal patterns of Ukrainian migration are discussed. However, as the literature research suggests, other factors should also be acknowledged in this respect. They can be demonstrated within the framework of the capacity constraints (mainly insufficient social resources useful during migration) and coupling constraints (predominantly those related to family obligations).

6.4.1 *Steering Constraints – Legal and Economic Context of Temporary Mobility*

For cross-border migration to take place in general, and for temporary forms of migration in particular, the necessary condition of being able to leave the home country without being prosecuted has to be met. For this reason, researchers usually regard the relaxation of the exit regulations introduced in the early 1990s in Ukraine as a crucial factor encouraging temporary mobility of Ukrainian nationals (Malynovska 2004; Okólski 2004; Stola 1997, 2001; Wallace 2002). The current exit regulations give Ukrainian nationals not only the right to travel abroad, but also to return after having migrated, which had not previously been the case before the political reforms of the early 1990s (see also Chaps. 2, 4 and 8).

Studies of Ukrainian migration also demonstrate the importance of entry policies (visa regimes) in shaping temporal mobility patterns. For example, according to Iglicka et al. (2011: 16), circulation between Ukraine and Poland has been “forced by procedures operating within short-term visa systems”. After the introduction of visas for Ukrainians in Poland in 2003, Ukrainian migrants still tended to enter Poland on short-term visas, but the changed legal framework for migration introduced the so-called “time corridor”, which forced the migrants to remain in Ukraine for at least three out of every 6 months (Follis 2012; Kindler 2011; see also Chaps. 4 and 7). The role of differences in entry policies between European countries in shaping Ukrainian movement to the European Union can be also traced. For example, Dietz (2010) demonstrated that when Germany relaxed visa procedures for Ukrainians in 2000, a number of Ukrainians entered Germany, only to travel onwards to the Netherlands and Portugal.

Studies on the migration of Ukrainians to Southern Europe have emphasized the role of regularization regimes, characteristic of the Mediterranean migratory model, in shaping temporal patterns of mobility (see Chaps. 4, 11 and 12). In the 1990s Wallace (2001) drew attention to a unique institutional factor determining circulation between Ukraine and Central Europe that can be also considered as a steering constraint: limited access to the welfare state. She argued that the employment/contribution-based welfare system in the destination countries along with the irregular status of migrants determine migrants’ need to stay in contact with their own welfare system, to be entitled to health care and pensions. There are hardly any studies analyzing the impact on temporal migration of the existence (or lack) of social security agreements between Ukraine and migrant-receiving countries (European Migration Network 2011).

In addition to entry policies, labour policy and programmes can play an important role in shaping temporal patterns of mobility. For example, according to a study by Janska and Drbohlav (2008), one factor in the changing temporal patterns of Ukrainian migration to the Czech Republic was the introduction of a pilot project by the Czech government aimed at attracting qualified foreign workers to settle. Since January 2006 Ukrainians have been eligible for this scheme and in 2007 they were the second most numerous national group, at 18% of applicants. In contrast,

studies conducted in Poland demonstrate how labour policy regulations can also induce temporariness and shape its temporal pattern. The introduction of regulations facilitating access to the labour market for neighbouring countries' citizens (including Ukraine) in Poland created a channel for the official inflow of seasonal migrant workers to Poland, reinforcing the temporariness of labour migration from Ukraine to Poland (Brunarska 2014; for more details on the system of declarations see Chap. 4).

Similar outcomes have been observed in the case of Ukrainian migration to Italy, when the 2007 labour agreement introduced "the possibility of job sharing, an important new opportunity that has significantly encouraged circular migratory practices" (Vianello 2013: 198). Under this agreement, foreign workers were legally entitled to share their job responsibilities with another person and manage their schedule independently of employers. Migrant women began to organize their work in Italy in 3-to-6-month shifts.

Studies on determinants of Ukrainian migration frequently cite failed economic reforms and falling wages resulting in deteriorating living standards in Ukraine as one of the main motivations for engaging in temporary labour migration. According to one study, the majority of Ukrainian migrants in Poland claimed that only improvement in the economic situation in Ukraine – meaning higher earnings and less corruption – would make them consider ceasing to circulate in this way (Górny et al. 2013). The dissatisfaction with pay rates (or income) also raised the odds of engaging in temporary labour migration (see Chap. 3). According to the results of qualitative research carried out between 2005 and 2008 the limited chances of finding well-paid employment in Ukraine stimulate the durability of circulation among the Ukrainian female migrants studied in Italy (Vianello 2013).

Research in Poland demonstrated that the existence of informal labour and job markets in the destination country is conducive to circular and temporary migration (Iglicka 1999; Szulecka 2007) since undeclared work is usually associated with insecure employment, which does not create favourable conditions for long-term stays and settlement (Gmaj 2005). The latter can be also observed in the frequently analyzed example of domestic workers employed for care work and cleaning. The nature of their work does not encourage settlement, as claimed by various authors, since the sector is dominated by undeclared work and characterized by low pay and low status (Kindler 2008, 2011; Kindler et al. 2015; Kordasiewicz 2010; Kordasiewicz 2011).

Another theme distinguished in the literature is the impact of the labour market requirements of the destination country, where jobs in the various sectors with a demand for foreign labour have particular temporal characteristics. For example, studies on Ukrainians coming to Poland in the 1990s confirm that stays of petty traders in Poland were noticeably shorter, lasting sometimes only several days or weeks, compared with those of migrants engaged in seasonal work in agriculture, for example, who spent up to 3 months in Poland (Stola 1997; Iglicka 1999; Okólski 1997; see also Chap. 8).

6.4.2 *Capacity and Coupling Constraints: Social Resources (Networks) and Family Situation*

Iglicka and Gmaj, discussing the length of stays and return of Ukrainian migrants in Poland, claim that “circularity is often a result of the passive attitude of human nature. Immigrants tend to follow well-established patterns created by their networks” (2013: 173). According to qualitative studies, limited initial access to migrant networks (lack of formal migrant services) is an important capacity constraint for Ukrainians who want to engage in long-term migration to more distant EU destinations than Poland or the Czech Republic (Kindler 2011). In the absence of such networks, not only are information and potential ties to people who may lend money for long-distance (possibly more expensive) travel missing, but ties to those who can provide support on the spot are also lacking. Fonseca et al. (2014) attribute the significant decrease that has been observed in the inflow of Ukrainians to Portugal since the 2008 economic crisis to the changing role of migrant social networks (see also Chap. 11). These networks, which provided positive feedback on job opportunities and assistance to newly arrived migrants, have started to transmit information about the decline in job opportunities in Portugal.

In nearby destinations for Ukrainian migrants such as Poland, the role of social networks in forming capacity constraints has also been observed. Kindler (2011), in a qualitative study of Ukrainian migrant domestic workers in Warsaw, points out that migrants with limited access to social networks and information had to accept very poor (if not exploitative) working conditions which did not encourage them to consider settling in Poland. Moreover, Górny et al. (2010b) argue, based on the rich qualitative material on immigration to Poland, that the social networks of circular migrants enable them first and foremost to continue circular migration. Ukrainian circular migrants can only transform their circular mobility into long-term forms of migration when they manage to develop social relations outside their own group (i.e. other circular migrants) and when these new contacts provide them with resources to pursue a different model of mobility (Górny et al. 2010a, b).

In line with these observations, Toruńczyk-Ruiz (2014), who also studied networks of circular migrants travelling from Ukraine to Poland, found that “ties based on work relationships and those helpful in finding a job seem to be stronger and more important than social ties maintained in the place of residence in Poland” (2014:56). This suggests that temporary stays in Poland rarely lead to Ukrainian migrants developing local ties that could result in stronger attachment in Poland and in a higher propensity towards settlement. Toruńczyk-Ruiz (2014) also found that those who had mainly formed ties (with Poles) in their neighbourhood in Poland more closely resemble long-term migrants than circular migrants and are more oriented towards the receiving society.

The role of family situation in shaping temporal patterns of migration is significant. The studies reviewed here frequently address the role of family in determining the temporal character of Ukrainian migration from one of two perspectives: location of family members (remaining in Ukraine or/and in destination country); and

marital status (with a special focus on divorced women and women married to nationals of the destination country). In particular, a number of studies analyze the impact on temporal mobility patterns of migrant family members' presence in the country of origin (Hosnedlová and Stanek 2014; Tolstokorova 2010). They argue that having at least one immediate family member in Ukraine indicates strong ties with the place of origin and may influence the decision to return, thus inducing temporariness of migration. While the authors did not verify this claim empirically, Hosnedlová and Stanek (2010, 2014) demonstrated that in Spain, 35.4% of Ukrainian migrants had at least one family member in Ukraine or elsewhere, and most Ukrainian women without a husband with them in Spain formed transnational families (see also Chap. 12). Näre (2007), focusing on female Ukrainian migrants in Italy, also found migrant women's marital status played an important role in the decision to engage in temporary/circular forms of mobility. The women Näre studied were divorced and in their early forties and were also the only breadwinners, which tend to raise the odds of engagement in temporary migration, as argued by Näre (see also Chap. 10).

The family dimension in Ukrainian migration to the EU strongly intersects with existing gender ideologies in the household and in society. In other words, Ukrainian women tend to have a subordinate position to men in the family hierarchy, as well as different caring responsibilities, and thus their temporal and spatial mobility strategies differ. In Spain, the proportion of men whose spouse or partner and at least one of whose children are living in their place of origin is four times greater than the proportion of women in the same family situation (Hosnedlová and Stanek 2010). Iglicka et al. (2011:16) argue that in "the Polish-Ukrainian case, circularity seems to be a female domain. Among other economic reasons, women who are engaged in circular mobility do not want to disappear from family life for good". At the same time, the authors stress that this "traditional" division of gender roles, in contrast, allows Ukrainian men, who are viewed as the main breadwinners, to prolong their stays abroad without the strong social labelling as bad parents or spouses which migrating women usually experience. Such observations are supported by a 2001 Ukrainian State Statistics Committee study demonstrating that even though female migrants accounted for 35.4% of all surveyed labour migrants, their share in "shuttle" or "suitcase" migration (also called petty-trade migration) was over a half (cf. Molodikova 2008). However, Molodikova (2008), who mainly cites the Italian study, argues that employment of women in domestic services, which is frequently irregular, results in their longer stays outside Ukraine than Ukrainian male migrants employed mainly in seasonal sectors (such as construction). This observation suggests that the assumption that women, as the main care providers, will want to return more often than men to their households/families and are consequently more likely to engage in circulation than men (see Iglicka et al. 2011) should not be taken for granted (see Chap. 5).

Some studies, though not numerous, also address the role of family in the process of converting temporary mobility into more permanent forms of migration. Authors researching Ukrainian migration to Southern Europe report that the presence of migrants' family members in the destination country is frequent, which may

mean a reduction in temporary mobility. According to Hosnedlová and Stanek (2010, 2014; Chapter 12), 44.5% of Ukrainian migrants had families in Spain and 33.7% brought all their children to Spain. Fonseca et al. (2014; Chapter 11) also quote studies demonstrating that 29.9% of Ukrainian migrants have migrated to Portugal to join one of their parents.

Where the settlement policy is relatively restrictive – which is the case in Poland – for many Ukrainian temporary migrants, marrying a Pole has been an opportunity to acquire legal residence status in Poland and to settle (Górny and Kępińska 2004; Brzozowska and Grzymała-Kazłowska 2014; see also Chap. 7). Thus, the studies under review suggest (though the evidence is not very robust) that reunification processes and family formation have played an important role in the settlement of temporary Ukrainian migrants in destination countries.

6.5 Consequences of Ukrainians' Temporary Mobility

Temporary mobility, especially of the circular kind, is being advocated as a possible solution to many of the challenges surrounding migration today. However, are there really effective “wins” for all stakeholders: migrants, sending and destination countries? This section carefully examines the positive and negative impacts of the prevailing temporary nature of Ukrainian mobility to Europe identified in the literature under review. The outcomes of various temporary forms of Ukrainian migration are addressed in relation to two groups of actors involved in the migration process – migrants and destination countries. The outcomes of temporary and more long-term migration for the sending country – Ukraine – concern the following: depopulation, decrease of labour force, risk of brain drain, limited potential of remittances and return migration to stimulate the development of the Ukrainian economy (see also Chap. 3).

6.5.1 *Impact on Migrants/Households*

Overall, studies point out that temporary migrants are keener to send remittances than are permanent/long-term migrants (Buch and Kuckulenz 2004; Mansoor and Quillin 2006; Glytsos 1997). In the case of temporary Ukrainian migrants, providing financial support to their families is in general the main goal of migration and a clear outcome.¹ The studies reviewed here usually find that remittances sent by temporary migrants are mainly spent on everyday consumption (Kindler 2011; Triandafyllidou 2011, 2013; UCSR and Ukrstat 2009; Chap. 3).

¹As Grotte (2012) cites the data of the National Bank of Ukraine, in 2011 Ukrainian migrants transferred 7 million USD (4.3% of Ukraine's GDP).

The fact that Ukrainian migrants can transfer the money earned abroad personally without having to bear additional transfer costs is an advantage of temporary, especially circular, migration (Grotte 2012). However, qualitative studies on the remitting behaviour of Ukrainian migrants report negative examples of Ukrainian migrants being robbed on the way back to or upon arrival in Ukraine (Grotte 2012; Kindler 2011).

A study conducted in Italy (Weber 2004) indicates that difficulty in re-negotiating social status when back in Ukraine may constitute a constraint on return, and rather a motivation to remain abroad longer than initially intended, going home only for short periods of time. This shows that the “status tensions” experienced by temporary migrants, as well as by their children, are strongly linked to their statuses in their countries of origin, which can impact not only temporal patterns of mobility but also the well-being of both migrants and their families. This also demonstrates that low-prestige work in the destination country does deprive migrants of their social status, partially challenging the claim put forward, for example, by the dual labour market theory of Piore (1979) that such deprivation should be lower or non-existent in the case of temporary migrants. This is due to the fact that the Ukrainian migrants studied had experienced tensions about their social position in the country of origin.

The risk of deskilling or de-qualification is high for temporary Ukrainian migrants (see Triandafyllidou 2011; Caglar et al. 2011; Iglicka et al. 2011). The temporary migration of Ukrainian citizens is often related to temporary jobs that do not require high skills and belong to the so-called secondary sector of the labour market. Consequently, studies in a number of countries have found loss of skills among educated Ukrainian migrants performing low-skilled jobs (Antoniewski and Koryś 2002; Shakhno and Pool 2005; Fedyuk 2012). For example, a study based on two national surveys of foreigners in the Czech Republic provides evidence of a significant waste of human capital among Ukrainians (Leontiyeva 2014; see also Chap. 8). A crucial finding of this study is that migrants “with permanent residence permits turned out to be twice as likely to have skilled jobs compared to those with temporary residence permits and were half as likely to end up on the bottom rungs of the labour market” (Leontiyeva 2014:74). This suggests that the temporal dimension of migration, related to legal status on the Czech labour market, intersects with the risk of deskilling among migrants, which tends to be higher for temporary migrants.

Irregular stay means higher risks and consequently higher mobility costs between Ukraine and the country of migration (see Chap. 4). However, paradoxically, efforts to gain legal status, even temporary, or to take part in seasonal migrant worker programmes, may lead to negative financial and other consequences for migrants.

6.5.2 *Impact on Destination Country*

Triandafyllidou (2011), who studied Ukrainian, Albanian and Moroccan circular migrants, critically reflects on the benefits of circular migration for the country of destination, such as responding better to changing labour market demand and

imposing very limited integration burdens. Such ideal benefits from circulation for the destination countries are in her opinion possible only if “EU member states make sure that their legal entry channels are simple and fast, so that migrant workers can satisfy the demands of domestic labour markets in several sectors where shortages are identified” (2011:10).

However, both quantitative and qualitative studies carried out in Poland and Hungary stress the positive outcomes of Ukrainian circular migration. In Poland temporary Ukrainian labour migrants complement the native workforce, filling market niches (see for example, Grabowska-Lusińska and Żylicz 2008; Grabowska-Lusińska et al. 2010; Górny et al. 2010b; Chap. 7). Researchers analyzing Ukrainian circular migration to Hungary underline its positive aspects in terms of migrants’ economic activity in the face of Hungary’s ageing population (Kincses and Rédei 2009). In contrast, studies on Ukrainian, Albanian and Moroccan circular migrants in Italy and Spain (Triandafyllidou 2011: 5), illustrate the negative side of circular migration by stressing that longer absence of migrants from work in the destination country (while they visit the home country) is negatively valued by the employers, as they “want reliable, stable, year-round migrant workers”.

Other negative aspects of Ukrainian temporary migration to Europe are often linked in the literature to irregularity, with irregular status becoming a major concern for receiving countries which not only lose out in terms of their national budget (undeclared work of migrants) and the additional costs of control and detention but also have to somehow address the issue of a group at risk of exploitation and marginalization (see Malynovska 2011). Moreover, it has been stressed in the literature that Ukrainian temporary migration, especially when the secondary sector of the labour market is involved, reproduces social, ethnic and gender inequalities (Fedyuk 2012, 2015; Tolstokorova 2010).

6.6 Conclusions

Ukrainian movements to Europe are not easy to capture using “traditional” definitions of migration. Researchers working in this field tend to propose various terms that draw attention to the durability of temporary forms of Ukrainian mobility. However, most works on Ukrainian migration report on circular and transnational migration (more specifically transnational practices), with little attention paid to the return migration perspective.

The literature reviewed here includes a considerable amount of the two former lines of research. However, the focus on migratory patterns, with the more frequent use of the term “circulation”, is arguably more popular in studies on mobility to Central Europe, whereas a transnational approach is more evident in studies of more distant migration of Ukrainians to countries like Italy and Spain. In the latter studies the notion of return migration is also sometimes employed, and here the determinants of temporary forms of migration are first of all addressed. Such variations can be explained by the differences in temporal patterns of migration to nearby Central

European countries and more distant countries of Europe. These differences deserve more in-depth comparative consideration, which could pave the way for a comprehensive conceptual framework to study temporalities in international mobility.

Given the prevalence of irregular work in “spontaneous circular migration” of Ukrainian nationals to Europe and other negative consequences of their temporary mobility, the literature reviewed in this chapter challenges the “triple-win scenario” promoted in political discourse on temporary migration in Europe. Although irregularity of work can be partly eliminated by the introduction of adequate programmes for seasonal and circular migration, other negative consequences of temporariness may still remain. These include deskilling and precarious work status, which both arise from the fact that temporary migrants are usually employed in the secondary sector of the labour market in the receiving countries. These negative outcomes would be difficult to eliminate even with the introduction of special programmes for temporary migrants. This is well illustrated by the case of Polish migrants who, even after gaining unrestricted access to the European labour market after Poland’s accession to the European Union (though after some transition period in selected countries) are still being employed in low-skilled positions (Trevena 2013).²

In a number of studies on Ukrainian labour migrants to the EU the role of the migrant household is stressed. While according to approaches such as the New Economics of Labour Migration, income from migration is only one of many sources of household income (see Stark and Bloom 1985), households of Ukrainian migrants can hardly be said to engage in a risk-diversification strategy through migration. Instead, they become, as migration continues, increasingly dependent on remittances. This leads to “petrification” of temporary forms of mobility. Relations of a migrant with his/her household can thus act as a crucial determinant of temporary migration, but temporary migration poses important consequences for the functioning of a migrant household. It is difficult to assess whether this multifaceted relationship can be treated as a universal feature of temporary forms of mobility or whether it is specific to Ukrainian movements.

The literature on Ukrainian mobility can contribute to understanding the importance of the temporal dimension in migration studies. Works on the determinants of temporary aspects of Ukrainian mobility are the most numerous and provide the richest material for further studies. Analyses of legal, family and social determinants and consequences show clear differences between temporary, short-term and long-term (settlement) mobility. Research on economic factors, however, tends to treat the temporariness of Ukrainian migration as a given. In this field additional research addressing the temporal dimension of Ukrainian mobility in more depth is recommended.

Other topics under-studied in the reviewed literature include theoretical and empirical consideration of the role of institutions in structuring temporary forms of migration, in particular the role of employment agencies. A focus on their role in Ukrainian migration to Southern and Northern European countries would certainly

² British LFS (Labour Force Survey) (2014) <http://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/series/?sn=2000026>

contribute to our understanding of migrants' agency in the context of limited legal channels of entry, stay and work.

Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, duplication, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included in the work's Creative Commons license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory regulation, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or reproduce the material.

References

- Ács, V. (2010). *Temporary and circular migration: Empirical evidence, current policy practice and future options in Hungary*. Budapest: European Migration Network Hungary.
- Antoniewski, R., & Koryś, I. (2002). *Imigranci o nieuregulowanym statusie: społeczne i ekonomiczne determinanty funkcjonowania w Polsce* [Irregular migrants: Socio-economic aspects of functioning in Poland]. CMR Working Papers 47. Warsaw: Institute for Social Studies, University of Warsaw.
- Brunarska, Z. (2014). Ukraińscy migranci zarobkowi w Polsce – dlaczego tak trudno ich policzyć? [Ukrainian labour migrants in Poland – why is it difficult to count them?] *Studia BAS*, 40(4): 155–174.
- Brzozowska, A., & Grzymała-Kazłowska, A. (2014). Procesy inkluzji migrantów a więzi i sieci społeczne wśród małżeństw mieszanych. [The proces of inclusion of migrants versus ties and social networks of mixed marriages]. *Acta Universitatis Lodzensis. Folia Sociologica*, 50, 69–87.
- Buch, C., & Kuckulenz, A. (2004). *Workers' remittances and capital flows to developing countries*. In ZEW Discussion Paper no 04-31.
- Burawoy, M. (1976). The functions and reproduction of migrant labor: Comparative material from Southern Africa and the United States. *American Journal of Sociology*, 81(5), 1050–1087.
- Çadlar, A., Sillo, T., Józwiak, I., & Hires-László, K. (2011). *Circular migration patterns migration between Ukraine and Hungary*. Metoikos Project, European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole.
- Chapman, M., & Prothero, M. R. (1983–1984). Themes on circulation in the Third World. *International Migration Review*, 17(4), 597–632.
- Constant, A. F., & Zimmermann, K. F. (2011). Circular and repeat migration: Counts of exits and years away from the host country. *Population Research and Policy Review*, 30(4), 495–515.
- Constant, A. F., Nottmeyer, O., & Zimmerman, K. F. (2013). The economics of circular migration. In A. F. Constant & K. F. Zimmerman (Eds.), *International handbook on the economics of migration* (pp. 55–74). Cheltenham/Northampton: Edward Elgar.
- Cwerner, S. B. (2001). The times of migration. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 27(1), 7–36.
- Danzer, A. M., & Dietz, B. (2009). *Temporary labour migration and welfare at the New European Fringe: A comparison of five eastern European countries* (IZA Discussion Paper 4142). Bonn: IZA.

- Dietz, B. (2010). Migration from Ukraine: A challenge for the European Union? In M. I. Baganha, J. C. Marques, & P. Góis (Eds.), *Imigração ucraniana: a emergência de uma ou várias comunidades?* (pp. 187–210). Lisboa: Alto Comissariado para a Imigração e Diálogo.
- Drbohlav, D. (2003). Immigration and the Czech Republic (with a Special Focus on the Foreign Labor Force). *International Migration Review*, 37(1), 194–224.
- Dustman, C., & Kirchkamp, O. (2002). The optimal duration and activity choice after re-migration. *Journal of Development Economics*, 67, 351–372.
- Dustman, C., & Weiss, Y. (2007). Return migration: Theory and empirical evidence for the UK. *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 2(45), 236–256.
- Elkan, W. (1959). Migrant labor in Africa: An economist's approach. *American Economic Review*, 49(2), 188–197.
- Engbersen, G., Snel, E., & De Boom, J. (2010). A van full of Poles: liquid migration in Eastern and Central European countries. In R. Black, G. Engbersen, M. Okólski, & C. Pantjru (Eds.), *A continent moving west? EU enlargement and labour migration from Central and Eastern Europe* (pp. 115–140). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- European Migration Network. (2011). *Temporary and circular migration: Empirical evidence, current policy practice and future options in EU member states*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.
- Fedyuk, O. (2012). Images of transnational motherhood: The role of photographs in measuring time and maintaining connections between Ukraine and Italy. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 38(2), 279–300.
- Fedyuk, O. (2015). Growing up with migration: Shifting roles and responsibilities within the transnational families of Ukrainian care-workers in Italy. In: M. Kontos & G. Tibe Bonifacio (Eds.), *In the dark: Family rights and migrant domestic work*. Submitted for publication, under contract with Palgrave.
- Fihel, A., & Górny, A. (2013). To settle or to leave again? Patterns of return migration to Poland during the transition period. *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, 2(1), 55–76.
- Follis, S. K. (2012). *Building fortress Europe. The Polish-Ukrainian frontier*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Fonseca, M. L., Pereira, S., & Esteves, A. (2014). Migration of Ukrainian Nationals to Portugal: Changing flows and the critical role of social networks. *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, 3(1), 115–130.
- Glytsos, N. P. (1997). Remitting behaviour of “Temporary” and “Permanent” migrants: The case of Greeks in Germany and Australia. *Labour*, 11(3), 409–435.
- Gmaj, K. (2005). *Imigranci na polskim rynku pracy w świetle opinii pracodawców* [Immigrants on the Polish labour market in employers' opinions]. Warsaw: Centre for International Relations.
- Górny, A., & Kępińska, E. (2004). Mixed marriages in migration from the Ukraine to Poland. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 30(2), 353–372.
- Górny, A., Grabowska-Lusińska, I., Lesińska, M., & Okólski, M. (Eds.). (2010a). *Immigration to Poland: Policy, employment, integration*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.
- Górny, A., Kindler, M., Piekut, A., Stefańska, R., & Szulecka, M. (2010b). Wybrane aspekty integracji imigrantów: w poszukiwaniu mechanizmów sprzyjających dalszemu napływowi cudzoziemców do Polski [Selected aspects of immigrant integration: Searching for mechanisms supporting further inflow of foreigners to Poland]. In A. Górny, I. Grabowska-Lusińska, M. Lesińska & M. Okólski (Eds.), *Transformacja nieoczywista. Polska jako kraj imigracji* [Unclear transformation. Poland as an immigration country] (pp. 188–231). Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.
- Górny, A., Kaczmarczyk, P., Napierała, J., & Toruńczyk-Ruiz, S. (2013). *Raport z badania imigrantów w Polsce* [Report from research on immigrants in Poland]. Warszawa: Fundacja Ośrodek Badań nad Migracjami.
- Grabowska-Lusińska, I., & Żylicz, A. (2008). Czy polska gospodarka potrzebuje cudzoziemców? [Does the Polish economy need foreigners?]. Warsaw: Centre for Migration Research, University of Warsaw.

- Grabowska-Lusińska, I., Anacka, M., Janicka, A., Kaczmarczyk, P., Szczepański, M., & Szulecka, M. (2010). The economy (labour market) as a primary driver of migrant inflow into Poland. In A. Górny, I. Grabowska-Lusińska, M. Lesińska, & M. Okólski (Eds.), *Immigration to Poland: Policy, employment, integration* (pp. 91–148). Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.
- Grotte, M. (2012). Transfery dochodów ukraińskich migrantów [Financial remittances of Ukrainian migrants.] In Z. Brunarska, M. Grotte, & M. Lesińska, *Migracje obywateli Ukrainy do Polski w kontekście rozwoju społeczno-gospodarczego: stan obecny, polityka, transfery pieniężne* (CMR WP 60/118). Warsaw: Centre of Migration Research, University of Warsaw.
- Grzymała-Kazłowska, A., & Okólski, M. (2003). *Influx and integration of migrants in Poland in the early XXI century* (CMR Working Papers 50). Warsaw: Institute for Social Studies, University of Warsaw.
- Hägerstrand, T. (1975). Space, time and human conditions. In A. Karlqvist, L. Lundqvist, & F. Snickars (Eds.), *Dynamic allocation of urban space* (pp. 3–12). Lexington: Saxon House Lexington Book.
- Hosnedlová, R., & Stanek, M. (2010). Ukrainian migration to Spain: Sociodemographic profile, mobility patterns and migratory projects. In M. Baganha, J. Marques, & P. Góis (Eds.), *Imigração ucraniana em Portugal e no sul da Europa: emergência de uma ou várias comunidades* (pp. 211–230). Lisbon: Alto Comissariado para a Imigração e Diálogo Intercultural.
- Hosnedlová, R., & Stanek, M. (2014). Analysing selected transnational activities among Ukrainian immigrants in Spain. *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, 3(1), 99–114.
- Iglicka, K. (1999). The economics of the petty trade on the Eastern Polish border. In K. Iglicka & K. Sword (Eds.), *The challenges of East-West migration* (pp. 120–143). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Iglicka, K., Gmaj, K., & Borodziej-Smołński, W. (2011). *Circular migration patterns. Migration between Poland and Ukraine*. San Domenico di Fiesole: Metoikos Project.
- Iglicka, K., & Gmaj, K. (2013). Circular migration patterns between Ukraine and Poland. In A. Traindafilidou (Ed.), *Circular migration between Europe and its neighborhood: Choice or necessity?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Illés, S., & Kincses, Á. (2012). Hungary as receiving country for circulants. *Hungarian Geographical Bulletin*, 61(3), 197–218.
- Janska, E., & Drbohlav, D. (2008). The Czech Republic. In E. Honekopp & H. Mattila (Eds.), *Permanent or circular migration policy choices to address demographic decline and labour shortages in Europe*. Hungary: IOM. Regional Mission for Central and South Eastern Europe.
- Jażwińska, E., & Okólski, M. (Eds.) (1996). *Causes and consequences of migration in Central and Eastern Europe. Podlasie and Śląsk Opolski: basic trends in 1975–1994*. Warsaw: Institute for Social Studies, University of Warsaw, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- Jażwińska, E., & Okólski, M. (Eds.). (2001). *Ludzie na Huśtawce. Migracje między Peryferiami Polski a Zachodem* [People on a swing. Migration between the Perypheries of Poland and the West]. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.
- Kaczmarczyk, P. (2002). Mobilność cyrkulacyjna jako kategoria badawcza w naukach społecznych [Circular mobility as a research category in social sciences]. *Studia Socjologiczne*, 4, 37–66.
- Kincses, Á., & Rédei, N. (2009). Hungary at cross-roads. *The Romanian Journal of European Studies*, 7–8, 93–102.
- Kindler, M. (2008). Risk and risk strategies in migration: Ukrainian domestic workers in Poland. In H. Lutz (Ed.), *Migration and domestic work*. UK: Ashgate.
- Kindler, M. (2011). *A risky business? Ukrainian migrant women in Warsaw's domestic work sector*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Kindler, M., Kordasiewicz, A., & Szulecka, M. (2015). *Country profile. Ukraine-Poland*. Global action programme on migrant domestic workers and their families. Geneva: ILO.
- King, R., Thomson, M., Fielding, T., & Warnes, T. (2006). Time, generations and gender in migration and settlement. In R. Penninx, M. Berger, & K. Kraal (Eds.), *The dynamics of international migration and settlement in Europe* (pp. 233–267). Amsterdam: IMISCOE Joint Studies, Amsterdam University Press.

- Kordasiewicz, A. (2010). *Etniczny wymiar funkcjonowania rynku usług domowych w Warszawie* [Ethnic dimension of care and domestic service market in Warsaw]. Warsaw: Institute for Public Affairs.
- Kordasiewicz, A. (2011). *Domestic service/servants. Transformation of asymmetrical social relation* (PhD dissertation). Warsaw: University of Warsaw.
- Leontiyeva, Y. (2014). The education–employment mismatch among Ukrainian migrants in the Czech Republic. *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, 3(1), 63–84.
- Levitt, P., DeWind, J., & Vertovec, S. (2003). International perspectives on transnational migration: An introduction. *International Migration Review*, 3(37), 565–575.
- Malmberg, G. (1997). Time and space in international migration. In T. Hammar, G. Brochmann, K. Tamas, & T. Faist (Eds.), *International migration, immobility and development, multidisciplinary perspectives* (pp. 21–48). Oxford/New York: BERG.
- Malynovska, O. (2004). International labour migration from the Ukraine: The last 10 years. In M. I. Baganha & M. L. Fonseca (Eds.), *New waves: Migration from Eastern to Southern Europe* (pp. 11–22). Lisbon: Luso-American Foundation.
- Malynovska, O. (2011). *Labour migration: Social consequences and political response*. Kyiv: National Institute for Strategic Studies. http://www.niss.gov.ua/content/articles/files/Malin_migraziya-dace3.pdf. Accessed 3 Sept 2015.
- Mansoor, A. M., & Quillin, B. (Eds.) (2006). *Migration and remittances. Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*. Washington: The World Bank.
- Massey, D. (1999). Why does migration occur? A theoretical synthesis. In C. Hirschman, P. Kasinitz & J. DeWind (Eds.), *The handbook of international migration. The American Experience* (pp. 34–52). New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Mitchell, C. (1961). The causes of labour migration, In: *Migrant labour in Africa South of the Sahara* (pp. 259–280). Abidjan: Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara.
- Molodikova, I. (2008). Trends in the field of social policies and welfare reforms in Ukraine and Moldova. Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale <http://www.cespi.it/WPMIG/BREPORT%20Ucraina.pdf>. Accessed 2 Sept 2015.
- Morokvasic, M. (2004). ‘Settled in Mobility’: Engendering post-wall migration in Europe. *Feminist Review*, 77, 7–25.
- Näre, L. (2007). *Ukrainian and Polish domestic workers in Naples – A case of East-South migration*. Migration Online, <http://www.migrationonline.cz/e-library/?x=1966763>. Accessed 29 Jan 2014.
- Newland, K., Aguinas, D.R., & Terrazas, A. (2008). *Learning by doing: Experiences of circular migration*. MPI Insights. <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/learning-doing-experiences-circular-migration>. Accessed 5 Sept 2015.
- Okólski, M. (1997). *Najnowszy ruch wędrowniczy z Ukrainy do Polski* [The newest mobility from Ukraine to Poland]. CMR Working Paper 14. Warsaw: Institute for Social Studies, University of Warsaw.
- Okólski, M. (2001). Incomplete migration: A new form of mobility in Central and Eastern Europe. The case of Polish and Ukrainian migrants. In C. Wallace & D. Stola (Eds.), *Patterns of migration in Central Europe* (pp. 105–128). New York: Palgrave.
- Okólski, M. (2004). Migration patterns in Central and Eastern Europe on the eve of the European Union expansion. In A. Górny & P. Ruspini (Eds.), *Migration in the New Europe. East-West Revisited* (pp. 23–48). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Piore, M. J. (1979). *Birds of passage: Migrant labor and industrial societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Piore, M. J. (1986). The shifting grounds of immigration. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 485, 23–33.
- Robertson, S. (2014). *The temporalities of international migration: Implications for ethnographic research*. ICS Occasional Paper Series 5(1), Sydney: Institute for Culture and Society.
- Shakhno, S., & Pool, C. (2005). *Ukrainian migrants in the Netherlands*. www.migrationonline.cz.

- Solari, C. (2010). Resource drain vs. constitutive circularity: Comparing the gendered effects of Post-Soviet migration patterns in Ukraine. *Anthropology of East Europe Review*, 28(1), 215–238.
- Stark, O., & Bloom, D. E. (1985). The new economics of labor migration. *American Economic Review*, 75(2), 173–178.
- Stola, D. (1997). *Mechanizmy i uwarunkowania migracji zarobkowych do Polski* [Mechanisms and conditions of labour migration to Poland]. CMR Working Papers 11. Warsaw: Institute for Social Studies, University of Warsaw.
- Stola, D. (2001). Introduction: Patterns of migration in Central Europe. In C. Wallace & D. Stola (Eds.), *Patterns of migration in Central Europe* (pp. 3–44). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Szulecka, M. (2007). *Obecność cudzoziemców na targowisku zlokalizowanym wokół Stadionu Dziesięciolecia z perspektywy kryminologicznej* [Foreigners' presence at the market located in the Warsaw Stadium area from criminological perspective]. CMR Working Papers 24(82). Warsaw: Centre of Migration Research, University of Warsaw.
- Tolstokorova, A. V. (2010). Bitter berries of better life: Socio-demographic costs of labour migration for the Ukrainian society. *ENQUIRE (Electronic Nottingham Quarterly for Ideas, Research and Evaluation)*, 5, 68–94.
- Toruńczyk-Ruiz, S. (2014). Neighbourhood ties and migrant networks: The case of circular Ukrainian migrants in Warsaw, Poland. *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, 3(1), 41–62.
- Trevena, P. (2013). Why do highly educated migrants go for low-skilled jobs? A case study of Polish graduates working in London. In B. Glorius, I. Grabowska-Lusińska, & A. Kuvik (Eds.), *Mobility in transition. Migration patterns after EU enlargement*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Triandafyllidou, A. (2011). *Circular migration between the EU and its neighbours. A comparative analysis*. BadiaFiesolana: European University Institute, Metoikos Project.
- Triandafyllidou, A. (2013). *Circular migration between Europe and its neighbourhood: Choice or necessity?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- UCSR, & Ukrstat. (2009). *Ukrainian external labour migration. Ukrainian Centre for Social Reforms*. Kyiv: State Statistics of Ukraine.
- Vertovec, S. (2007). *Circular migration. The way forward in global policy?* International Migration Institute, University of Oxford, Paper 4.
- Vianello, F. A. (2011). Suspended migrants. Return migration to Ukraine. In M. Nowak & M. Nowosielski (Eds.), *(Post)trans-formational migration* (pp. 251–274). Berlin: Peter Lang.
- Vianello, F. A. (2013). A transnational double presence: Circular migrations between Ukraine and Italy. In A. Triandafyllidou (Ed.), *Circular migration between Europe and its neighbourhood: Choice or necessity?* (pp. 187–211). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wallace, D. (2001). The new migration space as a buffer zone? In C. Wallace & D. Stola (Eds.), *Patterns of migration in Central Europe*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Wallace, C. (2002). Opening and closing borders. Migration and mobility in East Central Europe. *The Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 28(4), 603–625.
- Weber, S. (2004). Exploring some east-west migrant networks and their distant local dynamics, Ukrainian, Polish and Romanian migrants in Rome. In Maria I. Baganha & M. L. Fonseca (Eds.), *New waves: Migration from Eastern to Southern Europe*. Lisbon: Luso-American Foundation.
- Zelinsky, W. (1971). The hypothesis of the mobility transition. *American Geographical Society*, 61(2), 219–249.

Part II
Ukrainian Migration to Selected EU
Countries: Facts, Figures and the State of
Literature

Chapter 7

Ukrainian Migration to Poland: A “Local” Mobility?

Zuzanna Brunarska, Marta Kindler, Monika Szulecka,
and Sabina Toruńczyk-Ruiz

7.1 Introduction

Poland has a long history of ties to the territories of contemporary Ukraine dating from the fourteenth century, when parts of Ukraine were ruled by the Kingdom of Poland. Before World War II approximately five million Ukrainians lived in Polish territories. By the late 1940s only 200,000 were left, mainly due to the shift of the Eastern border after the war, but also as a result of forced displacement carried out by the Polish military (Motyka 2000; Hałagida 2002). The contemporary flow of migrants from Ukraine to Poland started in the 1990s. As researchers have pointed out, a new, distinct migration space was formed in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) at that time (Council of Europe 1992; Castles and Miller 1993; Rudolph and Morokvasic 1993; Frejka et al. 1999; Stola 2001; Stola and Wallace 2001; Grzymała-Kazłowska and Okólski 2003; Okólski 2004).

Okólski (2004) points to at least three historical developments that shaped the migration trends in CEE: relative economic and institutional underdevelopment, a

Analyses presented in this chapter were partly funded by the National Science Centre under the research project: “Two decades of irregular temporariness? An examination of changes in mobility from Ukraine to Poland in a multidimensional perspective” (no. DEC-2011/B/HS4/02275).

Z. Brunarska (✉) • S. Toruńczyk-Ruiz

The Robert B. Zajonc Institute for Social Studies, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland

Centre of Migration Research, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland

e-mail: zuzanna.brunarska@uw.edu.pl

M. Kindler

Centre of Migration Research, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland

M. Szulecka

Centre of Migration Research, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland

The Institute of Law Studies, The Polish Academy of Sciences, Warszawa, Poland

relative wealth of labour and the instability of state borders. A diversification in terms of economic performance occurred, with growing wage disparities between the countries within the region. Poland, along with the Czech Republic and Hungary, became an attractive destination for Ukrainians escaping the deteriorating living conditions at home (see Chap. 3). In contrast to fears voiced in 1989, migrants from CEE did not head for Western Europe, but primarily remained within the region. The reasons for this were entry restrictions to the Schengen Area, higher travel and stay costs (and thus higher risks) in the West compared to CEE, fast development of migrant networks within the region, cultural proximity and overall familiarity of migrants with a common post-socialist reality (Okólski 2004). As a result, a new migration space was created, with migration between Ukraine and Poland having the character of local forms of mobility between neighbouring countries. Local forms of mobility from Ukraine to Poland can be viewed as being predominantly temporary and reflect highly repetitive cross-border movement, seen by the migrants as relatively attractive earnings-wise and posing low risks. Today, Ukrainians represent the largest and most diverse migrant group in Poland. Moreover, this group is becoming more and more diversified due to changes in mobility patterns and legalization strategies.

For over two decades Poland did not have an articulated migration policy, and attitudes toward migrants entering Poland were rather reactive. The entry of foreigners was seen as having a positive impact on the economic development especially of border regions as well as on the improvement of social relations between societies with previously restricted mobility. The liberal approach to foreigners entering Poland has slowly been curtailed with Poland's process of joining the European Union. Visas for Ukrainian nationals were introduced in 2003, just before Poland's accession to the EU, and a more complex visa system was introduced upon Poland's joining the Schengen zone in 2007. However, over time, new facilitations for visa applicants from Ukraine were proposed. Poland's migration policy, elaborated by several ministries, was accepted by the government in 2012 and became the main framework for further administrative plans regarding migrants. It gives precedence to certain types of migrants, including labour migrants from specific countries with close cultural and geographic connections, such as Ukraine (MIA 2012). Thus, Poland's migration policy mainly addresses spatial and cultural proximity: local mobility between neighbouring countries, as well as groups that will potentially easily adapt in Polish society. The priority is to increase the scale of legal employment of foreigners with skills required by the Polish labour market. Among other measures facilitating this, Poland has liberalized employment and legalization procedures, extended the validity of temporary residence permits and signed a bilateral social security agreement with Ukraine.

This chapter focuses on the migration of Ukrainians to Poland that followed the development of a new migration space in the 1990s within Central and Eastern Europe (see for example Stola 2001), arguing that the post-2014 political developments in Ukraine have led to a weakening of this local mobility, with migrants arriving from new places of origin. The chapter critically presents the existing state of knowledge on contemporary Ukrainian migration to Poland, including available data sources and basic data on its nature and scale. Using official statistical data and

available estimates, it outlines migrants’ socio-demographic characteristics, their regions of origin and destination, and the type of work they engage in. A brief overview of literature on Ukrainian migration to Poland is also provided.

7.2 Ukrainian Migrants’ Characteristics

Where do Ukrainian migrants to Poland originate and where in Poland do they go? Data from household surveys point to Western Ukraine as the main place of origin of Ukrainian labour migrants in Poland – from over three-quarters of migrants in 2005–2008 to over 90% in 2010–2012 originated from that region (UCSR and Ukrstat 2009; ILO 2013). This concentration of places of migrant origin along the Ukrainian-Polish border is an argument in favour of treating Ukrainian migration to Poland as a particular form of mobility – a local movement between neighbouring states. However, since 2014 a diversification of places of origin has occurred, with Central and Eastern Ukraine also starting to play a role.

As regards places of residence in Poland, according to the Office for Foreigners data, as of 9 December 2014, 37% of Ukrainian nationals resided in Mazowieckie province, the majority of them in Warsaw. Large urban centres provide more work opportunities in both the formal and informal sectors of the economy as well as allowing irregular or semi-compliant migrants from Ukraine to remain “invisible”. However, rural areas also are an important destination for seasonal workers from Ukraine as they attract workers to the agriculture sector. Ukrainians also chose regions in the south and east of Poland: Dolnośląskie and Małopolskie (10 and 9%, respectively), Lubelskie (8%), Podkarpackie (6%) and Śląskie (5%) provinces. A similar picture with regard to regional distribution emerges from the 2011 population census (see Fig. 7.1): the Mazowieckie province takes the lead, followed by Lubelskie and Dolnośląskie provinces. The relatively high numbers of Ukrainian migrants in eastern and southern Poland are a result of the nearness to the Ukrainian border, the attractiveness of large urban centres and initially also the presence of the Ukrainian minority (Polish citizens of Ukrainian ethnicity), a legacy of (forced) repatriation from the former Soviet Union (mainly Soviet Republic of Ukraine) after World War II (Górny et al. 2010).

7.2.1 *Ukrainian Migration in Numbers: Large Inflows, Little Settlement?*

This section presents various data on the inflows and stock of Ukrainian migrants in Poland. It should be noted that the data sources showing the scale of both inflows and residence have certain drawbacks, with the population census and data sources on residence permits underestimating the actual number of migrants staying in




Fig. 7.1 Ukrainian migrants staying over 3 months in Poland by province, 2011 (Source: CSO (2011) Population Census, table 3)

Poland. This is because not all migrants entering and staying in Poland apply for residence cards – the majority stay based on visas. Moreover, the inflow data count the flows and not people, and the same person may cross the border or be granted a visa more than once a year. Nevertheless, the available data on the scale and intensity of flows combined with the limited scale of settlement point to the local character of Ukrainians' migration to Poland.

As far as inflows are concerned, in 2014, Polish consular services issued over 556,500 visas to Ukrainian citizens (predominantly Schengen visas). Since 15 September 2012, Ukrainians no longer have to pay for national visas if they intend to stay in Poland for between 3 months and 1 year.¹ Since July 2009, the Agreement on Local Border Traffic between Poland and Ukraine has been in force. Based on this agreement, Ukrainian nationals residing in the border zone – the area extending 30 km from the border – do not need visas, but only local border traffic permits entitling them to multiple crossings of the Polish border. The number of border crossings by Ukrainian citizens under a local border traffic agreement has been increasing each year (13 to 40% depending on year). It amounted to 10,734,959 in 2015 (Border Guard Statistics 2015).

Compared to the inflows of Ukrainian migrants, the stock of Ukrainian migrants is much lower. According to the Office for Foreigners, on 3 September 2015 Ukrainian nationals held less than 62,000 valid residence cards in total (including almost 26,000 permanent residence permits, almost 3000 EU long-term residence permits and over 33,000 temporary residence permits). Although this number is considerably lower than the number of visas issued, it still constitutes almost 27%

¹Previously only selected categories of people were exempt from the fee. This is a step towards visa liberalization for Ukraine.

of the total population of foreigners in Poland captured in official statistics.² According to the 2011 population census, Ukrainian citizens constituted the largest group of foreign permanent residents in Poland (13,400, or 25%).

Data on Ukrainian labour migrants also provide examples of differences between a large pool of mobile, temporary labour force, entering on the basis of a simplified employment procedure (the so-called employer’s declaration system implemented in 2007)³ for up to 6 months during twelve consecutive months without a work permit, and migrant workers employed on the basis of work permits. However, it should be emphasized that neither statistics on work permits nor employer’s declarations account for all Ukrainian migrant workers, for the following reasons. First, there are many categories of foreigners who do not need additional documents to work in Poland. These are, for instance, EU long-term resident’s permit holders, permanent residence permit holders, graduates of Polish educational institutions and spouses of Polish citizens. Thus, information on their involvement in the labour market in Poland is not reflected in the statistics on work permits or employers’ declarations. The second reason is that a considerable share of Ukrainian nationals work unofficially, especially in some sectors, such as domestic work, agriculture, construction (for an extensive analysis of the undocumented work status of Ukrainian migrants in a number of countries, see Chap. 4). The third reason relates to the way the employers’ declarations are used: for Ukrainian migrants they may facilitate receiving a visa to enter Poland, but often they do not follow this up by starting work for the employer who registered the declaration. Moreover, one Ukrainian may possess more than one declaration. This means that the number of declarations does not translate into the number of seasonal workers (see also Chap. 4).

7.2.2 Main Sectors of Employment for Ukrainian Migrants in Poland

Although the statistics on employers’ declarations and work permits do not reflect the real scale of Ukrainians’ involvement in the labour market, they seem to capture the general trends as regards the main sectors of employment and types of jobs held.

The majority of Ukrainian migrants work in the so-called secondary sector of the labour market. This is confirmed by a number of data sources. According to the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy data (MLSP 2014), in 2014 work permit holders were employed mostly by private households, in construction, transport, retail and wholesale trade. According to data on employers’ declarations of intent to employ a foreigner, in 2014 the majority of Ukrainian nationals were registered in

²Followed by Germans (11%), Russian nationals (6%), Belarusians (5.5%), Vietnamese (5%) and Italians (3%).

³The facilitated procedure for employment of seasonal workers had already been introduced in 2006, but it only concerned employment in agriculture for a maximum of 3 months within 6 months.




Fig. 7.2 Declarations of intent to employ a Ukrainian citizen registered by county labour offices in 2014 by main labour market sector (*Source: Based on MLSP (2014a)*)

agriculture, followed by construction, industrial processing, administration and support services (see Fig. 7.2).

Household surveys conducted in Ukraine in 2008 and in 2012 (UCSR and Ukrstat 2009; ILO 2013) reveal that the majority of Ukrainian migrants in Poland work in basic occupations. These survey results show a considerable number of Ukrainian migrants in the category of “skilled workers using specific tools” (16% and 11% for 2008 and 2012 surveys, respectively) and “workers in services and sales” (12% and 28%, respectively). Importantly, less than 7% of Ukrainian workers in Poland in 2010–2012 had jobs that reflected their level of education (ILO 2013), which suggests a process of deskilling among Ukrainian migrants.

While the majority of Ukrainians in Poland work, they are also present among students: in the academic year 2013/2014, there were 15,123 Ukrainian students out of a total of 35,983 foreign students (Perspektywy Education Foundation 2013). Between 2012 and 2015 the number of temporary residence permits issued to Ukrainians for educational purposes (including studies), has also increased: from 2351 in 2013, 3798 in 2014 to 4553 in the first 8 months of 2015.

7.2.3 Recent Trends: Effects of the Military Conflict in Ukraine or Change in the Law in Poland?

In November 2013, political protests against the Ukrainian government’s anti-EU stance started in Ukraine. The events that followed made some researchers and policy makers anticipate a wave of political refugees from Ukraine to the EU, including Poland. However, Jaroszewicz (2014) argues that rather than seeking refugee status, Ukrainian nationals will continue to circulate for work, with young people seeking opportunities to settle. She concludes that only a continuous crisis would lead to an

increase of settled migration among Ukrainians and a change in their mobility patterns. We argue that currently those applying for refugee status and those engaging in circulation are different groups of migrants, with the number of Ukrainians increasing with regard to all entry channels to Poland.

Since the escalation of the armed conflict in Ukraine, Polish offices have experienced higher numbers of Ukrainian applicants for residence permits. In 2013, 1694 permanent residence permits, 408 EU long-term resident's permits and 9795 temporary residence permits (valid for up to 3 years) were issued to Ukrainians. In the following years, these numbers increased significantly to 3484,⁴ 590 and 17,103, respectively in 2014, and 4570, 426 and 21,872 between 1 January and 2 September 2015 (Office for Foreigners 2015a). There has thus been a steady increase of positive decisions on issuing permanent and temporary residence permits. The number of registered declarations and work permits is also increasing. While in 2014, 372,946 employer's declarations (96% of all declarations)⁵ and 26,315 work permits (60% of all work permits) were issued to Ukrainians,⁶ by the end of June 2015, the number of registered declarations and work permits already exceeded the number of declarations from the previous year. In 2015 there were 762,700 declarations registered to Ukrainian nationals.

Moreover, significantly more Ukrainians applied for international protection in Poland in 2014 and 2015. 2318 and 2298 Ukrainian citizens applied for refugee status in 2014 and in 2015, respectively,⁷ compared with 46 persons in 2013. Ukrainians have become the second-largest nationality, after Russia, among applicants for refugee status in Poland, constituting about 34% of all asylum seekers in 2014 and about 19% of all applicants in 2015. Nevertheless, only six Ukrainians were granted subsidiary protection and 11 a tolerated stay permit in 2014. In 2015, these numbers were 6 and 6, respectively. In the second instance, the Council for Refugees granted refugee status to two Ukrainian nationals and subsidiary protection to 18 Ukrainian nationals (Office for Foreigners 2015b). Because this channel proves ineffective, as the refugee status criteria are not fulfilled by most applicants from Ukraine, many potential asylum seekers choose alternative ways to legalize their stay in Poland, for example, using the simplified employment scheme or applying for the Polish Charter (*Karta Polaka*). The Polish Charter is a document confirming the holder belongs to the Polish nation, which among other rights provides access to work without having to apply for a work permit, the right to study in Poland and a shorter route to a permanent residence permit or Polish citizenship.

⁴In May 2014, with the implementation of the Act on Foreigners of 2013, settlement permits were replaced with permanent residence permits, whereas temporary residence permits replaced fixed-term residence permits. Since the nature of the permits did not change substantially, the numbers for 2014 sum up the permits of a given character: a permanent and a temporary one, respectively.

⁵Other nationalities were citizens of Moldova (6331), Belarus (4017), Georgia (2103), Russia (1227) and Armenia (774).

⁶Data on work permits and employer's declarations are taken from official statistics of the Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Policy available at: <http://www.mpips.gov.pl/analizy-i-raporty/cudzoziemcy-pracujacy-w-polsce-statystyki/>

⁷Data from the Office for Foreigners; the numbers include renewals of the asylum procedure.

The dynamics of the inflow and stock of Ukrainian citizens in Poland may also be a result of changes to the law on foreigners, which came into effect in May 2014. The changes introduced a number of facilitations, such as the possibility of staying and seeking work for up to 1 year after completing studies in Poland,⁸ a procedure concerning applying for a work and stay permit (“single permit”), extending the maximum validity of temporary residence permits to 3 years, and an entitlement to legalize stay in Poland on humanitarian grounds. Access to permanent residence permits for persons with documented Polish roots or a valid Polish Charter also became easier. All these factors could have influenced the flow and stock of Ukrainian migrants in Poland (for more on the legal and policy context see Chap. 4).

Finally, to some extent, the quantitative changes observed in the statistics on temporary and permanent residence permits issued between 2013 and 2015 may be explained by the expiry of temporary residence permits issued in the 2012 regularization programme to 1500 Ukrainian nationals who had previously stayed in Poland irregularly (for more on regularization programmes see Chap. 4). Most of these people applied for a renewal of their residence permits between 2014 and 2015. Altogether, the increase in the number of Ukrainians applying for long-term residence permits indicates that although the predominant trait of Ukrainian migration continues to be temporariness and circularity, a particular form of enduring local mobility, we argue that the role of temporary mobility to Poland may decrease in the near future.

7.3 Research on Ukrainian Migrants in Poland: Overview

In the 1990s, major research topics included small-scale trans-border trade, and the casual and seasonal work of migrants from the former Soviet Union (see Wallace et al. 1997, 1998; Wallace 1999; Wallace and Stola 2001; Iglicka 1999, 2000, 2001). So-called “false tourists” were mainly engaged in trade or casual work and entered Poland on tourist visas. Research was concerned with how rules of reciprocity, trade and economic behaviour are developed and regulated in a society undergoing rapid social change. Studies estimated the volume of trade activity in bazaars and the functioning of informal markets (Wallace 1999; Iglicka 1999, 2000, 2001). According to Wallace et al. (1997: 13), “shopping tourism merges into trading when shoppers would buy goods for other people as well as themselves or buy goods to re-sell at home”. These flows resulted in the expansion of new trade networks, supported by semi-official organizations providing information about travel and documentation (Wallace et al. 1997). In the second half of the 2000s, small-scale trade became a less prominent research area (see Szulecka 2007), due to the decreasing role of the open-air markets and increasing role of foreign investments in large

⁸ However, due to specific requirements related to this permit, such as proof of having stable source of income or sufficient financial means, this law has been not effective.

supermarkets. Although frequent cross-border travel still occurs, it is aimed at shopping rather than selling goods brought from Ukraine (apart from excise goods from Ukraine, such as cigarettes). The topic is still analyzed in research conducted in border areas and border crossing points (Fomina and Konieczna-Salamatin 2012; Fomina et al. 2013; Józwiak 2014). By the mid-1990s, many Ukrainians pursuing for-profit activities in Poland had started to exchange small-scale trade for labour migration.

A study by Golinowska (2004) was the first attempt to estimate the demand for workers generated by households in Poland. The analysis includes socio-demographic characteristics of households employing workers and preference for nationality/country of origin of the workers to be employed. Although the study covers the undeclared employment of foreign workers, their residence status is not included. According to this survey, carried out in 2001, one in every ten Polish households employing a worker employed a foreigner, usually a Ukrainian. The types of work carried out by the employed foreigners were: cleaning (34%), child care (6%), care of the sick or elderly (10%), gardening/farming (19%) and renovation (11%) (Golinowska 2004). According to the studied employers, the main reasons for employing a foreigner were low costs (no taxes or insurance contributions) and high quality of work (strong motivation of foreigners to work). Flexibility and willingness to work for less money than native workers would accept were also important to the employers. A more up-to-date estimate of the household demand for foreign labour was made by Grabowska-Lusińska and Żylicz (2008). Their results are based on a representative household survey carried out in 2007, according to which approximately 80,000 Polish households – that is 6% of all households in Poland – had employed foreign workers both officially and unofficially in the 2 years preceding the survey. Compared to other sectors, the demand observed among households employing domestic workers was assessed as relatively high. The study by Grabowska-Lusińska and Żylicz (2008) also confirmed that Ukrainian migrants were the leaders in the numbers, reflecting the alleviated demand for foreign work in Poland, especially in case of medium and small-scale companies. One-third of foreigners employed by Polish companies were Ukrainians.

Studies that focus on migrant domestic workers, mainly Ukrainian women, are predominantly qualitative in nature (Kordasiewicz 2010, 2011, 2015; Kindler 2008, 2011; Kindler et al. 2016). Kordasiewicz (2015) analyzes the problematic nature of the labour relationship in the domestic work sector, involving both Polish and migrant domestic workers and focusing on the under-researched employer’s perspective. Migrant domestic workers have also been studied from a socio-cultural risk perspective (Kindler 2011). Based on her qualitative study, Kindler (2011) argues that the spatial and cultural distance between Ukraine and Poland, as well as entry to Poland, are perceived as acceptable risks or as non-risky.

As discussed in the context of other countries (see Chap. 4), Ukrainian migration to Poland is often defined in studies by its irregular status, mainly due to migrants working unofficially. The ILO 2013 household survey showed that in 2010–2012 only 28% of Ukrainian labour migrants in Poland had a fully legitimate status (both in terms of stay and employment). Since the survey estimated the overall number of

Ukrainian labour migrants in Poland at 168,400, this means that over 120,000 of them (72%) should be treated as irregular migrants as either their stay or their employment did not comply with the law. Among the causes of Ukrainian migrants' irregular work status, the large size and structure of the informal economy in Poland have been highlighted as the main ones (see for example Bojar et al. 2005; Bieniecki et al. 2008; Kicingier and Kloc-Nowak 2008; Górny et al. 2010). Szulecka (see Chap. 4) reviews the few qualitative studies, which addressed the effect of legal obstacles on the everyday life of individual migrants (such as costly and time-consuming registration procedures (until 2007) or the requirement to prove sufficient financial standing before being allowed to enter Poland, and the strategies they employed to overcome them). She also refers to Polish studies on how irregularity is linked to migrants' work status and how informal employment provides very few rights to workers, as well as the risk of abuse and potential instability without any guarantees for the future. Ukrainian migrants experience such forms of exploitation, as being cheated by intermediaries or employers, not being paid adequately or having no contract despite being promised one. However, they usually do not exercise their rights formally, since they perceive it as too costly and time-consuming, and – having no employment contract – they usually assess their chances of success as low. Lack of trust towards institutions in Poland may also be a reason for not reporting cases of abuse (FRA 2011).

Well-developed migrant networks provide information on job offers and recommendations that reduce the dangers of exploitation, unemployment or lack of protection resulting from involvement in the informal sector (Kindler and Szulecka 2013; Stefańska and Szulecka 2013). Several studies have investigated the role of social networks as informal channels of recruitment, but also informal safety nets (for example, Grzymała-Kazłowska et al. 2008; Kindler and Szulecka 2010; Górny et al. 2010). As these works reveal, developing a closer relationship with employers in the case of domestic workers allowed migrants to improve their social capital. A migrant who had access to resources in the form of the employer's social network provided other migrants with information about jobs and was an important link between the employer's friends (e.g. searching for a domestic worker) and other migrant women. Having access to several reliable employers increased the migrant's chances of finding ways to enter and stay in Poland legally (Kindler and Szulecka 2010; Kindler 2011; Kindler and Szulecka 2013).

Research rarely addresses the role of migrant institutions in Ukrainian mobility. An exception is the analysis of the role of the *vodiy*, which in Ukrainian means driver. This person uses their own car to drive migrants for a fee from their home to their workplace and back again, reducing some of the risks related to not being able to enter Poland (Kindler 2011). Kindler's study showed that the drivers shared information about work in Poland and controlled knowledge about the risks related to migration, but they had no interest in revealing it because they wanted labour migration to continue. Their involvement changed the context of crossing the border, helped migrants "act out" the credibility of their journey's aim and in one way or another supported their financial standing for a stay in Poland.

As we saw in Chap. 6, numerous studies have recognized circulation as the key form of migration of Ukrainians to Poland, which the migrants themselves plan to continue engaging in (Górny et al. 2013). This results on the one hand from factors facilitating trips to Poland, such as spatial and cultural proximity, relatively easy entry (especially until 2003), size and accessibility of the informal labour market, as well as migrant networks and informal infrastructure (such as drivers bringing people to work) (Wallace and Stola 2001; Górny et al. 2010; Kindler 2011). On the other hand, Poland provides limited legal opportunities for stays exceeding 1 year; these are restricted by formal requirements, which can easily be fulfilled only by certain groups of Ukrainian migrants, including those with a stable source of income, documented legal employment in Poland, Polish roots or Polish spouses. In other cases, the requirements hamper long-term migration.

Studies addressing the role of family, social networks and the degree of neighbourhood embeddedness in the transition from circulation to more permanent forms of residence are addressed by Górny and Kindler in this volume (see Chap. 6). As Brzozowska and Grzymała-Kazłowska (2014: 24) write, “close cultural distance between the Polish and Ukrainian societies as well as the volume and density of relations between Ukrainian immigrants and Poles (including very frequent mixed marriages) predominantly led to assimilation”. Marriage to a Pole is one of the principal reasons for settlement among Ukrainian nationals (Brzozowska and Grzymała-Kazłowska 2014; Fihel 2006; Fihel et al. 2007; Górny and Kępińska 2004). According to Brzozowska and Grzymała-Kazłowska (2014), Ukrainians, both those married to Poles and those married to Ukrainians, were actively developing their bridging capital in establishing limited but strong ties with Poles. 60% of Ukrainians in mixed marriages saw their economic situation as similar to that of Polish families. Although Ukrainians in mixed marriages had entered the primary labour market and enjoyed stable working conditions, they did not have high economic status because they often worked in the public sector (such as education or health care) where their salaries were no higher than those of average Ukrainian labour migrants.

Ukrainian migrants rarely engage in social activity in Poland and do not see the need for institutionalization of the group mainly due to the temporary nature of their migration (Biernath 2012; Grzymała-Kazłowska et al. 2008). Studies have analyzed how Ukrainians adapt to the legal and institutional migratory framework in Poland. For example, Stefańska and Szulecka (2013) analyzed how progression in their administrative status, which is regulated strictly by the law on entry, stay and work in Poland, of two distinct groups (Ukrainians and Vietnamese) influences the economic adaptation of migrants. Their analysis shows that many Ukrainians did not take advantage of their rights and worked in the secondary sector below their qualification levels. This could be caused, however, by the lack of cultural capital (e.g. imperfect knowledge of Polish) or by potentially discriminatory attitudes in the primary sectors. Although the migrants’ economic status did not always improve along with the improvement in their residence status, Ukrainians aimed at prolonging the validity of documents authorizing them to stay in Poland. This gave them a sense of security, even if they worked in the informal economy (*ibid.*).

Several researchers have also explored the changing attitudes of Poles toward Ukrainians in Poland, and the growing acceptance of Ukrainian nationals. According to the Public Opinion Research Centre's (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, CBOS) annual public opinion poll on the attitudes of Polish nationals toward other nationalities (including Ukrainians), there is a general increase in the openness of Poles towards others (CBOS 2015a). One in three respondents declares sympathy toward Ukrainian nationals. A similar picture emerges from the poll on attitudes toward Ukrainian immigrants in Poland, with three-quarters of Poles declaring that the presence of Ukrainian migrants in Poland is something positive (CBOS 2015b). However, these attitudes fluctuate and are influenced by ongoing events, with Poles having opened up to Ukrainian nationals during the Orange Revolution, while with the economic crisis, which has only recently become visible in Poland, Poles were already more in favour of restricting access to the labour market for Poland's eastern neighbours than in 2008 (CBOS 2010). It should also be noted that Ukrainian migrants continue to be associated with low-skilled occupations: in the 1990s with petty trade and by the mid-2000s with irregular and unskilled labour in sectors such as domestic work, construction and farming (Okólski 1997; Konieczna 2002; Mrozowski 2003; Kofta 2004; Grzymała-Kazłowska 2007).

7.4 Conclusions

Much research on immigration to Poland starts with an apologetic disclaimer that overall Poland still is primarily an emigration country. This is true, if mainstream definitions of migration and official data sources only are used. However, such an approach misses a crucial factor – the large-scale mobility of Ukrainians, who not only play an important role in the Polish labour market, but also affect changing attitudes in Polish society. The summary of data and the literature overview on Ukrainian migrants in Poland cited above create a picture of a particular form of mobility, here termed local mobility. This type of mobility has several characteristics.

First, it has been characterized by continuous large inflows and outflows of Ukrainian citizens since the early 1990s, and by still limited settlement. Among a number of reasons are spatial proximity and opportunities for seasonal labour migrants to access the labour market legally, combined with limited possibilities of settling in Poland legally. Although the extent to which the employer's declaration system actually enables Ukrainian citizens to leave the informal economy is debatable, it is a unique solution in the rather restrictive policy environment toward hiring third-country nationals in the EU labour market. Still, limited settlement opportunities are one of the key determinants of the highly temporary and repetitive nature of Ukrainian mobility to Poland.

Second, migrants coming to Poland predominantly originate from Western Ukraine, the closest area geographically and the most exposed both historically

and contemporarily to cultural and social Polish influences. The main destinations for these migrants are the provinces that offer the best work (not necessarily settlement) opportunities, with Warsaw in the lead.

Third, social networks that have dynamically evolved since the 1990s play a crucial role in shaping the mobility patterns of Ukrainians. Migrant networks create not only opportunities for mobility, providing access to particular resources (information flow, support in finding work, accommodation etc.), but also the rules of action and exchange. The “local” character of these networks stems primarily from the fact that Ukrainian migrants were familiar with the post-socialist reality and conditions of the early “wild capitalism” present both in Ukraine and in Poland in the 1990s. These cultural rules and norms included an acceptance of semi-compliance with the law in the form of unofficial work or street-level corruption and determined the specificity of the current social networks, which are mainly based on weak ties with other migrants and a few strong ties with “gatekeepers”, often Poles.

Data covering Ukrainian migrants’ travels, stays, documentary and economic history from studies such as respondent-driven sampling (RDS) surveys (for an elaboration see Górny and Napierała 2011, Górny et al. 2013) give great opportunities for studying the factors potentially influencing changes in administrative status and the migrants’ position in the labour market of the receiving state (especially from the legal perspective). Both external and individual factors may affect migrants’ trajectories. While this has often been analyzed in qualitative studies, quantitative data could shed more light on the impact of particular factors that condition migration patterns, especially if such data cover a long-term perspective and include more observations gathered in a standardized way.

Although the local, circular character of Ukrainian migration to Poland is still dominant, the nature of this mobility is becoming more complex. The relatively small number of settled migrants is growing. This change has been especially visible since the beginning of the military conflict in Ukraine, but it is also an effect of administrative solutions providing incentives for a long-term stay, among others, through facilitated access to the labour market for specific categories of migrants (such as students, graduates of Polish universities and Polish Charter holders). In order to identify the determinants of changes in mobility patterns, the reasons for the changes observed in mobility and legalization patterns since 2014 should be studied. Investigating possible shifts in mobility patterns as well as the reasons for the increasing scale of long-term migratory plans requires in-depth qualitative material, preferably supported by survey data.

Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, duplication, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included in

the work's Creative Commons license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory regulation, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or reproduce the material.

References

- Bieniecki, M., Frelak, J., Kaźmierkiewicz, P., & Pawlak, M. (2008). *Ukrainian migrants on the polish labour market*. Kiev: IOM.
- Biernath, M. (2012). Cross-border migrant organizations in Poland. In L. Pries & Z. Sezgin (Eds.), *Cross border migrant organizations in comparative perspective* (pp.99–151). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. <http://www.palgraveconnect.com/pc/doifinder/view/10.1057/9781137035110.0001>. Accessed 31 Aug 2015.
- Bojar, H., Gąsior-Niemiec, A., Bieniecki, M., & Pawlak, M. (2005). *Migranci na rynku pracy w Polsce. Wyniki badań przeprowadzonych wśród migrantów ekonomicznych i pracowników polskich* [Migrants on the labour market in Poland. Research carried out among labour migrants and polish workers]. Warszawa: ISP.
- Border Guard Statistics. (2015). Statystyki. http://www.strazgraniczna.pl/wps/portal/tresc?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=pl/serwis-sg/sg_statystyki_logistyka_wspolpraca/statystyki/. Accessed 15 Sep 2015.
- Brzozowska, A., & Grzymała-Kazłowska, A. (2014). Procesy inkluzji migrantów a więzi i sieci społeczne wśród małżeństw mieszanych. [The process of inclusion of migrants versus ties and social networks of mixed marriages.]. *Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Sociologica*, 50, 69–87.
- Castles, S., & Miller, M. J. (1993). *The Age of migration: International population movements in the modern world*. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
- CBOS. (2010). Praca cudzoziemców w Polsce [Foreigners working in Poland]. Research Report No BS/148/2010, November 2010. Warsaw: Public Opinion Research Centre.
- CBOS. (2015a). Stosunek Polaków do innych narodów [Poles' attitudes towards other nations]. Research Report No BS/14/2015, January 2015. Warsaw: Public Opinion Research Centre. http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2015/K_014_15.PDF. Accessed 1 Sep 2015.
- CBOS. (2015b). Przybyśże z bliska i z daleka, czyli o imigrantach w Polsce [Arrivals from close and far, about immigrants in Poland]. Research Report No BS/93/2015, June 2015. Warsaw: Public Opinion Research Centre. http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2015/K_014_15.PDF. Accessed 1 Sep 2015. http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2015/K_093_15.PDF
- Central Statistical Office. (2011). *Population census*. Warsaw: Central Statistical Office.
- Council of Europe. (1992). *People on the move. New migration flows in Europe*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Press.
- Fihel, A. (2006). Przestrzenny wzorec osiedlania się cudzoziemców w Polsce. [Spatial pattern of foreigners' settlement in Poland.]. *Studia Demograficzne*, 2, 49–67.
- Fihel, A., Górny, A., Grzymała-Kazłowska, A., Kępińska, E., & Piekut, A. (2007). *Od zbiorowości do społeczności: rola migrantów osiedleńczych w tworzeniu się społeczności imigranckich w Polsce*. [From a group to community: The role of settled migrants in developing migrant communities in Poland.] CMR Working Papers No. 27 (85). Warszawa: CMR UW. <http://www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/publ/556/>. Accessed 27 Aug 2015.
- Fomina, J., & Konieczna-Sałamatin, J. (Eds.). (2012). *Granica do naprawy. Problemy pogranicza Polski i Ukrainy*. [Border to be repaired. Problems of the borderlands of Poland and Ukraine]. Warszawa: Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego.
- Fomina, J., Horbowski, T., Lepak, A., & Szulecka, M. (2013). *Przejścia graniczne w czasie Euro 2012* [Border crossing points during Euro 2012]. Warszawa: Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego.

- http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Otwarta%20Europa/Granica_pol_ukr_podczasEuro2012.pdf. Accessed 27 Aug 2015.
- FRA. (2011). *Migrants in an irregular situation employed in domestic work: Fundamental rights challenges for the European union and its member states*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/migrants_in_an_irregular_situation_employed_in_domestic_work_en.pdf. Accessed 8 Mar 2013.
- Frejka, T., Okólski, M., & Sword, K. (Eds.). (1999). *In-depth studies on migration in Central and Eastern Europe: The case of Ukraine* (Economic studies 12). New York/Geneva: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, United Nations.
- Golinowska, S. (2004). *Popyt na pracę cudzoziemców. Polska i sąsiedzi*. [The demand for foreign labour. Poland and neighbours]. Warszawa: IPiSS.
- Górny, A., & Kępińska, E. (2004). Mixed marriages in migration from Ukraine to Poland. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 30(2), 353–372.
- Górny, A., & Napierała, J. (2011). Badania migrantów jako przedstawicieli populacji “ukrytych” – dobór próby sterowany przez respondentów [Respondent Driven Sampling]. In P. Kaczmarczyk (Ed.), *Mobilność i migracje w dobie transformacji, wyzwania metodologiczne* (pp. 155–194). Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.
- Górny, A., Kindler, M., Piekut, A., Stefańska, R., & Szulecka, M. (2010). Wybrane aspekty integracji imigrantów: w poszukiwaniu mechanizmów sprzyjających dalszemu napływowi cudzoziemców do Polski [Selected aspects of immigrant integration: Searching for mechanisms supporting further inflow of foreigners to Poland]. In A. Górny, I. Grabowska-Lusińska, M. Lesińska & M. Okólski, *Transformacja nieoczywista. Polska jako kraj imigracji* [Unclear transformation. Poland as an immigration country] (pp. 188–231). Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.
- Górny, A., Kaczmarczyk, P., Napierała, J., & Toruńczyk-Ruiz, S. (2013). *Raport z badania imigrantów w Polsce*. [Report from research on immigrants in Poland.]. Warszawa: Fundacja Ośrodek Badań nad Migracjami.
- Grabowska-Lusińska, I., & Żylicz, A. (2008). *Czy polska gospodarka potrzebuje cudzoziemców?* [Does the Polish economy need foreigners?]. Warsaw: Centre for Migration Research, University of Warsaw.
- Grzymała-Kazłowska, A. (2007). *Konstruowanie „innego”. Wizerunki imigrantów w Polsce* [Construction of the “other”. Images of immigrants in Poland]. Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.
- Grzymała-Kazłowska, A. (2014). The role of different forms of bridging capital for immigrant adaptation and upward mobility. The case of Ukrainian and Vietnamese immigrants settled in Poland. *Ethnicities*, 15, 460. doi:10.1177/1468796813518314.
- Grzymała-Kazłowska, A., & Okólski, M. (2003). Influx and integration of migrants in Poland in the early XXI century. CMR Working Papers No. 50. Warszawa: OBM WNE UW.
- Grzymała-Kazłowska, A., Stefańska, R., & Szulecka, M. (2008). Różnice i podobieństwa w integracji migrantów o różnym statusie prawnym [Differences and similarities in integration of migrants with a different legal status]. In A. Grzymała-Kazłowska (Ed.), *Między wielością a jednością. Integracja odmiennych grup i kategorii migrantów w Polsce* [Between multiplicity and unity. Integration of diverse groups and categories of migrants in Poland] (pp. 81–140). Warsaw: Centre of Migration Research Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw.
- Hałagida, I. (2002). *Ukraińcy na Zachodnich i Północnych Ziemiach Polski 1947–1957* [Ukrainians on western and northern Polish Territories 1947–1957]. Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej.
- Iglicka, K. (1999). The economics of the petty trade on the eastern Polish border. In K. Iglicka & K. Sword (Eds.), *The challenge of east–west migration for Poland* (pp. 120–144). London: Macmillan.
- Iglicka, K. (2000). Ethnic division on emerging foreign labour markets in Poland during the transition period. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 52(7), 1237–1255.

- Iglicka, K. (2001). Shuttling from the former Soviet Union to Poland: From primitive mobility' to migration. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 27(3), 505–518.
- ILO. (2013). *Report on the methodology, organization and results of a modular sample survey on labour migration in Ukraine*. Budapest: Decent Work Technical Support Team and Country Office for Central and Eastern Europe, International Labour Organization.
- Jaroszewicz, M. (2014). *Perspektywy migracji Ukraińców do UE*. [Future migration of Ukrainians to the EU.] Komentarze OSW [Commentaries OSW]. Nr 128/2.02.2013.
- Józwiak, I. (2014). Ethnicity, labour and mobility in the contemporary borderland. A case study of a transcarpathian township. *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, 3(1), 27–39.
- Kicingier, A., & Kloc-Nowak, W. (2008). *Combating the illegal employment of foreigners in the enlarged EU: The case of Poland*. CEFMR Working Papers, No.1.
- Kindler, M. (2008). Risk and risk strategies in migration: Ukrainian domestic workers in Poland. In H. Lutz (Ed.), *Migration and domestic work*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Kindler, M. (2011). *A risky business? Ukrainian migrant women in Warsaw's domestic work sector*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Kindler, M., & Szulecka, M. (2010). Integracja ekonomiczna migrantek na polskim rynku pracy. [Economic integration of migrant women in the Polish labour market.] In M. Kindler & J. Napierała (Eds.), *Migracje kobiet: przypadek Polski* [Migration of women: The case of Poland.] (pp. 138–160). Warszawa: Scholar.
- Kindler, M., & Szulecka, M. (2013). The Economic integration of Ukrainian and Vietnamese migrant women in the Polish labour market. In L. Näre & J. Andall (Eds.), *Gender and the labour market in Europe*. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 39, 649–667.
- Kindler, M., Kordasiewicz, A., & Szulecka, M. (2016). *Care needs and migration for domestic work: Ukraine-Poland*. Geneva: International Labour Organization.
- Kofta, M. (2004). Cudzoziemcy w Warszawie: źródła negatywnych postaw wobec 'obcych'. [Foreigners in Warsaw: Sources of negative attitudes towards 'the Others'.] In J. Grzelak & T. Zarycki (Eds.), *Spoleczna mapa Warszawy* [Social map of Warsaw.] (pp. 415–425). Warszawa: Scholar.
- Konieczna-Salamatin, J. (2002). *Wizerunek Ukrainy, Ukraińców i stosunków polsko-ukraińskich w Polsce. Raport z badań*. [The image of Ukraine, Ukrainians and Polish-Ukrainian relations in Poland. Research report.] Warszawa: Instytut Spraw Publicznych.
- Kordasiewicz, A. (2010). *Etniczny wymiar funkcjonowania rynku usług domowych w Warszawie*. [Ethnic dimension of care and domestic service market in Warsaw.] Warsaw: Institute for Public Affairs.
- Kordasiewicz, A. (2011). Domestic service/servants. Transformation of asymmetrical social relation (PhD dissertation). Warsaw: University of Warsaw.
- Kordasiewicz, A. (2015). Class guilt. Employers and their relationships with domestic workers in Poland. In S. Marchetti & A. Triandafyllidou (Eds.), *Paying for care: The Employers' perspective on migrant domestic work* (pp. 53–72). Farnham: Ashgate.
- MIA. (2012). *Polityka migracyjna Polski w odniesieniu do obywateli Republiki Białorusi, Ukrainy i Federacji Rosyjskiej* [Poland's migration policy in relations to the citizens of the Republic of Belarus, Ukraine and Russian Federation].
- MLSP. (2014). Total data. Work permits for foreigners. Ministry of Labour and Social Policy. Available at: <http://www.mpips.gov.pl/analizy-i-raporty/cudzoziemcy-pracujacy-w-polsce-statystyki/>
- Motyka, G. (2000). Problematyka stosunków polsko-ukraińskich w latach 1939–1948 w polskiej historiografii po roku 1989 [The theme of Polish-Ukrainian relations in the years 1939–1948 in Polish historiography after 1989]. In P. Kosiewski & G. Motyka (Eds.), *Historycy Polscy i Ukraińcy wobec Problemów XX wieku* [Polish and Ukrainian historians on problems of the 20th Century] (pp. 166–178). Forum Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego. Krakow: Universitas.
- Mrozowski, M. (2003). Obrazy cudzoziemców i imigrantów w Polsce. [The images of foreigners and immigrants in Poland.] In K. Iglicka (Ed.), *Integracja czy dyskryminacja? Polskie wyzwania i dylematy u progu wielokulturowości* [Integration or discrimination? Challenges and dilemmas on the eve of multiculturalism in Poland.] (pp.184–235). Warszawa: Instytut Spraw Publicznych.

- Office for Foreigners. (2015a). Statystyki. Data from the Office for Foreigners. <http://udsc.gov.pl/statystyki/>. Accessed 15 Sep 2015.
- Office for Foreigners. (2015b). *Raporty Specjalne. Bieżąca sytuacja dotycząca Ukrainy* [Special reports. Current situation concerning Ukraine]. <http://udsc.gov.pl/statystyki/raporty-specjalne/biezaca-sytuacja-dotyczaca-ukrainy/>. Accessed 15 Sep 2015.
- Okólski, M. (2004). Migration patterns in Central and Eastern Europe on the Eve of the European Union expansion: An overview. In A. Górny & P. Ruspini (Eds.), *Migration in the New Europe* (pp. 23–47). Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Okólski, M. (1997). *Najnowszy ruch wędrowniczy z Ukrainy do Polski. Charakterystyka Strumieni, cech migrantów i okoliczności pobytu w Polsce* [Recent migration from Ukraine to Poland]. CMR Working Papers No. 14. Warsaw: ISS CMR UW. <http://www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/publ/550/>. Accessed 21 July 2015.
- Perspektywy Education Foundation. (2013). *Study in Poland. Studenci Cudzoziemscy w Polsce 2013*. [Foreign students in Poland 2013] Warszawa: Fundacja Edukacyjna Perspektywy.
- Rudolph, H., & Morokvasic, M. (Eds.). (1993). *Bridging states and markets. International migration in the early 1990s*. Berlin: Edition sigma.
- Stefańska, R., & Szulecka, M. (2013). Bezpieczny status prawny jako determinanta awansu ekonomiczno-zawodowego odmiennych grup imigrantów w Polsce. [Secure legal status as a determinant of the economic and professional advancement]. *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, 2(1), 91–115.
- Stola, D. (2001). Two kinds of quasi-migration in the middle zone: Central Europe as a space for transit migration and mobility for profit. In C. Wallace & D. Stola (Eds.), *Patterns of migration in Central Europe*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Szulecka, M. (2007). *Obecność cudzoziemców zlokalizowanych na targowisku wokół Stadionu Dziesięciolecia z perspektywy kryminologicznej*. [Foreigners’ presence in the open-air market at the 10th Anniversary Stadium from a criminological perspective]. CMR Working Papers, No 24 (82). Warszawa: OBM WNE UW. Available: <http://www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/publ/479/>
- UCSR, & Ukrstat. (2009). *Ukrainian external labour migration*. Kyiv: Ukrainian Centre for Social Reforms, State Statistics Committee of Ukraine.
- Wallace, C. (1999). Crossing borders: The mobility of goods, capital and people in the Central European Region. In A. Brah, M. J. Hickman & M. Mac an Ghail (Eds.), *Global futures. Migration, environment and globalization*. Explorations in sociology. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Wallace, C., & Stola, D. (Eds.). (2001). *Patterns of migration in Central Europe*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Wallace, C., Bedezir, V., & Chmouliar, O. (1997). *Spending, saving or investing social capital: The case of shuttle traders in post-Communist Central Europe*. East European Series, 43. <http://ideas.repec.org/p/ihs/ihsrop/43.html>
- Wallace, C., Bedezir, V., Chmouliar, O., & Sidorenko, E. (1998). *Some characteristics of labour migration and the Central European Buffer Zone* (Sociological series, 25). Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies.

Chapter 8

Ukrainians in the Czech Republic: On the Pathway from Temporary Foreign Workers to One of the Largest Minority Groups

Yana Leontiyeva

8.1 Introduction

Ukrainian migration to Czech lands has a long history due to the geographical, cultural and historical closeness of the two countries. As early as the sixteenth century, labour migrants from Halych and Bukovyna used to move for seasonal work, mostly to Bohemia and Moravia (Zilynskyj 1995). At the turn of the nineteenth century, Ukrainian intellectuals who had abandoned their native country for political reasons were drawn primarily to Prague and other big cities within the Austrian part of the Habsburg Empire. During the first decades of the twentieth century, the Ukrainian diaspora, represented by a number of associations with different aims and scopes, was very active educationally (its academic activities included publishing a number of textbooks, dictionaries and encyclopaedias, and establishing a university and the Higher Pedagogical Institute). The subsequent Nazi and Soviet occupations of Czechoslovakia led to the enforced closing down of Ukrainian associations, and most Ukrainian immigrants were assimilated into the majority population (Zilynskyj and Kočík 2001). Many Ukrainians in the Transcarpathian region, which has an especially long and intensive history of migration not only as a borderland region but also as a former part of Czechoslovakia, continued to have a close connection to the Czech lands in many cases based on wider family ties. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Czech lands experienced an extensive new wave of predominantly economic migrants from Ukraine. The “older” generation of immigrants continue with a more traditional form of civic activity and – at the turn of the century – tended to distance themselves from “new economic” immigrants (Leontiyeva 2005). Over the last decade these new immigrants have become more settled, participating more in civic activity, and there has also been a gradual change in the activities of traditional Ukrainian NGOs aimed at the new wave of immigrants.

Y. Leontiyeva (✉)

Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague, Czech Republic
e-mail: [yana.leontiyeva@soc.cas.cz](mailto: yana.leontiyeva@soc.cas.cz)

Today Ukrainians represent the largest migrant group in the Czech Republic. Researchers are therefore particularly interested in this group, which combines two rather different features when compared with the other two largest groups of migrants: (a) at first glance it is often not recognizable because its members appear culturally not so different from the local population, mostly have decent language skills, keep close contacts with a majority population, and are well integrated into Czech society (unlike the first generation of Vietnamese, who constitute the third-largest migrant group); however (b) it is still not that hard to find as it has a large number of members who are often concentrated in certain “migrant jobs” (unlike Slovaks, who can be found in all sectors).

Most of the literature on Ukrainian migration to the Czech Republic is devoted to contemporary labour migration. However, there are a good number of descriptive studies devoted to the history of Ukrainian migration to the Czech lands and the activities of the Ukrainian diaspora, mainly at the end of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century (Markus 1994; Zilynskyj 1995, 2000; Zilynskyj and Kočík 2001). There are a number of more general studies describing harsh working conditions and the position of Ukrainian immigrants in the labour market (Horáková and Drbohlav 1998; Lupták and Drbohlav 1999; Drbohlav and Džúrová 2007; Drbohlav et al. 2001); barriers to labour market integration (Ezzeddine-Lukšíková et al. 2006); over-education of Ukrainian migrants (Leontiyeva 2014; Leontiyeva and Pokorná 2014); and other important aspects of social integration and potential settlement (Leontiyeva and Nečasová 2009; Bernard and Mikešová 2014). Some publications focus on more specific topics, such as the quasi-legal system of middlemen intermediating the employment of Ukrainian immigrants (Nekorjak 2006; Čermáková and Nekorjak 2009); irregular Ukrainian immigration (Nekorjak 2007); and less explored areas like transnational motherhood (Ezzeddine 2012), civic participation and community activities (Zilynskyj 2002; Leontiyeva 2005), transformation of national identities of Ukrainian immigrants (Trlifajová 2009), and remittances sent by Ukrainians from the Czech Republic (Leontiyeva and Tollarová 2011; Strielkowski et al. 2012; Leontiyeva 2015). Shared history means that a great deal of attention (especially in ethnological research) has been paid to immigration from Transcarpathian Ukraine, which used to be a part of Czechoslovakia (Uherek and Plochová 2003; Uherek et al. 2008), and also to the resettlement of ethnic Czechs from Ukraine (Valášková et al. 1997; Nosková 1999; Janská and Drbohlav 2001).

8.2 Today's Ukrainian Migration in Numbers

The number of Ukrainians in the Czech Republic has grown rapidly in the last 20 years. From less than 10,000 in the early 1990s, the official number of Ukrainian citizens who reside in the Czech Republic today has risen to over 100,000. Ukrainians are the largest migrant community in the country: they constitute about 25% of all migrants and about 40% of immigrants from countries outside the

European Union. The total number of Ukrainian citizens registered by the end of 2015 was 106,019 (MoI 2015a), a significant reduction since the end of 2008, when the number of Ukrainians residing in the country was about 132,000 (CZSO 2015).

In addition to the official numbers, it is worth looking at irregular migration of Ukrainians. According to official statistics, the annual number of Ukrainian citizens who cross the border without valid documents is very small.¹ However, most researchers and experts agree that Ukrainians (as well as many other immigrant groups) “fell into illegality” in the Czech Republic (Drbohlav and Lachmanová 2008; Leontiyeva and Nečasová 2009), mostly as a result of a rigid migration policy, especially with regard to the extension of work and residence permits. According to the annual Ministry of the Interior report (MoI 2015b), checks in the Czech Republic during 2014 found 1020 Ukrainian citizens without valid documents. At the same time, the official figures in the report suggest that undocumented migration is nowadays considerably lower than it used to be before the country joined the Schengen Area. This may be all the more true in times of economic recession, as the Czech state has imposed more restrictions on employment of third-country nationals. According to estimates, the number of irregular immigrants in the Czech Republic could be as high as the number of officially registered immigrants (Drbohlav et al. 2010), with estimates ranging between 50,000 and 150,000 people (Nekorjak 2007).

Ukrainian migration to the Czech Republic, as is often the case in other migrant groups, is quite “young”. The average age of Ukrainian migrants is just under 35 (CZSO 2015). Almost nine in ten (85%) Ukrainian nationals residing in the Czech Republic are of productive age (between 15 and 59 years of age), while the share of older Ukrainian migrants (60 and above) is negligible (less than 5%) and more than one in ten (11%) migrants officially registered in the country are under 15 (CZSO 2015). Despite this significant number of Ukrainian children (who even predominate in several age groups) second-generation Ukrainian migrants do not figure in public and academic discourse, unlike, for example, Vietnamese migrants. This is probably the result of the assimilation of Ukrainian children, who seem to have become an “invisible” part of society in general.

Since the 1990s the share of women among Ukrainian migrants has fluctuated around 40%, with a slight increase during the last 4 years. In 2015 the share of women among Ukrainian migrants was almost 47% (MoI 2015a). Stagnation of the immigrant inflow due to a change in the approach to newcomers (as discussed below) has resulted in a significant increase in the share of “settled migrants”. The share of permanent residence permit holders among Ukrainians in 2000 was less than one-fifth; it was almost one-third in 2008 and more than two-thirds (73%) by the end of 2015. As in some other EU countries, Ukrainian female migration is more settled (see Chapter 710 on Italy in this volume); the share of permanent residence permit holders is significantly higher among female migrants (76% compared with 71% among men) (MoI 2015a).

¹ The Ministry of the Interior reports that in 2014 only 15 Ukrainian citizens were caught crossing the border without valid documents (MoI 2015b).

Comparison of the data from four surveys conducted between 2001 and 2013 suggests that almost half of Ukrainians (between 42% and 48%) in waged employment are married, and a considerable proportion (between 14% and 16%) are divorced (Bernard and Leontiyeva 2013).² Transnational families are widespread among Ukrainian migrants in the Czech Republic; in most cases migrants' family members have remained in Ukraine but in some cases migrants' partners are working in other EU countries. A survey conducted in 2010 suggests that economically active Ukrainian men are more often separated from their partners and spouses (compared to female migrants) and that almost half of Ukrainians with children had to leave their offspring in the home country (Leontiyeva and Tollarová 2011).

8.3 The Predominantly Economic Nature of Ukrainian Migration

For more than two decades, Ukrainian migration to the Czech Republic has been predominantly economic in nature (similarly to Poland; see Chap. 7), although nowadays the share of family reunions is also growing significantly. Like third-country nationals in general in the EU, most Ukrainian immigrants are employed in the secondary labour market. By the end of 2011, official records reported 68,650 economically active citizens from Ukraine, of whom almost half were self-employed with the other half employed under a regular contract (CZSO 2015). This is the most recent date for which data on the employment of immigrants in the Czech Republic are available. The nature of the economic activities of Ukrainian migrants has obviously changed in recent years. Unfortunately due to changes at the Czech Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA), including restructuring and problems with the implementation of new computer systems for migrant registration, detailed official statistics for Ukrainian citizens employed since 2012 are unavailable. Expert estimates provided by MoLSA since that date are mostly aggregated to include data on all third-country nationals (these estimates are discussed below). Despite the lack of recent data, some recession-related trends are obvious even between 2008 and 2011. Figure 8.1 illustrates the significant decline in the number of directly employed Ukrainians (i.e. those with the status of a regular employee); this group showed an almost 60% decrease in 2011 compared with 2008. This did not, however, coincide with the mass return of migrants, as the total number of Ukrainians officially registered in the country declined by only 10% during this period.

In order to explain this development a short excursus into recent policy changes towards labour migrants in the Czech Republic is needed. It is important to note that in 2008 the vast majority (91%) of employed Ukrainians did not have free access to

²In spite of obvious methodological shortcomings, available quantitative data produce fairly stable outcomes when it comes to the main characteristics of Ukrainian nationals in waged employment (see Bernard and Leontiyeva 2013).




Fig. 8.1 Registered economic activities of Ukrainian nationals (Source: CZSO (2015). *Foreigners in the Czech Republic 2014*)

the labour market and had to apply for work permits, which were mostly issued for a period of up to 1 year and assigned to a specific employer, job and region (see Chap. 7 for comparison with the Polish case on facilitations in accessing the labour market). A foreign national who has been issued with a work permit had to apply for a residence permit for the purpose of employment (if there was no other legal reason for their stay). In times of economic boom (2004–2008) Czech labour offices issued large number of work permits for all jobs, including unskilled ones. In 2008 Ukrainians constituted the vast majority of work permit holders. However, at the very beginning of the economic recession, the Czech state adopted a rather restrictive approach not only toward newcomers but also toward immigrants already in the country. Since the beginning of 2009, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA) has sent several memoranda to labour offices aimed at facilitating employment of Czech citizens by strictly regulating the employment of third-country nationals. At first, the Ministry rather vaguely appealed for “greater consideration” of a general decline in the demand for foreign labour within the Czech economy. In spite of a declining trend in direct employment of third-country nationals (including Ukrainians), at the beginning of 2012 the Ministry decided to instruct labour offices to discontinue issuing work permits for positions for which employers do not require Maturita (General Certificate of Secondary Education – GCSE). In June 2012, following strong criticism from NGOs and Czech companies employing immigrants, the Ministry modified these regulations, instructing labour offices to issue and extend work permits for unskilled jobs for a shorter period of time: up to 6 months for jobs with no GCSE requirements, up to 1 year for those requiring a GCSE certificate, and up to 2 years for jobs requiring a degree. However, the new memorandum insisted that all applicants provide official proof of their qualifications. To

obtain recognition of foreign educational qualifications in the Czech Republic involves a considerable amount of time, knowledge of procedures and paperwork, therefore many migrants may not perceive the advantage of skills recognition and do not expect the procedure to pay off in terms of matching their formal education to a job in the Czech Republic (Leontiyeva and Pokorná 2014).

In November 2013 the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs modified the regulations again, this time extending the maximum validity of work permits for unskilled and semi-skilled workers to 12 months. The regulations for graduate jobs remained the same, but proof of qualifications was now only required for new work permits, not for the extension of existing ones. In June 2014 the Czech Republic introduced the employee card as a new type of permit for long-term residence where the purpose of stay is employment (see Chap. 7 for a comparison with the single permit introduced in Poland). This card replaced the long-term residence permit (visa) for the purpose of employment and is valid for up to 2 years. The advantage of an employee card lies in its dual nature: it entitles migrants to both reside and work in the territory of the country without needing to apply separately for a residence permit and a work permit in two places. This new card entitles migrants to a limited degree of mobility in the labour market, since both change of employer and multiple jobs are possible, subject to the approval of the ministerial authorities. The employee card is intended for all types of employment, regardless of the level of qualifications required. However, jobs for which foreign employees can apply must be on the central register of vacancies that are specifically designated “suitable for foreigners” and which cannot be taken by native Czech, EU/EEA and Swiss citizens and their family members.³

Although the general decline shown in Fig. 8.1 is obvious, statistics for third-country nationals employed since 2012 are missing due to the changes mentioned at the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. Available aggregated estimates provided by the Ministry show that by the end of 2014 the number of employed Ukrainian citizens was 35,319 (MoI 2015b), which is almost the same as the number of regular employees with Ukrainian citizenship back in 2011 (35,250 people as shown in Fig. 8.1). However, given the growing number of Ukrainians with permanent residence permits who have free access to the Czech labour market (in 2011 there were 12,798 such employees), it is obvious that the number of employment permits issued to Ukrainian citizens (work permits, employment cards, green cards and blue cards) has fallen significantly since 2011. The same estimates for 2014 show that the total number of employment permits issued to all third-country nationals was less than 21,000 (MoI 2015b).⁴ This is quite a difference compared with 2011, when the number of work permits issued to third-country nationals was 36,640, of which 22,348 were issued to Ukrainian citizens (CZSO 2015). It is not entirely clear how effective the measures described above have been in boosting the employment prospects of the domestic workforce. Statistics indicating whether Czech workers subsequently filled positions for which foreigners failed to get permits are not available. As we

³This register is available on the web site of the MoLSA: http://portal.mpsv.cz/sz/zahr_zam/prociz

⁴Unfortunately these estimates are not available for Ukrainian migrants separately.

have seen, the recession did not have such a significant impact on the total number of Ukrainians residing in the country. Given the dynamic of the Czech unemployment rate, it is logical to assume that rather than combating unemployment and exclusion, the measures taken by MoLSA merely influenced the nature of Ukrainian labour migration. It is interesting to compare the situation with that of employed foreign nationals who were not subjected to these rather strict work permit regulations. According to the official numbers, the economic recession did not seem to have such an important impact on the economic activities of Ukrainians (and other third-country nationals) who had free access to the Czech labour market (holders of permanent residence permits, family members, students, etc.), or EU nationals employed in the Czech Republic. On the contrary, these groups exhibited a slight increase in numbers. Thus, the decline in direct employment of Ukrainians cannot be explained purely by staff reductions and the bankruptcy of Czech companies; rather, it seems to be strongly associated with the changing approach to regulation of the labour market (Leontiyeva 2011).

Another important change illustrated in Fig. 8.1 is the 60% growth in the officially registered entrepreneurial activities of Ukrainian migrants since 2008. In order to understand the dynamics of self-employment among Ukrainians in the Czech Republic, it is important to consider a basic fact behind these official numbers: there are different forms of irregular economic activity carried out by immigrants. In addition to the employment of immigrants without valid residence permits and/or valid work permits, there is the widespread phenomenon of employment hidden behind self-employment. In practice this means hiring the holder of a trade licence (a person who works freelance) without a contract, not only for occasional jobs but also for regular working hours. Although these “bogus employment practices” (in the Czech context often called the “Švarc system”)⁵ are actually illegal under the Czech Labour Code, they are sometimes preferred (mostly for tax reasons) not only by employers and migrants, but also by the native population. This alternative employment strategy may be preferred by immigrants because it seems a more convenient and flexible way to obtain employment avoiding rather rigid foreign labour regulations. A trade licence is relatively easy to obtain in the Czech Republic.⁶ In most cases no proof of qualification is required; and it is possible to change jobs and even to be economically inactive for a while without the threat of losing the official “purpose of stay” status. The relative flexibility of this status in the Czech context (compared with very strict regulations when it comes to the regular employment of foreigners) might seem like a great advantage, especially for unskilled workers such as cleaners, cashiers, welders, construction workers, etc. However, the great disadvantage of this hidden employment is the vulnerability of

⁵This employment practice was nicknamed after the Czech building contractor (M. Švarc), who in the early 1990s fired his employees only to re-hire them again as self-employed to avoid paying social security and health insurance taxes.

⁶Besides, before the crisis it was also relatively easy to obtain a residence permit on the basis of entrepreneurial activities.

immigrants who are not protected by the Labour Code and therefore do not enjoy job security, regular pay, adequate working conditions, sick leave, and so on.


There are no reliable data on how widespread the “Švarc system” is among Ukrainian immigrants, although several studies suggest that it may be an important strategy for a considerable share of immigrants, and not only Ukrainians (Drbohlav 2008; Hofírek and Nekorjak 2010; Leontiyeva and Nečasová 2009; Drbohlav, et al. 2010; Čermáková at al. 2011). Estimates on the “Švarc system” (like any irregular economic activities) are of course rather problematic due to the sensitive nature of the subject. However, according to the results of the survey conducted in 2010, just over 5% of economically active Ukrainians interviewed admitted that they had been employed while holding a trade licence. In the 2013 survey the share of Ukrainians admitting to the bogus employment practices mentioned above was almost 8%.⁷

8.4 Typical “Ukrainian Jobs”

Most economically active Ukrainians work in low-skilled and low-paid jobs in the Czech Republic. As we have seen, strict regulations concerning direct employment have especially targeted low-skilled immigrants working in jobs where secondary education is not a requirement. Figure 8.2 provides an interesting time comparison of the occupational status of Ukrainian employees who held work permits and those who had free access to the labour market. The occupational status of Ukrainians with free access to the labour market was fairly stable between 2004 and 2011. As suggested above, during the same period the employment of Ukrainians regulated by the state experienced striking changes.

According to official statistics, during the economic boom there was rapid growth in elementary (unskilled) occupations, but a significant decline after 2009. It seems that in the wake of the economic crisis the overall occupational status of Ukrainian nationals holding work permits has improved slightly. Later data are not available; however, a significant trend in occupational structure should be expected because of rather strict regulation of the employment of semi-skilled and unskilled migrants described above. At the end of 2011, 52% of employed Ukrainians occupied elementary jobs (ISCO 9); while 41% of them occupied semi-skilled jobs (ISCO 4–8), most often as craft and related trade workers (ISCO 7; 20%). During the same period only 7% of employed Ukrainians succeeded in securing managerial, professional or other skilled job (ISCO 1–3). When it comes to economic sectors, Ukrainians were mostly employed in construction (44%), manufacturing (21%), wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, personal and household goods (8%), and transport, storage and communications (6%) (CZSO 2015).

⁷Numbers are based on the author’s analysis of primary data from the surveys mentioned. The quality and comparability of the quota samples described (including the comparison with available statistical data) are discussed in the methodological article by Bernard and Leontiyeva (2013).



**International Standard Classification of Occupations (Major groups of ISCO)
merged into three groups according to skills requirement:**

Skilled jobs

1. Legislators, senior officials, and managers
2. Professionals
3. Technicians and associate professionals

Semi-skilled jobs

4. Clerks
5. Service and sales/shop/market workers
6. Skilled agricultural and fishery workers
7. Craft and related trade workers
8. Plant and machine operators and assemblers

Unskilled jobs

9. Elementary occupations

Fig. 8.2 Occupational structure of Ukrainian nationals with employee status (*Source: CZSO 2015*)

Unfortunately, there are no detailed data on the occupational structure of self-employed Ukrainians. The lack of official statistics is at least partly compensated by the surveys of economically active Ukrainian migrants conducted in 2010 and 2013 cited above. The 2010 data suggest that the employment status of migrants affects their chance of having a skilled job (ISCO 1–3). Regardless of age, education, origin, etc., self-employed migrants were much more likely to be in skilled jobs (as opposed to semi-skilled) than waged, employed migrants. At the same time, this survey suggests that self-employed and waged Ukrainian employees have an equal propensity toward being employed in unskilled jobs (ISCO 9) (Leontiyeva 2014a).

Data gathered in 2013, however, produced slightly different findings, suggesting that self-employment might improve the position of Ukrainian migrants on the labour market – it improves the odds of being employed not only in skilled jobs but also in semi-skilled (ISCO 4–8) as compared with unskilled jobs (ISCO 9) (Bernard and Leontiyeva 2013).

Although quantitative data available suggest that domestic work is still not very widespread among the largest group of immigrants – which is still rather dominated by men – it has become more relevant over the last decade. The involvement of migrants in care and domestic work is attracting growing attention among Czech researchers, especially with regard to the rights of female immigrants engaged in domestic work – primarily cleaning and less frequently care. A report by Ezzeddine et al. (2014) suggests that there is an increasing demand for domestic services in the Czech Republic. Exploratory research based on interviews with 105 migrant women (60% of them from Ukraine) employed in the domestic sector revealed that, unlike Filipino women, most Ukrainian domestic workers do not live at the employer's house and often have several jobs. According to this study a significant proportion of Ukrainian women working in the domestic sector are over-qualified and often come from transnational families. Since these women often leave their children back in Ukraine, they have little choice but to accept precarious work in order to be able to support their family (Ezzeddine et al. 2014). An interesting example is the campaign “Do you know who cleans your place?” initiated by a Czech NGO and aimed not only at supporting the rights of domestic workers but also at raising awareness of the phenomenon among the native population.⁸ The advertisement featured a Ukrainian teacher working as a cleaning lady, treated without respect by her employer.

8.5 Just a Low-Skilled Labour Force – or Well-Educated but Over-Qualified Workers?

Ukrainians in the Czech Republic are portrayed as well-educated but over-qualified and underpaid (Drbohlav et al. 2001; Uherek and Plochová 2003; Drbohlav and Džúrová 2007; Drbohlav et al. 2010; Ezzeddine 2012). However, recent data and available statistics might suggest a different picture. According to internal statistics from MoLSA, at the end of 2011 the educational level of employed Ukrainian citizens was in fact low, as the majority of work permit holders only had elementary education (see Table 8.1).

These detailed data gathered by the Czech labour offices until 2011 are available on demand. The data include detailed information about third-country nationals with free access to the labour market as well as work permit holders. The educational level achieved and required were reported by the employee during a work

⁸The link to this social advertisement is available on the website of the project: http://www.migrace.com/en/support/media/video/6_vite-kdo-vam-doma-uklizi

Table 8.1 Educational level of Ukrainian citizens employed in the Czech Republic in 2011

	Absolute numbers	%			
		Elementary education and less	Secondary education	Tertiary education	N/A
Work permit holders	31,407	61.8	35.8	2.1	0.3
Others employed without work permit	10,696	33.2	52.7	11.4	2.7

Source: MoLSA internal statistics valid for 31 December 2011

permit application process or reported by the employer based on the regulations concerning the employment of third-country nationals (those with free access to the labour market). In most cases labour offices did not require proof of the migrant's qualifications (diploma or certificate), i.e. the data was based on their declaration or self-reporting. Despite these shortcomings, it is logical to expect these unique data to show relatively high validity. This is due to the fact that the results of this reporting had a direct impact on the migrant's official status and his or her employment (especially for work permit holders).

According to available sample surveys, the share of university graduates among directly employed Ukrainians varies between 10% and 13%, while around five or six in ten of Ukrainian employees have not completed secondary education (Horáková and Čerňanská 2001; Leontiyeva and Nečasová 2009; Leontiyeva and Tollarová 2011; Bernard and Leontiyeva 2013). The share of university graduates among self-employed Ukrainians is slightly higher but still comparable (Leontiyeva and Tollarová 2011). The results of these surveys do not seem to support rather popular stereotypes of the average Ukrainian as a university-educated construction worker or cleaner.

Labour market incorporation is generally considered a precondition for the successful integration of migrants into the host society. In turn, matching the education and skills of migrants to jobs in the destination country is often used as an indicator of labour market integration (Eurostat 2010; OECD 2014). A large proportion of Ukrainian migrants have lower than secondary education but what about those who have higher educational achievements? Survey data suggest that most of those with extended schooling tend to have skilled jobs (Leontiyeva and Tollarová 2011; Leontiyeva 2014). Nevertheless, a comparison of the educational and occupational status of migrants provides evidence of a significant waste of human capital, and suggests that well-educated Ukrainian immigrants are not always successful on the labour market. The risk of over-education among Ukrainians is relatively high; every fifth Ukrainian employed occupies a position in which most other employees have significantly lower educational achievements. The finding that post-migration experience (i.e. a longer stay in the Czech Republic) might not help Ukrainian immigrants to "catch up" in terms of matching their higher educational attainment to more appropriate occupations, especially when the starting point is at the bottom of the labour market, is also alarming. Institutional obstacles to labour mobility through work permit regulation may lower the expectations of immigrants and slow their integration into the Czech Republic. The reality that Ukrainians more often

than, for example, Russian or even Vietnamese migrants occupy unskilled jobs cannot be explained by the individual characteristics of these immigrants, or their less stable legal status and lower educational level. Detailed analysis of the data from surveys conducted in 2006 and 2010 showed that having Ukrainian citizenship increases the migrant's risk of being over-educated and occupying the least prestigious jobs compared with other frequently found nationalities with the same characteristics (Leontiyeva 2014).

8.6 Temporary Labour Migrants or Future Largest National Minority?

There is no straightforward answer to whether Ukrainian immigrants want to settle down in the Czech Republic, bring their families, and limit contact with the destination country to a minimum. However, there are certain developments that have become rather obvious within the last decade. The share of permanent residence permit holders among Ukrainian immigrants has grown significantly, especially following the economic recession, when the Czech state limited the number of new long-term visas and work permits for Ukrainians.

Almost seven thousand Ukrainian nationals (6,656 people) received Czech citizenship between 1993 and 2013 (CZSO 2015). Previous studies suggest that many Ukrainians did not apply for Czech citizenship because they did not want to lose their Ukrainian nationality (Leontiyeva and Nečasová 2009). The Czech Republic's new citizenship law (Act No. 186/2013 Coll.), which came into force on 1 January 2014, introduces dual citizenship. Although Ukrainian law does not allow dual citizenship, the number of applications is expected to increase. According to an MoI report the number of Ukrainian citizens naturalized in 2014 was 2077, which was more than double the annual maximum in previous years (MoI 2015b).⁹

Certain features of Ukrainian immigration support the notion of transnational spaces: the geographical proximity of Ukraine; a high degree of separation from the nuclear family; intensive contact with the country of origin; and frequent visits back home, etc. (Drbohlav and Dzúrová 2007; Leontiyeva and Nečasová 2009). Given the relatively high degree of separation from their closest family members it is not surprising that a significant proportion of Ukrainian migrants financially support someone back home. A case study by Strielkowski et al. (2012) conducted in the region of Transcarpathian Ukraine suggests that the typical Ukrainian breadwinner is a middle-aged man from a fairly poor family, irrespective of education.¹⁰

⁹According to internal statistics from the authorized centres for compulsory exams required for citizenship application, Ukrainians also represent the vast majority of applicants in the first half of 2015.

¹⁰This exploratory study focused on immigrants in the region sending remittances and their families left back home. The results are however far from representative and could hardly be generalized to the total population of Ukrainians living in the Czech Republic.

According to a 2010 survey, approximately six in ten economically active Ukrainian immigrants, irrespective of gender, sent financial remittances to support family and close relatives between 2008 and 2010. This survey suggests that (under similar circumstances) both Ukrainian women and men face similar obligations to support their family back home, but men tend to transfer larger sums than women (Leontiyeva and Tollarová 2011; Leontiyeva 2015).

There is limited data on whether Ukrainian immigrants want to prolong their stay in the Czech Republic. The results of a 2006 survey revealed that 36% of Ukrainian work permit holders wished to stay in the country for at least five more years, while more than one-third of them were undecided about their future. Similarly, 43% did express a wish to apply for permanent residency, a status that in many respects affords them the same rights as Czech citizens, while about one-third did not express specific plans to change their residence status (Leontiyeva 2010). A later survey, conducted in 2013, showed that Ukrainian migrants expressed an even stronger tendency to plan a long-term stay in the Czech Republic: the share of economically active Ukrainian respondents who would like to stay in the country for the next 5 years was over 80%. Besides, migrants who remained in the country already had their families with them and appeared to be more integrated in terms of contact with the Czech population than the Vietnamese immigrants (Bernard and Mikešová 2014).

8.7 Conclusions

Ukrainians are the largest group among migrants in the Czech Republic. Due to geographical, cultural and historical closeness and because of the significant growth of the Czech economy and the rather liberal migration policies of the Czech state towards unskilled immigrants before the economic recession, this country offered many Ukrainian migrants not only a chance to enhance their financial status and feed their families back in Ukraine but also an opportunity to build strong ethnic networks and find a relatively comfortable new home in the European Union. In fact, in the region of Central and Eastern Europe the Czech Republic is one of the most attractive destinations when it comes to contemporary Ukrainian migration; the number of officially registered Ukrainian citizens in the Czech Republic is higher than, for example, in Poland and almost as high as in Germany (see Chaps. 1 and 7). Ukrainian migration to this country is an interesting example of transformation from the temporary foreign labour force (with rather low aspiration to settlement and very widespread transnational practices including back-and-forth migration) to one of the largest groups of settled immigrants (who put down roots in the country of destination, became settled or even naturalized and started bringing in family members). The global economic recession adversely affected Czech economic performance and had a significant impact on the country's attitude towards foreign labour. Although Ukraine's migration potential is still significant, the inflow of Ukrainians to the Czech Republic practically stopped after 2008 due to rigid

policies and practices. Although the absolute number of Ukrainian migrants officially registered in the country dropped slightly, there was no massive return of migrants.

Nowadays Ukrainians in the Czech Republic represent a very diverse group of migrants. They can be found on construction sites, in supermarkets and in cleaning services, at Czech schools and universities, in managerial positions in big companies, among owners of small businesses, and even among the winners of prizes for the best young scientists. Many of them are integrated into Czech society, especially when it comes to the second generation of immigrants. Although a considerable proportion of Ukrainians rely on ethnic networks to look for jobs and many of them occupy jobs very typical for migrants, they do not form ethnic enclaves and are not very concentrated spatially (Leontiyeva and Nečasová 2009; Valenta 2012; Bernard and Mikešová 2014).

More in-depth research is needed to answer many outstanding questions.

- How has the economic recession influenced the migration patterns of Ukrainians?
- Will the new state regulations have an impact on transnational practices of Ukrainian nationals and their preferences toward settlement in the Czech Republic?
- Will a potential increase in the spatial concentration of Ukrainians result in ghettoization in the future?
- What is the role of ethnic economies and family migration on the integration of Ukrainian immigrants?
- What is the integration potential of the second generation of Ukrainian immigrants in the Czech Republic?

Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, duplication, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included in the work's Creative Commons license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory regulation, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or reproduce the material.

References

- Bernard, J., & Leontiyeva, Y. (2013). Cizinci jako obtížně dosažitelná populace. [Foreigners as a hard-to-reach population]. *Data a výzkum – SDA Info*, 7(1), 57–82. doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.13060/1802-8152.2013.7.1.3>.
- Bernard, J., & Mikešová, R. (2014). Sociální integrace imigrantů na rozhraní mezi dočasnou migrací a trvalým usazením. [The Socio-cultural integration of immigrants: In Between temporary migration and permanent settlement]. *Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review*, 50(4), 521–546. doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.13060/00380288.2014.50.4.107>.

- Čermáková, D., & Nekorjak, M. (2009). Ukrainian middleman system of labour organisation in the Czech Republic. *Journal of Economic & Social Geography*, 100(1), 33–43.
- Čermáková, D., Schováňková, S., & Fiedlerová, K. (2011). Podnikání cizinců v Česku: vliv struktury příležitostí. [Entrepreneurial activities of foreigners in the Czech Republic: The influence of the structure of the opportunities]. *Geografie*, 4(4), 440–461.
- Czech Statistical Office (CZSO). (2015). *Foreigners in the Czech Republic 2014*. <https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/foreigners-in-the-czech-republic-2014-x9xb72sby>. Accessed 1 Aug 2015.
- Drbohlav, D., & Džúrová, D. (2007). Where are they going?: Immigrant inclusion in the Czech Republic (A case study on Ukrainians, Vietnamese, and Armenians in Prague). *International Migration*, 45(2), 69–95.
- Drbohlav, D., & Lachmanová, L. (2008). Irregular activities of migrants in the Czech Republic: A delphi study about adaptations in a globalising economy. In P. Dostál (Ed.), *Evolution of geographical systems and risk processes in the global context* (pp. 129–156). Prague: Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Science.
- Drbohlav, D., Janská, E., & Šelepová, P. (2001). Ukrajinská komunita v České republice. [Ukrainian community in the Czech Republic.]. In T. Šišková (Ed.), *Mensiny a migranti v České republice: My a oni v multikulturní společnosti 21. století* (pp. 89–97). Praha: Portál.
- Drbohlav, D., Medová, L., Čermák, Z., Janská, E., Čermáková, D., & Džúrová, D. (2010). *Migrace a (i)migranti v Česku. Kdo jsme, odkud přicházíme, kam jdeme?* [Migration and (i)migrants in the Czech Republic. Who we are, where do we come from, where are we going?]. Praha: Slon.
- Eurostat. (2010). Demography report. Commission staff working Document. European Commission: Eurostat. ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=6824&langId=en. Accessed 01 Aug 2015.
- Ezzeddine, P. (2012). Mateřství na dálku. Transnacionální mateřství ukrajinských migrantek v České republice. [Long distance motherhood. Transnational motherhood of Ukrainian migrants in the Czech Republic]. *Gender, rovné příležitosti*, 13(1), 24–32.
- Ezzeddine, P. et al. (2014). *Migrantky a nájemná práce v domácnosti v České republice*. [Female migrants and domestic work in the Czech Republic.]. Praha: Sdružení pro integraci a migraci. http://www.migrace.com/docs/140925_vysledky-vyzkumu-najemne-prace-v-domacnosti-v-cr.pdf. Accessed 1 Aug 2015.
- Ezzeddine-Lukšířková, P., Kocourek, J., & Leontiyeva, Y. (2006). *Internal restrictions on the participation of the Vietnamese and Ukrainian ethnic groups on the Czech labour market*. Prague: International Organization for Migration. https://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/gdn/rrc/RRCV_53_paper_01.pdf. Accessed 1 Aug 2015.
- Hofřík, O., & Nekorjak, M. (2010). Od pásu ke stánku - a zpět? Proměny ekonomických aktivit Vietnamců v České republice. [From the production line to the market stand and back? Transformation of economic activities of the Vietnamese in the Czech Republic.]. In R. Trbola & M. Rákoczyová (Eds.), *Vybrané aspekty života cizinců v České republice* (pp. 77–94). Praha: Výzkumný ústav práce a sociálních věcí.
- Horáková, M., & Čerňanská, D. (2001). *Zaměstnávání cizinců v České republice. Část II. Závěrečná zpráva z empirického šetření*. [Employment of foreigners in the Czech Republic. Part II. Final report from an empirical investigation.]. Praha: Výzkumný ústav práce a sociálních věcí. <http://praha.vupsv.cz/Fulltext/zamci2.pdf>. Accessed 1 Aug 2015.
- Horáková, M., & Drbohlav, D. (1998). Mezinárodní migrace pracovních sil a Česká republika se zvláštním zaměřením na pracovní migraci Ukrajinců. [International migration of labour force and the Czech Republic with a special emphasis on labour migration of Ukrainians]. *Demografie*, 40(1), 27–38.
- Janská, E., & Drbohlav, D. (2001). Reemigrace volyňských a 'černobylských' Čechů [Re-emigration of Czechs from the Volyn and Chernobyl]. In T. Šišková (Ed.), *Mensiny a migranti v České republice* (pp. 107–115). Praha: Portál.
- Leontiyeva, Y. (2005). Minority organizations as possible mediators for civic participation of migrants. The example of Ukrainians in Czech Republic. In H. Rusu & B. Voicu (Eds.), *Perspectives on the European postcommunist societies* (pp. 47–56). Sibiu: Psihomedica.

- Leontiyeva, Y. (2010). Good for one and all! Does the Czech economy make efficient use of non-EU labour migrants? *Socioweb*, 7–8/2010, 17–21. http://www.socioweb.cz/upl/editorial/download/181_pdf%202010%2007%2008.pdf. Accessed 1 Aug 2015.
- Leontiyeva, Y. (2011). Imigranti v ČR – žádaní a nechtění. Současné migrační a integrační politiky v ČR. [Immigrants in the Czech Republic – demanded and unwanted. Current migration and integration policies in the Czech Republic]. In M. Rákoczyová & R. Trbola (Eds.), *Institucionální podmínky sociální integrace cizinců v ČR I* (pp. 13–36). Brno: Barrister & Principal.
- Leontiyeva, Y. (2014). The education–employment mismatch among Ukrainian migrants in the Czech Republic. *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, 3(1), 63–84.
- Leontiyeva, Y. (2015). Kdo jsou ukrajinští migranti, kteří posílají peníze do zahraničí? Analýza faktorů ovlivňujících posílání peněžních remitencí [Who are those Ukrainian immigrants sending money abroad? The analysis of factors influencing the remittance behaviour]. In D. Drbohlav (Ed.), *Ukrajinská pracovní migrace v Česku: migrace – remittance – (rozvoj)* (pp. 185–200). Praha: Univerzita Karlova v Praze, Nakladatelství Karolinum.
- Leontiyeva, Y., & Nečasová, M. (2009). Kulturně blízcí? Integrace přistěhovalců ze zemí bývalého Sovětského svazu. [Culturally close? Integration of immigrants from the Ex-Soviet Union countries.]. In M. Rákoczyová & R. Trbola (Eds.), *Sociální integrace přistěhovalců v České republice* (pp. 117–160). Praha: Sociologické nakladatelství.
- Leontiyeva, Y., & Pokorná, A. (2014). *Faktory bránící využití kvalifikace imigrantů na trhu práce v ČR. Výzkumná zpráva*. [Factors hindering the use of immigrants' skills on the Czech labour market. Research report] Praha: Multikulturní centrum. <http://www.mkc.cz/data/kvalifikace-final.pdf>. Accessed 1 Aug 2015.
- Leontiyeva, Y., & Tollarová, B. (2011). *Results from a survey of foreigners' incomes, expenditures and remittances. Main findings concerning remittances*. Prague: Institute of Sociology. http://www.soc.cas.cz/sites/default/files/soubory/immigrants_2010_-_report.pdf. Accessed 1 Aug 2015.
- Lupták, M., & Drbohlav, D. (1999). *Labour migration and democratic institutions in the Czech Republic (on the Example of Ukrainian Workers)*. Research report for NATO under Democratic Institutions individual fellowship program 1995/1997. Prague. <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/97-99/luptak.pdf>. Accessed 1 Aug 2015.
- Markus, V. (1994). Ukrainians in the Czech and Slovak Republic. In A. L. Pawliczko (Ed.), *Ukraine and Ukrainians throughout the world: The demographic and sociological guide to the homeland and its Diaspora* (pp. 147–156). Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Ministry of the Interior (MoI). (2015a). Cizinci s povoleným pobytem. [Foreigners with valid residence permit]. <http://www.mvcr.cz/clanek/cizinci-s-povolenym-pobytem.aspx>. Accessed 1 Feb 2016.
- Ministry of the Interior (MoI). (2015b). Zpráva o situaci v oblasti migrace a integrace cizinců na území České republiky v roce 2014. [Report on the situation in the area of migration and integration of foreigners on the territory of the Czech Republic in 2014]. <http://www.mvcr.cz/clanek/zprava-o-situaci-v-oblasti-migrace-a-integrace-cizincu-na-uzemi-ceske-republiky-v-roce-2014.aspx>. Accessed 1 Aug 2015.
- Nekorjak, M. (2006). Klientský systém a ukrajinská pracovní migrace do České Republiky. [Client system and Ukrainian labour migration to the Czech Republic]. *Sociální studia*, 1/2006, 89–109.
- Nekorjak, M. (2007). *Úvahy nad neregulérní migrací se zaměřením na ukrajinskou migraci v Česku*. [Some reflections on irregular migration with a focus on Ukrainian migration to the Czech Republic]. IVIRIS Working Papers. Brno: Institut pro výzkum integrace a reprodukce společnosti.
- Nosková, H. (1999). *Návrat Čechů z Volyně. Naděje a skutečnost let 1945–1954*. [The return of Czechs from the Volyn region. Hope and reality]. Praha: Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR.

- OECD. (2014). *International migration outlook 2014. Special focus: Mobilising migrants' skills for economic success*. OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/migr_outlook-2014-en. Accessed 1 Aug 2015.
- Strielkowski, W., Glazar, O., & Weyskrabová, B. (2012). *Migration and remittances in the CEECs: A case study of Ukrainian labour migrants in the Czech Republic*. Prague: IES Working Paper 19/2012, Charles University.
- Trlifajová, L. (2009). *Proměny současné ukrajinské imigrace. Role a formy identity v kontextu vývoje ukrajinské migrace do Česka. Diplomová práce*. [The change in Ukrainian immigration. The role of identity and its different forms in the context of transformation of Ukrainian migration to the Czech Republic. Master's Diploma Thesis] Praha: Univerzita Karlova v Praze, Filozofická fakulta.
- Uhrek, Z., & Plochová, K. (2003). Migration from the former Soviet Union to the Czech Republic: Comparing the cases of resettlers from areas affected by the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, Kazakhstan and labour migration from subcarpathian Ukraine. In D. Torsello & M. Pappová (Eds.), *Social networks in movement: Time, interaction and interethnic spaces in central eastern Europe* (pp. 211–227). Šamorín/Dunajská Streda: Forum Minority Research Institute.
- Uhrek, Z., Valášková, N., Bělohorská, K., & Mušinka, M. (2008). Pracovní migrace ze Zakarpatské Ukrajiny do České republiky. [Labour migration for the sub-carpathian Ukraine to the Czech Republic]. In Z. Uhrek, Z. Korecká, T. Pojarová, et al. (Eds.), *Cizinecké komunity z antropologické perspektivy: vybrané případy významných imigračních skupin v České republice* (pp. 121–148). Praha: Etnologický ústav AV ČR.
- Valášková, N., Uhrek, Z., & Brouček, S. (1997). *Aliens or one's own people. Czech immigrants from the Ukraine in the Czech Republic*. Praha: Etnologický ústav AV ČR.
- Valenta, O. (2012). Cizinci v Praze: prostorová koncentrace Slováků, Ukrajinců a Vietnamců. [Foreigners in Prague: The spatial concentration of Slovaks, Ukrainians and Vietnamese]. In M. Ouředníček & J. Temelová (Eds.), *Sociální proměny pražských čtvrtí* (pp. 92–115). Praha: Academia.
- Zilinskyj, B. (1995). *Ukrajinci v Čechách a na Moravě (1894) 1917 – (1945) 1994*. [Ukrainians in Czech and Moravian lands (1894) 1917 – (1945) 1994]. Praha: X-Egem.
- Zilinskyj, B. (2000). *Ukrajinci v českých zemích v letech 1945–1948*. [Ukrainians in Czech lands during 1945–1948]. Praha: Ústav pro soudobé dějiny Akademie věd ČR.
- Zilinskyj, B. (2002). *Ukrajinci v českých zemích po roce 1989*. [Ukrainians in Czech lands after 1989]. Praha: Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR.
- Zilinskyj, B., & Kočík, R. (2001). Ukrajinci v ČR. [Ukrainians in the Czech Republic]. In T. Šišková (Ed.), *Menšiny a migranti v České republice: My a oni v multikulturní společnosti 21. století* (pp. 81–88). Praha: Portál.

Chapter 9

Ukrainian Migration to Greece: from Irregular Work to Settlement, Family Reunification and Return

Marina Nikolova and Michaela Maroufouf

9.1 Introduction: Volume and Dynamics of the Flow of Ukrainian Migrants to Greece Over the Last Two Decades

Although Greece was not a key destination for Ukrainian migrants, it was among the first EU member states to receive immigrants in the mid-1990s, just after the relaxation of the exit visa regime in Ukraine. Ukrainian immigration to Greece in the 1990s followed patterns similar to those of other former communist states, driven by broadly similar factors. The most important pull factor was the demand for cheap labour in the informal sector combined with the restrictive migration policies of Western European countries (Castles and Miller 2003). Since 2007 the inflow of Ukrainian migrants to Greece has diminished and there is a tendency towards return (see Table 9.1). These trends have been intensified by the economic crisis.

According to the 2011 census, 17,008 Ukrainians were resident in Greece, making up 2% of the total third-country national population (712,879) yet they constitute the fourth-largest third-country national population after Albanians, Pakistani and Georgians. Nikolova and Maroufouf (2010) identify three periods of Ukrainian migration to Greece. In the first period (1991–1998), which begins with Ukraine's declaration of independence and Greece's first Migration Law, the character of migration changes, as well as the reasons behind it; while before 1991 it was mainly for ethnic (repatriated Greeks from the region of Crimea, see for example Voutira 1991, 2006) or family reunification reasons, a new and more numerous flow con-

M. Nikolova (✉) • M. Maroufouf

Department of Social and Educational Policy, University of Peloponnese, Corinth, Greece
e-mail: marinaniki@gmail.com; maroufouf@uop.gr

Table 9.1 Valid stay permits held by Ukrainian nationals in Greece, 2005–2012

Nationality/Year	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Ukrainians	20,854	22,295	22,995	22,210	22,178	21,523	20,959	16,698

Source: Greek Ministry of Interior, Nikolova 2013

sisted mainly of labour migrants after 1991. Then, Ukrainian migrants were generally employed in the informal labour market as domestic workers. The most common method of arrival in Greece was to obtain a tourist visa and overstay, thus living and working in the host country irregularly. The second period (1998–2007) is characterized by the implementation of a number of regularization programmes which enabled those Ukrainians living and working in the country without residence permits to regularize their status and obtain stay permits; the third period (since 2007) marks the end of the regularization programmes and the onset of the economic crisis, which has boosted return migration as is shown by the triangulation of the available statistical data, interviews with stakeholders and migrants, and academic research (Nikolova 2015a, b; Nikolova and Maroufouf 2010; Levchenko et al. 2010). According to Eurostat data on the number of family reunification stay permits issued in different European member states, in 2013 Ukrainians received the greatest share of those permits in Greece.

Family reunification and long-term residence permits are considered to be among the most significant legislative provisions for both the mobility and temporality of Ukrainian migration to Greece (Nikolova 2014). A turning point in the legislation, which facilitated the mobility of Ukrainian nationals and motivated them to regularize their status, was the possibility of family reunification introduced by Presidential Decree 131/2006.¹ Under this decree, some 1,317 permits had been issued to Ukrainian nationals for family reunification purposes by the end of 2011 (796 to women and 521 to men) (Nikolova 2013). Furthermore, the long-term residence permit gives people in vulnerable situations – be it through unemployment or for family reasons – the option of returning to Ukraine, while keeping open the option to come back to Greece legally (Nikolova 2015a). According to a qualitative study, those Ukrainians who managed to obtain a long-term residence permit after 2007 (in 2011 the total number was 1,950) claimed that this facilitated their return and reintegration in Ukraine. These were mainly families, who tended to return for economic or emotional reasons, and elderly women, who usually returned for family reasons (Nikolova 2015). The economic environment in Greece and the armed conflict which started in 2014 in Ukraine makes return problematic for many migrants, however.

¹Harmonization of Greek legislation with Directive 2003/86 / EC on the right to family reunification.




Fig. 9.1 Ukrainian population in Greece by gender (2002–2013) (Source: Labour Force Surveys, Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT))

9.2 Migrants' Socio-demographic Profiles

Census data provide the most comprehensive picture of the migrant population. Census and the Labour Force Survey (LFS) data show that between 2001 and 2013 women made up between 72 and 91% of the Ukrainian population of Greece (see Fig. 9.1). Although there was a small but steady increase in the number of men, especially in 2007 and 2009, a rapid decrease can be observed over the last 6 years, due to the sharp decline in the construction sector, where the men were mainly employed, caused by the economic crises (Nikolova and Maroufouf 2010). Figure 9.2 shows clearly that Ukrainian migration to Greece is highly feminized (for more discussion on the implications of feminized migration, see Chaps. 5, 6 and 10).

Unsurprisingly, the majority of Ukrainians in Greece belong to the most productive age groups. According to the 2001 and 2011 censuses, over 90% of the Ukrainians residing in the country were part of the active population (15–65 years of age) while more than half were between 20 and 45 years old (Nikolova and Maroufouf 2010) (see Fig. 9.2).²

The educational level of Ukrainian immigrants in Greece appears to be particularly high, in fact substantially higher than that of the country's general population. According to data from the 2011 census, over 40% of the Ukrainians residing in the country have completed some type of post-secondary education and over 35% have completed secondary education or pre-secondary vocational training (see Fig. 9.3). Some of the available data are more reliable than others. The data pertaining to insurance and residence permits, provided by IKA (one of the largest social security organizations in Greece) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs respectively, are

²Updated with data from the 2011 census.




Fig. 9.2 Ukrainian population by gender and age group in 2011 (Source: Census 2011, Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT))




Fig. 9.3 Ukrainian population by educational level (Source: Census 2011, Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT))

reliable since they correspond to the actual number of persons who were insured or possessed a residence permit at a given time. Labour Force Survey (LFS) data, on the other hand, provide estimates on the Greek population, and the Hellenic Statistical Authority has confirmed that estimates lower than 5,000 persons must be treated as purely indicative since they are accompanied by very large standard errors.³ However, given the lack of other reliable sources of data, the LFS data does provide indications of the development of Greece's Ukrainian population. In that light it is quite difficult to estimate the size of the irregular Ukrainian population in

³ Written communication with EL. STAT., 15 June 2012.




Fig. 9.4 Ukrainian population by employment sector (Source: Census 2011, Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT))

the country – some estimates by community leaders speak of approximately 5,000–6,000 persons without documents, but estimates⁴ by the Ukrainian embassy in Greece for 2010 suggest that there were 3,000 irregular Ukrainian migrants.

A study of the number of residence permits issued between 2005 and 2012 shows a sharp decline in the number of Ukrainian permit holders in 2012. The decrease came as a result of the economic crisis, which led to income and job cuts for the Greeks; consequently migrants employed primarily in the services sectors and construction suffered job losses, reductions in working hours and pay cuts. Some of them returned to Ukraine and others fell back onto irregularity as they could not afford to renew their stay permits. In December 2011 the total number of Ukrainians holding a valid permit was 16,570, of whom 81% were women. The largest number were issued for employment purposes (7,736 in total, of which 6,257 to women and 1,479 to men). The second-largest category was for marriage with EU citizens (mainly with Greeks: approximately 5,500, of whom 5,000 were women). A significant share are the holders of long-term ten-year residence permits and a very low percentage hold permits for an indefinite length of stay (total 1,950, of whom 1,521 were women and 429 men) (Nikolova 2015a).

According to the 2011 census, Ukrainians were employed mainly in domestic work and hotel and catering services, followed by retail, motor repairs, administrative

⁴ http://www.ukrinform.ua/ukr/news/blshst_ukranskikh_trudovih_migrantv_u_grets_gotov_povernutisya_v_ukranu___mzs_952970

and support service activities, manufacturing and construction (see Fig. 9.4) (For more discussion of gender-differentiated work sectors, see Chap. 5). Generally, the Ukrainians remain in the same employment sectors with the exception of a small rise in those employed in the hotel and catering industry since 2008. In addition, according to the Labour Force Survey, Ukrainian unemployment is at a lower rate⁵ than that of both the Greek population and Greece's wider foreign population (Nikolova 2015a).

9.3 Patterns of Settlement at Destination Country

Most Ukrainians travelling to Western and Southern Europe, especially till the early 2000s, used to depart on tourist visas for their destinations, but remained to work informally and without permits to stay in the host countries after their visas expired (Baganha et al. 2004), and this has also been observed in the case of Greece. When four regularization programmes were introduced in a few consecutive years in the period 1998–2005, many Ukrainians managed to legalize their status, with most of the permits to stay being issued for employment purposes. To summarize, the first phase of Ukrainian migrants to Greece (1990–1998) generally entered using tourist visas which were later overstayed. During the second phase (1998–2004), under regularization, living and working conditions improved. However, “return to irregularity” was quite common, with many Ukrainians (between 2,000 and 5,000 people according to different sources) failing to fulfil their residence permit renewal requirements (Nikolova 2013).

The migration flow was at its height during 1997–1998 and lasted until the first years of the new millennium, though it has considerably decreased since 2011 (e.g., in 2007, 22,995 Ukrainians were living officially with stay permits in Greece, compared with 16,698 in 2012).⁶ In the late 1990s Greece was statistically one of the countries with the highest shares of legally resident Ukrainian workers. Even so, they are not as numerous as in other Southern European countries, partly because migration and labour demand in Greece is female oriented. Due to improved legal channels of communication in both the sending and the receiving country, Ukrainians are now better informed about migration routes to Greece and living conditions in the country. Nevertheless, strategies for reliable information on legal migration channels need to be supported institutionally by government and other organizations. Other key features of Ukrainian migration to Greece include the fact that the majority of migrants are holders of permits to stay; some have succeeded in obtaining citizenship; the percentage of mixed marriages is very high; and since 2006 the option

⁵In 2012 the percentage of unemployed Greeks is 22.7, the total percentage of unemployed foreigners is 31 and for unemployed Ukrainians it is 18.12% (Labour Force Survey, ELSTAT).

⁶Data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the number of stay permits in the period 2005–2012.

of a family reunion permit to stay has been used to enable children or other family members to enter the country and be reunited with their relatives (Nikolova 2013).

The main reasons for the cessation of migration from Ukraine since 2008 are: improved living conditions in Ukraine; the first signs of the coming economic crisis in Greece observed in the decreasing amount of work in the construction sector; and last but not least, more reliable and better information in the home country about the position of migrants, job opportunities and way of life in the potential host country (Nikolova 2013). Indeed, since 2009 there has been a trend among Ukrainian migrants in Greece towards returning to their home country.

Until 2010, Ukrainians had high employment rates in the domestic sector (52%), followed by retail trade and motor repairs (17.4%), hotels and catering (17.4%) and construction (10.2%). There is a steady rise in those employed in the hotel and catering industry since 2008. The number of employed Ukrainians reported in LFS statistics more or less coincides with the number who in 2007 were insured with IKA, the main social fund in Greece, which indicates that the majority of employed Ukrainians are insured. Since the introduction of long-term stay permits in 2007, almost 20% of Ukrainians have successfully applied for 10-year stay permits (Nikolova 2015a). The long-term stay permit allows them more time to plan possible future scenarios, should they lose their job in Greece.

Psimmenos and Skamnakis (2008) argue that the duration of stay of women working in domestic service depends on the economic or educational needs of their children. Many Ukrainian families worry about reintegrating their children back in the homeland if they return. The number of children attending three Sunday schools in Athens in 2013 which offer courses in the history, geography and language of Ukraine reflects a desire to feel confident about reintegrating children at school back in Ukraine (Nikolova 2014). The time taken between decision and action seems longer and the people seem to prepare themselves and their family much more thoroughly for the return to Ukraine than they did for the original migration to Greece (Nikolova 2015a).

To return to the issue of integration in the labour market, according to the study by Psimmenos and Skamnakis (2008), the lack of official papers is an important factor determining the economic activity and the absorption of immigrant women into domestic work. Studies in Greece focus on legal obstacles and insurance, and migrants' perceptions of them, because of the (until recently) very restrictive legislation on labour mobility between different sectors for migrants. At present there are no inter-governmental agreements for transfer of insurance and pension rights between the two countries. In recent years live-in domestic workers from Ukraine have been earning from €400 to 500 per month, while some young women have taken on additional jobs due to their desire for greater independence or because of their family commitments (Nikolova 2013). Most women working in the domestic sector, especially those living in, are elderly and have been doing this kind of work for a long time.

Another factor in the cessation of migration flows to Greece, in addition to the tightening visa regime and rising wages in the stabilizing Ukrainian economy, is retirement for women in their own country – not hitherto an option in Greece

(Nikolova and Maroufouf 2010). A further shift in overall migration patterns from Ukraine is that new potential migrants are often well-educated young people looking for a professional job or further education, for whom Greece would not be a target destination.

With the intensification of the financial crisis since 2010, Ukrainian men have found it harder to keep their jobs or find new ones in Greece, hence the outflow of many families to Ukraine. According to a representative of a Ukrainian community organization in Athens, seven out of ten men have returned to Ukraine and some have already moved to Russia in order to find work there (Nikolova 2013). Some families who returned to Ukraine appeared to be unable to adjust psychologically and have returned to Greece. Many of those leaving hold long-term permits to stay and are legally entitled to remain in Greece, so they have the option of trying their luck in Ukraine or returning to Greece.

According to Nikolova's (2013) research, representatives of community organizations identify a number of reasons why immigrants might be hesitant about returning to Ukraine (also see Chap. 6 for temporal aspects of migration). Psychological factors are a major part of this decision. Migrants might be reluctant to return because they have developed a new way of life in a different cultural environment and cannot imagine being able to successfully reintegrate back in Ukraine. General studies of Ukrainian migration have shown that a long stay is likely to reduce the desire to return (see Chap. 10 for a comparison with the Italian case). Moreover, as both literature and interviews conducted in Athens testify, return remains problematic while there is no suitable economic environment in Ukraine in which to find a job or start a small business.

The pattern of return migration appears to take three forms: (1) following a decision by the immigrant and/or his/her family to return using their own financial means; (2) through organized schemes such as the IOM's assisted voluntary return programme; and (3) enforced return following expulsion and deportation (Nikolova 2013). The majority of Ukrainian returnees, however, remain statistically invisible, as they are returning to their homeland using their own resources. The majority of returnees probably hold a permit to stay in Greece. Projects promoting the reintegration of Ukrainian returnees have been established, but there is not much demand for their services, so in that sense they have been unsuccessful (Nikolova 2013).

On the other hand, data from a counselling centre for potential migrants in Western Ukraine show that, between January 2006 and January 2013, there was some interest in migration to Greece, even if it was not among the top preferred destinations (Nikolova 2013). There is no evidence as to whether those interested in Greece actually ended up migrating. Over the same period 2,052 people in total requested information about Greece from the Information Centre hotline in Ternopil. Most of them were women, most live in large cities and two-thirds of them were employed. Most of them wanted to go to Greece in order to find temporary, but not seasonal work – most were interested in the fishing industry and shipping, while only a small proportion were interested in domestic work or care of the elderly or children (Nikolova 2013). It is worth pointing out that the Centre staff are not

allowed to provide any information about employment agencies, record personal details or cooperate with other agencies.

Furthermore, monitoring by the Ukrainian NGO Europe Without Barriers of EU member states' consulates in Ukraine reveals that Greek consulates have improved their practice in comparison with the past two years: the percentage of visa application rejections has fallen, there have been substantial improvements in the attitude of consular staff towards visa applicants and the average number of documents required to obtain a visa has been reduced to seven. Greece is among the top five countries for rapid processing of the documents and attracts above all "tourists", "businessmen" and "close relatives". Europe Without Barriers believes that Ukrainians are now well informed about Greece as a host country thanks to "well-organized social networks and horizontal communications", but it notes the lack of official information about legal migration channels, formal employment and way of life in the country (Nikolova 2013).

One of the most important factors with regard to Ukrainian migration is ethnic networks of family, friends and fellow countrymen. These networks, however, also include (Greek) employers, traffickers, etc. whose motives are not always altruistic (Nikolova and Marouf 2010). Social networks usually play a key role in the choice of destination for Ukrainians deciding to migrate to Greece as the initial information about the country and how to organize the trip often comes from acquaintances or distant relatives. In addition, newly arrived migrants rely on the support of relatives, acquaintances or (travel/recruitment) agencies for support with their initial settlement and search for employment. The role was even more central during the 1990s when access to information through formal channels was scarce (Nikolova 2015b).

9.4 Literature and Research Overview

Early publications in the 1990s and early 2000s referred to migrants from the ex-USSR countries in general, including Ukraine, although this research mostly focused on Greek repatriates. From the population census of 2001 and data from immigrants who submitted applications by nationality during the first regularization programme in 1998 (Baldwin-Edwards 2004; Cavounidis 2003), it became obvious that migration from Ukraine had a strongly female character. Ukrainian migration has often been examined along with migration of other nationalities in studies concerning female migration and domestic work.

A study by KETHI (Research Centre on Gender Equality) in 2007 refers to the feminization of migration; women migrate on their own, not following their husbands or families as had generally been the case during the 1980s. The author concludes that most of the immigrants arrived after 1995, were married, and had come directly to Greece without a stopover in another country. The main reasons for migration were low wages, the desire to explore other ways of life and the need to provide financial assistance to their families. The women were mainly working as

live-in domestic workers and carers for the elderly and tended to remain in the country without intending circular or temporary migration.

Kampouri (2007), in her study of Albanian and Ukrainian immigrant women, conducts discourse analysis of the legislation and Parliament speeches and concludes that the immigrant women are represented by two models: “add-ons” of the male immigrant or victims of illegal human trafficking networks. Specific research suggests that immigrants working legally or illegally as domestic workers are already an important part of the immigrant population in the country. It also focuses on the narratives of immigrant women’s daily lives as domestic workers and stresses that this economic sector lies outside official migration policies.

Psimmenos and Skamnakis (2008) explore and explain access to and use of social services, health care and education by Albanian and Ukrainian migrant domestic workers and their families. According to the authors, the majority of Ukrainians migrated to Greece on a tourist visa and the way they entered the country, as well as their lack of official papers, played an important role in determining their type of economic activity and their absorption into the domestic work sector. Informal employment and employment conditions pose an obstacle to obtaining the papers required to apply for a work permit.

Emke-Pouloupoulos (2003) studies trafficking and highlights the fact that Ukraine was one of the major countries of origin for trafficked girls and women in Greece at the beginning of the twenty-first century (see also Lazos 2002). However, according to data from the Ministry of Citizen Protection, trafficking from Ukraine for the purpose of sexual exploitation decreased between 2003 and 2007 and is currently not a cause for concern.⁷

Kaurinkoski (2008) focuses mostly on identity issues and the temporariness of stay – separating the migration paths and plans of Pontic Greeks, Mariupol Greeks and ethnic Ukrainians. The Greek repatriates have easier access to citizenship and integration programmes. The author argues that Mariupol Greeks think of themselves as temporary economic migrants, Pontic Greeks perceive themselves as Greeks, and ethnic Ukrainians perceive themselves as foreigners in Greece. Accordingly the Greek origin of some, the possibility for others of receiving Greek citizenship, and the marriages with Greeks or family reunion, have a bearing on their future plans and the duration of their stay in Greece.

Nikolova and Maroufouf (2010), while examining Georgian and Ukrainian migration to Greece, present the main demographic features of the two immigrant groups. They analyze the causes, the phases and the pathways of migration from the two countries to Greece, the presence of both ethnic groups in the Greek labour market as well as the role of gender; finally they present the main activities and functions of both communities.

In the background report for the IRMA research project,⁸ Nikolova (2013) presents a review of the main issues discussed in the literature on Ukrainian migration since the 1990s, an analysis of key informant interviews with relevant actors in both

⁷ See: <http://www.astynomia.gr/>

⁸ See: <http://irma.eliamer.gr/>

Greece and Ukraine, and relevant statistical data. The report focuses on the characteristics of the Ukrainian community in Greece and the way it has been influenced and shaped by Greece's migration management but also by the economic environment prevailing in the country that determines the working conditions, living standards, or the migrants' decision to return back to their home country. A year later (Nikolova 2015a), the author follows the main patterns and challenges of Ukrainian migration to Greece and refers to the consequences of the recent economic and social crisis in the country on migrants' lives.

9.5 Conclusions

Among the important topics to be explored are the transnational aspects of Ukrainian migration to Greece, and the impact of the Greek financial and social crisis and the strategies for coping with it; additionally, more research is required in the areas of family reunification, integration (among others also of second-generation migrants) and political participation. With regard to political participation, it should be noted that migrants' right to participate in municipal elections was introduced by Law 3838/2010, but 3 years later it was withdrawn by the Greek State Council Decision No. 460/2013. The Decision stipulates that the right to vote and to be elected in municipal elections cannot be extended to those without Greek nationality (with the exception of EU nationals), without a revision of the relevant Constitution provisions.⁹ In this context, researchers should focus on issues related to migrants' integration and political participation, both from a qualitative and a quantitative perspective, in order to draw conclusions related to the benefits for society as a whole.

Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, duplication, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included in the work's Creative Commons license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory regulation, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or reproduce the material.

⁹<http://www.lawnet.gr/news/h-apofasi-4602013-ste-doc-antisuntagmatikes-basikes-diataxeis-tou-n-38382010-28810.html>.

References

- Baganha, M. I., Marques, J. C., & Góis, P. (2004). The unforeseen wave: Migration from Eastern Europe to Portugal. In M. I. Baganha, & M. L. Fonesca (Eds.), *New waves: Migration from Eastern to Southern Europe* (pp. 23–41). Metropolis-Portugal.
- Baldwin-Edwards, M. (2004). *Statistical data on immigrants in Greece: An analytic study of available data and recommendations for conformity with European Union standards*. Final report. Athens: Mediterranean Migration Observatory.
- Castles, S., & Miller, M. J. (2003). *The age of migration*. Houndmills/Basingstoke/Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cavounidis, J. (2003). Gendered patterns of migration to Greece. *The Greek Review of Social Research*, 110, 221–238.
- Europe Without Barriers. (2014). EU-Ukraine Enhanced Visa Facilitation Agreement: How are the main provisions implemented by the EU consular establishments (infographics). <http://novisa.org.ua/en/ugoda-pro-sproshhennya-oformlennya-viz-mizh-ukrayinoyu-ta-yes-stan-vikonannya-diyuchih-pravovih-norm-infografika/>. Accessed 1 Nov 2014.
- Kampouri, E. (2007). *Gender and migration, second volume: The everyday life of the immigrant women from Albania and Ukraine*. Gutenberg (in Greek).
- Kasimati, K., & Mosourou, L. (2007). Gender and migration: theoretical issues and empirical investigation, vol. B'. Centre for Social Morphology & Social Policy, Gutenberg (in Greek).
- Kaurinkoski, K. (2008). Migration from Ukraine to Greece since Perestroika: Ukrainians and returning ethnic Greeks. Reflections on the migration process and on collective identities. *Migrance*, 31, 71–86.
- KETHI Research Centre on Gender Equality. (2007). Female migration in Greece: The findings of KETHI's Pan-Hellenic research. (in Greek).
- Kostiuk, L. (2010). *Migration in Ukraine: Reasons, legitimacy and consequences for society*. Ternopil: National Pedagogical University. (in Ukrainian). <http://dspace.tnpu.edu.ua/bitstream/123456789/1340/1/KOstyuk.pdf>. Accessed 30 Mar 2013.
- Lazos, G. (2002). *Prostitution and transnational trafficking in modern Greece, vol. 1: The prostitute*. Athens: Kastaniotis Publications (in Greek).
- Levchenko, K., Malynovska, O., Shvab, I., & Trofymenko, O. (2010). *Ukrainian Greece: Reasons, problems, prospects* (According to the labour migrants' interview results). Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine and International Women's Rights Centre La Strada Ukraine.
- Nikolova, M. (2013). Background report: Ukrainian migration in Greece: There and back again and straight ahead for one more time, Deliverable 2.1, IRMA Project Governing Irregular Migration. <http://irma.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/IRMA-Background-report-UKRAINE.pdf>
- Nikolova, M. (2015a, December). Ukrainian migration to Greece: Patterns and challenges of remaining and of return. *Central and Eastern European Migration Review (CEEMR)*, 4(2), 107–120. http://ceemr.uw.edu.pl/sites/default/files/CEEMR_Vol_4_No_2_Nikolova_Ukrainian_Migration_to_Greece.pdf.
- Nikolova, M. (2015b). The dynamics of Ukrainian migration to Greece: Routes, decisions, practices, Deliverable 7.1, Case Study: Migration System 2, IRMA Project Governing Irregular Migration.
- Nikolova, M., & Maroufouf, M. (2010). Georgian and Ukrainian immigrants in Greece. In A. Triandafyllidou & T. Maroukis (Eds.), *Immigration in Greece in the 21st century*. Kritiki: Athens (in Greek).
- Psimmenos, I., & Skamnakis, G. (2008). *Migrant domestic workers and social protection: The case of the women from Albania and Ukraine*. Athens: Papazisis (in Greek).
- Rovenchak, O. A., & Volodko, V. (2010). *Ukrainian labour migrants in Greece* (Gender Aspect), West Analytic Group. <http://www.zgroup.com.ua/article.php?articleid=3491>. Accessed 9 July 2013.
- Voutira, E. (1991). "Pontic Greeks Today: Migrants or Refugees?", The Odyssey of the Pontic Greeks. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, special issue, 4(4): 400–420.
- Voutira, E. (2006). Post-Soviet Diaspora politics: The case of the Soviet Greeks. *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 24(2), 379–414.

Chapter 10

Migration of Ukrainian Nationals to Italy: Women on the Move

Francesca Alice Vianello

10.1 Introduction

Historically Italy has been a country of outward migration. Until the 1970s Italians emigrated to Northern Europe, the Americas and Australia (Monticelli 1967). The year that symbolizes the transformation of Italy from a country of emigration to one of immigration is 1981, when for the first time the census registered positive net migration. Following the oil crisis of 1973 Italian emigration reduced drastically and instead, inflows started to grow. This does not mean that immigration to Italy began because of the oil crisis. As noted by Colombo and Sciortino (2004), Italy was already a destination for some migratory movements, such as the seasonal immigration of Tunisian men in Sicily and female immigration from East Africa – linked to Italy by its colonial past – and from the Philippines (Marchetti 2014).

In the 1980s and 1990s, Italy was an important destination for migrants from North Africa, especially from Morocco but also from Egypt, the former Yugoslavia and Albania. Finally, in the second half of the 1990s Italy became one of the most important destinations for Eastern European migrants: Romanians, Poles, Ukrainians and Moldovans.

This chapter describes the main characteristics of Ukrainian migration to Italy and the major studies of this migratory process, one which is characterized by the key role of middle-aged women. Ukrainian migration is contextualized within Italian migration as a whole and analyzed in terms of its main socio-demographic features: gender, age, education, entry route, participation in the Italian labour market and geographical settlement. The most detailed and interesting studies of Ukrainian migration to Italy are also discussed. The majority of them are PhD theses investigating women's migratory trajectories, transnational motherhood, care

F.A. Vianello (✉)
University of Padua, Padua, Italy
e-mail: francescaalice.vianello@unipd.it

chains, global families and migrants' incorporation in the domestic and care sector. Thereafter, the most typical profiles of Ukrainian migrant women living and working in Italy will be illustrated – “the migrant in transit” and “the permanent migrant” – in order to show the plurality of migration patterns and the role of structural constraints, but without losing sight of migrants' subjectivity. The chapter concludes with some considerations on future development of research on the Ukrainian presence in Italy.

10.2 Facts and Figures of the Ukrainian Presence in Italy

The most striking characteristic of immigration to Italy is its heterogeneity. The top three national groups currently are Romanians, Moroccans and Albanians, followed by Chinese, Ukrainians, Filipinos, Indians, Moldovans, Bangladeshis and Peruvians. These communities have different gender compositions. In one group – Moroccans, Albanians, Indians and Bangladeshis – there is a clear male preponderance. On the other hand there are migratory movements predominantly composed of women, such as Ukrainians, Filipinos and Moldovans. Finally, the Romanian and Chinese populations are gender balanced (see Table 10.1).

Since 1981, the number of foreign residents has increased from just over 200,000 to five million, a 25-fold increase. On 31 December 2014, the foreign population was 5,014,437 (Istat 2014a), that is, 8.3% of the total Italian population, a proportion that is similar to and in some cases even higher than that of traditional immigration countries, such as Germany, the UK and France. The number of foreign nationals has more than tripled compared to 2001. This increase is due both to new immigration and births, because the children of foreign citizens are recorded according to their parents' nationality.

Table 10.1 Resident foreign population in Italy by gender and citizenship, 31 December 2014 (Top ten national groups)

	Male	Female	Total
Romania	487,203	644,636	1,131,839
Albania	254,622	235,861	490,483
Morocco	243,052	206,006	449,058
China	135,447	130,373	265,820
Ukraine	47,393	178,667	226,060
Philippines	733,320	94,918	168,238
India	88,838	58,977	147,815
Republic of Moldova	49,929	97,459	147,388
Bangladesh	81,185	34,116	115,301
Peru	45,653	64,015	109,668

Source: Istat 2014a, <http://demo.istat.it/str2014/index.html>





Fig. 10.1 Resident Ukrainian population on 1 January, time series Source: Istat 2015, http://dati.istat.it/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=DCIS_PERMSOGG1

Although contemporary Ukrainian migration to Italy started in the second half of the 1990s, it has only been statistically registered since the general immigration amnesty of 2002. Indeed, though in 2003 Istat (the Italian National Institute of Statistics) estimated that a mere 12,730 Ukrainian citizens were resident in Italy, by 2004 the number of Ukrainian residents had rapidly increased to 57,971 (see Fig. 10.1).

Since 2003 the number of Ukrainians living in Italy has increased year on year (Fig. 10.1), with some peaks coinciding with the regularization programmes implemented by Italy in 2009 and 2012 (Ambrosini 2013). As of 2015, 226,060 Ukrainian citizens are resident in Italy. They make up 6% of all non-EU citizens legally present in Italy, and are the fourth-largest national group. More than one million of the 3.8 million non-EU citizens come from the European continent. Ukrainians are the second-largest European community, after Albanians. However, from a socio-demographic point of view, the Albanian and Ukrainian communities are very different. Albanians began to arrive first, in the early 1990s, and their gender composition is slightly weighted in favour of men, with 54%. Ukrainians, on the other hand, arrived later and their gender composition is strongly weighted the



Map 10.1 Ukrainian settlement in four Italian regions (Source: Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali 2013)

opposite way, with 80% being women. Thus the first characteristic of the Ukrainian community is the strong prevalence of women.

The age composition is also noteworthy. The average age is 42.2 years, which is much higher than non-EU immigrants as a whole, whose average age is 31. The largest age groups are 45–49 (11.7% vs 8% of non-EU immigrants), 50–54 (15.2% vs 5.9%), 55–59 (12% vs 3.8%) and 60 and over (11% vs 4.9%). Furthermore, if we disaggregate these data by gender we can see that the women are, on average, older than the men. 40% of Ukrainian women are aged between 50 and 64, while 55% of Ukrainian men are under 34 (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali 2013). Moreover, among the Ukrainians living in Italy, minors are only 9% of the total in contrast to 24.1% among the non-EU migrants as a whole. The majority of young Ukrainians living in Italy are adolescents attending high school (7996 students in the 2012/2013 school year) (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali 2013). Thus, the second feature of the Ukrainian community in Italy is that it is chiefly composed of middle-aged women.

52.9% of Ukrainians live in northern Italy, in particular in Lombardy (47,759 or 21.3%) and in Emilia Romagna (31,000 or 13.8%). However, there are also very significant settlements in central and southern Italy: 24,608 Ukrainians live in Lazio (11%) and 41,511 in Campania (18.5%). The cities with the highest concentration of Ukrainian citizens are: Naples (Campania), Milan (Lombardy), Rome (Lazio), Brescia (Lombardy) and Salerno (Campania). So the geographical distribution of Ukrainian settlement is the third feature of this migratory flow, since it is strongly concentrated in certain regions and in certain cities that are situated at opposite ends of the country, Lombardy in the north and Campania in the south (see Map 10.1) (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali 2013).

Levels of education among Ukrainian immigrants are quite high in comparison with other immigrants from non-EU European countries. 70% have at least secondary-level education, and 22% have also completed tertiary-level education, while only 12% of the other non-EU European immigrants have reached this level (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali 2013).

The majority of Ukrainians hold a permit to stay for work reasons (almost 71%), with family representing only 26.8% (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali 2013). In 2013, 66.2% of Ukrainian migrants of working age were employed, 13.1% were unemployed and 23.1% were inactive. In spite of the economic crisis, their unemployment rate was lower than the average of non-EU immigrants as a whole (18%) (Direzione generale dell'Immigrazione e delle politiche di integrazione 2014). Their good performance in the labour market is due to the fact that the majority of Ukrainians are employed in the service sector, which has been less affected by the downturn than other economic sectors. Indeed, other national groups, such as Albanians and Moroccans, in which men employed in industry and construction predominate, have been the most affected by the downturn in jobs. In particular, in 2012, 48.4% of Ukrainian workers (mostly women) were employed by Italian families as care workers or domestic workers, 7.3% were employed in the industrial sector, 6% in construction and 2% in agriculture (mostly men). However, despite their good performances, Ukrainian workers are badly paid: only 22% have a monthly income higher than €1000 (vs 45% for other non-EU European immigrants) and the majority of Ukrainians are in the €751–1000 income bracket. Therefore, another important characteristic of Ukrainian immigrants is that the majority of them are employed in the care and domestic sector and earn less than €1000 per month (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali 2013) (for a discussion on the implications of gendered work sectors, see Chap. 5, and for a comparison with other countries with feminized migration, see Chap. 9).

10.3 Literature and Research Overview

The majority of the studies on Ukrainian immigration in Italy focus on female migration, given its gender composition.¹ This migration attracted the interest of many scholars, who mainly analyzed the incorporation of the labour market, with particular relevance to care and domestic work (Spanò and Zaccaria 2003; Chiaretti 2004; Mingozzi 2005; Mazzacurati 2005). However, there are also some publications on return migration, new generations' migratory projects and the discourse on children left behind as a process of migrant women's stigmatization (Sacchetto 2011).

Furthermore, female Ukrainian migration has been the subject of a great number of doctoral theses written between 2008 and 2011 and then published in books and

¹The only publication on male migration in Italy concerns the employment of Moldovan and Ukrainian migrants in the construction sector in Italy and in Russia (Morrison et al. 2013).

scientific articles. Five dissertations by the following authors are of particular interest: Ludovica Banfi, Lena Näre, the present author, Cinzia Solari and Olena Fedyuk.

Ludovica Banfi in her dissertation (2008)² compares the migration of different women, including Ukrainians, pointing out women's migratory projects, the impact of migration policies and incorporation in the workplace in Italy on transnational family life and the reorganization of the family in the face of the women's departure (Banfi 2009; Banfi and Boccagni 2011). Banfi underlines that even though the experience of transnational motherhood is shared by the majority of migrant women interviewed, such experiences are different according to the age of the mothers and children. Furthermore, she analyzes the family reorganization that occurs with the women's departure. She argues that Ukrainian families are already trained to deal with female migration, since during the Soviet period it was quite common for women to move away for study or work reasons, entrusting their children to grandmothers or other close female relatives.

Lena Näre's PhD thesis (2008)³ is based on an ethnographic research study conducted in Naples with three different national groups of domestic workers: Sri Lankan, Polish and Ukrainian (Näre 2009, 2011a, 2011b, 2013). In her work Näre stresses the negotiations and conflicts over gender/sexuality, 'race'/ethnicity, age and nationality taking place within the field of domestic work. In particular, she discusses the worker's role in the process of construction of the material, imaginary and social space of the employer's house, through the analysis of the meanings of everyday practices performed by maids and care workers, such as cooking, cleaning and caring.

My dissertation⁴ (2008) focuses exclusively on the migration of Ukrainian women to Italy, and investigates how migrant women move through the transnational space, mediating continuously between their own ambitions and external obligations, dictated both by structural processes, and by family and community social bonds (Vianello 2009; 2011, 2012, 2013b, 2013c; 2014b). I adopt the gender approach to the analysis of Ukrainian migration, showing the structural and family reasons for departure, the role of migrant social networks, work experience in the domestic and care sector and the impact of women migration on gender relations (see also Chap. 5).

Cinzia Solari's doctoral dissertation (2010a)⁵ compares two Ukrainian migratory movements: what she calls "the exile of older women to Italy" and "the exodus of entire families, led predominantly by older women, to California" (Solari 2006a, 2006b, 2010b; 2011). Solari analyzes several issues, such as: migrants' discourses

²"Female migratory processes and family transnationalism". Original title: "Percorsi migratori femminili e transnazionalismo familiare".

³"Managing households, making homes. A moral economy of migrant domestic and care workers in Naples".

⁴Francesca Alice Vianello "Migrating alone. Female practices of transnational mobility between Ukraine and Italy". Original title: "Migrando sole. Pratiche femminili di mobilità transnazionale tra Ucraina e Italia".

⁵"Exile vs. Exodus: Nationalism and Gendered Migration from Ukraine to Italy and California".

and practices with regard to their engagement in Ukrainian nation-building, the analysis of the post-Soviet transformations as a push factor for women emigration; the gender effects of post-Soviet migrations on Ukrainian society; migrant women's discourses and practices of gender identity negotiation at work; the different behaviour of the Greek Catholic Church and the Russian Orthodox Church toward Ukrainian immigrants in Italy (some of these issues are addressed further in Chap. 13).

Olena Fedyuk's PhD thesis (2011),⁶ is based on ethnographic field research among Ukrainian care and domestic workers living in Naples and Bologna. It explores how migrant women have translated the motherhood trope, giving meaning and legitimizing their migration in everyday practices, highlighting the negotiations, ruptures, coping mechanisms and continuities. To reach this objective she analyzes: the role of photographs in measuring time and maintaining connections between Ukraine and Italy; the reunification between migrants and their children; migrants' narratives of care work; and migrants' use of public spaces.

All these studies adopt the gender approach to frame Ukrainian migration, since it provides a useful instrument for the analysis of migratory patterns, the Italian labour market structure, Italian and Ukrainian care regimes and the implications of migration for power relations between men and women within families but also in the public sphere (Vianello 2013a; 2014a). Furthermore, they underline that Ukrainian immigration in Italy has to be contextualized in the processes of social and economic change that have affected both Italy and Ukraine in the last 30 years.

The political and economic transformations following the dissolution of the Soviet Union strongly affected Ukrainian women (see also Chap. 5). Migration became one of the most common solutions to cope with the tumultuous social and economic transformations occurring in Ukraine, but also one of the strategies adopted by Ukrainian women to pursue upward social mobility for their families.

In the 1990s and 2000s, the emergence of Ukrainian women's migration to Italy was matched by a demand for care and domestic workers resulting from the interplay of four social phenomena: the ageing of Italian society; the endurance in Italy of an unequal division of reproductive work according to gender; the Italian familist welfare state; and the growing participation of women in the workforce. The increase in female employment, which began in the 1970s, coincided neither with a more equal distribution of reproductive labour between men and women, nor with a transformation of the Italian welfare state. Women continued to be seen as the main caregivers of both children and elderly people, and the welfare state maintained its familistic structure, based on the male breadwinner model and characterized by cash transfers to households rather than the provision of services. As a consequence many women turned to private services to satisfy their families' care and domestic needs (Saraceno 2003; Zanfrini 2005; Bettio et al. 2006).

Italian families could rely on a cheap migrant labour force particularly suitable for working with elderly people full time, since they were white, Christian, middle-aged and alone, hence without any family obligations. Indeed, Ukrainians are

⁶“Beyond motherhood: Ukrainian female labour migrants to Italy”.

among the nationalities with the highest concentration in the care and domestic sector. After Filipino women, who have the highest degree of concentration in this sector (72.5%) come Ukrainian women (64%) (Direzione generale dell'immigrazione e delle politiche di integrazione 2012). Migrant workers therefore ensured the continuity of a care model centred on the family through the transfer of reproductive labour from the gift economy to the monetary economy (Bimbi 1999, 2014).

10.4 The Migrant in Transit

The migrant in transit is the most widespread type of Ukrainian immigrant. She is a middle-aged woman, often divorced or widowed (Vianello 2009), who left Ukraine when she was in her forties and her children were in their late teens or twenties. When she left her home country her plan was to stay abroad only for a year or two, with the aim of earning enough money to solve her economic problems at home and help her children to go to university and realize their potential. However her migratory experience in Italy goes on and on, for years, keeping her in a transitory condition or in a limbo in which she “put her life on hold until she returns to her family and will start a life again” as suggested by Fedyuk (2012: 297–298). She is strongly oriented to return, but she continuously postpones this event, carrying on living in Italy in precarious and marginal conditions (without a permit to stay; with a permit to stay but performing irregular work; working as live-in home care worker for many years).

Even if she stays in Italy for a long time (5–10 years), the narrations of the migrant in transit concerning her migratory project continue to identify return as her main goal. Thus, her behaviours, decisions, jobs, consumption and lifestyle are aimed at maximizing her earnings in order to return home soon, demonstrating loyalty to her family and fulfilling gender norms. She does not invest her energies in the improvement of her life and working conditions in Italy, since her life abroad is instrumental to the pursuit of her family interests, a realization that shapes her migratory experience. Indeed, according to Näre (2008), unlike Sri Lankan migrants, Ukrainian women do not invest in decorating their houses, since they perceive migration as a transitory moment in their life. They prefer to invest in decorating themselves or in status symbols to restore or improve their social identity.

The return is thus a myth situated at an undefined moment in the future, when the migrant in transit will have reached her economic goals, her children will be economically independent or the economic situation in Ukraine will have improved. Actually such conditions rarely come true. In particular, the Ukrainian economic and political situation has worsened year after year, despite the illusion of a visible improvement produced by the Orange Revolution (Solari 2006b). This is even more the case at this time with ongoing conflict, when the return is probably a mirage for many women. These migrants are thus in a situation of permanent instability, preventing them from either living fully in Italy or maintaining their social position in the origin country.

From the professional point of view, the migrant in transit experiences a radical process of devaluation. Even if she is well educated, highly skilled and has work experience in the education, health or administrative sectors, when she arrives in Italy she finds only low-skilled and badly paid jobs in the domestic and care sector. Usually she accepts working for many years as live-in home help or carer of elderly people without looking for another job as many migrant women do, because this allows her to save money on accommodation and board. Furthermore, working in the domestic sphere permits her to live in the shadows and to reduce the risk of being stopped by Italian police, given that during the first years of her stay in Italy she is undocumented.⁷ The live-in work is characterized by an extremely heavy workload and potentially endless working days, because of the overlap between home and place of work. Furthermore, according to Näre (2007, 2011b) the labour contract is accompanied by a moral contract based on normative notions of familial duty, reciprocity and gratitude. It means that labour relationships are transformed by both employers and employee into family-like relationships due to the locus of the work within the domestic sphere and the highly personalized nature of care work. However, the migrant in transit accepts this job, because she sees the migratory experience as just an interlude in her life. It is a “short” period of time spent far from her home country, during which it is acceptable to occupy the lowest rungs of the social ladder. According to this view, downward mobility is more admissible since if it happens in a foreign country it does not radically impact migrants’ social status (Vianello 2014a, b).

The migrant in transit identifies herself primarily as a mother, even if she has adult children and is often a grandmother (Marchetti and Venturini 2013), since she uses this social role to make sense of her migration and to legitimize her absence (Vianello 2009, 2011). Her narrations are permeated with the rhetoric of sacrifice: she is working abroad only to fulfil her “mission”, that is guaranteeing the economic well-being of her family and in particular of her children, postponing her own well-being. Indeed, according to Fedyuk’s analysis of the pictures that circulate between Ukrainian migrant mothers and their families left behind, a migrating woman has to be very cautious about selecting photographs to send home, since she has to be careful not to suggest that she has a new life abroad. The photographs should, instead, represent the migratory experience as a sacrifice and confirm the mother’s devotion to family interests. For this reason photographs usually portray the migrant woman alone, stressing emotions of solitude and nostalgia (Fedyuk 2012).

The rhetorical discourse used by the migrant in transit to explain migration is based on the idea of the brave mother, real pillar of the family and society, contrasted to that of the weak man, an idler unable to fulfil his family duties (Vianello 2009). The rhetoric of female power could be partially explained as a mix of Soviet propaganda depicting mother-workers as heroes and the post-Soviet revival of the Berekhynia myth, the ancient pagan goddess representing the “hearth mother” (see

⁷The majority of Ukrainian women arrived in Italy with a tourist visa that they overstayed. This means that they spend one or more years as irregular migrants. Usually they obtain a permit to stay through one of Italy’s amnesty programmes (Ambrosini 2013).

also Chap. 5). In both cases women are depicted as independent, powerful and family oriented, but while in the first case males are portrayed as weak, in the second case the patriarchal order is reaffirmed. The migrant in transit, according to the Soviet rhetoric, portrays herself as a heroine and her husband as a failure, but at the same time she ideologically endorses the Berehynia model. She uses this contradictory discourse to answer accusations of being a bad mother and a rebel wife, who is subverting the Ukrainian patriarchal gender order that is supported by many actors in the Ukrainian public sphere (Lutz and Palenga-Möllennebeck 2012).

The conflict between these two models is projected onto subsequent generations. Some migrants in transit seek to re-establish the gender order in the next generation, using remittances to enable their daughters to be proper mothers and wives, who stay at home with their children, and their sons to be proper men, independent and able to maintain their family (Solari 2010b; see also Chap. 5). Others seek a different future for their children, attempting to transmit to them an alternative gender model, not necessarily based on family roles (Vianello 2013a, b, c).

The migrant in transit is constrained by a dense network of obligations and pressures: maternal responsibilities, relatives' and community's expectations, Ukrainian economic and political instability and the suffocating job of home care worker. However, within this narrow horizon she finds spaces for agency and self-realization. Her migratory status offers her a powerful new personal and social identity. First of all, she exercises her power through the management of remittances, deciding how to spend money and who will benefit. She is aware of her economic power and proud of her capacity to improve the living conditions of her family left behind. This strengthens her self-esteem and enhances her social status (Vianello 2013b). Second, active participation in religious communities and ethnic associations is one of the most common practices adopted by the migrant in transit to seek fulfilment, validate her skills and distinguish herself during her stay in Italy. She devotes her free time to being leader of an ethnic association, minister of music in the church, Ukrainian language teacher in the community school for second-generation children, or journalist for small newspapers (Vianello 2014a, b). Finally, according to Fedyuk (2011), the migrant in transit does not completely renounce her romantic and sexual life. She establishes romantic and sexual relations with Italian men, without threatening her capacity to perform the idealized role of a sacrificing mother.

To conclude, the reasons why the migrant in transit's stay in Italy gets longer are multi-layered and include both economic and emotional reasons (Hochschild 2002). First of all, remittances become an indispensable income for her left-behind relatives, in particular when her children get married and have their own children. According to Banfi (2009) Ukrainian women maintain a strong "ethics of remittances" even several years after leaving. Money is destined for their children, who grow up with a high degree of dependence on remittances even after the conclusion of their education, probably because of the lack of professional opportunities in Ukraine. Second, the migrant's advanced age reduces her labour prospects in Ukraine and thus the possibility of being independent. Hence she chooses to finish her working life in Italy. She is also aware that she needs to put aside some money

for her old age, given that Ukrainian pensions are very low.⁸ Third, after many years abroad (from five to ten), the migrant in transit starts to build her identity around the figure of migrant worker and she does not really want to change her status/position in society again. In other words she is afraid to return and prefers to carry on her transnational life, since it guarantees her economic independence and power. Thus, sometimes finding new economic needs for the family left behind is a strategy to justify the extension of migration and postpone the return.

10.5 The Permanent Migrant

The permanent migrant is a woman with a stronger, more individualistic attitude, who is not willing to sacrifice her life and to work as a live-in caregiver for a long period. Thus, she can be considered a “rebel woman”, who finds a way to avoid social expectations and to undertake a new life in Italy, characterized in this case no longer by precariousness but by stability. Usually she is a little bit younger than the migrant in transit and her children are teenagers. She emigrated in her thirties in order to provide a better life for herself and her children and to escape from an unhappy marriage and/or an unsatisfying life in Ukraine (Vianello 2009).

During the early years of her stay in Italy her life and working conditions are very similar to those of the migrant in transit: undocumented and employed as live-in domestic or care worker. However, when she obtains documents her trajectory differs significantly from the migrant in transit. She abandons her initial project of short-term migration and starts looking for another job that will allow her to live away from the workplace. She usually turns to working as an hourly home helper and shares an apartment with compatriots. These choices make her working days harder, since to earn enough money to pay her expenses and continue sending remittances home, she needs to work many hours a day and for many different families, going from one house to another (Näre 2008).

Having several employers and living with other women allows the permanent migrant to enlarge and enrich her social network: she starts to select her friends, to have Italian acquaintances, even if relations are hierarchical because they are often her employers, and to distance herself from Ukrainian community social spaces, such as the Greek Catholic or Orthodox churches and ethnic associations. However, the real shift in her social and working life takes place when she finds a job outside the domestic sphere, given that she can access a wider social network and a richer social capital through her new acquaintance with Italian people. Sometimes among these new acquaintances she meets an Italian man and starts to date him.⁹

⁸The monthly average pension is now 1573 grivna (about 62 euro) (State Statistic Committee of Ukraine 2015).

⁹In 2013 there were 14,383 marriages between an Italian man and a foreign woman. The most common nationalities of women were Romanian (19.2%), Ukrainian (11%) and Brazilian (6.2%) (Istat 2014b).

Regaining her freedom and social life is not enough for a full redefinition of the migratory project. If she is not reunited with her nuclear family and in particular with her children, she continues deeply linked to Ukraine. Thus, if she really wants to re-orient her life project and settle in Italy she needs to organize family reunification. When the permanent migrant is still married this is often the moment when divorce occurs. Nevertheless, there are also cases in which the husband accepts moving to Italy.

According to Fedjuk (2011), any analysis of family reunification practices has to consider both reunification with children under 18, provided for by Italian law, and reunification with children over 18, which is arranged through other channels, such as buying a tourist visa or requesting an official workforce. In the first case, in accordance with Italian law, the permanent migrant has to fulfil income and housing requirements, while in the second case, she has to find a way to obtain a permit to stay for work or study. In both cases, great commitment from the migrant is needed to achieve the formal or informal reunification process (see also Chap. 5).

Fedyuk (2015) also points out that reunification after many years of separation does not always fulfil migrants' and children's expectations. Ukrainian teenagers can be disappointed by reunification since it changes them from the remittance bourgeoisie in Ukraine to migrant working class in Italy: even if they live with their mothers, they see little of them because they are working all day; they live in modest flats, sometimes shared with other people; they have little money to spend on their own amusement; and they realize that they do not have great opportunities for upward mobility in Italy. Furthermore, if they are not prepared to live in a multicultural society and to interact with other second-generation teenagers of different ethnic origins, they develop racist attitudes. For these reasons, many Ukrainian youths do not settle in Italy, but circulate between Ukraine and Italy. Some of them prefer to continue living in Ukraine, even if they maintain their permission to stay to visit their mothers. Others can be defined as cosmopolitans and after finishing their studies in Italy they develop transnational economic activities between Italy and Ukraine (Vianello 2013c).

To conclude, the permanent migrant is a woman who considers the option of settling in Italy, since she does not want to renounce her well-being completely. Her gaze is oriented towards the immigration country, where she wants to build a new life with her children and for this she is available to invest resources to improve her life abroad. The permanent migrant is, thus, a woman who, also due to her younger age, has risen above that dense network of social obligations and working conditions trapping the migrant in transit.

10.6 Conclusions

According to Morokvasic (2003), the post-Soviet transition has forced a great number of women to be on the move, circulating in a new migratory space and adopting different migration strategies from men. For many women, like the migrants in

transit, migration has become a lifestyle. In a sense they depart in order to stay and carry on their family project.

At the moment the Ukrainian community in Italy is still composed mainly of this category of women. However, the profile of the Ukrainian nationals will probably change in the coming years. It is seeing an increase in the number of young people, male and female, and of men, because of family reunification carried out by permanent migrants. Furthermore, given the conflict that is taking place in Ukraine we can expect a growth in the rate of immigration of young men escaping from military service and putting down roots among the Ukrainian community in Italy. Hence, in the future it is likely that: (1) the average age will fall; (2) the gender composition will be more balanced; and (3) Ukrainian citizens will perform a wider variety of jobs, in particular those belonging to the second generation.

First, future studies on Ukrainians in Italy should therefore focus on the working trajectories of women and men of the first and second generations, since it enables an understanding of the level of segregation of Ukrainian immigrants in the Italian labour market and their social mobility patterns (see also the Conclusions section in Chap. 5). To do this kind of research both qualitative and quantitative data are necessary, such as representative and longitudinal surveys and biographical interviews.

Second, another significant issue still little studied is cross-national marriages between Ukrainian women and Italian men. By analyzing practices and discourses connected to them it is possible to investigate women's agency but also the processes of racialization and sexualization of Eastern European women. In relation to this matter, it would be very helpful to analyze the media representation of cross-national marriages, but also to conduct in-depth interviews and focus groups with wives, husbands and their relatives.

Third, it would be interesting to investigate the impact of the ongoing conflict on Ukrainian migrants' grassroots organizations and the narrations produced by associations and single migrants on these issues. Here the best methodology would be ethnography.

Finally, more research is needed on the ageing of those migrants in transit who in the end do not want to or cannot return to Ukraine. What happens to these women trapped in transnational space when they get older? More accurate information could be gained on these questions by involving not only elderly migrant women but also public social and health institutions.

Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, duplication, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included in the work's Creative Commons license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory regulation, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or reproduce the material.

References

- Ambrosini, M. (2013). *Irregular migration and invisible welfare*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Banfi, L. (2008). Percorsi migratori femminili e transnazionalismo familiare. [Female migratory processes and family transnationalism]. Trento: Università di Trento.
- Banfi, L. (2009). Genere e legami familiari transnazionali Gender and transnational family ties. In R. Catanzaro & A. Colombo (Eds.), *Badanti & Co. Il lavoro domestico in Italia* Badanti & Co. The domestic work in Italy (pp. 195–218). Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Banfi, L., & Boccagni, P. (2011). Transnational family life and female migration in Italy: One or multiple patterns? In A. Kraler, E. Kofman, M. Kohli, & C. Schmoll (Eds.), *Gender, generations and the family in international migration* (pp. 285–310). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Bettio, F., Simonazzi, A., & Villa, P. (2006). Change in care regimes and female migration: The 'care drain' in the Mediterranean. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 16(3), 271–285. doi:10.1177/0958928706065598.
- Bimbi, F. (1999). Measurement, quality, and social change in reproduction time. The twofold presence of women and the gift economy. In O. Hufton & Y. Kravaritou (Eds.), *Gender and the use of time/Gender and Emploi du Temps* (pp. 151–171). The Hague: Kluwer Law International.
- Bimbi, F. (2014). Symbolic violence: Reshaping post-patriarchal discourses on gender. In M. T. Segal & V. Demos (Eds.), *Gendered perspectives on conflict and violence: Part B* (Advances in gender research, volume 18B, pp. 275–301). Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
- Chiaretti, G. (2004, ottobre–dicembre). A capo delle loro famiglie e a servizio delle nostre famiglie: i racconti di donne emigrate dall'Est-Europa At the head of their families and at the service of our families: Stories of women emigrated from eastern Europe. *Inchiesta*, 21–32.
- Colombo, A., & Sciortino, G. (2004). Italian immigration: The origins, nature and evolution of Italy's migratory systems. *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 9(1), 9–70.
- Direzione generale dell'immigrazione e delle politiche di integrazione. (2012). *Secondo rapporto annuale sul mercato del lavoro degli immigrati* Second annual report on the immigrant labour market. Rome: Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali.
- Direzione generale dell'immigrazione e delle politiche di integrazione. (2014). *Quarto Rapporto annuale sul mercato del lavoro degli immigrati*. Fourth annual report on the immigrant labour market.. Rome: Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali.
- Fedyuk, O. (2011). *Beyond motherhood: Ukrainian female labor migration to Italy*. PhD dissertation submitted to the Central European University. http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2011/fedyuk_olena.pdf. Accessed 9 Sep 2015.
- Fedyuk, O. (2012). Images of transnational motherhood: The role of photographs in measuring time and maintaining connections between Ukraine and Italy. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 38(2), 279–300. doi:10.1080/1369183X.2012.646422.
- Fedyuk, O. (2015). Growing up with migration: Shifting roles and responsibilities within the transnational families of Ukrainian care-workers in Italy. In M. Kontos & G. Tibe Bonificacio (Eds.), *In the dark: Family rights and migrant domestic work*. Submitted for publication, under contract with Palgrave.
- Hochschild, H. R. (2002). The sociology of emotions as a way of seeing. In G. Bendelow & S. J. Williams (Eds.), *Emotions in social life: Critical themes and contemporary issues* (pp. 3–16). New York: Routledge.
- Istat. (2014a). Cittadini Stranieri. Popolazione residente e bilancio demografico al 31 dicembre 2014 Italia. [Foreign citizens. Resident population and demographic balance on the 31th of December 2014, Italy]. <http://demo.istat/str2014/index.html>. Accessed 8 Sep 2015.
- Istat. (2014b). Anno 2013: Il matrimonio in Italia. [Year 2013: Marriage in Italy]. <http://www.istat.it/archivio/138266>. Accessed 8 Sep 2015.
- Lutz, H., & Palenga-Möllenberg, E. (2012). Care workers, care drain, and care chains: Reflections on care, migration, and citizenship. *Social Policy*, 19(1), 15–37. doi:10.1093/sp/jxr026.

- Marchetti, S. (2014). *Black girls. Migrant domestic work and colonial legacies*. Boston: Brill.
- Marchetti, S., & Venturini, A. (2013). Mothers and grandmothers on the move: Labour mobility and household strategies of Moldovan and Ukrainian migrant women in Italy. *International Migration*, 52(5), 111–126.
- Mazzacurati, C. (2005). Dal blat alla vendita del lavoro. Come sono cambiate colf e badanti ucraine e moldave a Padova. [From 'blat' to selling work. How Ukrainian and Moldovan care and domestic workers have changed in Padova]. In T. Caponio & A. Colombo (Eds.), *Migrazioni globali e integrazioni locali* [Global migrations and local integrations] (pp. 145–174). Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Mingozzi, A. (2005). Il lavoro domestico nel distretto faentino. Effetti di regolarizzazione sulle lavoratrici provenienti dall'ex Unione Sovietica. [Domestic work in the Faenza district. Effects of the regularization on workers from the former Soviet Union] In T. Caponio, & A. Colombo (Eds.), *Migrazioni globali e integrazioni locali* [Global migrations and local integrations] (pp. 117–144). Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali. (2013). *La Comunità Ucraina in Italia*. [Ukrainian community in Italy]. www.integrazionemigranti.gov.it. Accessed 8 Sep 2015.
- Monticelli, G. L. (1967). Italian emigration: Basic characteristic and trends with special reference to the last twenty years. *International Migration Review*, 1(3), 10–24.
- Morokvasic, M. (2003). Transnational mobility and gender: A view from post-wall Europe. In M. Morokvasic, U. Erel, & K. Shinozaki (Eds.), *Crossing borders and shifting boundaries* (Gender on the move. Vol. II, pp. 137–154). Opladen: Leske & Budrich.
- Morrison, C., Sacchetto, D., & Cretu, O. (2013). International migration and labour turnover: Workers' agency in the construction sector of Russia and Italy. *Studies of Transition States and Societies*, 5(2), 7–20.
- Näre, L. (2008). Managing households, making homes. A moral economy of migrant domestic and care workers in Naples. University of Sussex. <http://dare.uva.nl/cgi/arno/show.cgi?fid=199989>. Accessed 9 Sep 2015.
- Näre, L. (2009). The making of 'Proper' homes – Everyday practices of migrant domestic work in Naples. *Modern Italy*, 14(1), 1–17. doi:10.1080/13532940802535408.
- Näre, L. (2011a). The informal economy of paid domestic work – The case of Ukrainian and Polish migrants in Naples. In M. Bommers & G. Sciortino (Eds.), *Foggy social structures: Irregular migration and informal economy in western Europe* (pp. 67–87). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Näre, L. (2011b). The moral economy of paid domestic and care work: Migrant workers in Naples, Italy. *Sociology*, 45(3), 396–412. doi:10.1177/0038038511399626.
- Näre, L. (2013). Migrancy, gender and social class in domestic labour and social care in Italy: An intersectional analysis of demand. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 39(4), 601–623. doi:10.1080/1369183X.2013.745238.
- Sacchetto, D. (Ed.). (2011). *Ai margini dell'Unione Europea. Spostamenti e insediamenti a Oriente*. [At the margins of the European Union. Movements and settlements to the East]. Roma: Carocci.
- Saraceno, C. (2003). *Mutamenti della famiglia e politiche sociali in Italia*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Solari, C. (2006a). Professionals and saints: How immigrant careworkers negotiate gendered identities at work. *Gender & Society*, 20, 301–331. doi:10.1177/0891243205285633.
- Solari, C. (2006b). Transnational politics and settlement practices: Post-soviet immigrant churches in Rome. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 49, 1528–1553. doi:10.1177/0002764206288848.
- Solari, C. (2010a). *Exile vs. Exodus: Nationalism and gendered migration from Ukraine to Italy and California*. University of California. <https://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/2zc4v198>. Accessed 9 Sep 2015.
- Solari, C. (2010b). Resource drain vs. Constitutive circularity: Comparing the gendered effects of Post-Soviet migration patterns in Ukraine. *Anthropology of East Europe Review*, 28, 215–238.

- Solari, C. (2011). Between “Europe” and “Africa”: Building the new Ukraine on the shoulders of migrant women. In M. J. Rubchak (Ed.), *Mapping difference: The many faces of women in Ukraine* (pp. 23–40). New York: Berghahn Books.
- Spanò, A., & Zaccaria, A. M. (2003). Il mercato delle collaboratrici domestiche a Napoli: il caso delle ucraine e delle polacche [The market of domestic workers in Naples: The case of Ukrainians and Poles]. In M. La Rosa & L. Zanfrini (Eds.), *Percorsi migratori tra reti etniche, istituzioni e mercato del lavoro* [Migratory trajectories: Ethnic networks, institutions and labour market] (pp. 193–224). Milano: Franco Angeli.
- State Statistic Committee of Ukraine. (2015). *Monthly average pensions and amount of pensioner*. http://ukrstat.org/en/operativ/operativ2007/sz/sz_e/srp_07rik_e.html. Accessed 9 Sep 2015.
- Venturini, A., & Marchetti, S. (2013). Mothers and grandmothers on the move: Labour mobility and household strategies of Moldovan and Ukrainian migrant women in Italy. *International Migration*, 52(5), 111–126. doi:10.1111/imig.12131.
- Vianello, F. A. (2008). *Migrando sole. Pratiche femminili di mobilità transnazionale tra Ucraina e Italia*. [Migrating alone. Female practices of transnational mobility between Ukraine and Italy.] Padova: Università di Padova.
- Vianello, F. A. (2009). *Migrando sole. Legami transnazionali tra Ucraina e Italia*. [Migrating alone. Transnational ties between Ukraine and Italy]. Milano: Franco Angeli.
- Vianello, F. A. (2011). Suspended migrants. Return migration to Ukraine. In M. Nowak & M. Nowosielski (Eds.), *(Post)trans-formational migration* (pp. 251–274). Berlin: Peter Lang.
- Vianello, F. A. (2012). Continuità e confini tra vita pubblica e vita privata. La doppia presenza delle assistenti familiari. [Continuity and boundaries between public and private life. The double presence of the family assistants]. *AG About Gender*, 1(2), 175–203.
- Vianello, F. A. (2013a). Engendering migration. Un percorso attraverso trent’anni di dibattito. *Mondi Migranti*, 3, 49–66. doi:10.3280/MM2013-003003.
- Vianello, F. A. (2013b). Ukrainian migrant women’s social remittances: Contents and effects on families left behind. *Migration Letters*, 10(1), 91–100.
- Vianello, F. A. (2013c). A transnational double presence: Circular migrations between Ukraine and Italy. In A. Triandafyllidou (Ed.), *Circular migration between Europe and its neighbourhood. Choice or necessity?* (pp. 187–211). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Vianello, F. A. (2014a). *Genere e migrazioni. Prospettive di studio e di ricerca*. Milano: Guerini.
- Vianello, F. A. (2014b). Ukrainian migrant workers in Italy: Coping with and reacting to downward mobility. *Central and Eastern European Migration Review (CEEMR)*, 3(1), 85–98.
- Zanfrini, L. (2005). *La rivoluzione incompiuta*. Roma: Edizioni Lavoro.

Chapter 11

Migration of Ukrainian Nationals to Portugal: The Visibility of a New Migration Landscape

Maria Lucinda Fonseca and Sónia Pereira

11.1 Introduction

Immigration from Ukraine to Portugal began at the end of the 1990s with a sudden migratory movement that generated one of the largest immigrant groups in Portugal. In 1996, only 71 Ukrainian citizens were registered in Portugal. By 2002 the number had risen to 62,448. In 2014, Ukrainians were the third-largest foreign nationality in the country (after Brazil and Cape Verde). The magnitude of this sudden migration and the numeric relevance it gained as a foreign group in Portugal is unique within the migration of Ukrainians to other European countries. In other countries, for example those presented in this volume, either Ukrainian migration had a longstanding or historical relevance (Poland in Chap. 7, or the Czech Republic in Chap. 8 for example) or the recent flows never constituted such a large contingent in the destination country (Greece in Chap. 9, Spain in Chap. 12 or Italy in Chap. 10). In many of the destination countries of Ukrainian migration, women migrants are significantly in the majority (for example in Italy and Greece). This has generated important research relating to particular patterns of migrants' incorporation in the labour market (domestic service and care), transnational motherhood or trafficking. Over time, there has nevertheless been a certain trend towards increased participation of men in migration to, for example, Greece and Italy (see Chaps. 9 and 10). In Portugal, similarly to the Czech Republic, by contrast, migration was initially dominated by men with increasing numbers of women over time (see also Chap. 8).

M.L. Fonseca (✉) • S. Pereira
Centre for Geographical Studies, Institute of Geography and Spatial Planning,
Universidade de Lisboa, Lisboa, Portugal
e-mail: fonseca-maria@igot.ulisboa.pt; sonia.pereira@campus.ul.pt

The core initial mobility (mostly between 2000 and 2002) was closely related to a particularly high labour demand in the construction sector. Soon after this sudden increase, the number of Ukrainians residing legally in the country (without Portuguese citizenship) dropped significantly. Between 2004 and 2007 (due to both return and onward migration to other European countries, even though the respective numbers are difficult to quantify), the number of Ukrainians fell from 66,281 (2004) to 39,480 (2007).¹ The number registered an increase again between 2007 and 2009 (52,293 registered by SEF – Aliens and Border Service) and was followed by a new decline (in 2013: 41,091 and in 2014: 37,852). Despite the recent political instability in Ukraine the effects of the economic crisis in Portugal, which particularly affected the construction sector, seem to have had an even greater impact in terms of halting the flow from Ukraine to the country (see Fonseca et al. 2016 on the role of negative feedback in Ukrainian migration to Portugal). Since 2004 new arrivals have been mostly due to family reunifications, resulting in an increasing share of women within the Ukrainian group. More recently an increasing number of Ukrainians have acquired Portuguese citizenship (4,336 in 2013).

This chapter provides an overview of the main features of Ukrainian migration to Portugal, drawing on literature review, analysis of secondary data and original data gathered through exploratory interviews with key informants, i.e. semi-structured interviews with 32 Ukrainians residing in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area in 2011 and a survey of 306 Ukrainians in the same area conducted by questionnaire in 2012 for the THEMIS project² (for more details on the survey see Horgen Friberg and Horst 2014; Kubal et al. 2014). In addition, gaps in existing research are considered and recommendations provided for a future research agenda. The chapter starts by presenting the state of the art in the relevant research and moves on to the analysis of empirical data. First, the volume and dynamics of the migratory movement over time are examined. Second, migrants' socio-demographic profiles are presented. Third, the spatial dynamics of the migration are identified by looking at the regions of origin and destination. Fourth, patterns of settlement at destination are examined by considering legal status, labour market incorporation, social interactions, overall migration objectives and evaluation of migration outcomes. Fifth, transnational relationships with Ukraine are analyzed. The chapter concludes with suggestions for future research agendas.

¹ Data from Aliens and Borders Service (SEF): <http://sefstat.sef.pt/>.

² Research Project – Theorising the Evolution of European Migration Systems. Financial support for THEMIS from the NORFACE research programme on Migration in Europe – Social, Economic, Cultural and Policy Dynamics is acknowledged.

11.2 State of the Art: Research on Ukrainian Migration to Portugal

Studies and subsequent publications about Ukrainian migration to Portugal are as recent as the migration to the country and reflect two principal concerns that were generated by the features of the population movement mentioned above. They aim, first to understand how it was constituted so suddenly and the role of organized smugglers/traffickers in the process, and second to identify how Ukrainians are integrating in the country. This migration gradually began around the end of the 1990s, peaking in the early 2000s (2000 and 2001 in particular), and the first studies began to appear shortly thereafter. Most were empirical in nature and were intending to provide policy input more than contributing to improved theorization in migration studies.

The first comprehensive and large-scale study of Eastern European migration (mostly from Ukraine but also including other Eastern European countries: Russia, Moldova and Romania) was carried out in Portugal first in 2002 and then a follow-up in 2004 by Baganha et al. (2004, 2010). These studies offer a global overview of the main characteristics of the migratory movement, the trajectories of the migrants, their demographic and socio-economic profiles and also the patterns of their settlement in the country, including incorporation in the labour market, language fluency, civic participation and perception of discrimination felt in Portugal. A particular emphasis in these studies was on the conditions facilitating this unexpected new migration.

Following more of a theoretical concern, this topic has also more recently been studied by Fonseca et al. (2014), who pay particular attention to the role of organizations (including criminal organizations), social networks and feedback mechanisms in the constitution of such an intense and sudden flow, by drawing on the data collected for the THEMIS project mentioned above.

Another study that focused on a different feature of this migration was conducted and published by Fonseca et al. (2004) who explore the geographical dispersal of Ukrainians within the national territory. While previous migrants, largely from former Portuguese colonies in Africa, had mostly been concentrated in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area, Ukrainian immigrants settled all over the country, even in territories that had experienced very little immigration before. This was observed for example in the district of Évora, in the southern region of Alentejo, to which Ukrainian immigrants were drawn by opportunities in the local labour market. Unlike other migrant groups with a longer-standing presence in the country, Ukrainians had no significant social networks in particular regions. This absence of previous links facilitated their territorial dispersal. The authors also present a description of the demographic and socio-economic profile of the immigrants as well as the patterns of their settlement and migration trajectories. Overall, apart from its empirical findings, this study also feeds into an under-researched topic in migration studies: migration into rural areas.

Focusing on migrant trafficking, Peixoto et al. (2005) present yet another specific dimension of Eastern European (including Ukrainian) migration to Portugal, based on interviews and analysis of court cases related to trafficking for both labour and sexual exploitation as well assistance in illegal migration. In the same research the authors also examine Brazilian immigration which registered an important growth roughly at the same time as Eastern European migration. This study intended to theorize the links between migratory movements and a continuum of possible forms of “organized” migration from simple smugglers to organized criminal groups that not only organize migration but continue to operate through extortion once the migrants have found employment. In addition, by drawing on information available through the files of court cases in Portugal this research is original both in the methodology used and in the empirical data collected.

In a book published the same year, Ferreira et al. (2005) provide a more macro-structural analysis of the new Eastern European flow to Portugal and elsewhere in Europe, which also includes a characterization of trajectories and migrant profiles. This research presents a more structuralist view of how migrations are shaped by larger macro-economic contexts.

In the initial important publications regarding Ukrainian migration to Portugal referred to above, it is noteworthy that Ukrainian migration is never considered individually but always as part of a larger Eastern European group which arrived more or less at the same time and which shared common migration dynamics. The Ukrainians constituted, nonetheless and from the outset, the largest national group, by far, within this Eastern European contingent. However, since those early years of Eastern European migration to Portugal, when Russians, Romanians and Moldovans constituted a much smaller share (Baganha et al. 2010: 14), the number of Romanian immigrants in the country has registered a strong increase (from 10,938 in 2002 (Baganha et al. 2010: 16) to 34,204 in 2013, according to data from SEF). However, there are still few studies exploring the specific characteristics of this migration flow to Portugal.

Subsequent studies (examples below) aimed at expanding the understanding of the settlement patterns of Ukrainian immigrants in Portugal by looking at work, housing, legal status, education, access to health care and religion, within the realm of a conceptual framework of integration. The integration of Ukrainian immigrants in Portugal was approached both globally, at the national level, and in specific local and socio-professional contexts (the health-care sector in particular) where empirical data on the basic features of the phenomenon were missing. This approach was mostly a response to policy concerns by Portuguese institutions that had to react to the presence of large numbers of immigrants previously unknown in the country and who were ill prepared in terms of language skills and knowledge of prevailing norms, including both accessing rights and fulfilling obligations. In addition, widespread instances of immigrant exploitation and abuse both by those who had organized the migration (from Ukraine as well as nearby countries) and by less scrupulous employers (for more details on the exploitative situations faced by Eastern European immigrants, see for example Pereira and Vasconcelos 2008) generated the need for an institutional response and thus for empirical evidence to

support it. Studies include both those that focused specifically on Ukrainian migration or on Eastern European population movements more generally, and those that incorporate Ukrainian migration as part of larger studies of immigration in Portugal (some examples are Sousa 2006, Oliveira 2005, Hellerman 2005, Miranda 2009 and Pereira 2010). Three of the more generalist studies developed in the mid-2000s stand out as more significant in their inclusion of Ukrainian immigration. Wall et al. (2005) look at the specific trajectories of migrant women, including Ukrainians among other nationalities, which highlights the diversity of trajectories of migrant women and identifies the main problems they face. In the case of Ukrainian women the authors identify loneliness, lack of language skills, housing, working conditions, the legalization process, family reunification and issues with their children, discrimination and cultural shocks. Fonseca et al. (2005) and Fonseca and Ormond (2008) focus on family reunification processes. Carneiro et al. (2006) examine labour market trajectories of immigrants in Portugal, highlighting the different sectors and occupations where migrants find employment and the specificity of Ukrainian presence in agriculture and industry. The authors also identify a U-shaped trajectory with initial downgrade and progressive improvements with time of stay even though the time period considered for this evaluation is very limited.

11.3 Migration from Ukraine to Portugal: Analysis of Empirical Data

This section uses data gathered and published in previous studies: the two nationwide surveys of 2002 and 2004 by Maria Ioannis Baganha and her team; and the studies conducted by the Centre for Geographical Studies with Eastern European migrants in the Alentejo region (Fonseca et al. 2004 and Fonseca 2008) and nationwide about processes of family reunification (Fonseca et al. 2005 and Fonseca and Ormond 2008). In addition, 2011 census data and original data gathered for the THEMIS project and only partially published in Fonseca et al. (2014) are used. These data are the most comprehensive collected in the country in terms of both geographical coverage and survey dimensions. In addition, the data provide a time frame that ranges from initial stages of arrival in Portugal to more recent years, including the effects of the economic crisis Portugal has been experiencing since the end of 2008.

In the THEMIS project, the Ukrainian immigrants interviewed were selected through a snowball sampling strategy and in the case of the survey a sample was selected using the respondent-driven sampling (RDS) method (more details in Horgen Friberg and Horst 2014 and Kubal et al. 2014). There is a slight predominance of men over women among the respondents (52.9% and 47.1% of the total, respectively), and there are no significant deviations in terms of the proportion of men and women indicated by the RDS estimator (53.1% for the men and 46.9% for the women). It must also be noted that the proportion of men and women indicated

in the 2011 population census is very similar to the figures obtained by the RDS estimator. The sample is therefore sufficiently robust and diverse to offer a reliable portrait of Ukrainian immigrants residing in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area.

11.3.1 Volume and Dynamics of Migration Over Time

Since 2001 Ukrainians have ranked among the largest foreign-national groups in Portugal; between 2008 and 2012 they maintained a stable second position in the ranking of foreign nationals that reside legally in Portugal and in 2013 they fell to third position, after Brazil and Cape Verde, a position that was maintained in 2014 (data from SEF). The number of Ukrainian nationals grew until 2004, registered a decline until 2007 and recovered in 2008 and 2009. The numbers have been declining since then (from 52,293 in 2009 to 41,091 in 2013). Interestingly, the number of Romanian immigrants grew between 2008 and 2011 (from 27,769 to 39,312) and only began to decline thereafter, falling to 34,204 in 2013 (data from SEF). Immigration from Poland has not reached the same levels in Portugal as observed elsewhere (only 1,238 registered by SEF in 2013).

Around 2004 a large number of Ukrainians began to leave the country (the number of registered legal residents dropped from 66,281 in 2004 to 39,480 in 2007), either to return to their country of origin or to migrate further to other European countries (taking advantage of labour market opportunities, for example in construction in Spain). However, little is actually known about the exit patterns of Ukrainians who left Portugal at that time. One interview with the representative of a Ukrainian association in Portugal indicated that Ukrainians who had gone to Spain to take advantage of labour market opportunities and also of higher wages returned to Portugal when the crisis began to affect Spain and also because, in spite of the higher wages in Spain, Ukrainians prefer the greater stability they enjoyed in Portugal in other ways, such as the immigration regime and conviviality. However, this is only episodic evidence and further research would be needed to better understand the internal circulation of Ukrainian migrants in Europe.

In more recent years most of the arrivals have been due to family reunifications, with a falling labour market demand, particularly in the construction sector. Accurate numbers are difficult to obtain because even when family reunification is the primary reason, other types of permit – for example for employment or study purposes – may be used. As documented elsewhere (Fonseca et al. 2004: 6), the THEMIS data has shown that with time there has been increasing participation of women in the migratory movements from Ukraine and the motives “joining family members and other persons you care about” and “studying” have become more important than “work” motives, which most likely indicates the relevance of family reunification processes. Those that arrived between 1998 and 2003 were mostly male (57.6%) and driven by work-related motives (77.1%). By contrast, arrivals between 2009 and 2011 included 58.3% women, and “being with family members or other people you care about” was the most important motive indicated for

migration (52.1%) (For a discussion on the implications of gendered employment sectors see Chap. 5.) Overall, migration is currently declining and its future rate is uncertain in view of the current low demand in the labour market in Portugal that has followed the effects of the international financial crisis of 2008 and the intervention of the Troika (International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank and European Commission) through an austerity plan. However, there are some signs of a tendency towards circular migration on the one hand, and permanence in Portugal on the other. The THEMIS survey (conducted in 2012) indicates that 28.5% of Ukrainians interviewed wanted to spend part of their time in Ukraine and part in Portugal, 28.5% would like to remain in Portugal, 22.3% would prefer to return to Ukraine and 16.5% aspired to re-emigrate to another country (4.2% did not know or did not respond). In addition, the political events that took place in Ukraine in late 2013 and throughout 2014, including violent clashes, are likely to affect the migratory pressure with unknown consequences for further flows to destination countries where other Ukrainians have already settled.

11.3.2 Migrants' Socio-demographic Profiles

The flow of immigrants was at first by and large labour-market oriented and dominated by male adults, with an increasing number of women arriving in subsequent years. According to data from the population census, men represented 50.8% of the Ukrainian population residing in Portugal in 2011, falling from 81.4% in 2001. This reflects processes of return to Ukraine but also of remigration to other European countries where labour market opportunities are better, especially for men who found themselves unemployed due to the crisis in the construction sector. According to census data, in 2011 Ukrainian women who had still been resident in Ukraine in 2005 made up 60.1% of the total, which is illustrative of more recent migration of Ukrainian women to Portugal. In the survey conducted in 2002 by Baganha et al. (2010: 33) nearly 71% of Ukrainians residing in the country at that time were men. The same survey also reveals that, at that time, nearly 42% of the spouses and 60% of the children lived in Ukraine (as opposed to 30% and 9% in Portugal, respectively) (Baganha et al. 2010: 36).

Concerning age profiles, Baganha et al. (2004) indicate that the average age of the sample surveyed was 36 years old and indeed, data from SEF for 2006 reveal that around 69% of legal residents of this origin were aged 30 or older with the highest concentration in the 30–34 age group (18%) followed by 35–39 (15%). In 2011, the average age of the Ukrainian population was 34 (census data), that is 8.1 years younger than the Portuguese population. The average education level of these immigrants is high in comparison with both the Portuguese population and other third-country nationals. In the sample surveyed by Baganha et al. (2005: 38) 69% had completed secondary education or equivalent vocational training and 31% had tertiary education. The 2011 census indicates similarly high educational levels: secondary and post-secondary school levels were the most frequently found education

levels among Ukrainian nationals, reaching 46.82%, whereas only 19.9% of the national population were educated to these levels. Moreover, 23.3% of the Ukrainian population in the active age bracket (15–64 years) had completed higher education, 46.82% held a secondary or post-secondary school diploma, 20.26% had completed the third level of basic schooling and only 9.68% had an education level lower than this.

11.3.3 Spatial Dynamics: Regions of Origin and Destination

Earlier studies of Ukrainian migration to Portugal have identified the western part of Ukraine as the most important sending region, particularly the oblasts of Lviv, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi, Ivano-Frankivski and Chernivts (Baganha et al. 2010: 38). Other important sending regions identified by the same authors were Kyiv, Cherkasy and Donetsk. The THEMIS survey obtained similar findings and was also able to capture the existence of migration from Luhansk Oblast (sending region for close to 3% of the total), which the previous study did not find. Despite the widespread representation of Western Ukraine as the sending region, there is also a remarkable dispersion of sending areas, including Eastern Ukraine (Donetsk Oblast was the region of origin for around 11% of Ukrainians according to the THEMIS survey). According to Baganha et al. (2010: 40), the majority of Ukrainian immigrants originated from urban areas (69%) but migrants from rural areas were also significantly represented (29.4%). For more on Ukrainian migrants' regions of origin, see Chap. 7. The THEMIS survey has also been able to capture the previous international trajectories of Ukrainians who moved to Portugal. Around 28% had lived in another country before moving to Portugal, mostly in Russia (29), Poland (20), Germany (16) and the Czech Republic (10). These have all been longstanding destinations of Ukrainian migration and therefore it is unsurprising that prior migration experiences had taken place there.

In Portugal, Ukrainian immigrants have settled all over the country, especially in the early days of the inflow, but with higher concentration levels in the districts of Faro, in the Algarve (around 20% in 2005), Lisbon (around 20% in 2005), Santarém (around 12% in 2005) and Leiria (around 10% in 2005) (SEF). However, with time, we can observe some changing patterns of geographical concentration. There is an increasing concentration in Lisbon (data from SEF record around 26% in this district in 2009 and 28% in 2013), a decrease in Santarém (7% in 2009; stable in 2013) and also a slight decrease in Faro (to 18% in 2013). In the THEMIS survey, 15% of Ukrainians living in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area had initially arrived elsewhere in the country. Upon arrival, the majority of Ukrainians interviewed (86%) either stayed with someone who already had a house or received help to find initial accommodation.

Census data for processes of geographical mobility of Ukrainians in the period 2005–2011 also provide evidence of some, mostly short-distance, spatial mobility: 36.8% remained in the same place, 33.8% moved to another location within the

same municipality, 10.3% lived in a different municipality in 2005 and 14.9% resided abroad. It is worth noticing that the proportion of women who resided abroad in 2005 is higher than that of the men (18.2% and 11.7%, respectively), confirming the trend towards the feminization of more recent migrations resulting from family reunification processes.

11.3.4 Migration Process and Patterns of Settlement at Destination

Various studies have shown that most Ukrainians first entered the country on Schengen tourist visas and remained irregularly until they obtained their first permit to stay legally. For example, the THEMIS survey shows that 96% had obtained a short-term visa before travelling. A considerable number of these migrants benefited from the change in immigration law in 2001. Following the entry into force of the new legislation, irregular immigrants were able to obtain a permanence permit by presenting a contract of employment validated by the labour inspection authorities. This permanence permit needed to be renewed every year for 5 years as long as the immigrant presented a valid employment contract, after which they would gain access to a residence permit. In 2004, 64,730 Ukrainians out of a total of 66,281 legal residents had obtained a permanence permit. THEMIS data indicate that after arriving on a short-term visa, nearly 44% obtained a permit based on their employment and nearly 37% a permit based on family ties. Despite successive regularization campaigns (see also Chap. 4), there are still a number of Ukrainian immigrants who are undocumented or in the process of regularization. Our research for the THEMIS project indicated that 4.5% of Ukrainians surveyed did not have any permit to stay in Portugal and nearly 2% had applied for a permit but had not yet obtained it at the time of the interview (there are ongoing opportunities for regularization in the Portuguese immigration regime).

Ukrainians initially found jobs mostly in construction, industry and agriculture, generally in unskilled occupations, despite their medium-high qualifications (Baganha et al. 2004: 34; Santana and Serranito 2005). In time, a number of them were able to obtain jobs more in line with their qualifications. One such example was a programme to enable medical doctors to obtain recognition of their competencies which ran in 2002 (109 Eastern European doctors completed the course successfully) and again in 2008, sponsored by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. The THEMIS survey shows that at the time of the interview almost 72% of respondents did not have the same occupation they had had upon arrival. These data show that over the years an important proportion (close to 20%) have become small employers or independent workers. This evidence matches the information gathered in the semi-structured interviews. For example, one leader of a Ukrainian association mentioned that Ukrainians are increasingly investing in small businesses in Portugal to overcome situations of exploitation in the labour market: retailing of

Ukrainian products, cafés, restaurants, car repairs, cleaning, construction and sewing services are typical small businesses.

Despite this, in 2011, and according to the population census, the low-skilled and low-paid jobs were still predominant: 33.2% of Ukrainian men with a job worked in activities related to civil construction, 14.4% were drivers or mobile equipment operators and 12.5% were unskilled workers in extractive industries and manufacturing. Among Ukrainian women, the most frequent jobs were cleaning services in private dwellings, hotels and offices (37.2%), cooks and waitresses (10.3%), sales assistants (9.6%) and unskilled workers in manufacturing (6.6%).

At the higher end of the occupational hierarchy the presence of Ukrainian citizens is minimal. The more skilled and most socially prestigious activities, such as academics and scientists, directors and managers, and intermediate-level technical staff only represented 3%, 1% and 2.5% respectively of the total employed population of Ukrainian nationality.

Income from work was, according to data from the 2011 population census, the main source of funds for 71% of the Ukrainian population aged 15 or above. Almost 15% lived on family means and 7.8% on unemployment benefit; of the remaining population, 0.68% received a retirement pension, 1.5% received other social benefits and 4.1% had other non-differentiated sources of income.

Regarding Ukrainians' interactions with others from the same origin in Portugal, the THEMIS survey reveals that the vast majority spend their free time with other Ukrainians (around 76%) while 14.4% indicate that they cannot identify one "dominant group". They also tend to reside in neighbourhoods with a high concentration of Ukrainians³ (close to 59%) or with at least some Ukrainians (around 36%), even though they mention that this concentration (or lack thereof) by and large makes no difference to them (around 62%). Interestingly, similar concentrations of Ukrainians are not found in the workplace. Nearly 22% work on their own, 21% work with no other Ukrainians and almost 20% work with only some Ukrainians. Ukrainians' engagement with Ukrainian organizations or events is mostly restricted to involvement in religious organizations/church (64% mentioned they go to these at least once in a while). To a lesser extent, Ukrainians in Lisbon also go to events organized by the Ukrainian embassy (close to 30%), attend community organizations (23%) or go to Ukrainian restaurants (around 18%).⁴

Most immigrants interviewed for different research projects showed that theirs was largely a work-driven migration with mostly a short-to-medium-term stay in Portugal in mind, very much rooted in the intention of sending remittances back to Ukraine. Data from the THEMIS survey indicates that nearly 64% had "job opportunities" as their main motivation to migrate to Portugal and 51% gave "earning money to send back to Ukraine" as their main reason for leaving Ukraine. Since the initial stages of Ukrainian migration, researchers have observed that, on arrival in Portugal, most Ukrainian immigrants' migration projects are short-term ones. According to a national survey conducted in December 2004 and January 2005

³Corresponds to the answer option "there's a lot of people from Ukraine" in the neighbourhood.

⁴THEMIS data.

(Fonseca et al. 2005) and another one conducted in the Alentejo region in April 2003 (Fonseca et al. 2004), more than 70% of Ukrainian migrants claimed that they intended to stay in Portugal for less than 6 years. Moreover, it is important to stress that in the survey conducted in Alentejo, approximately 20% of the respondents said they intended to re-emigrate to another European country or the USA, and approximately 12% said they intended to stay permanently in Portugal. In the THEMIS survey, 35% indicated that when they moved to Portugal their intention was to stay 1 year or less and a little over 37% claimed they intended to stay between 1 and 5 years. The same survey also confirms the trend towards onward migration from Portugal: 85.4% of respondents know immigrants who have returned to Ukraine or have re-emigrated to another country.

Ukrainians' overall evaluation of the benefits of migration to Portugal is positive, according to THEMIS data. For nearly 51% their economic situation is somewhat better today as a result of moving, compared with what it would have been if they had stayed in Ukraine, and for 22% it is much better. The evaluation is even better if quality of life apart from economic issues is considered. In this case, 34.6% considered that it is much better today and 42.8% that it is somewhat better. The same data indicate that most Ukrainians perceive Portugal as a country where immigration policies are not very strict (76.5%), and where men and women from Ukraine are seen in a positive way (75.8% and 88.2%, respectively). However, regarding the economic opportunities available in Portugal, opinions are more mixed: 41.5% consider that there are good economic opportunities and 49.3% disagree with that statement.

11.3.5 Transnational Contacts and Practices

Transnational links with the country of origin are generally maintained through regular communication, travel and remittances. The THEMIS survey indicates that the majority of Ukrainians have visited Ukraine at least once (only 17.3% have not). In addition, the same data show that close to 73% have gone back to Ukraine for a visit more than once. Communication (by any means) with people back in Ukraine is also regular: 85.3% communicate either almost every day (31.7%) or every week (53.6%). In the month preceding the interview most of them had communicated with close family members – mother (148), sister (92), daughter (87), son (84) – and friends, colleagues or classmates – male (125), female (95).

As far as remittances are concerned, Fonseca et al. (2005) observed a strong relation between the level of remittances sent home and the presence of partners and dependent children living in the country of origin. Specifically, among Ukrainian respondents, the proportion of those sending remittances more regularly (the last remittance had been sent less than a year ago) was more than 90% among those having dependent children and/or partner/spouse in Ukraine. However, even if there were no such links to Ukraine, more than 60% declared they sent remittances regularly. More recent research indicates that sending remittances to Ukraine is still very

important. For example, according to the results of the THEMIS survey, 50% of the respondents said that they send remittances to Ukraine on a regular basis, while only 13.6% stated that they have never sent any remittances home. The same data also indicate that investments made in the origin country mostly involved housing (23.5%) or sending money to support a religious organization (11.4%).

11.4 Conclusions

Ukrainian migration to Portugal took place mostly between the late 1990s and early 2000s. Initially, it was largely male migration with work objectives and short-term migration projects. This process was enabled by a major demand for labour in the construction sector at that time, due to large public works being carried out in the country. The work of people smugglers and traffickers, and social networks established and perpetuated this migratory movement. The lack of previous links in the country facilitated geographical dispersal throughout the territory. Overall, this was a unique immigration experience for Portugal, where previous significant migration had originated in former colonies with historical connections to the country, shared language and social networks that generated large immigrant settlements in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area and smaller concentrations elsewhere (in the Algarve for example).

Over time, there has been an increasing participation of Ukrainian women, associated largely with processes of family reunification, and short-stay projects have turned into medium-to-long-term settlement. Nevertheless, after 2004 Ukrainians both returned to Ukraine and moved on to other European countries with more attractive labour market opportunities. Initially, entry was largely irregular, with tourist visas for Schengen followed by a period of irregularity until a permit was obtained. Portuguese immigration legislation has allowed irregular immigrants the opportunity of obtaining a valid permit to reside in the country if they can prove their participation in the labour market through contracts and respective social security payments. More research is needed on Ukrainians' onward migration strategies within Europe, on the one hand, and return practices and potential circular migration, on the other. Another topic requiring more in-depth research is the transnational practices adopted by Ukrainian nationals who have settled in Portugal more permanently towards both Ukraine and other destinations of Ukrainian migration.

As regards their settlement patterns in Portugal, continuity with the research that began in the early years of Ukrainian migration to the country is important, so that the dynamics of their prolonged stay, the effects on them of the post-2008 economic crisis and the resulting strategies they have developed can be captured. It is nonetheless interesting to note: (1) how overwhelmingly short-to-medium-term plans have turned into more permanent settlement for at least a proportion of Ukrainian immigrants; and (2) that their evaluation of the effects of migration on their life trajectories is mostly positive, even though they have experienced de-skilling in the labour market (despite some upward mobility that has also taken place with time) and their

perception of economic opportunities in Portugal is more negative than positive. At the same time, one should not forget how many have acquired Portuguese nationality and the influence this will have on their future plans to remain in Portugal or migrate elsewhere in Europe. Given the new socio-political context in Ukraine and the enduring crisis in Portugal this is certainly an immigrant group that requires further research not only at the national level but also within Europe as a whole.

Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, duplication, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included in the work's Creative Commons license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory regulation, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or reproduce the material.

References

- Baganha, M. I., & Fonseca, M. L. (Eds.). (2004). *New waves: Migration from Eastern to Southern Europe*. Lisbon: Luso American Foundation.
- Baganha, M. I., Marques, J. C., & Góis, P. (2004). The unforeseen wave: Migration from Eastern Europe to Portugal. In M. I. Baganha & M. L. Fonseca (Eds.), *New waves: Migration from Eastern to Southern Europe* (pp. 23–40). Lisbon: Luso American Foundation.
- Baganha, M. I., Marques, J. C., & Góis, P. (2005). Imigrantes de Leste em Portugal [Eastern European Immigrants in Portugal]. *Revista de Estudos Demográficos*, 38, 31–45.
- Baganha M. I., Marques J. C., & Góis P. (Eds.). (2010). *Imigração ucraniana em Portugal e no Sul da Europa: a emergência de uma ou várias comunidades?* [Ukrainian immigration in Portugal and Southern Europe: The emergence of one or several communities?]. Lisbon: Alto Comissariado para a Imigração e o Diálogo Intercultural (ACIDI, I.P.).
- Carneiro, R., A. C. d. Almeida, et al. (2006). *A mobilidade ocupacional do trabalhador migrante em Portugal* [Occupational mobility of the migrant worker in Portugal], Direcção-Geral de Estudos Estatística e Planeamento (DGEEP).
- Ferreira, E. S., Rato, H., & Mortágua, M. J. (2005). *Novos Caminhos da Europa: A Imigração de Leste* [Europe's new paths: Eastern European immigration]. Oeiras: Celta Editora.
- Fonseca, M. L. (2008). New waves: Immigration to small towns and rural areas in Portugal. The case of Alentejo region. *Population, Space and Place*, 14(6), 525–535.
- Fonseca, M. L., & Ormond, M. (2008). Defining 'Family' and bringing it together: The ins and outs of family reunification in Portugal. In Ralph Grillo (Ed.), *The family in question immigrant and ethnic minorities in multicultural Europe*, IMISCOE-AUP: 89–111.
- Fonseca, M. L., Alegria, J., & Nunes, A. (2004). Immigration to medium sized cities and rural areas: The case of Eastern Europeans in the Évora Region (Southern Portugal). In M. I. Baganha & M. L. Fonseca (Eds.), *New waves: Migration from Eastern to Southern Europe* (pp. 91–118). Lisbon: Luso-American Foundation.
- Fonseca, M. L., Ormond, M., Malheiros, J., Patrício, M., & Martins, F. (2005). *Reunificação Familiar e Imigração em Portugal* [Family reunification and immigration in Portugal]. Lisbon: Alto Comissariado para a Imigração e Minorias Étnicas (ACIME).

- Fonseca, M. L., Pereira, S., & Esteves, A. (2014). Migration of Ukrainian Nationals to Portugal: Changing flows and the critical role of social networks. *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, 3(1), 115–131.
- Fonseca, M. L., Esteves, A., & McGarrigle, J. (2016). The economic crisis as feedback-generating mechanism? Brazilian and Ukrainian migration to Portugal. In O. Bakewell, G. Engbersen, M. L. Fonseca, & C. Horst (Eds.), *Beyond networks: Feedback in international migration*. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Heckathorn, D. D. (2007). Extensions of respondent-driven sampling. Analyzing continuous variables and controlling for differential recruitment. *Sociological Methodology*, 37(1), 151–207.
- Hellerman, C. (2005). Migração de Leste: mulheres ‘sozinhas’. In S. Racismo (Ed.), *Imigração e Etnicidade. Vivência e Trajectórias de Mulheres em Portuga* (pp. 223–234). Lisbon: SOS Racismo.
- Horgen Friberg, J., & Horst, C. (2014). Respondent driven sampling and the structure of migrant populations. In G. Tyldum & L. Rodriguez (Eds.), *Applying respondent driven sampling to migrant populations: Lessons from the field* (pp. 17–26). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. [Online] Available at: <http://www.palgraveconnect.com/pc/doi/10.1057/9781137363619>
- Kubal A., Shvab I., & Wojtyńska A. (2014). Seeds and setting up the study. In G. Tyldum & L. Rodriguez (Eds.), *Applying respondent driven sampling to migrant populations: Lessons from the field* (pp. 37–48). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. [Online] Available at: <http://www.palgraveconnect.com/pc/doi/10.1057/9781137363619>.
- Miranda, J. (2009). *Mulheres Imigrantes em Portugal: Memórias, Dificuldades de Integração e Projectos de Vida* [Immigrant women in Portugal: memories, integration difficulties and life projects] OI 35. Lisbon: ACIDI.
- Oliveira, M. P. (2005). *Percursos Migratórios e Integração Social - Os Ucrânios no Concelho de Leiria* [Migration trajectories and social integration – Ukrainians in the municipality of Leiria]. Master's dissertation, Universidade Aberta, Lisboa.
- Peixoto, J., Soares, A. G., et al. (2005). *O Tráfico de Migrantes em Portugal: Perspectivas Sociológicas, Jurídicas e Políticas* [Migrant trafficking in Portugal: Sociological, juridical and political perspectives]. Lisbon: ACIME.
- Pereira, S. (2010). *Trabalhadores de Origem Africana em Portugal: o Impacto das Novas Vagas de Imigração* [Workers of African origin in Portugal: The impact of new migration waves]. Lisbon: Colibri.
- Pereira, S., & Vasconcelos, J. (2008). *Human trafficking and forced labour – Case studies and responses from Portugal*. Geneva: ILO.
- Santana, V., & Serranito, P. (2005). Percursos de vida de imigrantes de Leste [Life trajectories of Eastern European migrants]. In *Imigração e Etnicidade. Vivência e Trajectórias de Mulheres em Portugal* [Immigration and ethnicity. Experiences and trajectories of women in Portugal] (pp. 235–250). Lisbon: SOS Racismo.
- Sousa, J. E. X. F. (2006). *Os Imigrantes Ucrânios em Portugal e os Cuidados de Saúde* [Ukrainian immigrants in Portugal and healthcare]. Lisbon: ACIME.
- Wall, K., Nunes, C., et al. (2005). *Immigrant women in Portugal: Migration trajectories, main problems and policies*. Lisbon: European Observatory of Family Policies.

Chapter 12

Research on Ukrainian Migration to Spain: Moving Beyond the Exploratory Approach

Mikołaj Stanek, Renáta Hosnedlová, and Elisa Brey

12.1 Introduction

In the first decade of the twenty-first century Spain became an important destination for labour migration. According to official municipal register statistics, between 2000 and 2014 the total number of registered foreign-born persons grew almost fivefold, rising from 1,472,000 to 6,283,712. The intensification of immigration was accompanied by a considerable diversification of the origins of immigrants, with immigration from Central and Eastern Europe supplementing earlier migrations into Spain from the Maghreb and Latin America (Arango 2004). Migration from Central and Eastern European countries has grown exponentially over the last fifteen years. According to national population censuses, in 2001 residents from Central and Eastern Europe represented approximately 7% of the foreign-born population, rising to 24% by 2011. This increase in the proportion of migrants from former socialist states was due mainly to the arrival on a massive scale of Romanian and Bulgarian migrants and, though to a lesser extent, Ukrainian migrants (Marcu 2007; Stanek 2009). Ukrainians currently constitute the third-largest community among migrants from Central and Eastern Europe residing in Spain.

The increase of the population coming from Central and Eastern European countries to Spain has awoken substantial interest within the Spanish academic community, which is reflected in the growing number of publications (see, among others, Hellerman and Stanek 2006; Marcu 2007; Viruela Martínez 2002). Although a great

M. Stanek (✉)

Department of Sociology and Communication, University of Salamanca, Salamanca, Spain
e-mail: mstanek@ces.uc.pt

R. Hosnedlová

LabEx SMS, The Federal University of Toulouse, Midi-Pyrénées, France

E. Brey

GEMI, Complutense University of Madrid, Madrid, Spain

deal of the work focuses on Romanian migrants in Spain, Ukrainian migration has been receiving increasing attention from Spanish researchers over the last decade and a half. This chapter argues that, while the efforts of several researchers have undoubtedly contributed to a better understanding of current Ukrainian migration, Spanish migration research on this population still faces several challenges. Its objective is threefold: first, to assess key data sources on Ukrainians in Spain; second, critically to review current literature on this collective and assess existing conceptual and empirical tools applied in the research; and third, to discuss the value of the knowledge acquired, and highlight future challenges.

The chapter is structured as follows. Section 12.2 provides a critical overview of the key data sources for the measurement of Ukrainian migration and population. Several indicators used for describing main social and demographic features of the Ukrainian population residing in Spain are discussed. Section 12.3 consists of a critical literature survey about processes of social and cultural integration of Ukrainians. In Sect. 12.4 results of recent studies on patterns of international mobility of Ukrainians and transnational behaviour are discussed. Conclusions are drawn in Sect. 12.5. Data and literature discussed in the previous sections are used to assess the extent to which Spanish studies of Ukrainian migration have managed to explore and explain its most prominent features. Issues and topics related to this migration that require further research are also identified.

12.2 Socio-demographics of Ukrainians in Spain

This section gives the main statistical data sources used to describe the Ukrainian population in Spain. The ability of each source to provide comprehensive and reliable measures of flows, stocks and socio-demographic structure of this collective is assessed. The advantages and limitations of statistical data are highlighted, and the main socio-demographic features of Ukrainian migration are presented.

12.2.1 Main Data Sources on Ukrainian Migration in Spain

By the turn of the century, the substantial improvement in the quality and coverage of the municipal registries had made their statistical data the principal source of information on inflow, stock and basic socio-demographic composition of the foreign population in Spain (see González-Ferrer 2009). Since it includes foreigners residing in Spain regardless of their legal status (Rosero-Bixby et al. 2011), it is a more reliable source of information on this population than residence permit statistics provided by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security. It is assumed that the coverage of municipal population registers in the period 2001–2012 is high, since registration provides automatic access to health services and education even for those who do not have a legal residence permit upon arrival. Municipal registers not

only provide information regarding volume of population by country of birth and nationality but also basic socio-demographic features such as sex, age, region and province of residence in Spain.

However, several authors have suggested that municipal register statistics are not fully accurate as they tend to underestimate some categories of migrants (e.g., foreign-born pre-school children, seasonal workers) (González-Ferrer 2009). On the other hand, it has also been highlighted that the total stock of foreigners is mainly overestimated due to double registration (Ródenas-Calatayud and Martí 2009; Rosero-Bixby et al. 2011). Finally, it may be assumed that the restrictions on access to Spain's free health-care system imposed by the Spanish government on undocumented migrants between 2012 and 2015 has undermined incentives to register voluntarily among this category of foreign population which, in turn, affects the accuracy of municipal registers.

Residential Variation Statistics (EVR) derived from municipal registers show entries and removals produced due to residence changes and are also used to estimate inflow and outflow of the foreign population. In recent years they have become an important source for the exploration of this phenomenon (Larramona 2013; Parella and Petroff 2014). Although increasingly used, this source is not without its flaws. First, the EVR does not include complete information on the destination of the outbound flows since individuals are not obliged to provide that information when deregistering. Second, a significant number of deletions from the municipal register are due to immigrants failing to renew their residency. Consequently, there is a significant delay between the actual departure of the individual and the deletion of their entry from the register. Third, there are hardly any incentives for people from Spain moving abroad to deregister as they lose access to some state welfare benefits and there are no administrative sanctions for remaining on the register, so outflow figures might be underestimated. Finally, it should be noted that the EVR counts movements and not persons moving. So it is possible for the same person to register and deregister several times over the course of a year, each of which would be counted as a different movement.

Several studies on socio-demographic features of Ukrainian immigrants published in recent years have taken advantage of the National Immigrant Survey data set (NIS-2007) obtained by the Spanish National Institute of Statistics at the start of 2007. This survey was based on a sample of 15,465 people which included foreign-born persons over 15 years old who had been in Spain for at least 1 year at the time of the interview. To ensure maximum representativeness NIS-2007 followed a complex three-stage sampling design to select dwellings in which at least one resident was a foreign national (see Duque et al. 2014). The survey includes detailed information on personal characteristics (such as gender, age, education level, country of origin, year of arrival, marital status and region of origin) and traces occupational and residential trajectories in Spain and previous migration experience. The survey also looks into collective aspects of migration with questions on immigrants' family structure and geographical location of their members, household composition and relations with the country of origin (Reher and Requena 2009). Hosnedlová and Stanek (2010a, b) made extensive use of this database in their research on the

socio-demographic profiles of Ukrainian migrants. These authors also relied on NIS-2007 in their exploration of Ukrainian migrants' patterns of transnational behaviour (see Stanek and Hosnedlová 2012; Hosnedlová and Stanek 2014). The results of this research will be assessed in following sections of this chapter.

Although NIS-2007 was an exceptional data set in the European context which shed new light on several aspects of the immigration phenomenon in Spain, its shortcomings mean the results of the analysis of the Ukrainian case should be interpreted with caution. First, the subsample of Ukrainian migrants is relatively small (223 individuals) which to some extent affects the accuracy and validity of the results, so robust and more effective methods of statistical analysis are required to avoid small-sample bias and to yield finite and consistent estimates (see Stanek and Hosnedlová 2012). Second, NIS-2007 does not cover areas of interest such as measurement of the costs associated with international mobility and several issues related to integration processes (see González-Ferrer 2009; Duque et al. 2014). Finally, NIS-2007 was produced when the economic situation in Spain was still favourable. The outbreak of the economic crisis significantly altered the situation of immigrants in Spain. NIS-2007 outcomes should therefore be interpreted taking into account the specific socio-economic conditions of the period when its data were collected.

The fourth most important source of statistical data regarding Ukrainian immigration available in Spain is the population census. The advantages of census data for exploring features of foreign collectives are well known. They provide very reliable measures of the volume of foreign population and include a wide set of socio-economic and socio-demographic variables (such as age, gender, occupation, education level, year of arrival) which enable the main features of immigrant collectives to be explored. The census is especially valuable for its considerable data regarding household structure and family members' characteristics. On the other hand, the limitations of census data are also well known. As it is designed to gather basic information on the whole population, the number of variables regarding specific features of immigrant collectives is limited. In addition, the decennial temporal gaps between censuses make it difficult to fully understand the population trends. Despite these limitations the latest census (2011) provides currently the most up-to-date statistical information on specific features of Ukrainian migrants that are not included in municipal registers: educational level, labour market situation and living conditions.

12.2.2 Dynamics of Ukrainian Migration Flows and Evolution of Socio-demographic Features

What is the dynamic and volume of Ukrainian migration, according to statistical data? The first Ukrainian economic migrants arrived in Spain in the mid-1990s. Although we lack reliable statistical data for this period, it can be assumed that the influx was relatively large. After the regularization processes of 2000 and 2001 Spanish statistics displayed a sharp increase in immigrants of this origin. Between





Fig. 12.1 Major immigrant groups from Central and Eastern Europe in Spain, 2001–2014 (Source: Authors' own compilation based on data from the Municipal Register 2001–2014, National Institute of Statistics (Spain))


1996 and 2001 the number of Ukrainians with residence permits grew from 240 to approximately 9,500 (Ferrero Turrión 2005). By 2001 approximately 25,500 Ukrainians were registered in Spanish municipalities. In the years that followed, the number of Ukrainians registered in municipal registers increased exponentially, reaching 81,132 by 2009. In recent years the migration of Ukrainians to Spain has slowed down as a result of the economic downturn and the corresponding dramatic increase in unemployment and budget cuts. At the beginning of 2014, the total number of Ukraine-born migrants registered in Spain was approximately 85,000. For the purposes of comparison, data is included on Romanian, Bulgarian and Polish migrants who, together with Ukrainians, constitute the largest groups among the Central and Eastern European residents in Spain. Figure 12.1 shows the contrast between the stagnation in numbers of Ukrainians and the significant decrease in numbers of other major Central and Eastern European migrant groups.

The analysis of Residential Variation Statistics which draw on municipal register data and reflect movements between municipalities and regions, as well as departures abroad, can help to shed some light on observed differences. As can be seen in Figs. 12.2–12.5, since the economic crisis started in 2007, the entry of new migrants to Spain has decreased considerably when all four countries are taken into account. However, in the case of migrants from Romania, Bulgarian and Polish this decreasing trend coincides with a growing number of departures from Spain. By contrast, net migration seems to be more balanced in the case of Ukrainians. Although since



Figs. 12.2–12.5 Outflows and inflows of selected origins (Source: Authors' own elaboration based on deletions and registrations in the Municipal Register 2002–2013, National Institute of Statistics (Spain))

2007 deletions from the municipal register have been increasing, the volume of exits is still smaller compared to other Central and Eastern European countries. On the other hand, in contrast to the other three countries included in this comparison, the number of Ukrainian de-registrations only slightly exceeds the number of new arrivals registered in municipal registers. This seems to be related to the fact that Ukraine is the only one of these four countries that is not a member of the EU and



Figs. 12.2–12.5 (continued)

whose citizens’ mobility is limited by visa restrictions. For more on the impact of visa regulations on Ukrainian migrants in the EU, see Chap. 4.

The Ukrainian population in Spain has undergone a profound demographic transformation in the last fourteen years. There have been changes in terms of gender (from male dominated to female dominated). More specifically, municipal register statistics indicate that in 2001 this ratio of this immigrant group in Spain was 110 males per 100 females, but in 2014 the ratio was only 75–100. The age distribution has also changed from a clear concentration of immigrants in the economically




Fig. 12.6 Age-gender distribution of the Ukrainian immigrant population in Spain, 2001 and 2014 (%) (Source: Authors' own compilation based on data from the Municipal Register (2001 and 2014), National Institute of Statistics (Spain))

productive age groups to a widening of age groups to include children and adults over 44. According to the 2014 data, most of the population falls within the 30–49 age group. The balance between the sexes is of particular interest in the 35–49 age group. Women are in the majority in the 30–34 age group, and especially in the group aged over 50 (see Fig. 12.6). The trends in respect of gender and age seem to indicate that over the past decade the migratory process was initially dominated by men, but this was subsequently compensated by the arrival of women as part of the process of family reunification and due to individual migratory decisions (Hosnedlová and Stanek 2014). The relative increase in the female population in these categories is also due to the fact that Ukrainian males are, as we shall see, over-represented in activities that were hardest hit by the economic crisis, such as construction, and this is reflected in the gender balance of newly arrived Ukrainian migrants. The higher rates of unemployment among Ukrainian men also affect their higher propensity to return or re-emigrate.

Data from the population census of 2001 and National Immigrant Survey 2007 show that the educational structure of the Ukrainian immigrant population in Spain has also undergone an interesting transformation in the last decade. The level of this population's education has been increasing over the years. In 2001 the immigrants were mainly skilled workers or had less than secondary education. Between 2001 and 2007 the majority of new arrivals were people with secondary or tertiary educa-





Fig. 12.7 Highest education level achieved by Ukrainian migrants, 2001, 2007 and 2011 (Source: Authors' own compilation based on data from the Populations Censuses (2001 and 2011) and National Immigrant Survey NIS-2007)

tion. According to the National Immigrant Survey, in 2007, 52% of the Ukrainians in Spain had finished secondary education and 39% had finished post-secondary education. With the economic crisis, the increase in migrants with secondary and tertiary education stopped. No significant differences appear between the educational structure of the Ukrainian migrant population in 2007 and 2011. According to the census of 2011, approximately 51% of Ukrainians had a secondary diploma and 38% had completed tertiary education (see Fig. 12.7). Despite some differences in the data measurement procedure as well as the limitations of National Immigrant Survey data, it can be stated that the deteriorating economic situation has had a considerable impact on the arrival of migrants with the highest level of skills.

12.2.3 *Spatial Dynamics: Regions of Origin and Destination*

According to the municipal registers, in 2014 most Ukrainian immigrants were concentrated in four particular regions: the Madrid region (22%), Catalonia (20.1%), the Valencia region (18.2%) and Andalusia (15%). There are also relatively large contingents of Ukrainian immigrants who have settled in other regions of the Mediterranean coast, such as Murcia (Hosnedlová and Stanek 2010a; Sánchez Urios 2010). Map 12.1 shows the internal residential mobility of Ukrainians, revealing which destinations are transitory, which are more prone to permanent settlement and why. According to this visual analysis Madrid is the place with not only the highest concentration of the Ukrainian population, but also with the greatest inter-municipal mobility. In 2007 the region was both an important gateway to the rest of



Map 12.1 The inter- and intra-provincial residential mobility of Ukrainians in Spain (from their arrival until the time of the interview) (Source: Own elaboration of Hosnedlová (2014) based on the NIS-2007 data (the weighted data were used)). Note: A scale of proportions has been used in order to represent the volume of flows between provinces (*thickness of arrows*) and volume of intra-provincial mobility (the darker the tone of the province, the higher inter-municipal mobility). The data comprise only the mobile population ($N=86$) and intra-city movements have not been included. The map shows places where the individual has stayed for at least a month, excluding those on holiday

Spain (with its busy international airport and bus routes between Madrid and different Ukrainian cities), and a transit area. However, Madrid does not appear among the most important regions in respect of inter-provincial mobility, nor does it seem to attract a mass of new immigrants from other areas of Spain. This internal mobility seems to be associated with Spanish labour market characteristics. Madrid and Catalonia have attracted Ukrainian immigrants by offering employment in industry (especially women), in construction (men) and in hotels and catering. Valencia, Andalusia and Murcia can offer a wide range of temporary jobs in hotels and catering, agriculture, retail and wholesale trade (Hosnedlová 2014). For a comparison with the spatial concentration of Ukrainian migrants in Poland, see Chap. 7.

As to Ukrainian immigrants' places of origin, according to the results of the National Immigrant Survey, by 2007 over half of the Ukrainian immigrant population came from four provinces located in the western part of the country: Lviv (23.4%), Ternopil (12.7%), Ivano-Frankivsk (9.5%) and Chernivtsi (7.8%). Many immigrants also came from Kiev province (14.3%). This pattern is consistent with the results of studies conducted in other Southern European countries which also highlighted a large predominance of immigrants from Western Ukraine in Portugal, Italy and Greece (see Fonseca et al. 2014; Vianello 2014; Nikolova 2015).




Fig. 12.8 Regularity rates for Ukrainian immigrants in Spain, 2001–2013 (Source: Authors’ own compilation based on the Municipal Register (National Institute of Statistics) and the Ministry of Employment and Immigration statistics (Spain))

12.2.4 Irregularity Rates

Although there is no accurate statistical evidence, ethnographic research suggests that in the initial period of Ukrainian migration to Spain the majority of migrants entered the country on a short-term Schengen visa and after a brief period of regular stay became “overstayers” (Sánchez-Montijano and López-Catalán 2012; Hosnedlová 2014). This has led to a considerable increase in the number of undocumented Ukrainians residing in Spain. As shown in Fig. 12.8, between 2001 and 2005 around two out of every three Ukrainian migrants were undocumented. The implementation of extraordinary regularization in 2005 reduced the percentage of undocumented Ukrainian migrants from 62% to 29%, and this share showed a further decrease to 11% in 2013. The new legal measures enabled undocumented migrants to regularize their legal status under specific conditions via “labour” or “social” settlement schemes after 2 or 3 years of residence in Spain (see Sabater and Domingo 2012). These measures coincided with the intensification of family migration through reunification schemes. The importance of this method of obtaining residence permits among Ukrainian migrants is confirmed by the fact that by 2007, despite its comparatively small population size, Ukrainians in Spain were among the top ten countries when it came to obtaining a residence permit by means of family regrouping (Rosario and Manzano Sánchez 2007). Finally, an important factor contributing to the significant reduction of the levels of irregularity was the slow-down of Ukrainian immigration flows as a consequence of the economic crisis (Hosnedlová and Stanek 2014). For more information on irregularity of Ukrainian migrants and the role of regularization schemes, see Chap. 4.

In Spanish literature estimated irregularity rates have been provided by Hosnedlová and Stanek (2010a, b). These authors applied the most widely used method of estimating irregularity rates: contrasting the number of foreigners registered in the municipal registers with the number of holders of valid residence permits (see Cebolla and González-Ferrer 2008). The resultant figure is adjusted by

subtracting the number of foreign student permits, asylum seekers, and an estimate for residence permits in the process of renewal. While this method has been already implemented in a number of studies it is not free from bias resulting from inaccuracies in the municipal register (see above).

12.2.5 Labour Market Situation of Ukrainian Immigrants

The socio-economic situation of Ukrainian immigrants is closely linked to the fortunes of the Spanish labour market, which shows a marked sensitivity to changes in the rate of economic growth, creating a plethora of jobs in periods of expansion and dispensing with many of them when the economy shrinks. In addition to this structural feature, in the pre-crisis period a significant share of labour demand was generated by labour-intensive sectors (such as construction, hotels and catering, agriculture and domestic service) which resulted in a considerable demand for a low-skilled labour force and intense concentration of the foreign labour force in specific ethnic niches (Cachón Rodríguez 2009; Stanek and Veira 2013). Prior to 2008, Ukrainian migrants were concentrated in construction (men) and domestic services (women). According to NIS-2007, one in every two Ukrainians with a job worked in one of these two sectors. Other sectors employing a large proportion of them were agriculture (10% of total Ukrainian population), industry (9%) and hospitality (8%) (Hosnedlová and Stanek 2010a; Sánchez Urios 2010). Gender differences were also apparent: men predominated in agriculture and industry; and women in retail and hotels and catering. Some geographical areas offered a greater range of jobs than others (Hosnedlová 2014). Based on information from NIS-2007, just before the outbreak of the economic crisis, Madrid region clearly had the greatest homogeneity in terms of Ukrainians' occupations, with 93% being concentrated in two major sectors, construction and services. Valencia, on the other hand, stood out as the region with the most diverse employment for the Ukrainian population, the greatest proportion of Ukrainians being engaged in agriculture (30%) and retail (15%). A quite different picture emerges in Barcelona where the female population had found employment linked mainly to the industry sector (26%), while the male population was concentrated mainly in the construction sector (53%).

The onset of the economic crisis affected certain industries in particular: construction, for example, which had previously been booming, has contracted sharply over the course of the recession. As a result, whereas it was the Ukrainian female who was more likely to be jobless before the emergence of the economic crisis in Spain, since 2008 it is the male population that has been exposed to greater risks of unemployment (Hosnedlová and Stanek 2014). Studies by Sánchez-Montijano and López-Catalán (2012) and Kuzio (2012) make some reference to the effects of Spain's economic crisis on the labour situation of Ukrainians, but focusing on the case of Catalonia. While the first cited study presents the data provided by Employment Service of Catalonia and analyzes interviews with various experts, the latter draws on a survey of a non-representative sample of 100 Ukrainians conducted in 2011. Both studies confirm a sharp decrease in Ukrainian migrants employed in the construction sector. However, it is difficult to pinpoint the precise

impact of the crisis on this sector as the numbers diverge significantly (24% vs. 13%) due to the different methodological approach.

The 2011 population census contains valuable information on employment and shows that activity rates among Ukrainian migrants differed slightly between men and women. While 30% of Ukrainian men were employed in full-time jobs, it was only the case for 26% of Ukrainian women. Although women were more likely to be employed part time (14% versus 6% of men), they were less affected by unemployment (25.8% versus 28.4%). It is also remarkable that the percentage of students is higher among men (22.5%) than women (18.3%). In general terms, it may be that in times of economic crisis study is more often chosen by men as a strategy to address precariousness and unemployment. The proportion of self-employment is higher among Ukrainian men (7.8%, mainly in construction) than women (5.7%).

12.3 Research on Social and Cultural Integration of Ukrainians

The objective of this section is to present the main findings of Spanish research on the social and cultural integration of Ukrainian migrants in Spain – the focus of increasing interest in the early 2000s – and to discuss the conceptual tools and empirical data employed in the analysis of these phenomena. The first authors dealing with this thematic field were Zlobina et al. (2004), who focused on culture shock. Their main aim was to understand the difficulties that immigrants encounter in their adaptation to a new environment through the analysis of the concept of culture and its various dimensions. The analyses are quite elaborate and data come from a fairly extensive survey at national level (478 immigrants of six nationalities were interviewed and 27 immigrants took part in a focus group). Ukrainians represent a very small proportion, being a part of an Eastern European group of 53 Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians, and the results are interpreted mostly for whole groups of immigrants. Through analysis of the perceived cultural distance, the authors show that for Eastern European immigrants the biggest difference lies in the indirect communication style of Spaniards, and that they feel the lack of warmer and more intimate relationships with the autochthonous population. An unexpected finding was that Eastern European immigrants felt closer culturally to Spaniards than was the case for immigrants of Latin American origin, which may translate into a smoother process of cultural integration in the destination country. Apart from its empirical results, the contribution of this study is the creation of guidelines for improving intercultural interaction (both for each group of immigrants and for the autochthonous population). Culture was shown to be quite a powerful conceptual tool to explain the resultant adaptation differences and how culture shock is experienced. However, it has to be taken into account that this survey was conducted in 2002 and that the average residence time of respondents was 3 years, so the immigrants were in the early stages of their migration project. It remains to be seen whether the same concept and the proposed set of guidelines would be appropriate for second and subsequent generations and immigrants of mixed parentage, assuming that in these cases the

adoption of cultural norms is much more complex. In addition, the macro-structural conditions of the host country should be taken into account in future research as it could be reflected in changing cultural norms and dynamics.

Sánchez Urios (2007, 2008, 2010a), in a series of social intervention-oriented research, deals with the processes of social integration of Ukrainians in the region of Murcia and the social needs that arise in the course of this process. The analysis is based on 100 interviews conducted between 2005 and 2006 in the Murcia region. In her doctoral thesis, Sánchez Urios (2007) identified the issues that were hindering the socio-economic integration of Ukrainians in the region studied during the past decade. Among other things, the author pointed out how the downward labour mobility of Ukrainians in relation to the country of origin was causing many problems of adaptation in the process of integration into the destination community. She also observed that in the absence of social resources in the host community to meet the main needs (work, legal and other information), the Ukrainians mainly looked for support among the informal networks represented, above all, by their compatriots (family and friends). It was more often women who sought out information and support among Spaniards because they had created networks through their work in the domestic sector. Interestingly, according to the Sánchez Urios data, it was women, though they had smaller networks and fewer friendship ties with Spaniards than men, who developed more efficient ties with host society (81.6% of females, compared to 56.9% of males had received some kind of help from Spaniards). Sánchez Urios in her studies (2007, 2008), apart from the concept of economic integration, incorporated the migration network theory and social capital into the theoretical framework. Although these works are very descriptive and require more thorough analysis of, for example, the dynamics of social ties, they exemplify how the migration network approach can be useful for developing intervention plans for immigrants.

Finally, the anthropologist Alvarez Veinguer (2007, 2008) explored the situation of female Ukrainian and Russian domestic workers in southern Andalusia (specifically in Granada) from the perspective of gender, focusing on the issue of power relationships in households. The importance of concepts such as immaterial work, care work and the transnational social field are discussed. Individual subjectivity in particular is stressed to explain how domestic workers manage everyday life. Although both articles provide very valuable insights into the theoretical aspects of the domestic work performed by women who had left children behind in Ukraine or Russia, they are theoretically oriented without offering empirical conclusions. It should also be noted that the author did not differentiate between the two groups studied.

To sum up this section, the notion of integration (social, economic and cultural) is generally treated as obvious and self-explanatory in the Spanish literature on Ukrainian migration, and its content often remains vague. A more in-depth discussion on the meaning of this concept would help to move research on this population beyond analysis that is purely descriptive and explanatory. In addition, analysis of the integration of Ukrainians in Spain rarely includes institutional and structural factors such as immigration and citizenship policies or the nature of the Spanish welfare regime.

12.4 Research on Patterns of International Mobility and Transnational Behaviour

Other topics that are becoming central to an increasing number of studies dedicated to Ukrainian migration in Spain are patterns of international mobility and of transnational behaviour.

12.4.1 *Patterns of International Mobility*

To date the most complete and in-depth analysis of patterns of international mobility has been offered by Hosnedlová (2014). In her multidisciplinary and multi-methodological research, she focused on the formation of residential intentions and decision making in the field of return migration. Most of the analysis is based on data collected between 2008 and 2012, including the results from 20 in-depth interviews and from a two-stage semi-structured interview and ego-network questionnaire with 55 immigrants in 2009, completed by longitudinal follow-up interviews conducted in 2012. Additional fieldwork was conducted in six different regions in Ukraine in 2010, where 14 returnees and some family members were interviewed.

Drawing on the social network analysis approach, Hosnedlová emphasizes the meso-level perspective and life-course approach, in which the main concept is embeddedness and its different dimensions. More specifically, the study explored the extent to which the relational environment as a whole shaped return intentions and estimated the impact on the decision-making process of different types of social networks (“concentrated”, oriented to the host country; “semi-concentrated”, oriented to the country of origin; “semi-dispersed”, oriented to the host; and “sparse”, with affective load in the country of origin). The study demonstrated that the reduction of connections in Ukraine and shift towards networks based in Spain had a positive impact on intentions to stay in the host country. Although it proved essential, the degree of relational embeddedness in Ukraine and in Spain never operated uniquely, but rather in relation to other factors such as structure of networks, subjective appreciation of personal relations in Spain and Ukraine, time of residence, labour situation, time of life and documentary situation. The research also demonstrated that while the economic crisis was not a trigger for mass return migration of Ukrainians, differences in economic and social resources as well as the psychological support provided by networks have an impact on return decisions.

This theoretically rigorous study, based on sound methodology, contributes to a better understanding of the causal mechanism behind return decision making. However, it should be borne in mind that this research was conducted with a small sample of Ukrainians in Madrid municipality, and therefore its results can hardly be extrapolated to the whole Ukrainian population in Spain. In this case the external validity of results is limited to the specific social and economic context of urban areas. The relatively small sample size hampered further exploration of the gender dimension of return; little attention has been paid to the gendered division of the

decision-making power within households. In this regard, this study focused on individual intentions, decisions and actions, ignoring the collective dimension of return migration processes. Finally, although Hosnedlová's study sheds light on mechanisms which shape the process of Ukrainian migrants' return, it does not deal with other dimensions of international mobility, such as decision making regarding emigration and temporal mobility.

Cross-border circular migration has been covered by Marcu (2014) who focused on Eastern European migrants (Bulgarians, Moldovans, Romanians and Ukrainians) and their mobility between their countries of origin and Spain over the last 20 years. Writing from the movers' own perspective, this author examines how migrants construct their experience of mobility beyond the border. The analysis was carried out on data collected in an 8-month period between 2010 and 2011 in Spain (78 qualitative interviews in the Madrid and Valencia regions), and in the countries of origin with returned migrants from Spain (20 in-depth interviews in Romania, Moldova and Ukraine). One of the greatest contributions of the author is the comparison of the mobility practices of migrants who arrived in Spain at three different points in time: before and after the opening of the Schengen border, and following the entry of Romania and Bulgaria into the EU. The core concepts handled in this article are "learning mobility", "networked border" and "bordering". The author shows that we should not think of the border as a hindrance to human mobility, but rather as a valuable tool for learning mobility. Among other things, it has been shown that when migrants cross borders they adapt continuously to changes in European policies. This extensive research offers a very interesting insight into the patterns of international mobility; however, it focuses on the movers and returnees, omitting the category of non-migrants. Among the non-migrants will also be those who have failed in their attempts to migrate; analysis of the experience and conditions of these people could throw even more light on the mechanism of cross-border mobility.

Finally, Hosnedlová and Stanek (2010a, b) analyzed patterns of mobility from the perspective of family strategies. From their studies it is evident that one of the major consequences of migration is the break-up of the family unit both abroad and in the country of origin. Among Ukrainian migrants in Spain, at the time of the survey (NIS-2007) the total number of non-multi-local families (those in which all members of the immediate family were residing in Spain) exceeded the number of multi-local ones (those in which at least one member of the immediate family was outside Spain). In general terms, irregular immigrants were more likely to form part of a multi-local family. This pattern indicates that obtaining a permit was a crucial factor in the process of family reunification. In this sense, restrictions on obtaining legal status had a direct impact on the creation of the transnational family model.

The authors also showed that the existence of multi-local family bonds was more frequent among male immigrants. The proportion of males whose spouses and offspring were all living in Spain was almost half that of females who form part of this category. This indicates that the "male breadwinner" migration model predominated when households were making decisions on migration. Another typical migratory pattern of the Ukrainian population in the pre-crisis period was that almost a third of male migrants in Spain (30%) had no family responsibilities, as opposed to

11.3% in the case of the female migrant population (NIS-2007). This might indicate that for many Ukrainian males, emigration was part of a survival strategy or an attempt to improve their individual economic situation. The proportion of women in this situation was lower, confirming that for most females the migratory decision was conditioned by the mobility of their spouse or partner. This is also supported by evidence that 38.3% of women, compared with 5.2% of men, had their spouses or partners in Spain at the time of arrival. Within this context, single-parent families (without a spouse but with children) represent a special case. Almost 22% of the Ukrainian women in Spain found themselves in this situation, as opposed to 8.4% of the male Ukrainians. This gender difference is principally due to the fact that when couples split up, it is usually the women who look after the children. It should be noted that due to the economic crisis the labour market in Spain has become significantly less favourable for immigrant men than women. A change in the geographical distribution of Ukrainian families is to be expected, and this could have produced a change from the Ukrainian male breadwinner model in Spain.

12.4.2 Transnational Behaviour

Recent articles (Stanek and Hosnedlová 2012; Hosnedlová and Stanek 2014) have examined the issues around the migratory movements of Ukrainians from a transnational perspective. The authors have provided the first empirically and statistically grounded evidence of factors determining a number of the transnational practices of Ukrainians in Spain. Three indicators of transnational practices (frequency of contact with the communities of origin, travelling to the localities of origin and remittances) have been analyzed by gender, legal status in Spain and geographical dispersion of family to determine how these factors affect the frequency and extent of transnational activities. Most of the analysis is based on NIS-2007.

Telephone calls are the most widely used means of maintaining transnational contact with migrants' communities in their country of origin. Approximately 68% of Ukrainians said that they were in contact with close acquaintances in their home country at least once a week. Visits to the country of origin, on the other hand, are both short and infrequent. Less than a tenth of the surveyed population visited Ukraine at least once a year. In the gender category, no significant differences between males and females were observed in this regard. Finally, there was a direct relationship between the type of family and the number of visits to Ukraine. Members of multi-local families were visiting their places of origin more frequently than immigrants whose entire immediate family resides in Spain. In relation to non-direct contacts, Ukrainian immigrants maintained relationships with their communities of origin even after settling in Spain. Compared to women, men were only slightly less prone to maintain contact with their family and community of origin. With regard to economic transfers, before the crisis men were sending remittances more frequently than women. The NIS-2007 data also indicate that men remitted

more money, the annual averages for the year 2006 being around 2,200 euros for men and 1,670 euros for women. This fact could be directly related to the persistence of the male breadwinner model among a large percentage of Ukrainian immigrant households. The geographical dispersion of the family was a very significant factor determining strategies related to remittances. More than half of the immigrants who belonged to multi-local families were sending money at least once a month. This number contrasts with that of immigrants whose entire immediate family was living in Spain. There were no significant differences between irregular and regular immigrants in the proportion of those who send money and those who do not. However, it is striking that irregular immigrants sent money to Ukraine more than twice as frequently as documented immigrants.

While Stanek and Hosnedlová's research offers the most complete work so far on transnational behaviour, it also suffers from substantial shortcomings related to data. First, the analysis is based on statistical information from the National Immigrant Survey where the variables regarding transnational activities are very limited. The operationalization of key variables related to transnational behaviour was based on proxy measures, which has a considerable impact on the empirical and conceptual reliability of particular conclusions inferred from their analyses. Second, the interpretation of results focuses mainly on family dynamics and individual decisions, and does not take into account other hypothetical structural factors such as labour market policies, legal framework or international relations at state level.

12.5 Conclusions

The assessment of available statistical data suggests that although the Spanish municipal register system provides relatively accurate and updated information on stocks and the basic demographic features of the immigrant population, there are substantial obstacles to a more detailed examination of mobility and specific characteristics of Ukrainians, such as labour market incorporation and family structure. The collection of statistical data in Spain has not been sufficiently adapted to the increased international mobility in this country. Since the publication of the National Immigrant Survey in 2007, no single data source providing specific information on particular characteristics of immigrant has been released. Furthermore, although the Spanish statistical system provides several general population surveys that are to some extent useful for exploration of the migrant population, the limited representativeness of subsamples affects the validity of results in research into relatively small collectives. Finally, although the population census provides representative and extensive data not available from other sources, its estimates are soon outdated with the rapid demographic and social transformations of immigrant populations.

Primary data regarding Ukrainian migrants collected by researchers suffers from substantial limitations with regard to representativeness and validity of results. Most studies are conducted by individual researchers on a small selection of interviewees

or respondents (between 50 and 100) obtained by snowball sampling in specific locations. In addition, studies are hardly comparable due to different definitions or specifications of the target populations and diverse sampling methods. Qualitative studies are usually focused on specific subcategories and places, and specific locations.

Another characteristic of the research conducted so far on the Ukrainian population is its predominantly descriptive nature. Most of the publications assessed here describe the main features of this collective residing in Spain in terms of volume, and social and demographic variables, avoiding broader questions as to the causal mechanisms behind the phenomena observed. The few studies aiming at explanation focus mainly on individual or meso-social determinants. More research is needed to pinpoint explanatory mechanisms on a macro-structural level, as well as the geopolitical parameters of Ukrainian migration to Spain, the possible impacts of interregional tensions and internal political conflicts in Ukraine, and geopolitical competition between the EU and Russia over post-Soviet territory. In other words, there should be a greater effort to move beyond empirical generalizations and posit the phenomena observed in a broader theoretical context.

Several studies analyze Ukrainian immigrants in conjunction with other groups from Central and Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, it should be highlighted that despite their shared history of socialism installed after the Second World War that marked their socio-economic structure and organization, there are still differences between these societies that should not be overlooked. The socio-economic and political contexts of each country were already distinct before the war and they have followed very different paths since the raising of the Iron Curtain. Ukraine still does not belong to the European Union, and evinces greater political and economic instability than other post-Soviet states. In this regard, the particular macro-structural configuration of Ukraine as a sending country implies different migration conditions from those of other states of Central and Eastern Europe, so Ukrainian nationals can be expected to demonstrate unique behaviours and socio-demographic features.

This chapter's critical review of literature on Ukrainians in Spain has identified several concepts that should be tackled by future research dedicated to this collective. First, greater attention should be paid to the notion of integration and its operationalization. There is a need for longitudinal studies on integration. So far researchers have focused primarily on the early stages of the migration project of Ukrainians, but additionally, a conceptualization of circular migration is needed (see also Chap. 7). Currently it is assumed that Ukrainian migration to Spain is a long-term migration, and other possible patterns are ignored (such as '*va et vient*', temporal migration and re-emigration to other EU countries). More dynamic concepts and longitudinal approaches are needed to acquire a better understanding of the complexity of international mobility. A wide range of subject areas for future research remain. Research so far has concentrated on the adult working-age population, and more attention should be paid to migrant children, second-generation Ukrainians and older people who form a significant proportion of the Ukrainian population in Spain. There are also still important research areas to be studied on

Ukrainian family migration. Available research shows that in the last few years the number of Ukrainian migrants who have reunited their family has increased considerably. Of interest is how this phenomenon has transformed the Ukrainian population in Spain from a socio-demographic point of view, and their patterns of social and economic integration. Studies that compare migrants with non-migrants who stayed in Ukraine but are important agents in migration processes would contribute to the assessment and explanation of migration decisions by actors.

Finally, further research is needed on social interactions between Ukrainian migrants and other migrant groups or the Spanish population generally, in order to avoid the persistent analysis of migrants as a group independent of the receiving society. In that sense, as Sánchez-Montijano and López-Catalán (2012) have pointed out, as migrants are now residing in Spain for longer periods, debates related to the recognition of their political rights and socio-political participation are increasingly important. Further research could eventually focus on the impact of the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia on the international mobility of Ukrainians. There is evidence that the conflict in Ukraine has provoked an increase in flows of forced migrants to several EU countries as well as to the Russian Federation. A political mobilization of the Ukrainian diaspora has also been observed in many countries. In this complex situation, researchers are facing new challenges. Does the current conflict have any impact on Ukrainian migration flows to Spain? What strategies are new migrants using to enter the country and become integrated into the Spanish labour market? What is the role of social networks and previous migratory experience in this process? On the other hand, has the war in Southeastern Ukraine mobilized residents of Ukrainian origin in Spain? Can Ukrainian residents in Spain be observed returning and willing to participate in the conflict? These and many other questions should be addressed in current research on Ukrainian migration in the Spanish context.

Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, duplication, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included in the work's Creative Commons license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory regulation, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or reproduce the material.

References

- Alvarez Veinguer, A. (2007). El universo sexuado: cuerpos invisibles pero imprescindibles. Una aproximación a experiencias de mujeres de la Europa del Este que realizan trabajos domésticos [The sexed universe: Invisible but essential bodies. An approach to Eastern Europe women's experiences in domestic service]. In A. M. Muñoz Muñoz, C. Gregorio Gil & A. Sánchez

- Espinosa (Eds.), *Cuerpos de mujeres: miradas, representaciones e identidades* (pp. 245–63). Granada: Universidad de Granada.
- Alvarez Veinguer, A. (2008). Habitando la frontera: empleadas domésticas procedentes de Rusia y Ucrania [Inhabiting the border: domestic workers from Russia and Ukraine]. In S. Castillo & M.-J. Devillard (Eds.), *Tiempo de espera en las fronteras del mercado laboral: nuevos agentes sociales en el espacio social* (pp. 33–48). San Sebastian: Ankulegi Antropologia Elkartea.
- Arango, J. (2004). La población inmigrada en España [The immigrant population in Spain]. *Economistas*, 99, 6–14.
- Cachón Rodríguez, L. (2009). *La ‘España inmigrante’: Marco discriminatorio, mercado de trabajo y políticas de integración* [The “immigrant Spain”: Discriminatory framework, labour market and integration policies]. Barcelona: Anthropos Editorial.
- Cebolla, H., & González-Ferrer, A. (2008). *La inmigración en España (2000–2007). De la gestión a la integración de los inmigrantes* [Immigration in Spain (2000–2007). From the management of flows to integration of immigrants]. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales.
- Duque, I., Ballano, C., & Perez, C. (2014). The 2007 Spanish National Immigrant Survey (ENI): Sampling from the Padron. In J. Font & M. Méndez (Eds.), *Surveying ethnic minorities and immigrant populations. Methodological challenges and research strategies* (pp. 69–83). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, IMISCOE Research Series.
- Ferrero Turrión, R. (2005). *Nuevos socios, nuevas fronteras. Los procesos migratorios desde Europa Central y Oriental* [New members, new frontiers. The migration processes from Central and Eastern Europe]. Barcelona: CIDOB edicions.
- Fonseca, M. L., Pereira, S., & Esteves, A. (2014). Migration of Ukrainian nationals to Portugal: Changing flows and the critical role of social networks. *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, 3, 115–30.
- González-Ferrer, A. (2009). *National data collection systems and practices: Spanish country report*. PROMINSTAT Country Reports. http://www.prominstat.eu/drupal/?q=system/files/PROMINSTAT_Spain.pdf
- Hellerman, Ch., & Stanek, M. (2006). Nuevas perspectivas en los estudios sobre la inmigración de Europa Central y Oriental en España y Portugal [New perspectives in studies on immigration from Central and Eastern Europe in Spain and Portugal]. *Papeles del Este: Transiciones poscomunistas*, 11, 1–20.
- Hosnedlová, R. (2014). *Bridging the intention–realization gap in the process of returning. The role of networks in the experience of Ukrainians in Madrid*. Doctoral thesis, Universidad Complutense de Madrid and Centro Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Madrid, Spain.
- Hosnedlová, R., & Stanek, M. (2010a). Inmigrantes ucranianos en España. Una aproximación a las pautas de movilidad internacional [International mobility patterns of the Ukrainian immigrants in Spain]. *Scripta Nova. Revista Electrónica de Geografía y Ciencias Sociales* XIV.
- Hosnedlová, R., & Stanek, M. (2010b). Ukrainian migration to Spain: Sociodemographic profile, mobility patterns and migratory projects. In M. Baganha, J. Marques & P. Góis (Eds.), *Imigração ucraniana em Portugal e no sul da Europa: a emergência de uma ou várias comunidades*. Lisboa: Alto Comissariado para a Imigração e Diálogo Intercultural.
- Hosnedlová, R., & Stanek, M. (2014). Analysing selected transnational activities among Ukrainian immigrants in Spain. *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, 3(1), 99–114.
- Kuzio, M. (2012). Modern Ukrainian immigration to Spain. In Europe Without Barriers (Ed.), *Ukraine-Spain migration nexus. Ukraine’s input to migration map of Europe on the example of Spain* (pp. 37–64). Kiev: Europe Without Barriers.
- Larramona, G. (2013). Out-migration of immigrants in Spain. *Population (English Edition)*, 68(2), 213–235. doi:10.3917/pope.1302.0213.
- Marcu, S. (2007). Dinámica y estructura migratoria laboral de rumanos: 1990–2006. Flujos de emigración hacia España, destino Madrid [Labour migration dynamics and structure of Romanians: 1990–2006. Emigration flows to Spain, to destination Madrid]. *Migraciones*, 21, 115–57.
- Marcu, S. (2014). Learning mobility challenging borders: Cross-border experiences of Eastern European Immigrants in Spain. *Mobilities*. doi: 10.1080/17450101.2014.934055

- Nikolova, M. (2015). Ukrainian migration to Greece: Patterns and challenges of remaining and of return. *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, 14.
- Parella, S., & Petroff, A. (2014). Migración de retorno en España: salidas de inmigrantes y programas de retorno en un contexto de crisis [Return migration in Spain: Exits of migrants and voluntary return schemes in the economic crisis context]. In J. Arango, D. Moya Malapeira, & J. Oliver Alonso (Eds.), *Anuario de la inmigración en España (edición 2014): Inmigración y emigración: mitos y realidades* (pp. 62–88). Barcelona: CIDOB.
- Reher, D., & Requena, M. (2009). The national immigrant survey of Spain: A new data source for migration studies in Europe. *Demographic Research*, 20(12), 253–78. doi:10.4054/DemRes.2009.20.12.
- Ródenas-Calatayud, C., & Martí Sempere, M. (2009). Estimating false migrations in Spain. *Population (English Edition)*, 64(2), 361–76. doi:10.3917/pope.902.0361.
- Rosario del, H., & Manzano, L. (2007). *El proceso de reagrupación familiar en la ciudad de Madrid* [Process of family reunification in the municipality of Madrid]. Madrid: Observatorio de las Migraciones y de la Convivencia Intercultural de la Ciudad de Madrid.
- Rosero-Bixby, L., Castro-Martín, T., Reher, D., & Sánchez-Domínguez, M. (2011). Estimating the number of immigrants in Spain: An indirect method based on births and fertility rates. *Population (English Edition)*, 66(3–4), 543–60. doi:10.2307/41488613.
- Sabater, A., & Domingo, A. (2012). A new immigration regularisation policy: Labour and social attachment in Spain. *International Migration Review*, 46(1), 191–220. doi:10.1111/j.1747-7379.2012.00884.x.
- Sánchez-Montijano, E., & López-Catalán, O. (2012). Ukrainian migrants in Spain: Overview, perception and institutional participation. In Europe Without Barriers (Ed.), *Ukraine-Spain migration nexus. Ukraine's input to migration map of Europe on the example of Spain* (pp. 7–34). Kiev, Ukraine: Europe Without Barriers.
- Sánchez Urios, A. (2007). *Inmigración, necesidades y acceso a los recursos y servicios: los inmigrantes ucranianos en los procesos de inserción en la Comunidad Autónoma de Murcia* [Immigration, needs and access to resources and services: Ukrainians in the integration processes in the region of Murcia]. Doctoral thesis, Universidad de Murcia, Murcia.
- Sánchez Urios, A. (2008). Los ucranianos residentes en España en los procesos de inserción/integración: necesidades, diferentes fases de proyecto migratorio [The Ukrainians living in Spain in the processes of insertion/integration: Needs, different stages of migration project]. *Migraciones*, 24, 135–162.
- Sánchez Urios, A. (2010). Las redes migratorias y la intervención social: un estudio de caso de la comunidad ucraniana en la región de Murcia [Migration networks and social intervention: a case of the Ukrainian community in the region of Murcia]. *Cuadernos de trabajo social*, 23, 65–84.
- Stanek, M. (2009). Patterns of Romanian and Bulgarian migration to Spain. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 61(9), 1627–1644.
- Stanek, M., & Hosnedlová, R. (2012). Exploring transnational practices of Ukrainian immigrants in Spain. *Economics & Sociology*, 5(1), 62–73.
- Stanek, M., & Veira, A. (2013). Occupational nobility at migration: Evidence from Spain. *Sociological Research Online*, 18 (4). doi: 10.5153/sro.3134
- Vianello, F. A. (2014). Ukrainian migrant workers in Italy: Coping with and reacting to downward mobility. *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, 3, 85–98.
- Viruela Martínez, R. (2002). La nueva corriente inmigratoria de Europa del Este [The new wave of immigration from Eastern Europe]. *Cuadernos de geografía*, 72, 231–258.
- Zlobina, A., Nekane B., & Páez D. (2004). Adaptación de los inmigrantes extranjeros en España: superando el choque cultural [The adaptation of foreign immigrants in Spain: Overcoming cultural shock]. *Migraciones*, 15, 43–84.

Chapter 13

Theorizing the Ukrainian Case: Pushing the Boundaries of Migration Studies Through a Europe–US Comparison

Cinzia D. Solari

13.1 Introduction

In the US-based migration literature, the Philippines and Mexico are prototypical examples of contemporary sending states and are perhaps the most researched. Among them, Ukraine may seem like odd company. Ukraine, once part of the Soviet Union, is differently positioned in the array of “modernization projects” from sending countries in Asia and Central and South America. However, on economic indicators, Ukraine, with 38% of its population below the poverty line, looks similar to Mexico at 40%, and Ukraine might aspire to be the Philippines with its poverty rate of 30% (CIA 2011). Comparing the percentages of the population abroad in these three sending countries reveals that in 2010 the Philippines and Mexico had 4.6% and 10.7% of their total population abroad respectively, but Ukraine exceeded both countries with 14.4% of its total population abroad (Ratha et al. 2011: 178, 205, 249). These numbers suggest that Ukraine cannot be ignored as a sending country. Therefore, this chapter asks: What theoretical lessons does the Ukrainian case provide for the interdisciplinary field of migration studies?

This chapter suggests three insights that the Ukrainian case offers migration studies. First, Ukrainian migration highlights the importance of the transnational field as a key site for nation-state building. Ethnographic experiences with Ukrainian migrants in Italy are used to illustrate the agency of migrants working on the ground to build the “new” Ukraine from the outside in. Second, a comparison of migration streams to Italy and the United States leads to a consideration of the interactions between sending and receiving states that may produce contrasting migration patterns. These migration patterns both shape and explain contrasting migrant practices and subjectivities. Third, the comparison with key sending states such as

C.D. Solari (✉)

Department of Sociology, University of Massachusetts, Boston, MA, USA

e-mail: Cinzia.Solari@umb.edu

Mexico and the Philippines demonstrates that Ukraine provides theoretical insight into the use of intersectional approaches to make sense of the gender/migration/nation-state building nexus.

13.2 Conducting a Global Ethnography

In 2004–2006 I conducted participant observation and 158 in-depth interviews with Ukrainian migrants providing cleaning and caring services to the elderly in Rome, Italy and San Francisco, California, as well as community leaders such as priests, Ukrainian- and Russian-language newspaper editors, and union representatives of both migrant domestic workers and employers. I immersed myself in the Ukrainian community by attending church lunches, union meetings, cultural events, birthday parties, poetry readings and cultural performances. I also spent time in public spaces where Ukrainian migrants congregated. Several months into my fieldwork in Rome, the Orange Revolution began. I attended demonstrations and acts of solidarity with the protesters in Ukraine organized by Rome's Ukrainian community and waited in long lines with those attempting to cast their vote in the presidential election.

It soon became clear to me that in order to understand what was happening on the streets of Rome and San Francisco, I would have to walk the streets of Lviv, Ukraine. Italy and Ukraine are physically connected by Soviet-era courier vans transporting goods, money, pictures, foodstuffs and workers between Rome and seemingly every region of Ukraine on a weekly basis. For 3 days I rode with workers returning home to visit family. In Lviv, I conducted interviews with the children of migrants and reconnected with informants from Italy who were in Lviv for a visit home. I stayed with an informant in a rural village, tallied the households dependent on remittances from a family member abroad, and spoke informally with villagers. A global lens allowed me to explore ways of thinking through the individual-, meso- and macro-level connections between Ukraine, Italy and the United States. Having conducted research in three countries, although necessary, is not what makes this project a global ethnography. Also required is the adoption of a global perspective through which global processes are understood as produced in local contexts by individual and institutional actors. This global analytical lens allows us to see that globalization can be excavated on the ground in locales that are the domain of ethnographers (Burawoy 2000). While the sending country can fall out of the analysis in migration studies, the perspective of global ethnography, I suggest, demands that migration scholars include the sending country in their studies and in their theorizing. In doing so, the transnational field becomes visible.

13.3 Transnational Nation-State Building: Ukrainian Migration to Italy

As on many Sundays during my fieldwork with Ukrainian migrants in Rome, I took the metro to one of Rome's three Ukrainian Greek Catholic Churches (UGCCs). But this Sunday was different. This Sunday I would begin to understand the contours of Ukraine's transnational nation-state building process. I walked into the church and was surprised to look out onto a sea of orange. There were over 400 Ukrainian migrants, most middle-aged women labouring as domestic workers in Italy, wearing orange scarves and other orange paraphernalia. The crowd was showing solidarity with Viktor Yushchenko who, after questioning the integrity of the 21 November 2004 presidential election the previous week, sparked protests that came to be known as the Orange Revolution.

I saw an informant near the back of the church and went over to say hello. She introduced me to her friends and putting her arm around my shoulders told the group that I was there with her in St. Peter's Square this week when Pope John Paul II acknowledged the events in Ukraine saying, "Beloved, I assure you and all the Ukrainian people that I am praying these days in a special way for your dear homeland", a phrase I had heard repeated with satisfaction by Ukrainians all week. As the conversation changed to women reporting on phone calls with their children who had joined the protesters in city squares or other contacts on the ground in Kyiv, our attention was diverted to the parish priests. The priests solemnly processed into the church past a large orange flag with "*Tak Yushchenko!*" (Yes Yushchenko!) in large block letters and began the liturgy. Weeks later as the protests continued, Father Petro explained to me that the UGCC could not take sides in the contested presidential election. Yet when I asked about the reports of UGCC priests in Kyiv's Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) supporting the protesters, he conceded, "The Church is on the side of truth and justice, and it happens that Yushchenko is also on the side of truth and justice".

As I interviewed priests and parishioners over the following weeks I heard informants construct themselves as actors in Ukrainian nation-state building. In 2000 the UGCC had just two parishes or communities in Italy and by the Orange Revolution there were 90 and growing. Father Boryslav explained that creating Greek Catholic communities throughout Italy was about growing the Church, but it was also about creating a particular "national consciousness":

Well, the community gathering for lunch [in the church basement] after the liturgy was also a moment when we could sing our national songs. In this room, all the events that happened developed a national consciousness. You see the people that come here, the majority have lived through communism....[I]f before we started meeting and celebrating the liturgy people were afraid to tell Italians that they are Ukrainian – not Russian – and have a rich culture, afterwards they started to say "we are Ukrainian and our culture expresses itself in these ways".¹

¹ During my field work, Italians frequently referred to all migrants from the former Soviet Union as "Russians".

The UGCCs in Rome were not just for religiously minded migrants. They were also sites for Ukrainian migrants to find jobs, places to live, help with documents and, I discovered, sites for building particular cultural, ethnic and national visions of Ukraine that fuelled transnational political projects (Solari 2006a). Priests talked about teaching temporary labour migrants to be good Ukrainians as well as good Catholics so that they could return home to help build the new Ukraine. The women I interviewed in Rome realized they already were building the new Ukraine as transnational actors who, in the words of one informant, “carried Ukraine on their shoulders”.

The media, especially in the context of Ukraine’s current crisis, directs public attention to the complex national political scene inside Ukraine and highlights divisions between Eastern and Western Ukraine. Media coverage also draws the public’s attention to the international scene in which Ukraine is a site where historical squabbles between Russia, the United States, and Europe are once again being played out. Perhaps this is because journalists, like many scholars, are influenced by what anthropologist Nina Glick Schiller (2009: 17) calls “methodological nationalism” or “an ideological orientation that approaches the study of social and historical processes as if they were contained within the borders of individual nation-states”. Indeed in this international relations frame, nations are discrete, bounded entities. However, what the evidence suggests and the above vignette shows is that a national consciousness, what it means to be a “good Ukrainian”, in the words of several of the UGCC priests I spoke with, is also being cultivated abroad in the expectation that flows of ideas and cultural products, what sociologist Peggy Levitt (2001) calls “social remittances”, will accompany the movement of people. Defining a national identity is both about “who we are” and about “who we are not”. With the largest migratory movements to Russia and Europe, what it means to be Ukrainian is being constructed through the collective juxtaposition of migrants moving between these locations both physically but also discursively. The transnational processes that accompany migration have a significant influence in shaping the sending country. This is especially visible in Ukraine at this historical moment of contested and competing national projects.

However, this study of Ukrainian migration to Italy and the United States suggests that not all migration patterns have the same effects in the sending country. When looking at a number of different countries, the unit of comparison is *migration pattern*, which is a structural and discursive system produced in the intersection of sending and receiving sites. It is a concrete naming of transnational space. Therefore, sending and receiving countries are in a dynamic relationship with each other. This is the second insight offered to migration studies by the Ukrainian case. Additionally, this comparison offers a different way to understand one of this volume’s themes: beyond circulation.

13.4 Circular Versus Permanent: Interactions Between Sending and Receiving Sites

Much of the theorizing about migration comes from studies conducted in receiving countries where immigrants come with their families to settle. The focus is on ways of measuring the assimilation and incorporation of immigrants along many variables, such as education and work outcomes, language acquisition or political participation. The underlying assumption is that immigrants leave their home country and settle in the receiving country. The dominant example of permanent migration is the case of Mexican immigration to the United States. This case has inspired much of the migration theory produced by US-based scholars, and some Europe-based scholars have called for use of the Mexican case to illuminate facets of the “East–West migration” in Europe (Favell 2008: 702).

However, increased scholarly attention is currently being paid to circular or temporary labour migration. Ukrainian emigration to Europe highlights issues of temporality in migration. Scholars who look at temporary labour migration focus on the circulation of migrant labour (Parreñas 2010), the separation of the costs of reproducing workers borne by the sending country from the exploitation of cheap labour acquired by the receiving country (Burawoy 1976) and transnational mothering practices (Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997). The Philippines with its sex-segregated streams of migrant labour is the prototype of temporary labour migrations.

There is a bifurcation in migration studies between those who study the sending country and those who study migrants once they arrive in the receiving country, with the majority of scholars studying the latter (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011). It is from the perspective of thinking solely about what happens to migrants in their places of destination, and therefore comparing receiving sites rather than *migration patterns*, that temporary versus permanent migration becomes a salient characteristic.

Ukraine is uniquely positioned as a sending country because it has both predominantly temporary migration streams to Europe and predominantly permanent migration streams to the United States, allowing for a comparison that complicates the at times simplified causal links between this one characteristic of a migration pattern and variation in migrant practices. The comparison between migration patterns from Ukraine to Italy and to the United States makes clear the limitations of reducing the concept of migration pattern to temporary versus permanent, which is just one structural characteristic of the overall migration pattern. We must move both “beyond circulation” and beyond settlement. Other structural and discursive factors must be taken into account in order to explain the variation in migrant practices and subjectivities discovered in global ethnographic studies of Ukrainian migration. For example, research suggests that older women, mostly grandmothers, led migrations to both Italy and the United States. The characteristic of temporary versus permanent tells us little about why most migrant sending countries send young women, but Ukraine sends older women.

Table 13.1 Characteristics of migration patterns from Ukraine to Italy and the United States

Italy	United States
Temporary migration	Permanent migration
Individual women (grandmothers)	Family migration/family reunification
Undocumented/temporary visas	Documented
Constitutive of nation-state building	Peripheral to nation-state building

Analytically, gendered relations can be seen from a feminist and global perspective as a way of naming power, both at the level of individual interactions, and as the terrain on which relations between groups and nations are articulated. From this perspective, Ukraine as a sending country intersects with both Italy and the United States to produce different migration patterns, and it is the comparison of migration patterns that makes Ukrainian emigration such a sociologically interesting case. These migration patterns have both structural and discursive dimensions. Some of the structural characteristics of these two migration patterns are listed in Table 13.1.

The structural dimension refers to the institutional architecture of the migration pattern. This includes whether the migration pattern is temporary or permanent, whether migrants are documented or undocumented, and whether they migrate as individuals or in family units. Migration patterns also have different discursive terrains, but here this dimension will only be briefly alluded to. For example, the Ukrainian state produces different emigration discourses labelling migrants to Italy “prostitutes” and those to the United States “defectors” (Solari 2014). This shapes the practices of both migrants and non-migrants and ultimately leads to the production of different migrant subjectivities. These findings suggest that temporary versus permanent migration is just one characteristic of a larger migration pattern. There is much to consider analytically “beyond circulation”.

Using migration patterns as the unit of analysis highlights transnational processes because consideration is focused simultaneously on both sending and receiving countries. This does not mean, however, that whether a migration is temporary or permanent does not have any explanatory value or is unimportant. Some scholars find that temporary labour migrants tend to be more oriented toward the sending country, whereas permanent settlers are more oriented toward the receiving country. Others suggest that even permanent settlers may keep active transnational ties (Levitt and Schiller 2004; Portes et al. 2007). In receiving countries, whether a migration is temporary or permanent can also highlight the role of immigration laws and labour demands in shaping structural aspects of the migration pattern. Ukrainian migrants to Italy enter on tourist visas and overstay them. The Italian state recognizes that, given its ageing population and low birth rate, it has a “care crisis” with respect to its elderly. As a result, the Italian state has passed various amnesty laws to grant temporary work visas to migrant care workers in particular. The precariousness of their legal status shapes structural aspects such as the mobility of migrants and their ability to bring family with them. Immigration laws in the United States, in contrast, privilege family reunification and settlement. Those who had a family sponsor or who won a green card for lawful residence in the “green card lottery”

were able to bring unmarried minor children and spouses with them, making permanent settlement feasible. However, focusing on this one characteristic rather than the entire migration pattern can obscure the importance of the sending country with consequences for how we interpret migrant practices and subject formation, as the case of Philippine migration suggests.

In Rhacel Parreñas' (2001) important book on migrant Filipina domestic workers, she compares Rome, Italy and Los Angeles, United States as receiving sites. She notes that the migration literature relies on the concept of "contexts of reception" to explain variation in immigrant outcomes. Contexts of reception include the labour markets, immigration laws and institutions that immigrants find and must interact with in a particular receiving site. Differences in the contexts of reception between countries, or even cities within the same country, mean that immigrants are literally "received" differently. This produces different immigrant outcomes (Bloemraad 2006; Menjívar 1999; Portes and Rumbaut 1996; Solari 2006b). Rather than look at economic or other quantifiable immigrant outcomes, Parreñas argues that migration should be understood as a "process of subjectification" and is interested in comparing migrant subjectivities (2001: 31). Rome and Los Angeles clearly do have different contexts of reception. Therefore, Parreñas suggests that, according to the migration literature, we should expect differences between migrants' experiences and the subjectivities produced in these two locations. However Parreñas found that Filipina migrant domestic workers in Rome and Los Angeles experienced what she calls "parallel lives" *despite* differing contexts of reception. She explains this by noting the shared social location of women, migrants, domestic workers with a "shared role as low-wage laborers in global capitalism" (3, 247). The argument implies that all women migrant domestic workers, by virtue of occupying the same structural location in global capitalism, should experience migration in similar ways. However, in my study of Ukrainian domestic workers, in virtually the same receiving sites as Parreñas' study, I found the opposite – divergent rather than parallel lives.

Migration is indeed a process of subjectification, and, as Parreñas suggests, "the macroprocesses of globalization should be given greater consideration when accounting for the influences of different contexts of reception on settlement" (2001: 247). Global processes should be taken into account when examining subject formation by comparing migration patterns as transnational fields. These migration patterns are shaped not merely in the abstract by "macroprocesses of globalization", but concretely through transnational processes that connect and shape sending and receiving countries. Global ethnographers excavate these transnational practices from the bottom up.

Ukrainian domestic workers in Rome and San Francisco are embedded in two divergent migration patterns that produce radically different migrant subjects. While there are similarities, now well documented in studies of domestic workers that focus on the labour process, in the micro-constellations of power between domestic workers performing cleaning and caring work in private homes and their employers in Rome and San Francisco, the meaning migrants attached to performing domestic labour and their lived experience differed dramatically. In the United States,

informants were interested in speaking about the labour process, how it compared to pre-migration employment, and drawing lines of continuity by pointing out that in the Soviet Union they were “government workers”, and they now had a similar relationship to the US state. Comparing “Soviet subjects” to “capitalist subjects”, these migrants understood domestic work as signaling a particular position between “the free market” and the US state. Informants performing domestic work through a state agency juxtaposed their dependence on the state with their children’s work in private industry. Their children’s success was measured, not only in terms of their economic mobility through the market, but in their transformation into competent neoliberal subjects.

In Italy, the intricacies of performing cleaning and caring labour were not what interviewees understood as most salient in their lives. Rather, the particular confluence of gender, migration and social transformations that structured the migration pattern to Italy forced migrants into a painful relationship with the Ukrainian state. In this context, care work became a vehicle for Ukrainian nation-state building that involved a particular Europeanization project both at the level of nation and at the individual level of subject production. For many interviewees, migrating to be a care worker in Europe also involved cultivating what they considered a “capitalist” and European personal identity. They consciously remitted this cultural knowledge to their children back in Ukraine in the hope of giving them an advantage in navigating the post-Soviet economic and social order and in order to help create the new Ukraine. As one informant noted, “You cannot have a capitalist country without capitalists”.

Therefore, the lived experiences of migration, including the type and intensity of transnational ties to Ukraine, the construction of national and civic identities, relationships to the receiving countries and the meaning assigned to the performance of domestic work all differed between Ukrainian migrants in Italy and those in the United States. The reason for this is not that receiving countries do not matter, but rather that sending countries do matter.

Migration studies tend to construct comparisons in two ways. The first is to compare different immigrant groups in the same receiving site. Once scholars control for socio-economic variables of the individual immigrants, the different immigrant groups are comparable and the sending country falls out of the analysis. Alternatively, as in Parreñas’ study, immigrants from the same group in different receiving sites are compared. Here the sending country is considered a constant and it once again falls out of the analysis. However, given what we know about the routinized way that the Philippine state manages the migration process (Rodriguez 2010), it seems that Philippine migration to Italy and the United States includes two receiving sites, but only one migration pattern carefully managed by the Philippine state. From this analytical vantage point, it is unsurprising that Filipinas in different receiving sites engage in similar practices and have similar subjectivities because they are embedded in a single migration pattern.

In the case of Ukrainian migration to Italy and the United States, the sending country is not in fact a “constant”. Sending and receiving countries interact to shape and limit the structural and discursive terrain. This results in subjects attributing

different meanings to the “variables” ostensibly “held constant”. Moving beyond describing a migration as temporary versus permanent, and taking seriously the differing effects of the sending country within each migration pattern, will help push the boundaries of migration theory.

Considering migration pattern as the unit of comparison also changes our analyses of sending states. Emigration is studied from the perspective of the sending country as a singular phenomenon. However, identifying different patterns opens up the possibility that not all migration patterns are created equal. As the next section argues, the migration patterns to Italy and the United States are differentially implicated in Ukraine’s nation-statebuilding processes. This positions the Ukrainian case to make a third theoretical contribution to migration studies, which is to highlight the intersection of gender, migration and nation-state building through a comparison with other contemporary migrant sending states.

13.5 Comparing Sending States: Gendered Nation-State Building and the Ukrainian State

As we have seen, the transnational lens continues to grow in importance for migration studies. Some scholars argue that there is nothing new about transnationalism and that migrants of the Great European migrations to the United States at the turn of the twentieth century also engaged in transnational practices. Levitt (2001) argues that while transnationalism is not new, the form it takes and migrants’ transnational experiences today do differ from those of the first half of the last century. For example, the proportion of the sending country population abroad has increased dramatically. The relationship between sending states and emigrants has also changed. Levitt notes that states used to reach out to emigrants hoping that they would return home to live. Today, many sending states offer dual citizenship and encourage emigrants to be long-distance nationals in an effort to cultivate migrant remittances and labour in transnational development projects (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007). She further argues that today, emigrants leave countries at more advanced stages of economic development and nation-state building than in the past, when most Southern European migrants left homelands without a clear sense of belonging to a particular nation-state (24). Contemporary migrants feel a greater sense of identification and obligation to their sending country. In fact, scholars argue that this allows for a convergence on a set of sending-state strategies that leverage migrants’ sense of belonging to their home country to “manage” its population abroad (Fitzgerald 2009: 35).

Prominent among these strategies is the use of nationalism discourses to celebrate emigrants as “heroes” of the nation. The Philippine state institutionalized a labour export system that brokers temporary work contracts with receiving states in need of gendered and racialized labour (Rodriguez 2010). This is supported by state discourses that celebrate “migrant heroes” as saviours of the nation and enforced

through the production of a “global Philippine citizenship”. Nationalism discourses justify a robust web of overseas offices and consulates that offer Philippine migrant workers a measure of protection abroad, while simultaneously enforcing the obligations of citizenship, including the sending of remittances that are taxed by the state as an economic development strategy (Rodriguez 2002). The Mexican state engages in a similar strategy of “soft cultural nationalism” in order to maintain the loyalty of its population abroad and to secure the sending of remittances (Sherman 1999). Like the Philippines, the Mexican state also encourages the celebration of emigrants as “heroes” at local *fiestas* celebrating *los hijos ausentes* or its “absent children” (Fitzgerald 2009). State-organized Home Town Associations seek to include, as part of the Mexican nation, its population in the United States, including Mexican nationals, naturalized US citizens, and US-born citizens of Mexican descent, and turn them into “investors” in schools and infrastructure (Portes et al. 2007).

Ukraine, however, is not at an “advanced stage” of nation-state building. The Philippine state is able to publish a *Handbook for Filipinos Overseas* detailing how migrants are to behave as exemplary Filipino “ambassadors” (Constable 1997). For this to have power to shape the behaviour of Filipinos abroad, it must be based on a clearly defined national identity migrants are committed to upholding. This simply does not yet exist in Ukraine. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, both Ukrainian nationhood and Ukrainian statehood continued to be contested. A nation-statebuilding project in which there is overlap between Ukrainian ethnicity, language, culture and religion is just one of the many competing identity projects that have persisted in Ukraine since independence (Wilson 2000). As we have seen, Ukrainian emigration is involved in Ukrainian nation-state building, but not all migration patterns are involved in the same way. The migration pattern to the United States is less central to Ukrainian nation-state building, while the migration pattern to Italy is constitutive of it.

Migration from Soviet Ukraine to the United States was of concern to the Soviet state during the Cold War. Inside the Soviet Union, defection was considered a state crime and a “betrayal of the Fatherland”. Defectors were tried and sentenced in absentia (Krasnov 1989). Defection was an embarrassment to the Soviet Union, and the United States welcomed Soviet defectors as evidence that they were winning the “war of ideologies”. Therefore, in the context of the Cold War, migration to the United States had a symbolic significance that could compromise or bolster national prestige, which is no longer the case for today’s post-Soviet Ukrainian migrants.

The migration to Italy, however, is intimately connected to Ukraine’s future. Ukrainian nation-state building rests on a reorganization of family and work structures. Women are being squeezed out of the labour force, aided by a resurgence of biological determinism, in which discredited Soviet gender egalitarianism is replaced with discourses of gender difference and a celebration of women’s “special” abilities as nurturing mothers and caretakers. These changes in gendered ideologies both reflect and help produce a shift in family structures from extended Soviet families, in which grandparents were primary caretakers of children while young parents were in the paid labour force, to nuclear families with a mother-housewife and a father-breadwinner as the ideal form. This shift to a “traditional”

nuclear family is essential to the process of constructing Ukrainian national identity as “European” and “capitalist”, and it is seen by the state as the building block of the market economy (Zhurzhenko 2004). These structural and discursive transformations doubly marginalize older women from both the labour market and their position in extended families. The physical removal of older women through migration produces nuclear families. More generally, it is remittances from migrant women labouring abroad in Italy and Europe that make a stay-at-home housewife economically feasible. In other words, the social transformations upon which processes of Ukrainian nation-state building rely are made possible, in part, through the labour migration of grandmothers.

A comparison of migration patterns not only sheds light on this nexus of gender, migration and nation-state building, but reveals that “emigration”, from the point of view of the sending country, is not a monolithic and singular phenomenon. Once again the Ukrainian case offers us new insight into another aspect of migration studies, this time helping us think about how and why the sending country matters, even when our interest is migrant behaviours in the receiving context.

13.6 Conclusions

Scholars based in Europe have an intuitive sense of the importance of Ukrainian migration, perhaps because of the sheer number of people leaving Ukraine and heading to Western and especially Southern Europe, but those based in the United States are often asked: Who cares about Ukraine? There are three analytical reasons why migration scholars in particular should be interested in the Ukrainian case. First, as a still newly independent post-Soviet country, Ukraine is undergoing dramatic changes, including an economic transition from socialism to capitalism, the production of a new gendered order, and heightened processes of nation-state building. In the context of mass emigration, these complex processes of gendered economic change and nation-state building are occurring transnationally, challenging previous analytical frames characterized by methodological nationalism. Second, Ukraine draws our attention to the limitations of describing migration streams as either circular or permanent, challenging us to use migration patterns as our unit of analysis. The concept of migration patterns brings the sending country into our discussions and analyses of migrant practices and meaning-making in receiving countries. Finally, Ukraine challenges prevailing understandings of the relationship between a sending state and its emigrants. The Ukrainian case highlights that sending states have a more nuanced understanding of different migration patterns, which can have differential effects in the sending country. In these three areas of theorizing, the Ukrainian case pushes forward the boundaries of migration studies.

Ten years after the Orange Revolution described in the vignette at the beginning of this chapter, Ukraine is once again, through protests known collectively as Euromaidan, struggling to define itself as an independent country with a unified national identity. The current events in Ukraine are dramatic and include the ousting

of former President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014, Russia's annexation of the Ukrainian territory of Crimea the following month, and the continued fighting between Ukrainian government forces and Russian-backed militias. This is a symptom of the large middle ground between Ukrainian and Russian national identities (Wilson 2002). Without a stark line between these national identities, maintaining political boundaries has proven difficult. It is also a symptom of the unfinished work of the Orange Revolution and the continued contestation of Ukraine's nation-building processes. These play out inside Ukraine, but also abroad where Father Petro and Father Boryslav, themselves migrants in Rome, cultivate a national Ukrainian consciousness among labour migrants in the hope that these migrants will one day repatriate to help build the new Ukraine. Despite their importance to both the material and discursive constructions of Ukrainian nationalism, today, as during the Orange Revolution, emigrants are absent from discussions about Euromaidan in the media. Indeed, one of the realities of nation-state building processes in the twenty-first century is that they are likely transnational. The Ukrainian case can help us understand other cases of modern-day nation-state building, especially other former bloc countries forged in a similar context of post-socialism and post-colonialism. While the direction of Ukrainian nation-state building is uncertain, what is clear is that love and obligation to their nation will keep Ukrainian migrants in Europe intimately and painfully involved in what is to come.

Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, duplication, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included in the work's Creative Commons license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory regulation, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or reproduce the material.

References

- Bloemraad, I. (2006). Becoming a citizen in the United States and Canada: Structured mobilization and immigrant political incorporation. *Social Forces*, 85(2), 667–695.
- Burawoy, M. (1976). The functions and reproduction of migrant labor: Comparative material from Southern Africa and the United States. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 81(5), 1050–1087.
- Burawoy, M. (2000). Introduction: Reaching for the global. In M. Burawoy, J. A. Blum, S. George, Z. Gille, & M. Thayer (Eds.), *Global ethnography: Forces, connections, and imaginations in a postmodern world* (pp. 1–40). Berkeley: University of California Press.
- CIA. (2011). "Population below poverty line (2003) by country": *CIA world factbooks, December 18, 2003 to March 28, 2011*. Retrieved October 10, 2013, from http://www.NationMaster.com/graph/eco_pop_bel_pov_lineeconomy-population-below-poverty-line&date=2003.

- Constable, N. (1997). *Maid to order in Hong Kong: Stories of filipina workers*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Favell, A. (2008). The New face of East–West migration in Europe. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 34(5), 701–716.
- Fitzgerald, D. (2009). *A nation of emigrants: How Mexico manages its migration*. Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Glick Schiller, N. (2009). A global perspective on migration and development. *Social Analysis*, 53(3), 14–37.
- Hondagneu-Sotelo, P., & Avila, E. (1997). “I’m Here, but I’m There”: The meanings of Latina transnational motherhood. *Gender and Society*, 11(5), 548–568.
- Krasnov, V. (1989). *Soviet defectors: The Kgb wanted list*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.
- Levitt, P. (2001). *The transnational villagers*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Levitt, P., & Glick Schiller, N. (2004). Conceptualizing simultaneity: A transnational social field perspective on society. *International Migration Review*, 38(3), 1002–1039.
- Levitt, P., & Jaworsky, B. N. (2007). Transnational migration studies: Past developments and future trends. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 33(1), 129–156.
- Levitt, P., & Lamba-Nieves, D. (2011). Social remittances revisited. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 37(1), 1–22.
- Menjívar, C. (1999). Religious institutions and transnationalism: A case study of catholic and evangelical salvadoran immigrants. *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, 12(4), 589–612.
- Parreñas, R. S. (2001). *Servants of globalization: Women, migration and domestic work*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Parreñas, R. S. (2010). Homeward bound: The circular migration of entertainers between Japan and the Philippines. *Global Networks*, 10(3), 301–323.
- Portes, A., & Rumbaut, R. (1996). *Immigrant America: A portrait*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Portes, A., Escobar, C., & Radford, A. W. (2007). Immigrant transnational organizations and development: A comparative study. *International Migration Review*, 41(1), 242–281.
- Ratha, D., Mohapatra, S., & Silwa, A. (2011). Migration and remittances factbook 2011. Washington DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. (<http://go.worldbank.org/U1S23A9QR0>). Retrieved 23 June 2011.
- Rodriguez, R. M. (2002). Migrant heroes: Nationalism, citizenship and the politics of filipino migrant labor. *Citizenship Studies*, 6(3), 341–356.
- Rodriguez, R. M. (2010). *Migrants for export: How the Philippine state brokers labor to the world*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Sherman, R. (1999). From state introversion to state extension in Mexico: Modes of emigrant incorporation, 1900–1997. *Theory and Society*, 28(6), 835–878.
- Solari, C. (2006a). Transnational politics and settlement practices: Post-soviet immigrant churches in Rome. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 49(11), 1528–1553.
- Solari, C. (2006b). Professionals and saints: How immigrant careworkers negotiate gendered identities at work. *Gender and Society*, 20(3), 301–331.
- Solari, C. (2014). ‘Prostitutes’ and ‘Defectors’: How the Ukrainian state constructs women emigrants to Italy and the USA. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 40(11), 1817–1835.
- Wilson, A. (2000). *The Ukrainians: Unexpected nation*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Wilson, A. (2002). Elements of a theory of Ukrainian ethno-national identities. *Nations and Nationalism*, 8(1), 31–54.
- Zhurzhenko, T. (2004). Strong women, weak state: Family politics and nation building in post-soviet Ukraine. In K. Kuehnast & C. Nechemias (Eds.), *Post-soviet women encountering transition: Nation building, economic survival, and civic activism* (pp. 23–43). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Index

A

Asylum seekers and refugees, 60, 121, 204.
 See also Forced migration and
 displaced population

B

Borders
 EU external borders, 53
 national borders, 52
 rights, 53, 66, 121, 157
Brain drain, 42, 104

C

Care drain, 46, 75, 80
Care work, 73, 76–80, 83, 85, 101, 167–173,
 206, 220, 222
Church
 Greek catholic, 169, 173, 217
 orthodox, 169, 173
Citizenship
 dual, 144, 223
 EU citizenship, 4
 rights, 73, 121
 Ukrainian, 4, 138, 144
Crisis
 economic, 4, 5, 9, 17, 27, 36, 46, 65,
 102, 126, 140, 151, 155, 157, 167,
 180, 183, 190, 196, 197, 200, 201,
 203–205, 207, 209
 political, 53, 60, 65
Czech Republic, 4, 9, 40, 43, 52, 56, 57, 59,
 60, 62–65, 74, 77, 85, 92, 96, 100, 102,
 105, 116, 133–140, 142–146, 179, 186

D

Deportation, 23, 25, 26, 28, 158
Deskilling, 105, 107, 120
Diaspora, 2, 7, 19, 41, 133, 212
Displaced population, 65

E

Economy, 3, 10, 18, 19, 41–44, 55, 58, 62, 64,
 97, 104, 117, 124–126, 137, 145, 157,
 168, 170, 204, 225
Education
 level of migrant education, 11, 38, 46,
 120, 201
Emigration
 ethnic emigration, 21, 26, 28–29
 Four Waves, 3
Employment, 4, 7, 10, 12, 23, 37–40, 44–46, 55,
 59–64, 74–75, 77–79, 83, 92, 98, 100,
 101, 103, 107, 116, 119–121, 123, 125,
 134–141, 143, 155, 157, 159, 160, 167,
 169, 182–184, 187, 202, 204, 205, 222
Euromaidan, 225. *See also* Maidan

F

Family reunification and family rights, 152
Forced migration, 2, 40, 100

G

Gender, 1, 5, 8–11, 21, 37, 73–85, 98, 103,
 106, 145, 153, 154, 156, 160, 163–170,
 172, 175, 195, 196, 199, 200, 204, 206,
 207, 209, 216, 222–224

Generation, 11, 41, 75–78, 83, 85, 98, 133, 135, 161, 167, 172, 174, 175, 205, 211
 Germany, 4, 5, 19, 25, 38, 59, 64, 96, 100, 145, 164, 186
 Greece, 9, 10, 40, 56, 60, 61, 64, 74, 77, 79, 84, 151–153, 155–161, 179, 202

I

Immigrant
 associations, 133
 integration, 51, 134, 143, 182, 206
 Italy, 4, 9, 10, 27, 37, 45, 56, 57, 60, 61, 64, 74, 77–79, 82–84, 98, 101, 103, 105, 106, 135, 163–175, 179, 202, 215–218, 220–222, 224, 225

M

Media discourses, 75
 Migrant
 children, 41, 75, 80–82, 84, 211, 216
 domestic workers, 55, 56, 102, 123, 160, 216, 221
 highly skilled, 59, 64, 65
 seasonal, 64, 84, 85, 101, 103, 105, 107, 122, 126, 195
 Migration policies
 admissions, 55, 56
 apprehension, 6
 deportation, 23, 25, 26, 28, 158
 employment, 46, 55
 integration, 19, 206
 residence, 60, 61, 135

N

Networks
 co-ethnic, 59, 60
 social, 6, 7, 38, 56, 102, 124, 125, 127, 159, 168, 173, 181, 190, 207, 212
 transnational, 7, 82

O

Orange Revolution, 126, 170, 216, 217, 225

P

Participation
 civic, 134, 181
 political, 161, 212, 219
 Portugal, 4, 9, 10, 12, 40, 56, 59–61, 74, 77, 100, 102, 104, 179–190, 202

R

Regularization, 51, 54, 55, 60–61, 100, 122, 152, 156, 159, 165, 187, 196, 203
 Remittance, 8, 11, 35, 36, 41–44, 46, 77, 78, 80, 82–85, 104, 107, 134, 144, 145, 172–174, 188, 189, 209, 216, 218, 223, 225
 Repatriation, 26, 28–29, 60, 117
 Resettlement, 5, 19, 20, 22–25, 28, 134
 Rights
 electoral, 161
 family, 73
 human, 79
 mobility, 55

S

Schengen Area, 53, 57, 58, 116, 135
 Social
 capital, 1, 38, 124, 173, 206
 marginalization, 2, 106
 networks, 6, 7, 38, 56, 102, 124, 125, 127, 159, 168, 173, 181, 190, 207, 212
 security, 5, 12, 23, 100, 116, 139, 153, 190, 194
 Soviet Union
 history, 3, 8, 19, 26
 ideology, 3, 19, 23, 26, 224
 migration policy, 23–24
 Spain, 4, 9–12, 37, 40, 46, 57, 60–62, 64, 65, 74, 77, 96, 103, 106, 179, 184, 193–211

T

Trade
 shopping tourism, 122
 small-scale, 122
 Trafficking, 27, 160, 179, 182
 Transnational
 family, 75, 78, 80–85, 103, 136, 142, 168, 208
 nation-building, 169, 226
 networks, 7, 82
 parenthood, 82

U

Unemployment
 rate in receiving countries, 37
 rate in Ukraine, 42, 45, 167, 200
 United Kingdom (UK), 4, 40, 63, 74, 164
 United States, 4, 7, 215–226